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I see three related workers (1.14.200, 1.14.201, 1.14.202), the latter two apparently being discussed in chinese in . Can someone explain the differences?

Thanks for the fruitful discussion so far! This is really helpful.

* Another option would be to allow the asset holders to enable assets for pairing and specify which pairs could be opened in case the pair has lending enabled too

This is a very good suggestion, also because lending markets interfere with certain other issuer permissions, like override_transfer. Requiring the issuers to explicitly allow lending would give them a means to retain their powers.

I don't think "price" for calls etc should be determined from feeds and other external markets. "Price" should be determined from the market the loans relate to.
Agree. Because margin calls are executed against internal markets, an external price is of limited usefulness for determining how much collateral would be required to buy back the outstanding debt from the market, which is really what the "reference price" is all about. Also, requiring external price feeds won't scale, so IMO that can't be a solution.

As others have pointed out, almost everything we can measure on-chain can be faked, especially in low-volume markets. The catch-22 here is that volume can also be faked. That's why I like this suggestion too:
* Also, i highly recommend to limit the amount of tokens that can be used for lending.

This offloads the decision about volume to an external entity (the issuer), which in turn means we can use a simple internal measure and assume that it is good enough for a lending volume up to the externally defined limit.

The "simple" measure could be "last price", or perhaps slightly better "top of the book if present, otherwise last price" (plus forbid lending on markets that have no "last price").

General Discussion / [Ann] Testnet release 3.2.0
« on: June 23, 2019, 03:22:22 pm »

Core Team has tagged a new testnet release:

Preliminary release notes can be seen here:

Mainnet release is planned for 2019-07-05.

I think we should instead learn from the catastrophic results of the OMO fund, use the accumulated CNY to pay back the OMO debt and return the few remaining OMO funds to the reserve pool.
Use any fuiure CNY fee income to slowly buy back BTS (or maybe trade off-market against BTS, e. g. those escrowed workers that are paid in CNY) and return them to the reserve pool as well.

Meta / Re: Banning!!!
« on: June 19, 2019, 07:58:37 am »
Perhaps think about why you were previously banned, and then don't do that?

Most bans are because of SPAM postings.

Please use GDEX official support. The community can't help you.

General Discussion / Re: Price Feed Review
« on: June 07, 2019, 08:34:28 am »

This. bitUSD is pegged to USD not USDT.

General Discussion / Re: bitusd peg
« on: May 31, 2019, 07:24:43 am »
It always comes down to this...everything gets personal.

I'm sorry if my tone was offensive. It wasn't meant to be.

What I'm trying to say is - it's easy to say "we need this" but it's damn hard to get the details right. I don't see how this idea could be made to work, and despite the fact that it has been brought up repeatedly over the past two years or so, *nobody* has come up with a detailed description of *how exactly* it could be done.

That's why I say "Write a BSIP". *Someone* has to come up and describe the mechanics of a bitasset that is backed by multiple tokes at once. You don't need a deep understanding of MCR and MSSR. Maybe it's even better if you don't know much about these, and come up with your own ideas instead. Write down what you think it means to have an asset backed by two other assets. Describe what different actors in this model can do, like short tokens, trade tokens, settle tokens.

Once you're finished, start attacking your model with questions like mine above - "What if...?". If you model has an answer to all your questions it might be time to show it to the public, and see how it holds against *their* questions. I'm pretty sure if you come up with a working model it will be accepted.

General Discussion / Re: bitusd peg
« on: May 30, 2019, 07:36:49 am »
Open Market or Insurance Fund or Reserve Fund

Settlement is mostly meant to be used when the market does not provide sufficient liquidity, so that's not an answer.
We don't have an Insurance Fund, so you must spec out that too.
We have so far strictly avoided using the reserves for bailing out speculators, and IMO that's a good thing. I hope such a proposal will have little chance to succeed.

Point is this ....needs to get started or once again an opportunity will be blown..

Then go ahead and write a specification. Answering a few select questions on a simple example is not one.

General Discussion / Re: bitusd peg
« on: May 29, 2019, 08:44:21 am »
Given the current crypto bull market sentiment...wouldn't it make sense to for a BSIP to be put up for a vote to accomplish this..?...

Of course it would make sense. Problem is... we don't have such a BSIP. People keep requesting this, but so far nobody has come up with an explanation *how exactly* this would work.

What does it *mean* to have an asset backed by different things? Suppose for example that bitUSD was backed by BTS and OPEN.BTC. Can you short bitUSD by putting up either BTS or OPEN.BTC as collateral? Or 50% of each? What does it mean for forced settlement? Can the settler choose if he receives BTS or OPEN.BTC? If he chooses BTS but the least collateralized short is backed by OPEN.BTC, where does the chain find BTS for him? What if OL goes bankrupt, so the OPEN.BTC collateral is worthless but the BTS collateral is not?

A BSIP must answer all these questions, and many more.

General Discussion / Re: Bitshares at the cross roads
« on: May 23, 2019, 07:40:39 am »
Participating BTS shareholders are voluntarily giving their voting power to BEOS so that BEOS is enabled to integrate with bitshares.

Erm, no. They voluntarily lock up their BTS to receive shares from the raindrop.

If you join the BEOS telegram room you will find a room full of people who support the BEOS team and look forward to them using their voting power to vote in BSIPs for trustless gateways. Claiming that people are only interested in the rainfall is simply not true.

Claiming that every rainfall participant supports the BEOS voting chaos, or whatever other plans the BEOS team might have, is equally untrue.

General Discussion / Re: Bitshares at the cross roads
« on: May 22, 2019, 08:00:29 am »
Participating BTS shareholders are voluntarily giving their voting power to BEOS so that BEOS is enabled to integrate with bitshares.

Erm, no. They voluntarily lock up their BTS to receive shares from the raindrop.

General Discussion / Re: Bitshares at the cross roads
« on: May 19, 2019, 06:52:17 pm »
us upgrading BitShares to a sidechain in the EOS universe

Is that your goal? Why didn't you say so in the rainfall terms?

How about asking people if they actually want that *before* you lure them out of their voting power?

General Discussion / Re: Complaint against clockwork witness
« on: May 14, 2019, 02:32:44 pm »
Perhaps we should turn the witch hunt around and publish screenshots of short positions with low collateral ratio.

These guys are the cancer of BTS and must be punished! Vote for 150% MSSR please!


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