Fee Flow / Yield Info Graphic

[oldman]

Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?

Reserve fund.

[Method-X]

This will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value.   

The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents.  I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.

With this system for interest, that seems true. But we'll never be a serious payment system rivalling Visa's TPS rates with that approach.

That's a good point. Powerful computers will eventually be required and cost a significant amount. Perhaps a more accurate statement would be "the end game for delegates will always be delegates breaking even".

[tonyk]

Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are in bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.

You still have not told me how you do that trick?

Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit".

Ok I bid 51 BTS/ bitUSD and trying to buy 2 bitUSD ;the best ask (more likely short) is asking for 47 BTSX for each bitUSD. The 2 are matched.
The seller gets his 94 BTSX, I get my 2 bitUSD and I pay 102 BTSX.

Now the system has 8 BTSX... how  those 8 BTSX get converts into bitUSD?

You could view that same market the other way around... you bid $0.04  they ask $0.03 for 100 BTSX.     Bid pays $4 and gets 100 BTSX.   Ask receives $3 for their 100 BTSX.  Network is left with $1.

Yes but the shorting competition goes only in the direction described by me... you cannot short BTSX ...not yet.

[Troglodactyl]

This will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value.   

The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents.  I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.

With this system for interest, that seems true. But we'll never be a serious payment system rivalling Visa's TPS rates with that approach.

[xeroc]

[updates] .. to the look and feel of the snapshot graphic .. hope you like it .. and hope it is accurate

one question: when I pay transaction fees with bitUSD .. how sets the amount? I just chose an arbitrary number of 0.1 bitUSD

[xeroc]

The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents.  I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.

That depends on how quickly we reach VISA level .. then machines/power/and bandwidth will probably get more expensive

[bytemaster]

Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are in bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.

You still have not told me how you do that trick?

Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit".

Ok I bid 51 BTS/ bitUSD and trying to buy 2 bitUSD ;the best ask (more likely short) is asking for 47 BTSX for each bitUSD. The 2 are matched.
The seller gets his 94 BTSX, I get my 2 bitUSD and I pay 102 BTSX.

Now the system has 8 BTSX... how  those 8 BTSX get converts into bitUSD?

You could view that same market the other way around... you bid $0.04  they ask $0.03 for 100 BTSX.     Bid pays $4 and gets 100 BTSX.   Ask receives $3 for their 100 BTSX.  Network is left with $1.

[tonyk]

Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are in bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.

You still have not told me how you do that trick?

Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit".

Ok I bid 51 BTS/ bitUSD and trying to buy 2 bitUSD ;the best ask (more likely short) is asking for 47 BTSX for each bitUSD. The 2 are matched.
The seller gets his 94 BTSX, I get my 2 bitUSD and I pay 102 BTSX.

Now the system has 8 BTSX... how  those 8 BTSX get converts into bitUSD?

[Method-X]

This will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value.   

The end game for delegates will always be delegates getting no pay. And that's fine. People seed torrents.  I could host a delegate for next to no cost currently and I would definitely allocate 100% to interest because ultimately that benefits me the most.

[bytemaster]

Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are in bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.

You still have not told me how you do that trick?

Bid/Ask overlap... the market engine buys more BitAssets than it sells keeping the BitAssets as "profit". 

[arhag]

I think (eventually) all income collected by the network should go to the delegates and the delegates should determine how the income is distributed.

--> Rewards Fund
--> Burn
--> Delegate Income

The shareholders vote for delegates that distribute network income in a way they agree with.

I would prefer if the delegates didn't actually get the money and then were expected to distribute it out to the appropriate funds (although that could be an acceptable compromise until a better system was built). I would like the network to do the distribution so that everyone can be guaranteed it will happen and they do not need to put additional trust in the delegates.

In particular, I would love to see a system where the delegates can make proposals that tweak the network rules which only become active if enough shareholders ratify it. Any active delegate would create a new proposal. If the majority of active delegates voted with approval, the proposal would be put up for consideration. Only one proposal can be up for consideration at a time. If the majority of delegates decide to do so, they can discard a proposal at any time. If more than a certain percentage of the stake votes in favor of the proposal up for consideration, then it is ratified and its rules become active in the next round. Perhaps in addition, if more than another percentage of the stake vetoes the proposal, it would immediately be discarded as well. Therefore transactions would only need a small addition to acknowledge the active proposal with a yea or nay.

These proposals could have parameters that define things like delegate pay rate (perhaps denominated in BitUSD), pay rates to different accounts (both mandatory and discretionary incomes) so they can use the funds for productive purposes (like development and marketing), interest rate caps on each BitAsset, prioritization of paying BitAsset interest, etc.

[bytemaster]

one side of the market is still paying their fees in BTSX.
margin calls are still in BTSX
transfer fees are still in BTSX

This will reduce delegate compensation, but will increase BTSX value.   

If delegates need more compensation they can raise rates. 

[tonyk]

Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are in bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.

You still have not told me how you do that trick?

[Troglodactyl]

If my understanding is correct, paying fees other than short fees out as interest should break the peg.  In an uncertain market in which demand due assets matches demand to short, the peg should work. If everyone wants to short, that breaks the peg, which is why we had to use the price feeds.  Allowing the shorts to pay the longs interest should recreate the balanced/uncertain market in which the peg works, but providing additional interest from other fees to asset holders would then break the peg again by increasing demand for assets.

The question is whether demand for bit assets is greater than the demand to short.   Considering demand for BitAssets increases demand for BTSX 2x... short demand should be in very high supply.  The game theory on the peg still holds.   Also, it doesn't matter *as much* if it breaks the peg to the upside (because a BitUSD will remain >= $1) which means people can accept it at face value with confidence.

I guess since the short fees are still floating they would just decrease to account for the subsidies to long positions.  Effectively both longs and shorts would then be subsidised by the delegates who are expected to process their transactions for free.  The hope being that this would pay for itself in marketing value. Is this correct?

[Method-X]

I think (eventually) all income collected by the network should go to the delegates and the delegates should determine how the income is distributed.

--> Rewards Fund
--> Burn
--> Delegate Income

The shareholders vote for delegates that distribute network income in a way they agree with.

This sounds like a reasonable... I think "burn" is probably the least effective option on the list.  The more BitAsset users/holders there are BTSX gets a 2x advantage.  Thus in my estimation driving demand for BitAssets is #1.

 

Personally, I would only vote for delegates who allocate 100% to interest.