Witnesses (like employees) are expected to do EVERYTHING right.

<fairy tale>
Alice and Bob are running a window cleaning business, and Charlie is their employee. Alice insists that windows must be cleaned with MagicClean(tm), while Bob insists that windows must be cleaned with WindowMagic(tm).

If Charlie uses MagicClean, Bob will fire him. If Charlie uses WindowMagic, Alice will fire him. What should he do?

Alice and Bob's customers don't care how their windows are cleaned, they're just interested in having clean windows. What should they do?

So the customers (and Charlie as well) go to Dave, who is also running a window cleaning business. Charlie, Dave and the customers live happily ever after, while Alice and Bob go broke.
</fairy tale>

If Alice and Bob were clever they'd sort out their differences among themselves, then tell Charlie about their decision. And NO, the BSIP-42 vote is not a decision, because obviously everyone is reading something else into it.

Stop brute-forcing decisions and find consensus!

Quote from: pc on September 27, 2018, 12:21:25 pm

There are no shorts because both have black-swanned early this year. Interestingly, the markets seem to be ignoring this.

can you elaborate on what you mean by "the markets seem to be ignoring this"? is there a more efficient position the market can take on bit.GOLD currently?

http://cryptofresh.com/a/GOLD

Settlement price is 4,753 BTS/GOLD, that's the exact amount of available backing collateral per bitGOLD.
However, market price is around 10,000 BTS/bitGOLD with a significant spread (highest buy is offering more than 9,500 BTS).

The bitGold and bitSilver are not any longer backed by BTS or no longer need to be backed by BTS because of the black swan?
How was the black swan solved?

Each bitGOLD is backed by 4,753 BTS. The black swan was not resolved, it still persists.

The black swan comes when one collateral is under the ratio of one. Are they any thoughts how we can prevent the market from an individual?
Maybe we should set the min. call ratio to 2.0 for bitSilver, bitGold and bitBTC?

Changing MCR at this time will not help.

How can we increase the supply of bitGold and bitSilver without borrowing?

We can't. They need to be revived first, which is unlikely to happen before BTS price recovers to the level it had earlier this year.

Also see discussion in https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/48

What was your voting for BSIP42 ?

He's currently voting FOR the proposal. http://cryptofresh.com/ballots

with BTS price going down, bitCNY are squeezed out, risk and capital cost of shorts increase. but demand change slowly than that, all these lead to higher premium and vice versa.

that's one problem of smartcoin, when premium go farer from 0 there's nothing to stimulate the premium to go toward 0, and that's why we now try the negative feed back price feeding, hope that can help.

Keep in mind that margin called short positions create automatic demand, and the amount of poorly collateralized bitCNY short positions is the biggest reason for the premium.

The whole theory of bitassets is based upon the premium. If bitXY trades with a premium there is an incentive for shorters to create (and sell) more bitXY, which brings the premium down. If bitXY trades below par there is an incentive for shorters to buy up cheap bitXY and close their positions. In both cases, the market price is driven towards par. Therefore it doesn't make sense to claim that nothing stimulates the premium - the premium exists to stimulate market participants.

Thanks.

Can anyone explain why whaleshares doesn't have the inflation protection for vested balances that steem has?
Why should I *not* claim the sharedrop, withdraw and sell as quickly as the rules allow?

MSSR is an important parameter here, it determine the gap between margin call price and the margin call order sell price, and will impact the behavior of different roles.

the higher the MSSR, the bigger the gap, the easier the margin call order will be eaten, but at the same time, the higher profit of shorting and the bigger the shorting incentive.

the lower the MSSR, the smaller the gap, more difficult the margin call order will be eaten, however at the same time, the lower the profit of shorting and the smaller the shorting incentive.

I'm glad to see that we agree about the mechanisms.

margin call is not bad or good, it will always happen, no use to blame bitCNY shorters who prefer being margin called, they have their risk and they provide liquidity.

I agree that the margin call as such is neither good nor bad. It is, however, an indication of a bad (read: dangerous) situation, i. e. short positions without sufficient collateral, which increases the likelyhood of a black swan.

The health of the system depends on shorters providing sufficient collateral. In bitCNY, shorters don't do that. They prefer being margin called. They even deliberately try to keep the collateral as low as possible, perhaps because only the least collateralized positions can profit from the 5% settlement offset.

IMO this is an indication of a very unhealthy situation. The settlement offset is an incentive for shorters to keep their collateral as low as possible, and the current MSSR isn't sufficient incentive for providing enough collateral. Your suggestion increases the likelyhood of a black swan, as you correctly pointed out above.

Yes, bid_collateral is how a globally settled bitasset can be revived.
When there are sufficient bids available to cover the outstanding debt, and if the collateral of those bids is sufficient in terms of price feed and MCR, the asset will be revived during the next maintenance interval.