Best way to exclude custodian accounts from voting

[abit]

As Jonathan Bahai commented in the Telegram group (https://t.me/BitSharesDEX/463938):

[In reply to litepresence.com]
whup you already answered.. yeah.. at the same time though.. its still based on stake.. if I am big enough, I can make sure that things go in a direction where I can recover my spent BTS and then some.. motivated by my own gain and not the good of the network.

in otherwords, the shenanigans everyone is upset about bitcrab doing would continue and then some

https://t.me/BitSharesDEX/463901

[Forwarded from litepresence.com]
vote_power

= min(ballots_owned/int(ballot_age_years+1), bts_staked) * days_staked

buy 1 ballot with 1 BTS via

    1/3 null-account burn
    1/3 reserve-account burn
    1/3 dividend weighted split to other ballot holders

no staking any collateral. 

proxy must be ballot backed and staked.   

Then governance decisions are aligned with future BTS value.

Debt payment decisions are not made by those in debt.

BTS is deflationary making collateral positions easier to pay in time.

[abit]

simple solution:

BALLOTS:

chain offers ballots
ballots cost one bts per ballot

ballots are not transferable and non returnable; effectively proof of bts burn.

How would you believe someone who has burned all his BTS will do any good for the platform? What are the incentives for him to do so?

Lately I came with an idea which would probably make the Proof of Burn doable.

I name it "Burn & Stay".

If an account burns X BTS, and she still has Y BTS, then her voting power would be boosted as:

Code: [Select]

V = min(X, Y) * N + max(0, Y-X)
Among the formula, N is another factor, maybe a good value for it is between 2 and 10, and it should decay over time.

This mechanism, if combined with lock-for-voting (staking) on the Y part, would be even better. Since centralized exchanges may lock their funds, but they likely won't burn.

I think we can create a BSIP for this.

STAKE:

bts must be stake locked to vote

user specifies days of lock, machine counts down

user may add (but not take away) funds or duration to the countdown clock at any time.

during stake lock bts is non transfer / trade

POWER:

voting power = min(bts locked, ballots owned) * days of stake locked bts remaining





COLLATERAL:

add to that any bts held as collateral cannot be locked for voting.

PROXY:

add to that that proxy decays linearly over 365 days and requires user to vote stake lock their bts against owned ballots for proxy to have power.

RESULT:

Now you want to vote? first you burn a bts to buy a ballot.  It is difficult with custodial funds.
and you want to vote you stake lock on countdown timer. This is also difficult with custodial funds

If you're aware how exchanges are participating in other PoS or DPoS chains, you won't come with this idea. It is not difficult for them at all. Their users explicitly agree and even ask them to lock funds for them to earn interest or dividends or whatever it calls.

and if you want to proxy your voting power you are held to same standard.
collateral bullshits occurring are patched 
legally bts is still a required "utility voting token" to fill ballots owned, purchased only with bts

now you want to gamble with the switches in bitshares voting box you have "bts futures" and "burnt bts" on the line, not just proof of momentary wealth. interests in promoting the bts core token price in the future are aligned with votes

you want to be an owner?  buy in and act like an owner.

problem solved


ps move everything to likert scales

pps split ballot burn to 1/3 "null burn account" 1/3 "reserve pool" 1/3 "dividend split among ballot holders"

[abit]

simple solution:

BALLOTS:

chain offers ballots
ballots cost one bts per ballot

ballots are not transferable and non returnable; effectively proof of bts burn.

How would you believe someone who has burned all his BTS will do any good for the platform? What are the incentives for him to do so?

STAKE:

bts must be stake locked to vote

user specifies days of lock, machine counts down

user may add (but not take away) funds or duration to the countdown clock at any time.

during stake lock bts is non transfer / trade

POWER:

voting power = min(bts locked, ballots owned) * days of stake locked bts remaining





COLLATERAL:

add to that any bts held as collateral cannot be locked for voting.

PROXY:

add to that that proxy decays linearly over 365 days and requires user to vote stake lock their bts against owned ballots for proxy to have power.

RESULT:

Now you want to vote? first you burn a bts to buy a ballot.  It is difficult with custodial funds.
and you want to vote you stake lock on countdown timer. This is also difficult with custodial funds

If you're aware how exchanges are participating in other PoS or DPoS chains, you won't come with this idea. It is not difficult for them at all. Their users explicitly agree and even ask them to lock funds for them to earn interest or dividends or whatever it calls.

and if you want to proxy your voting power you are held to same standard.
collateral bullshits occurring are patched 
legally bts is still a required "utility voting token" to fill ballots owned, purchased only with bts

now you want to gamble with the switches in bitshares voting box you have "bts futures" and "burnt bts" on the line, not just proof of momentary wealth. interests in promoting the bts core token price in the future are aligned with votes

you want to be an owner?  buy in and act like an owner.

problem solved


ps move everything to likert scales

pps split ballot burn to 1/3 "null burn account" 1/3 "reserve pool" 1/3 "dividend split among ballot holders"

[chigbolu]

simple solution:

BALLOTS:

chain offers ballots
ballots cost one bts per ballot

ballots are not transferable and non returnable; effectively proof of bts burn.

STAKE:

bts must be stake locked to vote

user specifies days of lock, machine counts down

user may add (but not take away) funds or duration to the countdown clock at any time.

during stake lock bts is non transfer / trade

POWER:

voting power = min(bts locked, ballots owned) * days of stake locked bts remaining





COLLATERAL:

add to that any bts held as collateral cannot be locked for voting.

PROXY:

add to that that proxy decays linearly over 365 days and requires user to vote stake lock their bts against owned ballots for proxy to have power.

RESULT:

Now you want to vote? first you burn a bts to buy a ballot.  It is difficult with custodial funds.
and you want to vote you stake lock on countdown timer. This is also difficult with custodial funds
and if you want to proxy your voting power you are held to same standard.
collateral bullshits occurring are patched 
legally bts is still a required "utility voting token" to fill ballots owned, purchased only with bts

now you want to gamble with the switches in bitshares voting box you have "bts futures" and "burnt bts" on the line, not just proof of momentary wealth. interests in promoting the bts core token price in the future are aligned with votes

you want to be an owner?  buy in and act like an owner.

problem solved


ps move everything to likert scales

That's a genius solution, however I'd prefer staking instead of outright burn, just my opinion though...

[litepresence]

simple solution:

BALLOTS:

chain offers ballots
ballots cost one bts per ballot

ballots are not transferable and non returnable; effectively proof of bts burn.

STAKE:

bts must be stake locked to vote

user specifies days of lock, machine counts down

user may add (but not take away) funds or duration to the countdown clock at any time.

during stake lock bts is non transfer / trade

POWER:

voting power = min(bts locked, ballots owned) * days of stake locked bts remaining





COLLATERAL:

add to that any bts held as collateral cannot be locked for voting.

PROXY:

add to that that proxy decays linearly over 365 days and requires user to vote stake lock their bts against owned ballots for proxy to have power.

RESULT:

Now you want to vote? first you burn a bts to buy a ballot.  It is difficult with custodial funds.
and you want to vote you stake lock on countdown timer. This is also difficult with custodial funds
and if you want to proxy your voting power you are held to same standard.
collateral bullshits occurring are patched 
legally bts is still a required "utility voting token" to fill ballots owned, purchased only with bts

now you want to gamble with the switches in bitshares voting box you have "bts futures" and "burnt bts" on the line, not just proof of momentary wealth. interests in promoting the bts core token price in the future are aligned with votes

you want to be an owner?  buy in and act like an owner.

problem solved


ps move everything to likert scales

pps split ballot burn to 1/3 "null burn account" 1/3 "reserve pool" 1/3 "dividend split among ballot holders"

[Thul3]

We will find a good solution to exclude the missuse of votes from custodian accounts which don't own them being used in the interest of individuals only instead of bitshares.

Example ZB = Voting based on one individual own point of view (being also used for inside deals supporting non bitshares people)
BEOS = Bought voting power which is against DPOS and consensus to force the bitshares community to accept and pay for BEOS integration.Massivly supporting inside deals (non active members on bitshares for committee and witnesses) and even scam workers.


CN-Vote has been created because a smart chinese group created a counter party to the massive abuse of BEOS for "buying" votes and its bad voting behavior to approve all workers and flooding the market with BTS from reserve pool.


Both examples showed for a very long time that votes from custodian accounts are not able to vote for the best interest of
bitshares and its community but only vote based on selfish interest destroying the community,stopping real progress , making a lot of big supporters leave or replace them with non active members on bitshares for their own personal benefit.See witnesses.

People vote as they please. Some might not like your voting, does that mean you will be excluded too?

Everyone has the right to vote as pleased with their own or delegated BTS (for nothing in return)

Vote buying is and was against DPOS and consensus same as CEX using their customers stake to participate in voting.

[sahkan]

We will find a good solution to exclude the missuse of votes from custodian accounts which don't own them being used in the interest of individuals only instead of bitshares.

Example ZB = Voting based on one individual own point of view (being also used for inside deals supporting non bitshares people)
BEOS = Bought voting power which is against DPOS and consensus to force the bitshares community to accept and pay for BEOS integration.Massivly supporting inside deals (non active members on bitshares for committee and witnesses) and even scam workers.


CN-Vote has been created because a smart chinese group created a counter party to the massive abuse of BEOS for "buying" votes and its bad voting behavior to approve all workers and flooding the market with BTS from reserve pool.


Both examples showed for a very long time that votes from custodian accounts are not able to vote for the best interest of
bitshares and its community but only vote based on selfish interest destroying the community,stopping real progress , making a lot of big supporters leave or replace them with non active members on bitshares for their own personal benefit.See witnesses.

People vote as they please. Some might not like your voting, does that mean you will be excluded too?

[Thul3]

We will find a good solution to exclude the missuse of votes from custodian accounts which don't own them being used in the interest of individuals only instead of bitshares.

Example ZB = Voting based on one individual own point of view (being also used for inside deals supporting non bitshares people)
BEOS = Bought voting power which is against DPOS and consensus to force the bitshares community to accept and pay for BEOS integration.Massivly supporting inside deals (non active members on bitshares for committee and witnesses) and even scam workers.


CN-Vote has been created because a smart chinese group created a counter party to the massive abuse of BEOS for "buying" votes and its bad voting behavior to approve all workers and flooding the market with BTS from reserve pool.


Both examples showed for a very long time that votes from custodian accounts are not able to vote for the best interest of
bitshares and its community but only vote based on selfish interest destroying the community,stopping real progress , making a lot of big supporters leave or replace them with non active members on bitshares for their own personal benefit.See witnesses.

[fractalnode]

I am against that. Because who is to decide who gets excluded and who doesn't? That's just another way to manipulate the votes.

if the lock will count from the time of the last outgoing transfer, say 30 days. Then the algorithm will decide, not a human. After another 30 (60 days of lock) the voting power could increase slightly and, for example, to reach its maximum value after 90 days.

However, this does not protect against selling the entire account, as was the case with STEEM..
So it should be combined (with logical AND) with something like an updated list of well-known scam accounts and here comes the human factor but if you manage it with 2/3 + 1 votes of the committe account, it could work.

I suggest a new coin for voting, the coin will be airdropped to active accounts through a form of whitelisting, this removes BTS core token's responsibility as a coin for voting. Whitelisting will ensure only active accounts can receive the coins, it also removes the possibility of proxy voting as the airdrop will happen to single accounts....

there are many who are able to sell their own mother and there is a monster who wants to buy her from these motherf#ckers. I've seen it somewhere before ;|

[chigbolu]

I suggest a new coin for voting, the coin will be airdropped to active accounts through a form of whitelisting, this removes BTS core token's responsibility as a coin for voting. Whitelisting will ensure only active accounts can receive the coins, it also removes the possibility of proxy voting as the airdrop will happen to single accounts....

[Bangzi]

BTS is different from STEEM.

STEEM Witnesses freeze Steem Inc related accounts which owned by TRON. Then TRON fully take over STEEM blockchain by replacing Top 20 Witnesses because STEEM witnesses unable to secure their fund.

On the other hand, as far as I know BTS Witnesses are not interested to freeze anyone BTS and BTS Whales like Bitcrab, ALT and BEOS know how to control their stake without fully take over the chain. BTS Holders have voting right, it is a privilege and add a lot of value to BTS. Excluding BTS accounts from voting just same as freezing their accounts.

Anyway, if there is BSIP to Exclude Custodian Accounts from Voting, it can easily abused by Witnesses or Committee, depending on who decide which accounts will be blacklisted. If follow some STEEM witness practice, basically any accounts that does not vote for him will be blacklisted soon or later.

[bitcrab]

I am against that. Because who is to decide who gets excluded and who doesn't? That's just another way to manipulate the votes.

right，another problem is how to exclude if the goal account switch to another account? say, beos switch from "beos" to "beos-pro", can the system always exclude it?

[sahkan]

I am against that. Because who is to decide who gets excluded and who doesn't? That's just another way to manipulate the votes.

[Thul3]

Our goal is to exclude custodian accounts like CEX,BEOS etc as we see their voting behavior is bad,mostly inactive and not participating and missused for the vision of a few users (which steem is a good example for) creating centralisation and high risk.
Also discouraging the participation in voting by smaller voters.

[fractalnode]

in relation to the link above
I propose to consider 2 additional aspects, namely people who really use the platform on a daily basis.
1) value of funds in open orders on the market - market making
2) the value for the ecosystem which is issuing bitAssets

That is why I propose:
1. blocking funds understood as not being able to transfer funds between accounts, e.g. for 30 days. At the same time, we must eliminate the risk of exchanging BTS or bitAssets for junk UIA. Therefore, during the blockade, trading should be limited to MPAs owned by the committe-account and null-account

2. voting rights for bitAssets - as you can see their holder also risks a lot.

3. voting right for collateral, but only for real valuation - minus debt. If I count correctly, for MCR 1.6 the number of BTS in collateral can be 2.66 times higher than their real value. Therefore, voting rights should be limited to real BTS valuation.

I don't like the idea that those who decide about the future of the platform are forced to not use it. It threatens detachment from reality.

Transfer lock will do the trick with exchanges and other custodial wallets