0 Members and 1 Guest are viewing this topic.
When the value of BTSX is falling, the peg is enforced by margin calls buying BitUSD as well as those looking to hedge against falling BTSXWhen the value of BTSX is rising, the peg is enforced by shorts taking their profits and re-shorting. We don't want to prevent shorts from shorting at prices below market if there is someone willing to buy ABOVE market. What does this mean? It means that anytime there is demand for BitUSD then which ever short is willing to pay the highest price gets matched first. The difference between the short's price and the ask price has always been captured as fees. This means that USD holders now benefit from added "insurance" in the event of a crash and BTSX holders benefit as well. Meanwhile "shorts" can set a price and get their order executed rather than "skipped". I believe that these rules are both simple and easy to understand and that once the "glut" of BitUSD on the market catches up to the demand the peg will hold just fine and transaction volume will be increasing.I think "forced covering at a profit" will be unnecessary.
I think "forced covering at a profit" will be unnecessary.
Quote from: cygnify on August 31, 2014, 09:42:10 pm Quote from: Agent86 on August 31, 2014, 09:37:32 pmWell, I think it shows that the token she holds will fetch the holder $1 given some time. If she offers it at a discount ($0.90) I believe there will be other people willing to scoop it up knowing that they will eventually get $1 for it, assuming Bob doesn't take the opportunity.Maybe Alice shouldn't be buying things that she doesn't want. All in all, I think with enough people participating my belief is that this problem does not exist and is purely academic.That's right. All markets will move to equilibrium (price parity) given enough time and liquidity.The only reasons the peg is slightly off presently is the wallet software (could be more stable and also needs to help the user know when opportunities arise), not enough traders and few abritage opportunities at the moment.Everyone is forgetting the key element of an information market. Information flow is a key element and we have very poor information flow. If information is like the oxygen in our blood flowing through our bloodstream then if we have poor circulation we can't survive.BitUSD/BTSX is an information market. It's a prediction market where you're trying to guess whether BTSX is going up or down in price. Since most people have been convinced that it's going up in price not many people decided to buy BitUSD. The other problem is not many people even knew what BitUSD is or how to use it (myself among them).So you have to consider the amount of time it takes to master the UI of Bitshares X along with figuring out all the advanced features. As expertise begins to increase, along with automation, there will be people who can capitalize quickly, if and only if information circulates.So we need to build information feeds into the GUI so that information can flow efficiently to eyeballs. The GUI could be like the heart of the whole ecosystem where all information flows through so that everyone using Bitshares X software receives a live stream on their dashboard. This would increase situation awareness and information flow so that speculators can make rational informed decisions quickly.Right now the Bitshares interface and bugs in the software prevent anyone from using it properly.
Quote from: Agent86 on August 31, 2014, 09:37:32 pmWell, I think it shows that the token she holds will fetch the holder $1 given some time. If she offers it at a discount ($0.90) I believe there will be other people willing to scoop it up knowing that they will eventually get $1 for it, assuming Bob doesn't take the opportunity.Maybe Alice shouldn't be buying things that she doesn't want. All in all, I think with enough people participating my belief is that this problem does not exist and is purely academic.That's right. All markets will move to equilibrium (price parity) given enough time and liquidity.The only reasons the peg is slightly off presently is the wallet software (could be more stable and also needs to help the user know when opportunities arise), not enough traders and few abritage opportunities at the moment.
Well, I think it shows that the token she holds will fetch the holder $1 given some time. If she offers it at a discount ($0.90) I believe there will be other people willing to scoop it up knowing that they will eventually get $1 for it, assuming Bob doesn't take the opportunity.Maybe Alice shouldn't be buying things that she doesn't want. All in all, I think with enough people participating my belief is that this problem does not exist and is purely academic.
Short orders appear with Bids/asks in the GUI
my idea with my knowledge of english what we need:1. liquidity - the new rules around the median price killed the whole bitUSD market. 1 trade per hour is nothing!2. we want more stability in direction to the pegi am against all this 10% of something to cover etc. it makes everything complicated and at most, if we see this in the future on the other side, how do we react?so we need a solution for every situation.1. what does it mean to peg the USD?it will oszillate around it, so if we start not 1:1 it is absolute fine, because in extreme situation the peg will not hold, because the buyers and sellers will struggle for the savesed bet.so in the moment more people, or extreme more people want to short bitUSD and drive the price away from market peg.my solution1. we just count the volume the last say 1.000 trades- 5000 BTSX are traded on the bid side- 50.0000 BTSX are traded on the short sideits 5.000 : 50.000 = 1:50 we are in an extreme enviroment, who everyone looks to short bitUSDso we will do this1 : 50 = 50 -1 = 4949 is translatet do 49% interest bid side is 30 with 1.000 bitUSDshort side is 32 with 30.000 bitUSDif you want to short and buy the bid side away you have not to pay 1.000 BTSX + colleteral, but the new counting will look like this30.000 BTSX + 49% interest for the buyer of bit USD or 14.700 BTSX == 44.700 BTSX to buy the bid side away with a short from the buyer (extreme expensive)now it is extreme expensive to do this.this interest will adjust after a couple of trades.advantages?1. the market can trade freely and will decide which price is worth to pay2. in an extreme situation it will much more intesting to take the other side, so more liquidity for the unfavorde side3. the rules are for both sides, so if in the future the conditions are in favore of bitUSD we don't need to worry because the short will get a premium to take the positioni hope you could follow my idea.
Quote from: Riverhead on September 01, 2014, 03:19:16 amQuote from: yiminh on September 01, 2014, 02:42:57 amhehe, this is fun, I'll wait couple of days to see if anyone else can figure it out:)Even if you have the right answer and we come up with the same one we'll never know. Of course you'll jump up and down saying, "Yes! This was my idea!" Frankly it just comes across as looking for attention. So, on that note I'm done responding to your attention bate posts.Only when you have a solution can you realize the current peg needs work, ByteMaster kind of suspected that, but most of you don't even think there is a problem, I need BTSX, not attention, nobody knows who I am.
Quote from: yiminh on September 01, 2014, 02:42:57 amhehe, this is fun, I'll wait couple of days to see if anyone else can figure it out:)Even if you have the right answer and we come up with the same one we'll never know. Of course you'll jump up and down saying, "Yes! This was my idea!" Frankly it just comes across as looking for attention. So, on that note I'm done responding to your attention bate posts.
hehe, this is fun, I'll wait couple of days to see if anyone else can figure it out:)
I have a perfect solution to this pegging problem, only need one little change to the current system, no price feeds, no 90% stuff, if you post a 10 M BTSX bounty, I'll post it.
Quote from: bytemaster on August 31, 2014, 07:32:06 pmIf we are going to rely on a price feed we can force covering any time the highest offer to buy BitUSD is less than 90% of the feed price. Could price feeds reduce price security? Could there be DDOS attacks on feed sources to could make the network less stable? Just wondering..Quote from: bytemaster on August 31, 2014, 07:32:06 pmDoes this punish shorts? I don't think it does. I think it supports the peg by adding liquidity without adding any risk to the shorts. I think this added liquidity should come form which ever shorts are least collateralized. This way the shorts which don't want to be forced into providing liquidity pre-maturely can avoid it by having a large surplus of collateral and thus making the entire network more secure. Under this system BitUSD is always worth at least $0.90 and the market makers / market will likely drive that to near $0.99- $1.01. I don't mind this approach but I'm glad we're discussing it. I have been Alice and run into a couple liquidity problems so far trading BTSX and I think what you're proposing would be fair and increase liquidity. With that said, is it the best way? Will liquidity not increase as other currencies/options are added to the platform? In your example Alice is stuck because there is one exit from her USD position and it's blocked. But what if there were more exits? What if Alice could buy CNY from Zhang Li? Or Bitcoins from Stan? More exits = more liquidity.
If we are going to rely on a price feed we can force covering any time the highest offer to buy BitUSD is less than 90% of the feed price.
Does this punish shorts? I don't think it does. I think it supports the peg by adding liquidity without adding any risk to the shorts. I think this added liquidity should come form which ever shorts are least collateralized. This way the shorts which don't want to be forced into providing liquidity pre-maturely can avoid it by having a large surplus of collateral and thus making the entire network more secure. Under this system BitUSD is always worth at least $0.90 and the market makers / market will likely drive that to near $0.99- $1.01.
This is history in the making.I love that you guys are taking the time to dissect every idea and try to implement something that works.You are operating well outside of the dogmatic belief systems that some people have on here, and you can only be cheered for it.I think considering to implement multiple, different solutions might be more productive than to just try to get the one way that will work out of the box, because who knows what happens when it gets out of the box?Good job guys, keep an open mind.
Frankly I understand nothing of this, so I have stayed away, but was wondering something (might be stupid).Is one of the issues is that there are not enough longs or shorts; means at some point one look more attractive than the other and so its skewing it? In that case, can you introduce some kind of 'odds'? In betting, if you are taking less risk, you will receive a less return; but higher risk nets higher profits.In the same way if it feels like majority is against, say, short, but you do anyway, shouldn't there be a more incentive? Might balance up both sides this way.
Quote from: davidpbrown on August 31, 2014, 09:05:04 pmSurely bitUSD is a safe haven for any perceived future drop in BTSX. While BTSX rises perhaps it'll be tempting not to buy bitUSD but to short it? So, between those two, you have a draw into bitUSD.I'm not sure whether you need to control the market as much as sell the idea of it. I wonder there needs to be some ELI5 descriptions for those of us with less experience of financial markets; and those of us who've drunk too much beer :pIf ever there is a prospect of bitUSD being widely available on exchanges and used in the real world, it seems very likely it'll find its market. USD is an imposed consensus; bitUSD is a distributed consensus and as such it's not bitUSD==USD but the peg and the utility and the idea of bitXYZ acknowledging real world assets is a powerful one. Just add time.. not rules.Quote this: The only way BitUSD will be used as a safe haven is if information flow and market signalling is improved. People make rational decisions only when they receive timely information otherwise it's just gambling.BitUSD is best used when you have accurate pertinent information about a market disrupting event which is about to occur. A spike in the purchasing of BitUSD may be a statistical indicator that something has happened which will result in a crash in the price. If Mt Gox gets hacked, if the Bitcoin ETF is about to open, if big whale investors are about to enter the market, all of that influences whether or not people should buy BitUSD because it's a prediction market.Information right now doesn't flow very well. It's hidden in the forums, in the Mumble meetings, etc. This lack of information flow causes a delay in people purchasing BitUSD, and it is partially why people don't value BitUSD yet. It's going to take a dramatically more interconnected and efficient information flow to create a true information market.
Surely bitUSD is a safe haven for any perceived future drop in BTSX. While BTSX rises perhaps it'll be tempting not to buy bitUSD but to short it? So, between those two, you have a draw into bitUSD.I'm not sure whether you need to control the market as much as sell the idea of it. I wonder there needs to be some ELI5 descriptions for those of us with less experience of financial markets; and those of us who've drunk too much beer :pIf ever there is a prospect of bitUSD being widely available on exchanges and used in the real world, it seems very likely it'll find its market. USD is an imposed consensus; bitUSD is a distributed consensus and as such it's not bitUSD==USD but the peg and the utility and the idea of bitXYZ acknowledging real world assets is a powerful one. Just add time.. not rules.
Quote from: Agent86 on August 31, 2014, 09:37:32 pmQuote from: TheOnion on August 31, 2014, 09:29:25 pmA86, this does not explain how Alice gets $0.90, 10 seconds after she purchased the dollar.Well, I think it shows that the token she holds will fetch the holder $1 given some time. If she offers it at a discount ($0.90) I believe there will be other people willing to scoop it up knowing that they will eventually get $1 for it, assuming Bob doesn't take the opportunity.Maybe Alice shouldn't be buying things that she doesn't want. All in all, I think with enough people participating my belief is that this problem does not exist and is purely academic.It is actually not Alice that wants to buy them, it is us wanting her to buy them My response stays the same, regarding the not-bold text:Quote from: TheOnion on August 31, 2014, 08:45:20 pmI think the idea is that in Alice's mind she would be absolutely secure that she can sell at 90%, at all times. Just like the system bot proposal but without a bot.
Quote from: TheOnion on August 31, 2014, 09:29:25 pmA86, this does not explain how Alice gets $0.90, 10 seconds after she purchased the dollar.Well, I think it shows that the token she holds will fetch the holder $1 given some time. If she offers it at a discount ($0.90) I believe there will be other people willing to scoop it up knowing that they will eventually get $1 for it, assuming Bob doesn't take the opportunity.Maybe Alice shouldn't be buying things that she doesn't want. All in all, I think with enough people participating my belief is that this problem does not exist and is purely academic.
A86, this does not explain how Alice gets $0.90, 10 seconds after she purchased the dollar.
I think the idea is that in Alice's mind she would be absolutely secure that she can sell at 90%, at all times. Just like the system bot proposal but without a bot.
Quote from: Empirical1 on August 31, 2014, 09:32:54 pmQuoteNow all Alice has to do is wait and Bob will buy it back for $1... This is because due to price movement one of two things will happen:But what if she doesn't want to wait and what if she has a large volume that the market can't support in times of low liquidity. We want those kind of buyers to enter the market no? Quote from: puvar on August 31, 2014, 09:17:35 pmSo it looks like a double punishment for shorters. The imminent consequence of this is fewer people willing to short, and as a result slower growth of BitUSD supply.There seem to be long queues of people willing to short. The growth of BitAssets in the short to medium term seems like it will be determined by how appealing it is to the people going long BitAssets.In the bitsharesx platform is there a part of the Interface that shows people wanting to want to go short? Or do we have no one wanting to do this yet? I cant see it in yet but I could be blind (please laugh).
QuoteNow all Alice has to do is wait and Bob will buy it back for $1... This is because due to price movement one of two things will happen:But what if she doesn't want to wait and what if she has a large volume that the market can't support in times of low liquidity. We want those kind of buyers to enter the market no? Quote from: puvar on August 31, 2014, 09:17:35 pmSo it looks like a double punishment for shorters. The imminent consequence of this is fewer people willing to short, and as a result slower growth of BitUSD supply.There seem to be long queues of people willing to short. The growth of BitAssets in the short to medium term seems like it will be determined by how appealing it is to the people going long BitAssets.
Now all Alice has to do is wait and Bob will buy it back for $1... This is because due to price movement one of two things will happen:
So it looks like a double punishment for shorters. The imminent consequence of this is fewer people willing to short, and as a result slower growth of BitUSD supply.
Quote from: bytemaster on August 31, 2014, 07:32:06 pmThis idea has been discussed in other threads, but the more I think about it the more critical I think it will be. To describe what I am talking about lets start out with a simple example.Alice and Bob decide to take opposite bets and one ends up with BitUSD the other is Short BitUSD. Immediately after this trade occurs Alice decides she wants out of her position, but Bob doesn't. Alice has to shop around looking for someone else to take her BitUSD position... no takers.Alice drops the price to 95%, 90%, 50% of the dollar .... still no takers. The value of the dollar hasn't changed during this time, there is just no BitUSD liquidity. Bob hasn't actually made any money, he is just refusing to give up his position. So we have a situation where people are looking to exit their BitUSD position and they are willing to pay a fee to do so. If the network knows the price then it is easy to implement this. We simply change the terms of the short "contract".Bob agrees that Alice has the option to exit her position at $.90 per BitUSD at any time. Bob makes money even though the dollar did not fall against BTSX and Alice is assured some liquidity should she need it. If we are going to rely on a price feed we can force covering any time the highest offer to buy BitUSD is less than 90% of the feed price. Does this punish shorts? I don't think it does. I think it supports the peg by adding liquidity without adding any risk to the shorts. I think this added liquidity should come form which ever shorts are least collateralized. This way the shorts which don't want to be forced into providing liquidity pre-maturely can avoid it by having a large surplus of collateral and thus making the entire network more secure. Under this system BitUSD is always worth at least $0.90 and the market makers / market will likely drive that to near $0.99- $1.01. I think the problem of overshorting comes from the fact that market is asymmetrical: everybody can sell BitUSD (either by shorting or selling), but only BTSX owners can buy BitUSD.It would be more natural to make it symmetrical: allow BitUSD owners to short BTSX (effectively create extra BitUSD buy pressure). In this case Alice will have a chance to sell her BitUSD to a pessimist who bought BitUSD, and is so strong about his position that is willing to short BTSX with BitUSD collateral.
This idea has been discussed in other threads, but the more I think about it the more critical I think it will be. To describe what I am talking about lets start out with a simple example.Alice and Bob decide to take opposite bets and one ends up with BitUSD the other is Short BitUSD. Immediately after this trade occurs Alice decides she wants out of her position, but Bob doesn't. Alice has to shop around looking for someone else to take her BitUSD position... no takers.Alice drops the price to 95%, 90%, 50% of the dollar .... still no takers. The value of the dollar hasn't changed during this time, there is just no BitUSD liquidity. Bob hasn't actually made any money, he is just refusing to give up his position. So we have a situation where people are looking to exit their BitUSD position and they are willing to pay a fee to do so. If the network knows the price then it is easy to implement this. We simply change the terms of the short "contract".Bob agrees that Alice has the option to exit her position at $.90 per BitUSD at any time. Bob makes money even though the dollar did not fall against BTSX and Alice is assured some liquidity should she need it. If we are going to rely on a price feed we can force covering any time the highest offer to buy BitUSD is less than 90% of the feed price. Does this punish shorts? I don't think it does. I think it supports the peg by adding liquidity without adding any risk to the shorts. I think this added liquidity should come form which ever shorts are least collateralized. This way the shorts which don't want to be forced into providing liquidity pre-maturely can avoid it by having a large surplus of collateral and thus making the entire network more secure. Under this system BitUSD is always worth at least $0.90 and the market makers / market will likely drive that to near $0.99- $1.01.
Dear yiminih,Working together and helping each other is very rewarding experience and I would recommend it that you should give it a go. You will be pleasantly surprised. Peace and Love
Quote from: yiminh on September 01, 2014, 02:30:11 amQuote from: TheOnion on September 01, 2014, 02:19:15 amSure, only if it is implemented without changes you get the 1 Million bounty!10Mil are you nuts?Don't you think it's worth 10M BTSX if it worked?It might be. I know a person who's idea is worth several trillion dollars (in my estimation)... He did not get the money for posting his idea and expecting someone to pay him for it. In fact most of us here try to help him get most of that value out of this idea.
Quote from: TheOnion on September 01, 2014, 02:19:15 amSure, only if it is implemented without changes you get the 1 Million bounty!10Mil are you nuts?Don't you think it's worth 10M BTSX if it worked?
Sure, only if it is implemented without changes you get the 1 Million bounty!10Mil are you nuts?
Quote from: yiminh on September 01, 2014, 02:30:11 amQuote from: TheOnion on September 01, 2014, 02:19:15 amSure, only if it is implemented without changes you get the 1 Million bounty!10Mil are you nuts?Don't you think it's worth 10M BTSX if it worked?Perhaps. But it's just your idea versus everyone else's that are posting up and everyone else thinks they have the solution too. Difference being of course they're collectively trying to solve a problem and you're...I'm not sure what you're doing lol. Buy a lot of BTSX, throw your golden screwdriver out there, and if it works your shares make you rich. If it doesn't you're no further behind.
if you post....... 1 M BTSX
Quote from: okidoki on September 01, 2014, 12:47:45 amQuote from: puvar on August 31, 2014, 10:16:50 pmQuote from: bytemaster on August 31, 2014, 09:47:09 pmSo this discussion is mostly focused on "how do we make a peg work in a thin market"....without thinning the market more :-)Yes, please do not complicate this market with lots of regulations and profit limits for arbitrages, and strange policies like only people who are long bitUSD can short for the same amount... If I had a position and saw it forcefully closed I would say: "What shit is this??@!" Also if I have to be long and short at the same time, I do not enter the market at all. You eliminate all the profit!!Also market feeds do not reflect sudden -50% to +90% price moves of the value of BitShares X!!Let the people make their bets and introduce another market on Bter in order to increment the transparency of the market and let the arbitrage work. PLEASE!!! This will help the market to be attractive for traders and give it more and more liquidity. You have to give it some time....I tend to agree with that... my only concerns are that we have many "newbies" that express the same thing, and less "older" members they do...(?) PS Don't take it personal
Quote from: puvar on August 31, 2014, 10:16:50 pmQuote from: bytemaster on August 31, 2014, 09:47:09 pmSo this discussion is mostly focused on "how do we make a peg work in a thin market"....without thinning the market more :-)Yes, please do not complicate this market with lots of regulations and profit limits for arbitrages, and strange policies like only people who are long bitUSD can short for the same amount... If I had a position and saw it forcefully closed I would say: "What shit is this??@!" Also if I have to be long and short at the same time, I do not enter the market at all. You eliminate all the profit!!Also market feeds do not reflect sudden -50% to +90% price moves of the value of BitShares X!!Let the people make their bets and introduce another market on Bter in order to increment the transparency of the market and let the arbitrage work. PLEASE!!! This will help the market to be attractive for traders and give it more and more liquidity. You have to give it some time....
Quote from: bytemaster on August 31, 2014, 09:47:09 pmSo this discussion is mostly focused on "how do we make a peg work in a thin market"....without thinning the market more :-)
So this discussion is mostly focused on "how do we make a peg work in a thin market".
Quote from: bytemaster on August 31, 2014, 09:47:09 pmAllowing someone to Short BTSX backed by BitUSD would be an interesting experiment for a future chain. It would certainly create buying pressure on cheap BitUSD. ... is something I was thinking about 2 nights ago, even in my sleep.
Allowing someone to Short BTSX backed by BitUSD would be an interesting experiment for a future chain. It would certainly create buying pressure on cheap BitUSD.
On the whole the network is stronger with fewer shorts and more guarantees for BitUSD holders. On the whole the network is stronger with fewer rules and more free market action. Allowing someone to Short BTSX backed by BitUSD would be an interesting experiment for a future chain. It would certainly create buying pressure on cheap BitUSD. Price feeds are something I would prefer to avoid all together. Average prices are something I would prefer to remove all together. So this discussion is mostly focused on "how do we make a peg work in a thin market".
Quote from: bytemaster on August 31, 2014, 07:32:06 pmThis idea has been discussed in other threads, but the more I think about it the more critical I think it will be. To describe what I am talking about lets start out with a simple example.Alice and Bob decide to take opposite bets and one ends up with BitUSD the other is Short BitUSD. Immediately after this trade occurs Alice decides she wants out of her position, but Bob doesn't. Alice has to shop around looking for someone else to take her BitUSD position... no takers.Alice drops the price to 95%, 90%, 50% of the dollar .... still no takers. The value of the dollar hasn't changed during this time, there is just no BitUSD liquidity. Bob hasn't actually made any money, he is just refusing to give up his position. So we have a situation where people are looking to exit their BitUSD position and they are willing to pay a fee to do so. If the network knows the price then it is easy to implement this. We simply change the terms of the short "contract".Bob agrees that Alice has the option to exit her position at $.90 per BitUSD at any time. Bob makes money even though the dollar did not fall against BTSX and Alice is assured some liquidity should she need it. If we are going to rely on a price feed we can force covering any time the highest offer to buy BitUSD is less than 90% of the feed price. Does this punish shorts? I don't think it does. I think it supports the peg by adding liquidity without adding any risk to the shorts. I think this added liquidity should come form which ever shorts are least collateralized. This way the shorts which don't want to be forced into providing liquidity pre-maturely can avoid it by having a large surplus of collateral and thus making the entire network more secure. Under this system BitUSD is always worth at least $0.90 and the market makers / market will likely drive that to near $0.99- $1.01. To expand on your simplified negotiation... In addition to selling Alice the one bitUSD that Bob wanted to short, Bob must also place additional short/sell orders at slightly above the price feed (proposed rule is can't be below feed). This is to stop Alice from just posting it for sale at a real high price and triggering Bob's margin call. Alice then posts the dollar for sale just below the price feed.Now all Alice has to do is wait and Bob will buy it back for $1... This is because due to price movement one of two things will happen:1) bitUSD rises and bob gets a margin call giving alice $1 worth of BTSX...2) BTSX rises to the point that Alice's measly dollar is tying up a huge amount of valuable BTSX that Bob now can't use until he closes the position and he isn't getting enough leverage to be worth not closing. So he will buy it back for $1.-notice how the rule "no short selling below feed" immediately makes the market center around feed price.
Quote from: TheOnion on August 31, 2014, 08:45:20 pmQuote from: Agent86 on August 31, 2014, 08:28:49 pmMy first impression is this is totally unnecessary. Bob knows he has to buy back that dollar sometime, and there will be a lot of Bobs. Alice knows if bob runs out of collateral he is forced to buy it back at fair price.It also gives too much power to the price feed. I wouldn't use the price feed for anything other than eliminating new shorts below the feed price.I think the idea is that in Alice's mind she would be absolutely secure that she can sell at 90%, at all times. Just like the system bot proposal but without a bot.That's nice an all for Alice. But Bob is screwed, going short is all about risk reward, and now we're cutting the reward for bob.
Quote from: Agent86 on August 31, 2014, 08:28:49 pmMy first impression is this is totally unnecessary. Bob knows he has to buy back that dollar sometime, and there will be a lot of Bobs. Alice knows if bob runs out of collateral he is forced to buy it back at fair price.It also gives too much power to the price feed. I wouldn't use the price feed for anything other than eliminating new shorts below the feed price.I think the idea is that in Alice's mind she would be absolutely secure that she can sell at 90%, at all times. Just like the system bot proposal but without a bot.
My first impression is this is totally unnecessary. Bob knows he has to buy back that dollar sometime, and there will be a lot of Bobs. Alice knows if bob runs out of collateral he is forced to buy it back at fair price.It also gives too much power to the price feed. I wouldn't use the price feed for anything other than eliminating new shorts below the feed price.
Please let the market move freely. Let people allow to make money with arbitrage. If there is no money to be made with arbitrage than people will not look at that market.
What would be great is having an BTSX:bitUSD market at bter.com. This way arbitrage would get a lot easier. One can buy bitUSD in the bitasharesx client and then sell it on bter for more bitshares and repeat this until prices are the same.
I Agree.
The people who buy the bitUSD at bter can sell them for USD.