I just stumbled upon this https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LuPCAh9FCc
It is the best thing I heard for a long while. I has just been a great insight for me personally but I also think it has two implications which this forum might be interested in apart from the benefits of non violent language itself.

Often fights start of on the forum because of two things (this is just my theory, might be wrong). Because people judge others and because people interpret the statements of others beyond what can objectively be said about those statements. It then gets worse if both parties take part in this two sided process.

Also there is a great parallel between Daniel's non violent / non state vision of society (I don't know enough about it, so I would have to interpret it too much to have an opinion about it ). But what I know I can say is that the objective great. 
For me the theory underlying the video implies two things:
(1) This non violent society vision can only work if not only institutions but also minds/culture/language changes.
(2) There is a possibility to practice the non violent society everyday (on the forum, with other communities, with the media).

Just thought this (the video) had a very powerful message. I have to watch the rest myself though...

http://youtu.be/7_i7UHjrjQ4?t=14m30s

Haha

Would you agree?

Normal POS:
Contra:
- With competitive tx fees: Gets centralized with those that have a big stake. More centralized than DPOS in the end (if pay back delegates do not flourish).
- [crossed out] If not delegation is not an option, which is assumed here in order to analyze the two different types of systems, a lot of stake (!) has to be online which is pretty insecure. Is that still correct or can you lease (with NXT) to yourself? <- based on this https://nxtforum.org/general-discussion/nxt-pos-vs-bitshares-dpos/msg70367/#msg70367 I would cross out this disadvantage. Further verification would be good though.

DPOS:
Contra:
- Delegates do not have the same interest in the success of the system as when shareholders = forgers.
- An attacker could put up 52 delegates and let them gain the trust of shareholders over a long time and then perform one big attack after which he would be out. This would be cheaper than buying 51 % of the stake but maybe not possible at all.

Further pros and cons?

Higher tx volume and scales better is not an argument because the few forgers with non delegated POS could also have expensive, reliable forging servers and with transparent forging it is known in advance who produces the next block like with DPOS.

I was trying to import a electrum wallet. I saved electrums's default_wallet file and was trying to import that.
I got the following message back:

4 parse_error_exception: Parse Error

failed to parse electrum wallet

��� {}

��� th_a� electrum.cpp:232 electrumwallet



��� {}

��� th_a� electrum.cpp:272 import_electrum_wallet

error importing bitcoin wallet /home/lubts/Desktop/default_wallet

��� {"wallet_dat":"/home/lubts/Desktop/default_wallet","account_name":"lubts2"}

��� th_a� wallet.cpp:3600 import_electrum_wallet

��� {}

��� th_a� common_api_client.cpp:643 wallet_import_electrum



��� {"command":"wallet_import_electrum"}

��� th_a� cli.cpp:540 execute_command

The questionmarks are spaces...

More detailed explanation why we souldn't give "pay back delegates" a perspective right from the start is here https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5868.msg78966#msg78966

Goals (arranged acc. to subjective importance, most important first):
(1) Minimizing the influence of (obviously) bad actors.
(2) Prevent centralization. Source for centralization https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5775.0 There might be a free rider (group trap) problem depending on how high the tx fees are that you get back for voting for the giving back delegate. I think it is likely that people can not estimate how much they can loose (together with everyone else) in relation to what they gain and simply take the additional gain because it is the most obvious benefit. Then the free rider problem is there no matter what the estimate is approximately in reality. (2) is interrelated to (1) as a bad actor could use the pay bcak to voters scheme as a means to gain control. But decentralization also has benefits of it's own so it is an own own point.
(3) Maximum representation (= percentage of shares equals percentage of approved delegates).

Instruments / suggestions:
(a) delegation of votes (= your voting power is distributed among those you vote for)
(b) approval voting (= you can give as many delegates as you want (variant: only a limited amount of delegates) your approval, each approval vote has the same weight.
(c) negative votes (= vote against a delegates in style (a) or in style (b)). Variant (d): Negatives votes could be weighted more than the positive votes (e.g. 1 negative vote + 2 positive votes = 0). Variant (e): limit the amounts of negative votes in case negative votes are style (b) / via disapproval voting. 

Effects/propositions:
- (a) and (b) equally lead to (2) if people perception is that they gain more from voting for the delegates that pays out the most tx fees to his voters compared to his competing delegates and/or if the actually gain/looses estimate is in favor of such behavior.
- approval voting is better to minimize the influence of a potentially bad actor.
- In the end negative votes is the same as positive votes. Just the procedure is different. Right? (didn't think long about this)   

I don't know if "the give back to voters" attack can be prevented without a "social ban". I don't know a solution. Ask a game theory specialist...

Merockstar brought up that question: How and in what are dividends paid. There are basically two options: Shares in the company itself (eg. Idea5Coins) or in another currency (eg. xts, btc or bts me). Is there any clarity yet about this. Here were my thoughts:
If dividends are paid out in Idea5Coins, there are different options:
- pay from the issuer's funds he held for a long time (should work)
- buy shares from the open market (vunerable to insider trading, incl. the issuer fooling his investors)
- create new shares (can't work, market cap shouldnt change)

But paying dividends in Idea5Coins might always be problematic if the market cap isnt big and the price is volatile. 

Another requirement for paying in Idea5Coins might be that shareholders/investors not only profit from the promise to pay out profits in Idea5Coins but also own the company in every other respect (own the Idea5Coins manufacturing machines and get their shares when the company is sold). Otherwise there is no value outside Idea5Coins that would give it value in the first place. 

DOPS: Couldn't an attacker that controls 51% of a DPOS network mine blocks in disguise and this way double spend coins when his hidden chain has caught up?
Contra argument: When 51% of the delegates mine a hidden chain they can't mine the currently longest chain. This would lead to them being "unvoted" (based choice of words for approval voting i can think of).

POW: If the Ghash mining pool operator begins to mine a hidden chain he couldn't mine for profit in the mean time and all miners with Ghash would jump off the Ghash pool.
Correct?

Is mining a hidden chain the only way to double spend?
 

Saturday 07 June 2014 w/ Bytemaster

Please ask and vote on questions to be asked here: http://www.reddit.com/r/BeyondBitcoinShow/comments/270zpu/submit_questions_for_7_june_2014_dev_voice/