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Messages - earthbound

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Ahhhh . . . crickets are wonderful creatures, LOL :)

Only curious--did my posts about iruu's suggestion and also any of my code help out?

(I still vote you get mining donation prizes for getting it done.)


I will do donation mining. Absolutely.

MemoryCoin / Re: [ANN] reverse-engineer of MMC (GPU) miner
« on: January 16, 2014, 01:03:31 am »
How much faster is the MMC GPU miner than the best CPU miner out there, though?

Dunno. I haven't used it or looked further into it, since I don't know the source, and folks here have strongly disapproved of reverse-compiling it (etc.), and I've reluctantly concluded that's probably right and best.

BitShares PTS / Re: Free-server GPU PTS miner?!
« on: January 15, 2014, 08:31:21 pm »
This hack (which I'll offer more detail here on how to do) works for many different miners that are "locked" to one pool:

My instructions here assume you're running Windows (maybe Windows 7). If you're on another platform, you'll have to look up how to modify the hosts file for your platform and/or otherwise redirect inbound/outbound traffic from a particular IP address.

First, shut down your miner (if it's running). Then navigate to:

Code: [Select]
--and double-click the file which is named "hosts." Windows will probably ask you what you want to open the file with; choose any plain text editor.

Then edit that file so that the operating system's networking redirects all traffic related to one address to another address. For example, if the miner is hard-coded to mine at (I think that's, you can add this line to the hosts file:

Code: [Select]
--and then save the hosts file. Then start up your miner again. Voila! Your miner mines somewhere else.

Maybe this post from iruu could point you in the right direction? . . .

Also, I have no idea whether it may help, but you're free to look at the Visual Studio project source files I posted in this archive:

This got all of the files to compile, it's just that the miner doesn't seem to properly communicate with a mining pool. With a traffic monitor, you can see traffic sending out from it, but it seems that no traffic is sent back from the pool; it also eventually throws an error which I looked up and which has to do with not connecting to a network.

A hosts file hack which has been used for other miners also works for this (or, it might, if this miner worked :) ), which allows you to redirect a miner hard-coded to one pool to mine at another (of the same coin and protocol). It's hard-coded right now to, but by using this hack:

You can get it to try connecting to e.g. Er, if that pool uses the same port :/

... I suggest we take Daves gpuhash kernel code which is relatively self contained and easy to get to compile under visual studio and then merge it in with the source for here. I have gotten the kernel to compile no problem. If anyone who is more familiar with the protoshares algorithm is willing to point me in the right direction of what function call I need to replace with a call to daves kernel I will happily give it a shot and put up a github link with the code...

Maybe this post from iruu could point you in the right direction?

If you'd like to PM me with a link to your source archive, I could poke around in it . . . my intent is to create something that we'd release open-source (if we get it working).

BitShares PTS / Re: Free-server GPU PTS miner
« on: January 15, 2014, 04:15:33 am »
Are you asking if any of the GPU miners can be made to mine at whatever pool you want?

Anyway, anyone with problems please send me a PM, thanks

I have sent you an email and one previous PM. I also posted a description of my problem in this thread. You did not respond to any of these messages. I have now sent you another PM.

I've gone back and forth about this, and I feel I must say this.

All of the code which dga used in his development (of a GPU-enabled ProtoShares miner) is either copyleft or open, with the only exception being his original code itself, which simply claims his copyright. However, the expected terms of use of dga's code have been very clearly expressed in the forum. bytemaster paid a very substantial ProtoShares bounty (1,000!) to dga with the express hope that it would lead to open development of a GPU-enabled ProtoShares miner. dga has himself also expressed his wish for others to openly develop modifications to his work. I do not speak for bytemaster or dga, but I will comment on the nature of their comments: their expressions form a very clear verbal license which states that if you produce derived works from dga's source code, you must make the sources for your derived works available.

It is therefore only right that you should make your sources available, or else stop distributing the resultant binaries. Although my modifications to dga's work are only in a development stage, I have made those source modifications publicly available. But I am the only programmer who has released my modified sources.

Programmers: you should either make your modified sources (from dga's work) available, or else stop distributing the resultant binaries.

Your better option is to release your sources, since it was the expectation to begin with that you do so. Moreover, the community will gladly continue to donate to you from their mining proceeds.

Community: if you have not been liberally sharing some of your proceeds to these programmers, please reconsider. They deserve compensation for their hard work.

Aside: I earlier posted a philosophical rant arguing for Invictus to release their sources to the Public Domain. But now I see how sadly necessary express copyleft can be :(


got missing MSVCP110D.dll


Looking into that, apparently that means I didn't properly build it in "release" mode (so even installing the redisributable probably wouldn't fix it). . .

Gronk make dirty hack visual studio windows port compile and run. Gronk post compile and source code here.

Gronk not sure miner actually doing any pool work when run. GPU gears spin-spin, but no output to screen maybe? How make write on screen? Is doing any work? Maybe it work? Please test, advise. Gronk tax disabled for test. Mines at Gronk drink beeeeer mine. Want make mine anywhere. Not do that for now.


Miner in Gronk /src/Release cave.

BitShares PTS / Re: SO the GPU miner.......
« on: January 12, 2014, 07:51:24 pm »
Gronk try make better source miner is CUDA now for Windows. Please test, advise. Thank.

Of course the answers to the rhetorical questions you ask are obvious. Also, the ideas I have presented are naturally outrageous in that they have probably never been tried. But that something has not been tried does not necessarily make it impractical. Nobody may ever know whether it's practical unless they try it.

My expectations about how people would respond to a Public Domain development kit are based on what I think my personal responses would be: I think I would be thunderstruck, and that it would win over my good will even more, and I would want to use the tools in the context which those who release it ask (yet do not demand). But my expected personal response isn't necessarily a predictor for how others would respond.

I do think the general guidelines bytemaster outlined in his OP would work very well, and I'll happily support whatever the community/Invictus decides is best.

I'm puzzled by the apparent implicit expectation that if something is not protected by copyfarleft than it can pave a way for patent trolls etc. A Public Domain Dedication of something which could potentially be patented, but which is not; this would preclude patent trolls from patenting any such thing as the Public Domain Dedication claims and proves as its original invention, and which is already so freely and widely either used or planned for use that nobody could reasonably claim exclusive right to it. There is substantial precident that shows this. The many attempted patents which you describe by e.g. Apple and J.P. morgan are laughed out of the U.S. patent office, because the patent office (surprisingly and wisely!) sees that they are shadows of ideas that nobody can patent because they are already in wide and free use. It's like trying to trademark a number (the way Intel tried to trademark the number 8088, and were laughted at for it). J.P. Morgan's pretentious digital currency patents have been rejected by the Patent office more than a hundred times. So also will Apple's (even if they apply a hundred times). Or, if not, the public has a hella case to bring against Apple, and Apple will not ultimately win, provided the public is willing and able to fight.

About value being made "out of thin air," of course I do not literally mean that the value is made out of thin air. What I do mean is that its a model which can create value with surprising ease--after the train gets going. Of course it takes a terrible lot of sweat, coal and steam to get the train going.

Also, I'm hearing two things at odds:

1) We must protect our investment from abuses e.g. patent trolls or large enterprises who would simply step in and poach our efforts, running off with so much value while giving nothing back.

2) Giving ten percent to the folks who back an enterprise from the get-go is "pittance," so nobody has any reason to do the wrong thing (to not give that ten percent).

Well, if nobody has any reason not to do the right thing, why should we contractually oblige them to?

I believe I am arguing for benevolent anarchism--yes, there are no rules other than that you hope others will do the right thing, because they obviously have no compelling reasons not to. It is an implied contract: I trust you not to mess with me, and I will freely exchange ideas and efforts with you for so long as it seems to me apparent that you will hold by this obligation which is so obvious that yes, of course I formally ask you to do what's right . . . but how do we always know what's right or best? What is right or best can change with circumstances; even drastically.

And what about drastic, unexpected changes? What necesittates benevolent anarchism is precisely the uncertainty which is underscored by the contradictions in your comments. One minute, your comments center on concern about people doing the wrong thing, and the next minute, you emphasize that they clearly have no reason to do the wrong thing--they only have reasons to do the right thing.

Well, which is it?

I think we don't know (and hence we vascillate on the question) because we don't yet know whether the Social Contract we propose to form is even the ideal contract. This technology and social engineering (and it really is social engineering) is so new and so novel that nobody could possibly predict what will come of it. It therefore needs to have a social setting which is so very flexible as to allow people to alter the rules for whatever benevolent purposes they may deem necessary (and which they may be able to persuade others are necessary). I challenge even your assertion that we know what will necessarily protect and best promote our investment, and that approach X will work while approach Y will not.

Now, maybe I've run into a self-contradiction here; in that I don't know whether benevolent anarchism will work; or whether there's any guarantee that it will work: can I really say it will work and a Social Contract won't?

No, I can't--but the difference is that benevolent anarchism admits this and, I'm concerned, a Social Contract . . . might try to hedge about that; to say "we are sure this set of rules will work."

No, we are not sure this will work.

But we do hope it will.

I do not like a proposed contract because I believe that in an absolutely free/frictionless commerce, if the majority happens to generally foster good will and make prudent decisions by the merits of their own instincts and conscience, the good majority will win, no matter what anyone with ill-will (or simply foolish will) may try to impose on them. Again, that's assuming or hoping that the majority generally favors what happens to be objectively good for everyone. If the majority picks otherwise, if the majority happens to be foolish or ill-willed, we're toast, and yes, that's chaotic/unruly anarchism. But if the majority makes poor choices, then there is not any system that can make it otherwise, period.

This is way too young and way too wild to say with any certainty what contracts will best predict a bright future and which contracts will not. I therefore propose the contract of maximal risk, because I want the potential maximal rewards of risking that others will do right by the community (really the world), which I hope and believe they will.

But I won't pretend that I could protect myself from people disappointing me, whatever set of rules I would impose in whatever circumstance--circmustances that can change so wildly that I may have a hard time recollecting next year why I wanted a certain set of now-discarded rules.

Consider this scenario (and this is one I've actually been ruminating on, and I would love to make this DAC); suppose somebody invents a DAC: "ID Squatter DAC," which somehow manages to be able to both generate and hide private keys from everyone, including itself, until some certain condition is met. And suppose that the private keys it hides happen to be for Keyhotee IDs which it automatically mined using GPUs, so that it mines ten thousand highly desirable IDs in a week, and then squats on those IDs, only dispensing the private keys for them, securely, to the highest bidders, such that the DAC itself can guarantee that it does not know the private keys and that only the highest bidder can know the keys (e.g. Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, famous Hollywood director X, famous politician Y). Moreover, ID Squatter DAC also does all this from its own blockchain which is independent of Protoshares, let's call it HorkedIDShares, and this independent blockchains shares operates similarly to the BitShares/BitBTC exchange; HorkedIDShares can be used as collateral investment in a seperate exchange blockchain, ProtoSquatter, which somehow finds a way to deprecate the value of ProtoShares unless people pay seriously high "registration" fees to ID Squatter DAC. Now we've got a market that completely disrupts the foundational assumption that nobody would want to bid on Keyhotee IDs, in the same way that (supposedly) nobody wants to bid on an email addresses. (We've also got a DAC that it would be very tempting to sell for a few billion dollars when evil parties realize how much power they could abuse with this DAC.) We have something monetized which we never imagined could or should be monetized.

Are we sure about our assumption that unique and desirable Keyhotee IDs could have no further value than the face value we assign to them based on our assumptions about how they will be used or function? Are we sure they can't be used in some very unexpected ways that might make them more highly valuable--and therefore purchaseable--than we might have thought?

Now, what do we do with the promise that we'd give Keyhotee Founders precedence in profits--when some weird bloke with his insance DAC came along and smashed our expectations to smithereens, by suddenly making a "killing" on something--free Keyhotee IDs--which he found a way to seriously exploit in ways we couldn't have guessed?

What do we do with our entire technological and investment infrastructure if market innovations prove to turn our foundational assumptions on their head?

What we do is found the whole enterprise on an implied contract which can be as drastically flexible as drastic unpredicatability may warrant: A Public Domain Dedication, or benevolent anarchy.

(And let the Founders figure out how to increase the value of their Founder ID proceeds which have been seriously devalued by ID Squatter DAC.)

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