Best Selling Option

[Empirical1.2]

the community does not want to give up control

Gold has successfully outlasted all attempts at human controlled currency

until now

www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAAahUKEwj_rsqp-5nIAhXFWD4KHdBsCkA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fbullion.directory%2Fcern-scientists-create-230m-dollars-gold-in-lab%2F&usg=AFQjCNHcpjSqjeHY7fxPRhcms9q7xiIlog

wait... no... pay no attention to this fact... it is false

Yeah was an April 1st 

Gold's long term future isn't certain though, Asteroid mining, Sea-Water gold extraction, nuclear transmutation etc.

The point is though that when humans control a money supply they invariably find reasons to inflate it and destroy it's value over time.

[Empirical1.2]

interesting. ....it appears that the community does not want to give up dynamic control of their miners to a central authorative algorithm (the protocol) even in the event of extreme voter apathy. why do you insist on clinging to this freedom? why do you seek such control over your own destiny?  wouldn't you prefer that your government (the smartchain) handle this potential terrible threat for you?  Does not the thought of personally choosing some evil miners terrify you?  why do you insist on taking personal responsibility for your mistakes?  don't you want to be able to blame someone else when something bad happens?  Just let Goldman handle the mining and nothing bad can ever be your fault.  you do not have to vote. you still have the right to remain silent.

I personally have different views for companies vs. currencies. I like immutable currencies and am not opposed to algorithmic solutions for simple crypto-currencies. Gold has successfully outlasted all attempts at human controlled currency for many obvious reasons.

I'm also not opposed to the idea of some fall-back system for BTS but don't think the collateral bid system is a good solution.

[gamey]

@r0ach have you ever thought that even "collateral bid" is not more secure if the attack is organized from very wealthie/rich witnesses? (like Goldman Sachs or Soros )
I mean a entity  for example that owns $1billion  dollars in "savings", could easily damage the  bts block-chain ...
In our eyes we would assume that they have much to loose compared with the "poor" witnesses when in reality their "big" stake  on bts would be like nothing compared with their overall wealth (less than 1%).... So in reality they have nothing to loose compared with a "poor" witness that has for example at stake  $10.000 from a total of $50.000.... Which one will secure the network better? Which one looses more?  On this example obvious the "poor" witness will probably secure it better....Not?

This is why claims of game theory should be very suspect. Yes a collateral system aligns incentives, but do not confuse it with game theory. At least not any of the game theory I ever learned.

[BunkerChainLabs-DataSecurityNode]

Which part of 'applicants for the BOD make their case through various communication channels and shareholders evaluate them and vote.' was unclear?

Shareholders, plural, vet candidates not just Bytemaster.  Various communication channels, plural, not just this website.

Decentralized voting and decentralized communication by shareholders to manage a decentralized company.

Yes, I'm familiar with Liberty reserve.

Does Bytemaster look like an underground criminal mastermind to you?  He's gonna fold like an accordion and run for the hills if Bitshares is legislated against.  People aren't going to risk operating through "various communication channels" and going to prison.  The political process can't function in that manner in the first place.  The political process requires operating out in the open.  The only way for the system to continue in that context is by being much more automated, such as the collateral bid system, where some Russian oligarch off in god know's where will pick up the slack that you've never met in your life.

In 2.0 anyone can make a proposal to do BTS development work & BM albeit a large holder is just one of a thousand, soon to be tens of thousands of shareholders. If there's legislation in any of our jurisdictions we can make a decision to sell our shares most likely to people in legal jurisdictions or where enforcement is harder & communication easier.

There will be countries where BTS is legal, thrives and communication is easy.  As for the rest, shadow economies, companies and their employees make up 23% of global GDP & a decentralized company is much harder to shut down, so there will probably still be a future for BTS wherever it fills a need.

Argentina is a good example of where USD to Peso at black market rates is illegal but the practice is pervasive. With widespread selling and communication networks, the rates were even published in newspapers. It is perhaps a good template for how BTS might function in similar countries if it fulfils a similar need.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/article-2548646/Tourists-crisis-hit-Argentina-using-black-market-favourable-exchange-rates.html

  The only way for the system to continue in that context is by being much more automated, such as the collateral bid system, where some Russian oligarch off in god know's where will pick up the slack that you've never met in your life.

The current system is a decentralised version of what has worked well to create successful and competitive companies for hundreds of years.

Whereas the collateral bid system could make it very easy to attack BitShares imo because it's unlikely our current trusted and talented witnesses could put up more than 500k BTS each as collateral, so it would allow attackers to be voted in by apathetic shareholders who we know outnumber active ones with as little as 8 million BTS in a 31 witness system vs. the cost of needing to buy 300 million + BTS currently, plus the large loss you would take trying to sell such a big position rapidly after having voted in your bad witnesses but prior to an an attack.

  response.

This collateral proposal I think is flawed in the premise of what the collateral accomplishes. The added security that is being sought was aptly talked about in the last hangout a few days ago regarding political will.

We might gain some lessons from dogie on this one.

[Method-X]

The current system is a decentralised version of what has worked well to create successful and competitive companies for hundreds of years.

He's right. Start with what's been proven to work and iterate from there.

[Empirical1.2]

Which part of 'applicants for the BOD make their case through various communication channels and shareholders evaluate them and vote.' was unclear?

Shareholders, plural, vet candidates not just Bytemaster.  Various communication channels, plural, not just this website.

Decentralized voting and decentralized communication by shareholders to manage a decentralized company.

Yes, I'm familiar with Liberty reserve.

Does Bytemaster look like an underground criminal mastermind to you?  He's gonna fold like an accordion and run for the hills if Bitshares is legislated against.  People aren't going to risk operating through "various communication channels" and going to prison.  The political process can't function in that manner in the first place.  The political process requires operating out in the open.  The only way for the system to continue in that context is by being much more automated, such as the collateral bid system, where some Russian oligarch off in god know's where will pick up the slack that you've never met in your life.

In 2.0 anyone can make a proposal to do BTS development work & BM albeit a large holder is just one of a thousand, soon to be tens of thousands of shareholders. If there's legislation in any of our jurisdictions we can make a decision to sell our shares most likely to people in legal jurisdictions or where enforcement is harder & communication easier.

There will be countries where BTS is legal, thrives and communication is easy.  As for the rest, shadow economies, companies and their employees make up 23% of global GDP & a decentralized company is much harder to shut down, so there will probably still be a future for BTS wherever it fills a need.

Argentina is a good example of where USD to Peso at black market rates is illegal but the practice is pervasive. With widespread selling and communication networks, the rates were even published in newspapers. It is perhaps a good template for how BTS might function in similar countries if it fulfils a similar need.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/article-2548646/Tourists-crisis-hit-Argentina-using-black-market-favourable-exchange-rates.html

  The only way for the system to continue in that context is by being much more automated, such as the collateral bid system, where some Russian oligarch off in god know's where will pick up the slack that you've never met in your life.

The current system is a decentralised version of what has worked well to create successful and competitive companies for hundreds of years.

Whereas the collateral bid system could make it very easy to attack BitShares imo because it's unlikely our current trusted and talented witnesses could put up more than 500k BTS each as collateral, so it would allow attackers to be voted in by apathetic shareholders who we know outnumber active ones with as little as 8 million BTS in a 31 witness system vs. the cost of needing to buy 300 million + BTS currently, plus the large loss you would take trying to sell such a big position rapidly after having voted in your bad witnesses but prior to an an attack.

[r0ach]

Which part of 'applicants for the BOD make their case through various communication channels and shareholders evaluate them and vote.' was unclear?

Shareholders, plural, vet candidates not just Bytemaster.  Various communication channels, plural, not just this website.

Decentralized voting and decentralized communication by shareholders to manage a decentralized company.

Yes, I'm familiar with Liberty reserve.

Does Bytemaster look like an underground criminal mastermind to you?  He's gonna fold like an accordion and run for the hills if Bitshares is legislated against.  People aren't going to risk operating through "various communication channels" and going to prison.  The political process can't function in that manner in the first place.  The political process requires operating out in the open.  The only way for the system to continue in that context is by being much more automated, such as the collateral bid system, where some Russian oligarch off in god know's where will pick up the slack that you've never met in your life.

[Helikopterben]

Click this link and then re-write your post with a new solution that would prevent a government agency from taking it down:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_Reserve

Its ridiculous to compare bitshares to a centralized custodial model such as liberty reserve. 

Nobody is going to invest in Bitshares if all a govt agency has to do is shut down this website to win.

They don't have to shut down this website to win.  They have to gain enough votes to control 51% of the network, and that will buy them a day or two, until the community clones the system and introduces a new chain with all the attacker's shares revoked.  It will be messy with some potential damage done, but the system will survive.

Any solution people suggest that involves asking Bytemaster to let them be a delegate is completely asinine.

Again, delegates have to gain shareholder approval, not Bytemaster approval.  I appreciate your concern and I think you have some viable ideas, but some things you are saying is borderline fud. 


I think you underestimate the importance of:
1) digital signatures
2) the ability of the system to clone/fork at will

The same goes for bitcoin, nxt, ethereum and even ripple.  The consensus mechanisms of these systems are sufficiently decentralized, with ripple being the most centralized, but most likely still sufficiently decentralized.  There is no need to find the holy grail of decentralization.  Sufficiently decentralized is good enough.  Of course this theory will be tested at higher levels of adoption and higher market caps, but I think it will hold.


Here are my thoughts on blockchain governance that I said a while back:

I like Mike Hearn's assessment of how blockchain governance works most efficiently and effectively.  Basically, you have one core group of guys, or even one leader in some cases, who make most of the decisions and everyone for the most part just goes along with it and gives their input here and there.  However, blockchain governance gives us one, last-resort, fail-safe measure to override the decisions of those core developers if we have to.  In the case of bitcoin, there is a network of miners who can override the decisions of the core devs if need be and in bitshares the stakeholders have the power to override the decisions of the core devs, which is more efficient.

I like to think of it as insurance - it's something you purchase but hope you never have to use.  Hopefully the tree out in my front yard never falls on my car but I'm going to buy insurance just in case it does and if by chance a huge storm comes up and blows that tree over on my car, then I will use my insurance to protect myself financially.  It will be a big inconvenience and something I didn't want to have to do in the first place, but at least I was protected. 

Same goes for bitshares.  As a shareholder I would rather just vote for BM & Co to run the show.  They created this project and got it to where it is today, so i dont see any better alternative.  I probably won't change my vote for every little change that needs to be made or new feature that needs to be added.  However, if the core devs attempt to completely compromise the system for any reason, then I can use my "insurance" to override their decisions along with all other stakeholders.  It will be a huge inconvenience to figure out what is going on and how best to use my vote to protect the integrity of the system - and it will likely be ugly and get a little messy, but at least I am protected just in case and we as shareholders can prevent the destruction of the system by a small group of people.  However, hopefully things go along business-as-usual and I don't have to take any action.

tl;dr  I don't see voter apathy as a big problem, but voters who do not vote for a proxy should have votes expire or decay over time.  Most of us will probably just vote for a proxy that goes along with cnx and the vision of bitshares and only use our voting power if serious issues arise.  That will be the most efficient and effective way to run this blockchain.

[Empirical1.2]

What is your suggestion for bringing new delegates into the system and satisfying game theory metrics while making the assumption this website and Bytemaster don't exist?  The only possible way is with some type of finite resource.

Similarly to how traditional companies work, applicants for the BOD make their case through various communication channels and shareholders evaluate them and vote.

I don't know. Are there many successful companies that instead of choosing a BOD which shareholders think are best for the job, chooses people based on how many shares they post as collateral?

Bitshares has USD and gold pegs, just like Liberty Reserve, so your idea is a centralized solution that can easily be legislated against and taken down just like the previous Liberty Reserve?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_Reserve

You're saying Bytemaster needs to vet all candidates?  So when a govt agency passes legislation, he then needs to flee the country to some 3rd world country and vet candidates from there?  Woops, that's what the Liberty Reserve people did, they went to Costa Rica and the US govt still got them heh.  The system has to be automated like a virus to avoid legislation from one of 200 different countries thinking they control it.

Which part of 'applicants for the BOD make their case through various communication channels and shareholders evaluate them and vote.' was unclear?

Shareholders, plural, vet candidates not just Bytemaster.  Various communication channels, plural, not just this website.

Decentralized voting and decentralized communication by shareholders to manage a decentralized company.

Yes, I'm familiar with Liberty reserve.

[r0ach]

What is your suggestion for bringing new delegates into the system and satisfying game theory metrics while making the assumption this website and Bytemaster don't exist?  The only possible way is with some type of finite resource.

Similarly to how traditional companies work, applicants for the BOD make their case through various communication channels and shareholders evaluate them and vote.

I don't know. Are there many successful companies that instead of choosing a BOD which shareholders think are best for the job, chooses people based on how many shares they post as collateral?

Bitshares has USD and gold pegs, just like Liberty Reserve, so your idea is a centralized solution that can easily be legislated against and taken down just like the previous Liberty Reserve?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_Reserve

You're saying Bytemaster needs to vet all candidates?  So when a govt agency passes legislation, he then needs to flee the country to some 3rd world country and vet candidates from there?  Woops, that's what the Liberty Reserve people did, they went to Costa Rica and the US govt still got them heh.  The system has to be automated like a virus to avoid legislation from one of 200 different countries thinking they control it.

[Empirical1.2]

What is your suggestion for bringing new delegates into the system and satisfying game theory metrics while making the assumption this website and Bytemaster don't exist?  The only possible way is with some type of finite resource.

Similarly to how traditional companies work, applicants for the BOD make their case through various communication channels and shareholders evaluate them and vote.

I don't know. Are there many successful companies that instead of choosing a BOD which shareholders think are best for the job, chooses people based on how many shares they post as collateral?

[r0ach]

@r0ach have you ever thought that even "collateral bid" is not more secure if the attack is organized from very wealthie/rich witnesses? (like Goldman Sachs or Soros )
I mean a entity  for example that owns $1billion  dollars in "savings", could easily damage the  bts block-chain ...
In our eyes we would assume that they have much to loose compared with the "poor" witnesses when in reality their "big" stake  on bts would be like nothing compared with their overall wealth (less than 1%).... So in reality they have nothing to loose compared with a "poor" witness that has for example at stake  $10.000 from a total of $50.000.... Which one will secure the network better? Which one looses more?  On this example obvious the "poor" witness will probably secure it better....Not?

Your statement is making the assumption that the current system will work in the long run.  There's currently no valid entry point for bringing new delegates into the system.  They should not have to come through this website to become one, they should not have to beg people like Bytemaster to become one, they should not have to speak English to become one.  That's far too much ambiguous friction for a distributed system to function.  The way into the system has to be clearly defined and accessible in a step by step chart, it is currently not.

People like Anonymint criticize Bytemaster as being a Steve Jobs, control freak type figure, and this critcism really shows here.  It's far too painfully obvious he's unable to comprehend Bitshares without him existing to control it.

What is your suggestion for bringing new delegates into the system without the centralized bureaucracy that exists now?  The only logical way is with some type of finite resource with game theory elements, just like PoW uses.  Collateral is the only thing up for the task in a PoS system.  It has to be used in some way for bringing new delegates in or the system might not function in the long run from not being automated enough to sustain itself. 

The political process in general requires a central point of information distribution, whether it be a town square, website, or news channel.  This means instead of game theory elements running the equation, you have a more arbitary information gate keeper(s) guiding the lemmings around to their doom by telling them which candidates do or don't exist at all, and which to vote for.

As for state sponsored attacks, Goldman Sachs probably doesn't have to touch the delegate system to implode the coin.  They can probably just buy a bunch of coins, take out a huge short, then dump like mad men while simultaneously circulating some type of "security breach" rumor.  They might even profit on it's demise.  If they wanted to attack via the delegate system, they could probably easily make it in with or without the collateral bid system in place as well.  Just like they can already afford to 51% attack Bitcoin....

If the goal is to harden the system against instant, overnight takeover by large amounts of money,  you would need to make it so instead of all delegates being up for re-election all the time, delegate positions would last a specific time span like a senate term and only open up for vote/bids if they go offline for a certain amount of time or other metric.  If Bitshares became really huge, delegates would probably be running double or triple redundancy servers in that case to avoid dos attack. 

[Akado]

What about bytemaster idea on the mumble session about a reputation system?...

Reputation, (i.e trust) and anonymity is a recipe for scams. You cannot combine them safely because there are no consequences to behaving badly. Bitcointalk is completely full of examples of this combination failing over and over - in fact ripple even changed their 'trust lines' design due to a huge meta scam purpotrated by TradeFortreess (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=207718.0), which was designed to show that such a system was inherently untenable.

But look at DNMs, they have reputation systems and they seem to work. Obviously they have scams too, lots of them. What I'm saying is, we should analyse both sides. I would agree, however, that Reputation + Identity could, in theory reduce the number of scams, however, let's see this from a scammers point of view. If you really want to scam, you will find a way to do it, fake IDs, etc, the problem here is how to get an identity that is unique and true.

For all we know if we use an identity and reputation system, identity X can be fake. Unless the person publicly reveals their info and shows his face, but with anonymity we can already do that if we want.

The question is do we want BitShares to be anon based or identity based? Isn't  that what Identabit is trying to do? Unless we had both, identity to whoever wants it and anonymity to whoever wants to preserve it 

[monsterer]

What about bytemaster idea on the mumble session about a reputation system?...

Reputation, (i.e trust) and anonymity is a recipe for scams. You cannot combine them safely because there are no consequences to behaving badly. Bitcointalk is completely full of examples of this combination failing over and over - in fact ripple even changed their 'trust lines' design due to a huge meta scam purpotrated by TradeFortreess (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=207718.0), which was designed to show that such a system was inherently untenable.

[liondani]

@r0ach have you ever thought that even "collateral bid" is not more secure if the attack is organized from very wealthie/rich witnesses? (like Goldman Sachs or Soros )
I mean a entity  for example that owns $1billion  dollars in "savings", could easily damage the  bts block-chain ...
In our eyes we would assume that they have much to loose compared with the "poor" witnesses when in reality their "big" stake  on bts would be like nothing compared with their overall wealth (less than 1%).... So in reality they have nothing to loose compared with a "poor" witness that has for example at stake  $10.000 from a total of $50.000.... Which one will secure the network better? Which one looses more?  On this example obvious the "poor" witness will probably secure it better....Not?