NEW BSIP: Redefine and clear the scope of Committee

[binggo]

The on-chain governance structure (written in code) is as simple as that, if a voter disagrees with a decision that a committee member made, the voter doesn't vote for the committee member and/or votes for other committee members.

Other rules are all not written in code.

If to make a BSIP to change rules, please focus on the in-code part but not the non-code part.

correct, in public chain code is law, if anyone are not satisfied with the code, please suggest BSIP to do code improvement.

If the committees use defect code to cheat the community and steal the power from the community, then things will become very interesting.

Ok, maybe some committees like the feeling of grabbing power, didn't want to correct the defect code.

You should see，this is a BSIP.

If a chain's parameters can easily be changed by 11 people, then it is centralization not decentralization, this is the most ridiculous part of DPOS, a 623,602,107(383,809,064)/2,750,586,155 vote can easily control the chain, this is the decentralization belong to you?

[bitcrab]

The on-chain governance structure (written in code) is as simple as that, if a voter disagrees with a decision that a committee member made, the voter doesn't vote for the committee member and/or votes for other committee members.

Other rules are all not written in code.

If to make a BSIP to change rules, please focus on the in-code part but not the non-code part.

correct, in public chain code is law, if anyone are not satisfied with the code, please suggest BSIP to do code improvement.

 

[litepresence]

we should really create more network fees to raise revenue which are technically infeasible to pay directly to the reserve pool.  this will allow fees accumulate in the committee account instead.  also, we should ensure voting is run by only 3-4 people so that they can elect everyone in the committee that has to manage the fund.   it is the only correct way to manage a public blockchain.

[ripplexiaoshan]

I agree committee is adviser instead of governor, the governor is BTS holders. 

[binggo]

The on-chain governance structure (written in code) is as simple as that, if a voter disagrees with a decision that a committee member made, the voter doesn't vote for the committee member and/or votes for other committee members.

Other rules are all not written in code.

Thing is not like what you think is so simple, we must get the lessons from the real world, not if a voter disagrees with a decision that a committee member made, the voter doesn't vote for the committee member and/or votes for other committee members.

If things was so simple, the real world will become so easily, and didn't need so many laws, and didn't need the “Division of Power”, EOS didn‘t need the Constitution.

You can't make sure the turnout, so you can't make sure the committee. When we give the power to committee, just like we give the knife to them, when they stabbed us, you tell me to chose another one who will not stab the cummunity?

Decision MUST be made by the BTS holders, can't be made by the committee, this is the the bottom line.

and we must clear know, why the committee want the power?!

This is a guideline and bottom line, let the committee know what they should do and what they shouldn't do.

With this , we can find out easily who is capturing the power from the community, even the committee is the representative of the big voting power holders.

If to make a BSIP to change rules, please focus on the in-code part but not the non-code part.

This is belong to the BSIP too, even it is in-code part or not.

[abit]

The on-chain governance structure (written in code) is as simple as that, if a voter disagrees with a decision that a committee member made, the voter doesn't vote for the committee member and/or votes for other committee members.

Other rules are all not written in code.

If to make a BSIP to change rules, please focus on the in-code part but not the non-code part.

[binggo]

I think:

"Committee" just is adviser，not "council" , "commission" and "Board".

"Committee" only needs to follow the decision of the holders of BTS and give the advice to the holders of BTS, can't replace the holders of BTS to make decison.

Every onchain governace must vote through the holders of BTS, not the Committee.

We build the WPS system, everything can be solved through WPS system，didn‘t need the Committee replacing the holders of BTS to make decison.

We must remember the bottom line, the holders of BTS have all the power, only they can make decisions, not the  "Committee".

If the committee have the power to make decisons，then we build a Nazi agent/The thirty tyrants for the holders of BTS.

If the committees have any advice for community, they can make a issue in BSIP or BAIP, after fully discussed and reasonable process in BSIP and BAIP, the committees can make a WP through the committee account, after voting by the holders of BTS, then the committee can follow the decision of holders of BTS.

Any WP can't cede power from BTS holders to committee.

After being voted in as active committee you can help set policies and parameters for the BitShares blockchain including:
Transaction fees
Parameters of BitAssets (e.g. market fees)
Blockchain parameters (e.g. block size & interval)
Referral and vesting parameters (e.g. cash back percent for life-time-members and vesting period)
Other governance matters

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For the onchain governace vote like BSIP/BAIP:

I suggest:

1. Every worker fund should come from the WPS pool(donation exception);

2. A BSIP worker should get continuous seven days pay from the reserver pool;
If there have a YES/NO BSIP worker proposal, which got more votes and keep the higher vote than another in continuous seven days, and it shoud get continuous pay from the reserver pool in the competition process of keeping the higher vote than another in continuous seven days;

3. This day pay must be fully worker pay.

4. We must set a Threshold to make sure the vote can't be cheated and ensure the turnout

The Threshold must >=3/8 (the worker which have the hightest votes+the wittness which have the hightest votes)
Example:
The hightest worker votes is 675557848, the hightest wittness vote is 941299444
So the Threshold=3/8 * 1616857292=606,321,484.5

SO, a BSIP/BAIP want to be approved, must meet2，3，4.

5. This voting threshold mechanism should be voted by the holders of BTS，and get continuous 30 days pay from the reserver pool, then we can consider the voting threshold mechanism approved.


https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/282

Open up and say what you think.

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我认为：

1.理事会只是一个幕僚设置，参谋角色。

2.理事会仅仅需要遵从与遵守BTS持有者的投票决定及提供给BTS持有者合理性的提案及建议，而不是代替BTS持有者做决定。

3.任何的链上治理必须要经过BTS持有者的投票，而不是理事会投票。

4.我们设计了WPS（工人提案机制），任何问题都可以通过WPS（工人提案机制）投票解决，而不是理事会越俎代庖的代替BTS持有者做决定。

5.我们必须牢牢记住一个底线，BTS持有者拥有所有权力，只有BTS持有者才能做决定，而不是理事会。

6.如果理事会可以做决定，那就形同与我们给BTS持有者设计了一个纳粹机构/三十僭主。

7.如果理事有什么建议给社区，可以在BSIP/BAIP上发issue，在经过充分讨论与合理的BSIP/BAIP流程后，理事可以通过理事会账户发工人提案交由WPS投票，然后理事会可以根据投票结果做下一步。

8.任何的提案都不允许从BTS持有者让渡权力给理事会。

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对于像BSIP/BAIP这样的链上治理投票;

我建议：

1. 任何工作提案资金必须经过提案资金池（捐赠除外);

2. 一个BSIP/BAIP工作提案必须从提案资金池得到连续七天足额工资；

如果有YES/NO提案并存，哪一个得到更多票数并且连续七天高于另一个提案，且在高于另一个提案的过程中必须能够连续得到七天足额工资；

3. 日工资必须是足额日工资。

4. 并且需要有一个阈值来保证最大限度上投票不被操控与投票参与度：

这个阈值必须 大于等于 3/8*（得票最多提案+得票最多见证人）

所以一个BSIP/BAIP工作提案必须满足2、3、4条件才能被认为批准。

5. 此投票阈值机制在得到连续30天足额日工资后，才可认为生效。