Author Topic: bitSHARES - As True Shares and Not a Currency!  (Read 66194 times)

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Offline CoinHoarder

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@tonyk

A. You simply cannot make BTS untradable on centralized exchange. This proposal will simply give one exchange, or a small combination of exchanges, a stranglehold on the exchange of BTS. The first exchange that puts in the work to develop the backend for BTS exchange will gain a quasi monopoly. Thus, Bitshares could end up worse off from this proposal... going from traded on many exchanges to one or a few exchanges.

B. You cannot simply make bitUSD the "main" smartcoin that is traded against BTS. Some people, specifically China and Euros may prefer bitEUR or bitCNY. This proposal effectively fragments the main BTS/BTC market into several (possibly many) smaller markets.

Thus, each market separately will have a smaller amount of liquidity than if we were to continue BTS/BTC being the main market... possibly much less depending on how many smart coins are used in this manner and the popularity of other smart coins other than bitUSD. It is a possibility that to get the best price on BTS you would have to buy 3 different smartcoins, then trade all of them for BTS.

C. It is unclear to me how you plan to pay worker proposals and such in bitUSD without autonomously shorting bitUSD into existance or printing unbacked bitUSD. Several community members are vicously against such practices, as I found out when I brought up my proposal.

D. Even with creating a separate asset, and not freezing BTS, I still see a lot of issues arising from the transition period. What would be the value of the original BTS tokens, if anything? What happens when people purchase these tokens after the transition period thinking that they are receiving equity in Bitshares ecosystem?

There are other issues that I can think of that may arise, as mentioned in my first post, but I don't have have time to explain.
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Offline abit

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Or maybe this split the difference. The bond puts up half of the collateral and pool the other half. Profits are split 50/50 for asset sells.

No actually it seems in order to align the risk/reward profiles:

Negative price movement (aka BTS price going down in comparison to BTC):
- the bridge should get 100% of the  loss due to price movement .(its position is fully hedged so no real loss)
- collateral sponsors should get just a flat fee (or interest).
- Every attempt should be made to liquidated before 100% of bridges collateral is needed to cover any loss on the 'short bitBTC' position.

Positive price movement (aka BTS price going up in comparison to BTC):
- the collateral sponsors should get 100% of the profit due to price movement .(bridge's position is fully hedged so no gains expected, or deserved)
- The bridge can get the fee the sponsors get in the opposite scenario (just a thought).


This sounds too good to be true actually. Wish somebody can check/verify the above!!! @arhag (wish you are around) @theoretical (wish you are not busy coding 100% of the time)
Technical implementation and who controls (able to willing close) the position, are big remaining issues. Seems that the position should be controlled by the bridge, and force liquidated by the blockchain.
The main issue I think is: if the price of shares dropped too quickly, when 50% of the collateral (100% of the bridge provided) is unable to sold out or not enough to close the position (aka the black swain event), what can the system do? Lock up?
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Offline abit

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@tonyk what do you think if I develop this and launch a testing network? Will you lead the testing work? And what do you think is the best approach?

1.I think it is very unlikely 'BTS main' to simply jumps into this new direction itself. Nor I am saying it should - I just see a ton of benefits if it does. Others have pointed concerns. Concerns with various degrees of seriousness. I have yet to see any outweighing the positives, but it is just one man's opinion.

2. I do not see a test chain having any way to prove one way or the other if this thing works. At  the end, We are mainly testing market incentives; and with test-chain where such  incentives are removed  I do not see the experiment working.  What I see is  a new chain testing the theory. I mean a full blown chain of its own, even if its init status matches BTS share distribution 1:1.
If we developed the new features, we need to test the functionalities first, right? So that's what I said "testing". If it doesn't work at all, for example crashes once a hour, it's not possible to launch a real chain. When to release a real chain, or how to , is another story.

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3.Assuming we more or less agree on p.2 - It was truly amazing how you have seeming excelled at Graphene code. Especially amazing was the speed with which you did the '*poor man's bandwidth fees' feature [Do not get me wrong - I called it poor man's because it is lacking the stuff that reduces the usage at high tx times (or increases the fee at such times) and paying the fees by locking funds in the future in order to earn fees post factum. On the opposite - they way you did it - aka keeping the fees and just earning them by having a balance for time X, is much closer to what I believe is better (for this proposal purposes and in general)]. So even that the feature (changes) to the existing code I have proposed so far in this thread seem to be just 2-3 times more work than what you have done (coded) for bitshares already, my biggest issue remain funding this new chain. And while I am willing to do what you call testing for free [I am not very sure what will I really test, as I am not much of a coder. So it will be more like running the code as a user and seeing if it works, more than true testing]
Yes, you proposed the features, you should know what you want better than anyone else, so you're the best one to check whether it works like you want, the more comprehensive, the better. I mean this kind of testing. You don't even need to run the code, I or other volunteers (if we have) will. I think I didn't say "for free". Yes, it would be a new chain, we, the founders, will have all rights reserved, except that some social consensuses (if any) and legal limitations (if any) that we need to follow.

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So wile I and seemingly you are ready to start working on this for free, I would feel much better if we had some more solid plan regarding the future financing of the project. While "if it starts successfully, we can later on run workers on the dShares" is a plan, but a plan not good enough in my oppinion. And not because I have wasted my own time, but more because I have not given the project enough chance to succeed. In particular I do not consider just diluting Bitshares [or dShares] by worker proposals 'financing the development'.
I'm going to set default witness pay and the cap of worker payment to zero. Or maybe change related code entirely. My idea is to pay what we're able to afford, or say, pay from income. Pay by ourUSD but not shares. If no income, no payment. Will you accept this? Anyway we define the rule first (at least before asking for any external fund). Less change is better.

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For me it should work something like this - real investor  is found. He pays the devs in cash (so they can live). The worker proposal is for ( actual cost to develop * 1.33 ) and the worker pay is locked (for 1.5-2 years; ); the investor recieves those new shares after said 1.5 year. Selling those worker pays in the DEX in some sort of "Worker Backed Assets" is a interesting possibility, but then again the feature itself requires development (money) in itself.
This looks like a good idea. I haven't totally thought through it though. It's not urgent imo, unless you need to fund yourself in this way.

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* 'pragmatic man's approach' is probably a better term - it cuts the fancy [and more difficult to implement] and not particularly useful stuff out; while also keeping the possibility to pays the fees directly.

Anyway, those are some of my current thoughts. Your (and anybody else take) on those issues is welcomed.
Looking forward to hearing more from you. Maybe PM?
Thanks!

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Offline tonyk

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Or maybe this split the difference. The bond puts up half of the collateral and pool the other half. Profits are split 50/50 for asset sells.

No actually it seems in order to align the risk/reward profiles:

Negative price movement (aka BTS price going down in comparison to BTC):
- the bridge should get 100% of the  loss due to price movement .(its position is fully hedged so no real loss)
- collateral sponsors should get just a flat fee (or interest).
- Every attempt should be made to liquidated before 100% of bridges collateral is needed to cover any loss on the 'short bitBTC' position.

Positive price movement (aka BTS price going up in comparison to BTC):
- the collateral sponsors should get 100% of the profit due to price movement .(bridge's position is fully hedged so no gains expected, or deserved)
- The bridge can get the fee the sponsors get in the opposite scenario (just a thought).


This sounds too good to be true actually. Wish somebody can check/verify the above!!! @arhag (wish you are around) @theoretical (wish you are not busy coding 100% of the time)
Technical implementation and who controls (able to willing close) the position, are big remaining issues. Seems that the position should be controlled by the bridge, and force liquidated by the blockchain.
« Last Edit: February 16, 2016, 08:44:39 pm by tonyk »
Lack of arbitrage is the problem, isn't it. And this 'should' solves it.

Offline Pheonike

Or maybe this split the difference. The bond puts up half of the collateral and pool the other half. Profits are split 50/50 for asset sells.

Offline tonyk

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Could we create a bond asset that converts 1:1 to bts. The funds from the bond asset can be used by for the bot that the committee controls. The reserve pool could then be used to only pay dividends to the bond based on the performance on the bot. This would cut down on the risk of the funds in the reserve pool. The bond holders assume the risk and the network only has to pay out when there is a profit.

OK here is the very rough version of my 'market approach to some  collateral issues experienced by gateway regarding bitAssets bridges.'

The issue in short is that if a gateway/bridge (never got to remember which is which and why so) wants to offer a say BTC to bitBTC bridge, it has to come with min about 2x in BTS for each net bitBTC that is requested by customers through its bridge.

What if willing parties ['bridge collateral sponsors'???] can provide the second 100%+, for some benefit?

Important points:
In case of liquidation the collateral provided by the bridge is used to cover the losses (if any) first [before the collateral from the 'collateral sponsor'] .
The loss for the bridge is fictional BTW. That loss is exactly offset by the same gain of holding BTC received by the customer requesting the bridge from BTC to bitBTC.

« Last Edit: February 16, 2016, 07:30:10 pm by tonyk »
Lack of arbitrage is the problem, isn't it. And this 'should' solves it.

Offline tonyk

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I don't see BTS keep it's valuation if there is not enough demand for the products (bitassets).

Should I company have a high valuation even though the market does not like its product?


I think we should get our 2.0 products out there first. and once we have some liquidity traded in the BTS:bitasset markets, we can then still upgrade the 2.0 products to 3.0 products .. would you agree?

In ideal world where liquidity in those bitAsset market  grows and the leadership keeps it focus on the great innovation* - bitAssets? Probably.

But what I see is those market not growing. The leadership not only not focusing on this THE product by actions (choosing stealth over market improvements, and dreaming of MAS after that) but out right stating 'bitassets might be not so great, after all'. The bridges only caring about their own IOUs, etc etc.

The answer also depends on what you consider the main benefits of the new approach. If you find that what it does for the bitAssets is the main benefit, why first wait on inferior version of bitAsset to take off before implementing the superior?

*Off topic but I am a believer that every one is entitled to max of one truly GREAT innovation. Google's was search, and even with thousands of PhDs on stuff and seeming all the money on the would they will simply not beat that one.[I know BM believes ha can come up with a handful of such ideas per day, but no one can]. Well, BTS' greatness is called bitAssets.
Lack of arbitrage is the problem, isn't it. And this 'should' solves it.

Offline tonyk

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At least Tony is grounded enough to admit that the economic and social issues that arise from this proposal cannot be tested on a test net. Several valid concerns have been brushed aside. Hell, no one even responded to my post with at least a few very valid concerns. It is like an echo chamber in here. I wish BM would speak up and share his opinion, as to why he didn't think this proposal was a good idea, because I have a feeling he is smart enough to understand some of the issues I brought up better than I can.

I will not speak for BM, I will just say that some of the concerns that he should have arise for the consequences for BTS and  in particular its transformation to this new state. Something that was pointed out by many. I personally have also acknowledged those issues and have never pretended they do not exist. My personal take is/was they are for the better good and are outweighed by the benefits.
Anyway, the new chain approach eliminates this, as there will be no process of 'eliminating the right to transfer' for current BTS holders and there will be no slow process of outdrawing everything from exchanges and all its messy consequences.

CoinHoarder you should stop reading here if you are not ready to read my posts for what they are - disagreement with ideas/actions and not personal attacks on the poster!!!

I really do not see any issues of any great significance in your post up thread, other than the one address above. Feel free to explain again the ' few very valid concerns' that you believe are the big no-nos. It as well could be me, not seeing them from the correct angle.

@tonyk: Let's say we cut off BTS transfers and forced trading onto the DEX only.  Would that create the "perfect peg" you're after? Or would BTS - even on the DEX - still be trading against a variety of different versions of the same assets i.e. multiple versions of BTC, multiple versions of USD, multiple versions of CNY, etc?

One would expect that when BTS is perfectly pegged to bitUSD, the usefulness of any variation of USD to go way down. People can make them and try to make a market for them. I expect the market for them to be not only thin but to mainly show a discount for the more risk they carry (in the case of IOUs USD) compared to bitUSD. In other words I expect improvements compared to the current situation in that regard as well.(less fragmentation)
Even now, even with pretty poorly pegged bitAssets, imagine one of the bridges somehow manages to offer bitUSD (bitBTC) directly instead of their  IOUs. Don't you think they will overtake most of that particular assets market pretty quickly?
Lack of arbitrage is the problem, isn't it. And this 'should' solves it.

Offline monsterer

Ok, that makes sense.  So now the question is, why is no one doing any of this instant arbitrage between the various versions of the same assets on the DEX?  Without that, instead of realizing the promise of pooled liquidity, we're mired in a shit storm of duplicate assets that is making the DEX unusable for most people.

They cannot. This would need the blockchain to perform this operation atomically and react instantly. It would be like a built in HFT trader the dividends of which get distributed to BTS holders.
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Offline cube

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my biggest issue remain funding this new chain.


If the idea was great, it should have no problem attracting investors.  What we need is the community's help to make it happen.
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Offline tbone

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That's a pretty terse answer.  But I think you're trying to say that it's difficult to do arbitrage on external markets, whereas arbitrage on the internal DEX markets can be done very efficiently.  That makes sense.  I wonder why no one has stated this clearly after MULTIPLE questions about the benefit of eliminating BTS trading from the centralized exchanges! 

Not just difficult, but impossible. If you cannot transfer BTS, you cannot arbitrage externally at all, which implies that the price of BTS can only be affected by DEX trades.

There is a more significant point as well, in that the blockchain itself is ideally placed to do instant arbitrage between markets and to redistribute this to BTS holders as dividends.

Ok, that makes sense.  So now the question is, why is no one doing any of this instant arbitrage between the various versions of the same assets on the DEX?  Without that, instead of realizing the promise of pooled liquidity, we're mired in a shit storm of duplicate assets that is making the DEX unusable for most people.

Offline monsterer

That's a pretty terse answer.  But I think you're trying to say that it's difficult to do arbitrage on external markets, whereas arbitrage on the internal DEX markets can be done very efficiently.  That makes sense.  I wonder why no one has stated this clearly after MULTIPLE questions about the benefit of eliminating BTS trading from the centralized exchanges! 

Not just difficult, but impossible. If you cannot transfer BTS, you cannot arbitrage externally at all, which implies that the price of BTS can only be affected by DEX trades.

There is a more significant point as well, in that the blockchain itself is ideally placed to do instant arbitrage between markets and to redistribute this to BTS holders as dividends.
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Offline tbone

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Ok, let me rephrase the question.  Let's first consider that (both now and under your proposal) there are and will be multiple BTS/USD markets, multiple BTS/BTC markets, multiple BTS/CNY markets, etc.  So the question is, why would having all of those markets trade only on the DEX be much better for the peg than the current situation where some of those markets are (and some are NOT) traded on the DEX?

No external arbitrage means no need for a feed price - the prices can come from the orderbook (although price at time 0 is undefined).

Why does it matter if the markets are external or on the DEX?  You still have to factor many different BTS markets.  The only difference is that there would be no BTS feeds for the witnesses to bother with.

The 'only difference' you just described impossible with external arbitrage.

That's a pretty terse answer.  But I think you're trying to say that it's difficult to do arbitrage on external markets, whereas arbitrage on the internal DEX markets can be done very efficiently.  That makes sense.  I wonder why no one has stated this clearly after MULTIPLE questions about the benefit of eliminating BTS trading from the centralized exchanges! 

@tonyk, I like your idea more now and could see the merits of implementing something like that down the road, just not right away since a) there are obvious risks that have been pointed out already, b) we should first have a more reasonable amount of liquidity for the BitAssets trading on external exchanges and c) we haven't even proven that we can do any kind of meaningful internal arbitrage between the various versions of BTC, USD and CNY. 

But regardless of if/when BTS ever stops trading externally, we can get going on the arbitraging of existing internal markets, and we can get going with other liquidity measures such as a basic maker/taker model and perhaps using the reserve pool to back the creation of BitAssets, right?  What are we waiting for?   

Offline gamey

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Ok, let me rephrase the question.  Let's first consider that (both now and under your proposal) there are and will be multiple BTS/USD markets, multiple BTS/BTC markets, multiple BTS/CNY markets, etc.  So the question is, why would having all of those markets trade only on the DEX be much better for the peg than the current situation where some of those markets are (and some are NOT) traded on the DEX?

No external arbitrage means no need for a feed price - the prices can come from the orderbook (although price at time 0 is undefined).

Why does it matter if the markets are external or on the DEX?  You still have to factor many different BTS markets.  The only difference is that there would be no BTS feeds for the witnesses to bother with.

People can park their BTS in active orders or using a script within their own wallet.

If someone wrote the right tools, instead of all these nontransparent layers of fiat etc like nushares has, you see the collateral on the blockchain in one market. A really really conservative market making script would probably find use by many.

edit - I'm sorta misusing collateral a bit. It gives bitUSD one guaranteed liquid market... into BTS.  Which can only go back into bitWHATEVER.  What value does that bring? 
« Last Edit: February 16, 2016, 02:26:31 pm by gamey »
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Offline monsterer

Ok, let me rephrase the question.  Let's first consider that (both now and under your proposal) there are and will be multiple BTS/USD markets, multiple BTS/BTC markets, multiple BTS/CNY markets, etc.  So the question is, why would having all of those markets trade only on the DEX be much better for the peg than the current situation where some of those markets are (and some are NOT) traded on the DEX?

No external arbitrage means no need for a feed price - the prices can come from the orderbook (although price at time 0 is undefined).

Why does it matter if the markets are external or on the DEX?  You still have to factor many different BTS markets.  The only difference is that there would be no BTS feeds for the witnesses to bother with.

The 'only difference' you just described impossible with external arbitrage.
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