Thanks for clearing it up.

Wow, excellent!

I encourage everybody to support this worker proposal. I think proper research on this matter could produce very interesting and helpful results.

The GUI doesn't connect to cli_wallet. You must connect it to the "rpc-endpoint" of the witness_node.

In order to "link" an external coin to an MPA you must publish a price feed for the MPA.
Or if you want to "link" a UIA to an external coin you must operate a gateway for it.

unlocked >>> gethelp vote_for_witness

Vote for a given witness.

An account can publish a list of all witnesses they approve of. This
command allows you to add or remove witnesses from this list. Each
account's vote is weighted according to the number of shares of the core
asset owned by that account at the time the votes are tallied.

Parameters:
    voting_account: the name or id of the account who is voting with their
        shares (type: string)
    witness: the name or id of the witness' owner account (type: string)
    approve: true if you wish to vote in favor of that witness, false to
        remove your vote in favor of that witness (type: bool)
    broadcast: true if you wish to broadcast the transaction (type: bool)

Returns
    the signed transaction changing your vote for the given witness


You need >70% of the elected witnesses to be actively producing blocks.
Use the `get_global_properties` command in cli_wallet to show the elected witnesses, then use `get_witness <id>` to check that their `last_confirmed_block_num` is recent.

Please check out this proposal and join this discussion.

Thanks for the fruitful discussion so far! This is really helpful.

* Another option would be to allow the asset holders to enable assets for pairing and specify which pairs could be opened in case the pair has lending enabled too

This is a very good suggestion, also because lending markets interfere with certain other issuer permissions, like override_transfer. Requiring the issuers to explicitly allow lending would give them a means to retain their powers.

I don't think "price" for calls etc should be determined from feeds and other external markets. "Price" should be determined from the market the loans relate to.

Agree. Because margin calls are executed against internal markets, an external price is of limited usefulness for determining how much collateral would be required to buy back the outstanding debt from the market, which is really what the "reference price" is all about. Also, requiring external price feeds won't scale, so IMO that can't be a solution.

As others have pointed out, almost everything we can measure on-chain can be faked, especially in low-volume markets. The catch-22 here is that volume can also be faked. That's why I like this suggestion too:

* Also, i highly recommend to limit the amount of tokens that can be used for lending.

This offloads the decision about volume to an external entity (the issuer), which in turn means we can use a simple internal measure and assume that it is good enough for a lending volume up to the externally defined limit.

The "simple" measure could be "last price", or perhaps slightly better "top of the book if present, otherwise last price" (plus forbid lending on markets that have no "last price").

I think we should instead learn from the catastrophic results of the OMO fund, use the accumulated CNY to pay back the OMO debt and return the few remaining OMO funds to the reserve pool.
Use any fuiure CNY fee income to slowly buy back BTS (or maybe trade off-market against BTS, e. g. those escrowed workers that are paid in CNY) and return them to the reserve pool as well.