Proposed Future DAC Delegate Pay Model

[Empirical1.1]

I even like having as little as 5 positions to focus on that can get access to a budget flow and be the accountable face of the DAC.

The 101 Delegates are like an IT role to me, while incredibly important it is separate and can't be followed all the time especially in multiple DAC's whereas the top 5 key people can.

I also still don't like inflation/dilution. I prefer setting aside 10% of the shares initially with a social consensus on how many will be released a year. (Like 25% of the remaining total a year).
So unless the business plan is flawed/there's a great opportunity/there's a great emergency, then there will be no need for inflation, only the distribution of shares that have been set aside in the business plan.

[liondani]

to many changes* in a short period of time, I am afraid, don't create the necessary confidence ...
maybe I am wrong (I hope so)


* even if they are in the right direction

[gamey]

  for separate business (sub)accounts.  I propose 101 "technical delegates" as currently, plus up to 101 "business delegates", each requires 51% approval.  Keep the design simple and conservative.

Having non-separate accounts as in the original proposal would mean the business delegates' funding is contingent on their ability to produce blocks, which means they should invest a substantial portion of that funding into making their block production infrastructure ironclad against failures ($10 million / year ~ $1000 per hour of downtime).  You'd basically force delegates to use a portion of the created inflation to pay IT costs that are not required for the network to function.

do we really need 101 delegate to take the inflation road? what about to split them 81 block producer 20 inflators? so we could increase pressure to the inflators. I don't see 101 delegates who will spend the shares for the future of the blockchain. Only some people will want to do it.

I'm not necessarily against the board of directors approach, but I also see no need to force it.  So in that regard the KISS principle kicks in  and I am completely fine with just leaving the delegates as is, and give them a way to point their inflation payment to an account.  The transparency etc will not go on so much at that level, but the actual people/services being funded by these accounts will have to provide transparency or have the delegates stop paying them.  The delegates will be responsive.  Perhaps the delegates can pay for a couple of independent auditors.

[Agent86]

Network Maintainers' (aka Delegate's) job is measurable, strictly defined, and can be audited. It can even be decentralised (Imagine each delegate split into X different subdelegates that need all approve the same block). Their job is network support and security.

You propose to merge these accountable/auditable strictly defined jobs with investment politics, dilution and subjective  "increase the value of DAC".
Here I disagree with you.

I am also of the opinion that delegates should be separate from workers.  I also feel strongly that dilution should require majority (50%+) approval of "active" shares. 

Gamey, I think your idea that merging this function into the role of delegate simplifies things is wrong and it will have the opposite effect.  It creates more complication and need for "brainpower" than keeping the roles separate.

discussion from a while back:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5467.msg73251#msg73251

You operate under the assumption that people have spare time to learn the 101 delegates to begin with.  This has shown to be wrong.

We haven't really cracked keeping track of 101 delegates. 

A person spending their inflation in a wasted manner will be likely brought to light quite quickly. 

Having 2 lists of people keep track of etc just adds obvious complexity, but it might happen not be as novel and so it makes more sense to people.  So I agree if the board of directors is sufficiently small it could make it simpler for a user to keep track of, yet it is still another page on the GUI, another separate race, etc etc.  I understand it fits into pre-existing defined roles, but that doesn't mean it actually makes it all simpler.  Perhaps it does, but it definitely does not from the coding end and makes the codebase even more complex.

Also by making a smaller board of directors, you give any 1 person more power than spreading the power around 101 delegates. I'm not sure thats actually a good thing.

I'm not advocating starting another "list of 101 people."  With workers you just approve who you want and ignore the rest.  If they get over 50% approval they are in so the list can be as small as 0 or 1 (you don't have to vote for 101 people to maximize your influence).

You operate under the assumption that people have spare time to learn the 101 delegates to begin with.  This has shown to be wrong.

We haven't really cracked keeping track of 101 delegates.

I never agreed with having a fixed number of 101 delegates people must keep track of.  I think I have cracked this problem, I just haven't taken the time to write it up.  I support a dynamic number of delegates so there is no harm in only voting for a handful of delegates.

[arhag]

You will never see 51% approval due to apathy, lost stake, etc.

I am trying to understand your position. Do you have a philosophical objection to a proposal system ratified by shareholder vote? Or is it just that you think the added code complexity is not worth the development time for the benefits (if you believe there are any benefits) it provides?

Keep in mind, the proposal system is far more general than how much inflation trusted actors get to create and spend to improve the DAC. It allows shareholders to modify parameters that govern the DAC: imagine adjusting interest rate caps on BitAssets, or minimum collateral reserve requirements, or even the number of active delegates. It allows shareholders to decide when/if to upgrade features in the DAC that require a hard fork. Currently that is done by the core developers telling the delegates to upgrade and the delegates following orders. That is centralization. That is okay in these early stages, but I am trying to future-proof this design so we can eventually transition to more decentralization.

That said, even though I am still a huge supporter of delegate proposals ratified by shareholder vote, I realize that maybe it is not the right time to try to get an implementation of this proposal ready for DACs like Music, Vote, and DNS. I don't know how much development time it would take to implement and I don't think it is that important currently to take away precious time that can be spent on more important features and of course killing bugs and improving BitShares X. So further discussion about the proposal system is a hypothetical discussion about the potential benefits of a feature on my wishlist, but one I still really wish to have, time permitting.

[Shentist]

  for separate business (sub)accounts.  I propose 101 "technical delegates" as currently, plus up to 101 "business delegates", each requires 51% approval.  Keep the design simple and conservative.

Having non-separate accounts as in the original proposal would mean the business delegates' funding is contingent on their ability to produce blocks, which means they should invest a substantial portion of that funding into making their block production infrastructure ironclad against failures ($10 million / year ~ $1000 per hour of downtime).  You'd basically force delegates to use a portion of the created inflation to pay IT costs that are not required for the network to function.

do we really need 101 delegate to take the inflation road? what about to split them 81 block producer 20 inflators? so we could increase pressure to the inflators. I don't see 101 delegates who will spend the shares for the future of the blockchain. Only some people will want to do it.

[gamey]

Network Maintainers' (aka Delegate's) job is measurable, strictly defined, and can be audited. It can even be decentralised (Imagine each delegate split into X different subdelegates that need all approve the same block). Their job is network support and security.

You propose to merge these accountable/auditable strictly defined jobs with investment politics, dilution and subjective  "increase the value of DAC".
Here I disagree with you.

I am also of the opinion that delegates should be separate from workers.  I also feel strongly that dilution should require majority (50%+) approval of "active" shares. 

Gamey, I think your idea that merging this function into the role of delegate simplifies things is wrong and it will have the opposite effect.  It creates more complication and need for "brainpower" than keeping the roles separate.

discussion from a while back:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5467.msg73251#msg73251

You operate under the assumption that people have spare time to learn the 101 delegates to begin with.  This has shown to be wrong.

We haven't really cracked keeping track of 101 delegates. 

A person spending their inflation in a wasted manner will be likely brought to light quite quickly. 

Having 2 lists of people keep track of etc just adds obvious complexity, but it might happen not be as novel and so it makes more sense to people.  So I agree if the board of directors is sufficiently small it could make it simpler for a user to keep track of, yet it is still another page on the GUI, another separate race, etc etc.  I understand it fits into pre-existing defined roles, but that doesn't mean it actually makes it all simpler.  Perhaps it does, but it definitely does not from the coding end and makes the codebase even more complex.

Also by making a smaller board of directors, you give any 1 person more power than spreading the power around 101 delegates. I'm not sure thats actually a good thing.

[bytemaster]

  for separate business (sub)accounts.  I propose 101 "technical delegates" as currently, plus up to 101 "business delegates", each requires 51% approval.  Keep the design simple and conservative.

Having non-separate accounts as in the original proposal would mean the business delegates' funding is contingent on their ability to produce blocks, which means they should invest a substantial portion of that funding into making their block production infrastructure ironclad against failures ($10 million / year ~ $1000 per hour of downtime).  You'd basically force delegates to use a portion of the created inflation to pay IT costs that are not required for the network to function.

You will never see 51% approval due to apathy, lost stake, etc.

Motivation to avoid downtime helps the entire network... delegates should be doing that anyway.

[theoretical]

  for separate business (sub)accounts.  I propose 101 "technical delegates" as currently, plus up to 101 "business delegates", each requires 51% approval.  Keep the design simple and conservative.

Having non-separate accounts as in the original proposal would mean the business delegates' funding is contingent on their ability to produce blocks, which means they should invest a substantial portion of that funding into making their block production infrastructure ironclad against failures ($10 million / year ~ $1000 per hour of downtime).  You'd basically force delegates to use a portion of the created inflation to pay IT costs that are not required for the network to function.

[Shentist]

The direction is right!

But Bytemaster maybe you can explain it a little better with examples.

if i understand it correct i could create a delegate and burn 100.000 BTSX (for sake of any DAC). If i get elected i will "earn" 100.000 BTSX every block i sign?

Question:
1.
How long? As long as i am elected? Or could we vote for something like a campaign? Delegate A wants to be elected and raise 2.000.000 BTSX and burns 100.000 BTSX. After 2.000.000 BTSX are earned his delegate will automatically only take transaction fees. Or runs he all the years with 100.000 BTSX per signed Blocks?

2.
Problem is here (example of Music DAC) Founders holds 10% and via PTS allocation Invictus holds roughfly 9 % of the shares. We already see in BTSX here is not much voting from the stakeholders so in reality both partys will set the course of which delegates are elected and which not. Which this saying i would prefer something as a plan for the near future for the voting of their shares. The 2 biggest known stakeholders would make a official statement how they intent to vote in the next 1-3 years.

3.
To compare it with a company. We would vote for delution, but the new shares will not be allocated to the shareholders, but only to elected delegates. Why would i do this? No one guarantees that the delegate will spend the shares for the DAC and don't run with it. I would prefer that the delegate will post for what reason he need the money. The elected client will automatically posting every transaction they make public on the blockchain. With this feature we could audit them and can downvote for broken promises. For this reason the 28 hours are much to short and should be days and not hours. We need some form of communication from the delegate to the voters in the client. Maybe integration of the forum and every delegate should have a thread for his projects.

[Agent86]

Network Maintainers' (aka Delegate's) job is measurable, strictly defined, and can be audited. It can even be decentralised (Imagine each delegate split into X different subdelegates that need all approve the same block). Their job is network support and security.

You propose to merge these accountable/auditable strictly defined jobs with investment politics, dilution and subjective  "increase the value of DAC".
Here I disagree with you.

I am also of the opinion that delegates should be separate from workers.  I also feel strongly that dilution should require majority (50%+) approval of "active" shares. 

Gamey, I think your idea that merging this function into the role of delegate simplifies things is wrong and it will have the opposite effect.  It creates more complication and need for "brainpower" than keeping the roles separate.

discussion from a while back:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5467.msg73251#msg73251

[bytemaster]

I propose that the ratio be decided by the voters....

Looks good to me!

 Ability to "hire" entities is always good for a DAC. Imagine a future where a DAC hires another DAC ...

So that leaves us with just deciding on the required approval percentage.

51% ?
75% ?
Dilution based on approval ?

You cannot know what percent of shares are "apathetic" or "available for voting" because shares held as bids/asks/collateral/cold storage may not be voting.  Voter turnout may be low and an apathetic vote can be thought of as "consent" to the active voters. 

You can rank all contestants by their approval level to get a measure of "most approved" and "least approved"

[emski]

I propose that the ratio be decided by the voters....

Looks good to me!

 Ability to "hire" entities is always good for a DAC. Imagine a future where a DAC hires another DAC ...

So that leaves us with just deciding on the required approval percentage.

51% ?
75% ?
Dilution based on approval ?

[gamey]

There is also the fact that a lot of the inflation payments will be publicly discussed.  So in that regard it is not likely to be a single IT guy which you guys seem to fear making decisions. 

If you want to make decisions about whom and what to pay, then put yourself out there, have them pay your firm and be transparent.   The inflation can be directed at someone else to make the decisions. 

If you dislike the decisions delegates are doing, then start a thread and start to discuss it.  If your points are strong then they will likely be accepted.

Please do not attack this by making the software and participation level required even more complicated. 

edit - being a victim of limited brainpower - the above commentary is made not fully understanding what the current model is.  Seems like you guys are going with a board, so nevermind.

[blahblah7up]

and so the first DPOS CEOs are born?