Best Selling Option

[canucklehead]

The changes are also taking into account that the system should run flawlessly if this website and Bytemaster ceased to exist at any time.  The current system is far too bitshares website-centric.  I want to remove as much of the human element as possible and automate as much as possible.

This quote is really something to think about. And so is this one...

Put yourself in the shoes of a potential witness and ask yourself: "is this a good deal for me?"  If the answer is no then the only witnesses you will attract are those who are deriving benefits from being a witness other than their witness pay.   The witness cannot serve two masters, so will be loyal to where their pay comes from and not to the blockchain.   Do you really want to encourage that?

[r0ach]

What about bytemaster idea on the mumble session about a reputation system?...
so the witnesses could "win"/deserve  his place putting his reputation on stake/risk instead of his money/bts...
As bytemaster mentioned, reputation has more value over collateral and it gives the opportunity to "poor" witnesses also to participate and not only "sharks" ...

I'd rather have a secure system that runs on game theory than an insecure system designed for poor people...

Anything PoS derived is already an aristocracy in the first place.  Trying to make it not one just removes the game theory elements that make it function at all.  We already see how this works in Bitcoin, how it works in theory, but as soon as you introduce mining pools, a separate layer of abstration is applied that makes the system not function anything like the PDF describes.

If you wanted to introduce reputation in DPoS, it would have to be applied equally with stake then divided by two to average it or some other ratio instead of applying reputation as the last layer that takes precedent over everything else.

It's easy to create an inefficient Rube Goldberg machine once you get to the level of arbitrary reputation variables instead of simply relying on game theory.  Blockchains work best when hedging finite resources as a backbone of the system.  Collateral is a finite resource and reputation is a pseudo finite resource that's much easier to game than collateral.  Due to this, if you were to introduce reputation at all, which I'm not sure it's a good idea, it would need to be something like a 30/70 split with stake being the 70% of the equation.  Once again, they would need to be averaged on the same layer and not with reputation taking precedent as the last layer.

Next time you talk to Bytemaster in audio, have him address the Liberty Reserve issue as well.  How if a govt entity comes after it, the system needs to be resilient in losing many delegates at once and recovering without having to go through a pope (bytemaster) annointing process.  It needs to be able to recover with ease assuming this website and Bytemaster don't exist at all, meaning the delegate selection process needs to be much more automated.  If someone passes a law against Bitshares, you need to be able to say, well, I'm not operating that, it just exists out there like a virus.  Bitshares doesn't operate like a virus, that's the problem.  It won't attract big dollars until it does because that means it can't be legislated out of existence with ease.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_Reserve

[liondani]

I address these ideas on Mumble, but will state it again here.

1.  Locking funds away only makes sense to someone expecting a Return on Investment for doing so.
2.  That return on investment will have to come from witness pay (if honest) or from some backroom deal (if dishonest)

As a witness you have the ability to influence the price DOWN by misbehaving, but very little ability to influence the price UP.  This means that locking funds away means you are exposed to the DOWNSIDE risk of any mistakes you make, but have nothing to gain except your witness pay of you do your job well.

Anyone with more than $50,000 locked up could do better elsewhere.   Anyone with less than $50,000 locked up doesn't have much to lose if they are intent on attacking the network.   

Put yourself in the shoes of a potential witness and ask yourself: "is this a good deal for me?"  If the answer is no then the only witnesses you will attract are those who are deriving benefits from being a witness other than their witness pay.   The witness cannot serve two masters, so will be loyal to where their pay comes from and not to the blockchain.   Do you really want to encourage that?

for anybody interested that's the part on the mumble session where bytemaster answered abouts r0ach approach   
https://soundcloud.com/liondani

[liondani]

What about bytemaster idea on the mumble session about a reputation system?...
so the witnesses could "win"/deserve  his place putting his reputation on stake/risk instead of his money/bts...
As bytemaster mentioned, reputation has more value over collateral and it gives the opportunity to "poor" witnesses also to participate and not only "sharks" ...

[r0ach]

I think a prerequisite should be that the person must join the test network for a period of time and demonstrate they a proficient in managing a witness. After that a they can be released into the the pool of users that quality to be voted on for the witness role. Just like there are metrics to judge a poor performing witness, there should be metrics to prove worthy of being a witness.

Do you know how ridiculous this idea sounds?  Do you think Bitcoin would exist at all if it was that easy for government agencies to shut it down?  Their attack vector is  to simply stand in front of the test net?  I feel like I'm surrounded by crazy people.

Click this link and then re-write your post with a new solution that would prevent a government agency from taking it down:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_Reserve

The only viable method I know of is that collateral bid system for delegate selection.  Nobody is going to invest in Bitshares if all a govt agency has to do is shut down this website to win.

The delegate replacement process has to be easy, seamless, and as autonomous as possible.  Any solution people suggest that involves asking Bytemaster to let them be a delegate is completely asinine.

[Pheonike]

when someone asked me "what do I need to do to try and become a Bitshares miner/delegate?"

Show the community that you deserve to be a miner:

Tell us who you are, where you live, show us proof that you kick ass, or show us a picture of your gear, tell us your business plan, or impersonate Ken Code.  Tell us what you plan to use all your mined BTS for.  Be creative, or just be f'n cool, and make us laugh.  Tell us who you know, drop some names.  Have your famous friend sport a BitShares T-Shirt to the Grammys.

when someone asked me "what do I need to do to try and become a Bitshares miner/delegate?"

you tell them:

"simple...just do the exact same thing you do on a job interview for any job:"


sell yourself

Good miners are a dime a dozen today.  You need to differentiate yourself from the rest.  BitShares mining is all about being a good community member... we want good team players, dedicated fanatics, or people who just want to structure their political and financial lives/careers within the ecosystem.

I think a prerequisite should be that the person must join the test network for a period of time and demonstrate they a proficient in managing a witness. After that a they can be released into the the pool of users that quality to be voted on for the witness role. Just like there are metrics to judge a poor performing witness, there should be metrics to prove worthy of being a witness.

[monsterer]

As a witness you have the ability to influence the price DOWN by misbehaving, but very little ability to influence the price UP.  This means that locking funds away means you are exposed to the DOWNSIDE risk of any mistakes you make, but have nothing to gain except your witness pay of you do your job well.

In the current system, there is zero exposure to downside risk at all, which means there is nothing to lose by misbehaving. I find it difficult to see why that is better?

[r0ach]

when someone asked me "what do I need to do to try and become a Bitshares miner/delegate?"

Show the community that you deserve to be a miner:

Tell us who you are, where you live, show us proof that you kick ass, or show us a picture of your gear, tell us your business plan, or impersonate Ken Code.  Tell us what you plan to use all your mined BTS for.  Be creative, or just be f'n cool, and make us laugh.  Tell us who you know, drop some names.  Have your famous friend sport a BitShares T-Shirt to the Grammys.

when someone asked me "what do I need to do to try and become a Bitshares miner/delegate?"

you tell them:

"simple...just do the exact same thing you do on a job interview for any job:"


sell yourself

Good miners are a dime a dozen today.  You need to differentiate yourself from the rest.  BitShares mining is all about being a good community member... we want good team players, dedicated fanatics, or people who just want to structure their political and financial lives/careers within the ecosystem.

It's supposed to be a "DAC".  Your answer was not autonomous or decentralized at all.  You need to think of a better answer.  Especially one that doesn't entirely revolve around this website.

What if they only speak Japanese?  What if they only speak Spanish?

Bitshares is currently designed to draw as little new people in as possible because there's no valid entry point in doing things like becoming a delegate.  Whatever answer you give me should make the assumption that this website does not exist at all as well.

The collateral bid system is the only valid way I know of to bring new people into the system in this manner.

What if a govt entity goes after Bitshares like they did for Liberty Reserve and shut down this website?  There has to be an automated way of replacing delegates with ease:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_Reserve

[r0ach]

plus we want to differentiate ourselves from the DASH "pay to play" meme

BitShares - everyone is free to compete to be a miner/witness, especially the poor

No, this is not true, such as the example from today when someone asked me "what do I need to do to try and become a Bitshares miner/delegate?"

There is no valid answer to this question.  What am I supposed to tell him?  Go beg Bytemaster or some other random person he doesn't know to vote for them?  There is no valid point of entry in becoming a delegate.  The point of entry should not be entirely centralized around this website either.   There should be a free market answer to this question that doesn't involve this website or begging some random guy they don't know.

You should be able to give an answer such as "purchase X amount of Bitshares and put up collateral" or something to that end.

[Thom]

Well said BM, even better and more concisely than on mumble.

[bytemaster]

I address these ideas on Mumble, but will state it again here.

1.  Locking funds away only makes sense to someone expecting a Return on Investment for doing so.
2.  That return on investment will have to come from witness pay (if honest) or from some backroom deal (if dishonest)

As a witness you have the ability to influence the price DOWN by misbehaving, but very little ability to influence the price UP.  This means that locking funds away means you are exposed to the DOWNSIDE risk of any mistakes you make, but have nothing to gain except your witness pay of you do your job well.

Anyone with more than $50,000 locked up could do better elsewhere.   Anyone with less than $50,000 locked up doesn't have much to lose if they are intent on attacking the network.   

Put yourself in the shoes of a potential witness and ask yourself: "is this a good deal for me?"  If the answer is no then the only witnesses you will attract are those who are deriving benefits from being a witness other than their witness pay.   The witness cannot serve two masters, so will be loyal to where their pay comes from and not to the blockchain.   Do you really want to encourage that?

[liondani]

My main interest in the Bitshares system is that it's base framework is the easiest to fix to create an actual valid system in terms of high TPS and sufficient game theory.  If changes like this aren't done, it's just going to clumsily stumble along for years with a low market cap and constant "vote these delegates out" threads.  The changes I mention aren't some random spur of the moment thing, it's changes I would make to not feel like I'm doing something stupid by investing in it.  Changes that would also allow it to beat Bitcoin.

The changes are also taking into account that the system should run flawlessly if this website and Bytemaster ceased to exist at any time.  The current system is far too bitshares website-centric.  I want to remove as much of the human element as possible and automate as much as possible.

luckily bytemaster is open-minded and he makes changes whenever he sees value on it... I am very optimistic he will consider all this ideas. I personally like your approach r0ach 

[r0ach]

I don't think that "game theory candidates" is true. You have to demonstrate there is not a benefit to having the majority or a large portion of candidates under the control of 1. It is sort of a half-assed game-theoretical approach, but nothing says it is a optimal/un-exploitable solution.

A flat rate only puts an upper limit on number of sybil nodes, while a bid system improves on it much further.  The only thing needed is to lock the collateral and make it unable to be used for your sybil delegates to vote for each other.  There are numerous different ways to accomplish this lock.  This is not the most optimal way, but if you wanted to do a rush job for BTS 2.0, one of the more exotic methods would be to have some type of asset on the exchange people purchase at a 1:1 ratio, "delegate token" or whatever you want to call it, then the voting list sorts people by how many delegate tokens they have in their account and puts them at the top.

Like I said, not the best way to do it, but just thinking of a way it could be rushed for BTS 2.0 on time.

exactly that is what I think about yesterday! Brilliant and easy to implement!

PS make it sense not to let the purchase ratio of the witness-asset 1:1 but let the market decide how valuable it is to get a witness?Let the market decide how much security they want

That would be a huge mistake.  I can't even imagine how much drama would ensue from people trying to corner the delegate token market.  Bytemaster or somebody would buy a ton and then people would be calling it a pyramid scheme for the next 10 years.  It has to be 1:1 if implemented that way.  Since the currency inflates, if it's too hard to do a 1:1 peg for some reaosn, you could just issue 100 billion of them from the start and have them exchange at 1:1 ratio.

Anyway, it blows my mind people don't understand the current Bitshares voting system is broken.  The fact that threads even exist called "Vote these delegates out" proves this.  The collateral bid system not only fixes numerous other terminal flaws like voter apathy, it also fixes zombie delegates since you can just make each collateral bid not automatically roll over and have them expire.

I'm not a long time Bitshares fan or anything by the way.  I consider all the current coins out there extremely lacking.  My main interest in the Bitshares system is that it's base framework is the easiest to fix to create an actual valid system in terms of high TPS and sufficient game theory.  If changes like this aren't done, it's just going to clumsily stumble along for years with a low market cap and constant "vote these delegates out" threads.  The changes I mention aren't some random spur of the moment thing, it's changes I would make to not feel like I'm doing something stupid by investing in it.  Changes that would also allow it to beat Bitcoin.

The changes are also taking into account that the system should run flawlessly if this website and Bytemaster ceased to exist at any time.  The current system is far too bitshares website-centric.  I want to remove as much of the human element as possible and automate as much as possible.

[Pheonike]

It's better to start with a low number and let voters increase it over time. This will demonstrate the system working.  It will always be easier to increase the number than decrease because people will always lean towards more being better no matter what the justification for less is. So I say 21 is a good starting point. People will vote to increase it for sure.

[38PTSWarrior]

If the security is as good with 17 as with 100 then we just have to explain this to the buyer and that's it.

If we don't lose anything with 100 then we should stick to 100 and change it later if there is a need for optimization. I doubt that 100 vs 17 is a significant optimization and the cost in terms of perception isn't worth it.

I don't think perception is important. When you buy a computer, the seller would say 'it has only 2 gb but because it's faster than the old 4 gb ram module it's better.'

100 is too much cause of voter apathy.

Be careful, I just woke up and am maybe not qualified to write here.