What will force settlement bring to the market and why I call it robbery?

[alt]

you only need maniuplate it about 1 hour,  you can choice the time, you can choice the volume,
all the shorters can do is to add collateral  rate, and bless other unlucky guy be settlement insteand of self.
of couse, you'd better  cooperate with the exchange like BTC38, they can do it with all most 0 cost.

Just answer my question, will you short more bitCNY/bitUSD and sell it to the market?

settlement is the best method to maniuplate the market

the key is a bitCNY holder can buy any volume at the same price.
imagine bitCNY can peg at rate 1:1 now
1. somebody collect 200K bitCNY first
2. ask for settlement
3. after about 22 hours, before the settlement be executed, he sell 200K CNY at BTC38, maniuplate the price down
4. waitting the settlement execute

if exchange like BTC38 do this, it's more easy.
shorters will found, they always be sold at a low price
it's not because they are unlucky, it's because the stupid rule.
this will loop again and again, until all bitCNY short position be settlement and no more stupid shorter continue the game.

When you find a system that prevents someone owning 10+% of any market, to manipulate it....call me.

[tonyk]

settlement is the best method to maniuplate the market

the key is a bitCNY holder can buy any volume at the same price.
imagine bitCNY can peg at rate 1:1 now
1. somebody collect 200K bitCNY first
2. ask for settlement
3. after about 22 hours, before the settlement be executed, he sell 200K CNY at BTC38, maniuplate the price down
4. waitting the settlement execute

if exchange like BTC38 do this, it's more easy.
shorters will found, they always be sold at a low price
it's not because they are unlucky, it's because the stupid rule.
this will loop again and again, until all bitCNY short position be settlement and no more stupid shorter continue the game.

When you find a system that prevents someone owning 10+% of any market, to manipulate it....call me.

[alt]

settlement is the best method to maniuplate the market

the key is a bitCNY holder can buy any volume at the same price.
imagine bitCNY can peg at rate 1:1 now
1. somebody collect 200K bitCNY first
2. ask for settlement
3. after about 22 hours, before the settlement be executed, he sell 200K CNY at BTC38, maniuplate the price down
4. waitting the settlement execute

if exchange like BTC38 do this, it's more easy.
shorters will found, they always be sold at a low price
it's not because they are unlucky, it's because the stupid rule.
this will loop again and again, until all bitCNY short position be settlement and no more stupid shorter continue the game.

[merivercap]

 
  Why a shorter short?
   
  obviously because he judge that something is overvalued.
   
 in BTS term shorter refer to the users who judge that fiat is overvalued, on the contrary, BTS is undervalued, so they short BitAssets, they hope when the BTS price rise up they can sell their BTS to get BitAssets back to cover the short position, and then make profits.
   
 shorters bear the risk of being margin called.
   
 so the basic logic for shorters is that he can hold his collateral when the collateral ratio is sufficient and wait for the price change.
   
 now you make the force settlement, which means anyone can get the collateral from the shorters at the feed price, no matter how high his collateral ratio is.
   
 isn't it robbery? when BTS price is low, speculators can get BTS by force settlement as they will, they can even supress the BTS price in external exchange to lower the feed price to make them even better conditon to rob BTS from shorters.

   trade logic should be, you can ask to buy, but I can refuse to sell, even the leverage contract only get settled in some special conditons, now you enable any one can force settle any time. why be so cruel to shorters?

   you said force settlement is not new, it comes out for long time. anyway, in 1.0 there is no such force settlement, but many shorters's conditions are inherited from 1.0, shouldn't you be more cautious when it's possible to hurt a group of users?

now let's check what force settlement will bring to the market.

in BitUSD market the BTS price is always lower than feed price, we can forsee that seldom force settlement will happen.

in BitCNY market as now force settlement is well known, BitCNY will be priced much expensive than CNY, suppose 1.05 CNY, transwiser paused the deposit business, and no one will use BitCNY to deposit to BTC38.

for pegged asset it's important to peg well, just get a price floor will make no sense, if 1 BitCNY always worth 1.05 CNY, no merchant would like to use it, they won't list 2 different prices for one single goods, one for CNY, the other differnent for BitCNY. and if the merchant just regard BitCNY as same as CNY,  who want to pay in BitCNY?

force settlement will bring chaos to the well organized BitCNY ecosystem, and do good only to speculators.

let me repeat my suggestion: please make force settlement an asset-specific feature, and committee can decide to which asset the feature will apply, then for example we can enable this feature for BitUSD and disable it for BitCNY,  by doing so we can also compare the behavior of these 2 MPAs to analyse what force settlement bring to the market and decide further.

 

 

Note:  Just one thing though, we really don't have enough market depth to compare bitUSD to bitCNY so just because there are more asks vs bids in bitUSD and it's the opposite in bitCNY can be due to a lot of temporary factors.  We just don't have any liquidity overall. 

[sudo]

 
  Why a shorter short?
   
  obviously because he judge that something is overvalued.
   
 in BTS term shorter refer to the users who judge that fiat is overvalued, on the contrary, BTS is undervalued, so they short BitAssets, they hope when the BTS price rise up they can sell their BTS to get BitAssets back to cover the short position, and then make profits.
   
 shorters bear the risk of being margin called.
   
 so the basic logic for shorters is that he can hold his collateral when the collateral ratio is sufficient and wait for the price change.
   
 now you make the force settlement, which means anyone can get the collateral from the shorters at the feed price, no matter how high his collateral ratio is.
   
 isn't it robbery? when BTS price is low, speculators can get BTS by force settlement as they will, they can even supress the BTS price in external exchange to lower the feed price to make them even better conditon to rob BTS from shorters.

   trade logic should be, you can ask to buy, but I can refuse to sell, even the leverage contract only get settled in some special conditons, now you enable any one can force settle any time. why be so cruel to shorters?

   you said force settlement is not new, it comes out for long time. anyway, in 1.0 there is no such force settlement, but many shorters's conditions are inherited from 1.0, shouldn't you be more cautious when it's possible to hurt a group of users?

now let's check what force settlement will bring to the market.

in BitUSD market the BTS price is always lower than feed price, we can forsee that seldom force settlement will happen.

in BitCNY market as now force settlement is well known, BitCNY will be priced much expensive than CNY, suppose 1.05 CNY, transwiser paused the deposit business, and no one will use BitCNY to deposit to BTC38.

for pegged asset it's important to peg well, just get a price floor will make no sense, if 1 BitCNY always worth 1.05 CNY, no merchant would like to use it, they won't list 2 different prices for one single goods, one for CNY, the other differnent for BitCNY. and if the merchant just regard BitCNY as same as CNY,  who want to pay in BitCNY?

force settlement will bring chaos to the well organized BitCNY ecosystem, and do good only to speculators.

let me repeat my suggestion: please make force settlement an asset-specific feature, and committee can decide to which asset the feature will apply, then for example we can enable this feature for BitUSD and disable it for BitCNY,  by doing so we can also compare the behavior of these 2 MPAs to analyse what force settlement bring to the market and decide further.

 

[Empirical1.2]

If you hold a smartcoin the peg has to have a floor at parity with the asset it mimics.
There can be a premium to buy it but never a loss when disposing of it.

Why?

I think there could be a cost, especially if you are trying to sell when everyone is looking to sell.

NuBits seems to sell about 0.5% above the peg and are purchased back circa 0.5% below by their market makers, this probably adjusts during periods of high demand and they do pretty well.

[JonnyB]

If you hold a smartcoin the peg has to have a floor at parity with the asset it mimics.
There can be a premium to buy it but never a loss when disposing of it.
I don't even like the 24hrs you have to wait when you hit settle.
It's not really a market pegged asset if you can't settle when you want to.

traders need to put up big buy walls at settlement price and then sell for a 5% premium.

you can issue a private smartcoin and set instant force settle and check its behavior.

We don't want any more smartcoins in the same currency, We need everyone using the same one so it becomes liquid.
For liquidity we need the ability to to buy at feed price with deviation.

[bitcrab]

If you hold a smartcoin the peg has to have a floor at parity with the asset it mimics.
There can be a premium to buy it but never a loss when disposing of it.
I don't even like the 24hrs you have to wait when you hit settle.
It's not really a market pegged asset if you can't settle when you want to.

traders need to put up big buy walls at settlement price and then sell for a 5% premium.

you can issue a private smartcoin and set instant force settle and check its behavior.

[JonnyB]

If you hold a smartcoin the peg has to have a floor at parity with the asset it mimics.
There can be a premium to buy it but never a loss when disposing of it.
I don't even like the 24hrs you have to wait when you hit settle.
It's not really a market pegged asset if you can't settle when you want to.

traders need to put up big buy walls at settlement price and then sell for a 5% premium.

[Ander]

As long as the person forcing settlement has to pay a premium to do so is fine.  The problem is if the premium isnt large enough or the price feed is off and this allows someone to profit by forcing settlement.

[Empirical1.2]

I haven't used BitAssets 2.0 and don't necessarily understand them very well.

Is the force settle currently set to 1-1?

1. What about lowering the request settlement to 99%?

It should lower the premium and it's fair that there should be a cost associated with accessing liquidity at the expense of shorters.

Hopefully market makers will step in the majority of the time but the ability to get $0.99 on the dollar in 24 hours regardless of market conditions would still be very appealing to longs and merchants imo.

2. What about a collateral threshold? So that this feature can only be applied to those with less than 'X' collateral?

[bitcrab]

 
  Why a shorter short?
   
  obviously because he judge that something is overvalued.
   
 in BTS term shorter refer to the users who judge that fiat is overvalued, on the contrary, BTS is undervalued, so they short BitAssets, they hope when the BTS price rise up they can sell their BTS to get BitAssets back to cover the short position, and then make profits.
   
 shorters bear the risk of being margin called.
   
 so the basic logic for shorters is that he can hold his collateral when the collateral ratio is sufficient and wait for the price change.
   
 now you make the force settlement, which means anyone can get the collateral from the shorters at the feed price, no matter how high his collateral ratio is.
   
 isn't it robbery? when BTS price is low, speculators can get BTS by force settlement as they will, they can even supress the BTS price in external exchange to lower the feed price to make them even better conditon to rob BTS from shorters.

   trade logic should be, you can ask to buy, but I can refuse to sell, even the leverage contract only get settled in some special conditons, now you enable any one can force settle any time. why be so cruel to shorters?

   you said force settlement is not new, it comes out for long time. anyway, in 1.0 there is no such force settlement, but many shorters's positions are inherited from 1.0, shouldn't you be more cautious when it's possible to hurt a group of users?

now let's check what force settlement will bring to the market.

in BitUSD market the BTS price is always lower than feed price, we can forsee that seldom force settlement will happen.

in BitCNY market as now force settlement is well known, BitCNY will be priced more expensive than CNY, suppose 1.05 CNY, transwiser paused the deposit business, and no one will use BitCNY to deposit to BTC38.

for pegged asset it's important to peg well, just get a price floor will make no sense, if 1 BitCNY always worth 1.05 CNY, no merchant would like to use it, they won't list 2 different prices for one single goods, one for CNY, the other differnent for BitCNY. and if the merchant just regard BitCNY as same as CNY,  who want to pay in BitCNY?

force settlement will bring chaos to the well organized BitCNY ecosystem, and do good only to speculators.

let me repeat my suggestion: please make force settlement an asset-specific feature, and committee can decide to which asset the feature will apply, then for example we can enable this feature for BitUSD and disable it for BitCNY,  by doing so we can also compare the behavior of these 2 MPAs to analyse what force settlement bring to the market and decide further.