Author Topic: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee  (Read 3235 times)

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Offline sschiessl

Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #30 on: July 20, 2018, 06:08:09 am »
LTM Users too, they'll only get 50% instead of 80% cashback.
Right .. that's somewhat of a show stopper assuming LTM upgrades were made with the expectation to spare 80% of the fees .. :-/
I'd say, the most fair approach, if committee chooses to change network percentage was to have it changed independent of the other fees and have a proposal expire after 4 weeks. That at least gives everyone sufficient time to do their math ..

I support the limit order fee increase. I would suggest that the prominent gateways specifically get informed on that with a weeks notice to adjust their market fees. Additionally, if the committee feels like network fee % is a to deep-cutting decision the BTS holders can always be asked.

Offline Digital Lucifer

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #31 on: July 20, 2018, 09:37:07 am »
LTM Users too, they'll only get 50% instead of 80% cashback.
Right .. that's somewhat of a show stopper assuming LTM upgrades were made with the expectation to spare 80% of the fees .. :-/
I'd say, the most fair approach, if committee chooses to change network percentage was to have it changed independent of the other fees and have a proposal expire after 4 weeks. That at least gives everyone sufficient time to do their math ..

I support the limit order fee increase. I would suggest that the prominent gateways specifically get informed on that with a weeks notice to adjust their market fees. Additionally, if the committee feels like network fee % is a to deep-cutting decision the BTS holders can always be asked.

Since we are setting up Newsletter and Support departments for new bitshares.org - Committee can have department to issue newsletter/updates to gateways who submitted their respective legal contacts for it. If they not comply with it, in worst case can be delisted from wallet.bitshares.org

I support fully these movements towards more success for BitShares as Priority 1 - enforcing some Compliance with 3rd parties.
Milos (Mike) Preocanin - General Manager @ Syntek Solutions
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Nong Prue, Bang Lamung, Chonburi 20250, Thailand.

Offline Digital Lucifer

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #32 on: July 20, 2018, 10:04:25 am »
I would also like to ask why the rest of Committee is not welcoming new member proposal and fees discussion ?

I see few of them active around but not in this specific thread for a week, is that a way to welcome new initiatives ?
« Last Edit: July 20, 2018, 01:38:06 pm by Digital Lucifer »
Milos (Mike) Preocanin - General Manager @ Syntek Solutions
TOANDI Co., LTD. (BOI Approved) - TAX ID: 0205549016913 - 95/5 Moo 4 Siam Country Club Rd.
Nong Prue, Bang Lamung, Chonburi 20250, Thailand.

Offline JohnR

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #33 on: July 20, 2018, 03:03:05 pm »
I am sure the other committee members, proxies, and large stakeholders who have not voiced an opinion already are beyond busy carrying out their efforts for the general welfare of the blockchain and all constituents. 

That being said I do sincerely hope to engage more people in an honest discussion about the matters discussed already in this thread as well as my continued earnest candidacy for committee membership.

We are entering a phase of legitimacy for distributed enterprise (including BitShares) and I am encouraged by the professionalism being displayed by key community members already.  And I know the future holds more promise of the same.

Offline binggo

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #34 on: July 21, 2018, 05:53:23 am »
1. Asset-Specific:CREATE ASSET:Longer Symbols.

The standard FEE of Longer Symbols should be 1000 bts at least, to curb the fraudulent and phishing asset.

2. Charge the security deposit from the asset.   the security deposit should be 888bts at least, to curb the fraudulent and phishing asset.

when someone create a asset,the man need to pay the security deposit to active the asset every year, the security deposit is circular, when paid the new security deposit, then return the old security deposit.

when the asset didn't renew the security deposit timely,then forbid the trading of this asset;

if the asset didn't renew the security deposit  two years,then the DEX can confiscate the security deposit.
« Last Edit: July 21, 2018, 06:33:38 am by binggo »

Offline binggo

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #35 on: July 21, 2018, 06:36:51 pm »
and i don't think change fee is a good idea, let's consume the Reserve Pool and see what will happen!!!

and you will find soon: you do anything is nothing.

Offline clockwork

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #36 on: July 22, 2018, 12:09:08 am »
Charge the security deposit from the asset.   the security deposit should be 888bts at least, to curb the fraudulent and phishing asset.

when someone create a asset,the man need to pay the security deposit to active the asset every year, the security deposit is circular, when paid the new security deposit, then return the old security deposit.

when the asset didn't renew the security deposit timely,then forbid the trading of this asset;

if the asset didn't renew the security deposit  two years,then the DEX can confiscate the security deposit.

hmmm..you might have something there

Offline binggo

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #37 on: July 22, 2018, 12:36:05 am »
Charge the security deposit from the asset.   the security deposit should be 888bts at least, to curb the fraudulent and phishing asset.

when someone create a asset,the man need to pay the security deposit to active the asset every year, the security deposit is circular, when paid the new security deposit, then return the old security deposit.

when the asset didn't renew the security deposit timely,then forbid the trading of this asset;

if the asset didn't renew the security deposit  two years,then the DEX can confiscate the security deposit.

hmmm..you might have something there

just for BITCNY and B1TCNY or BITUSD and B1TUSD,so amazing asset!!!

Offline JohnR

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #38 on: August 15, 2018, 02:45:42 pm »
Thank you all for the amazing support.  At the moment I am out of the USA and will be more available after the upcoming week.  I look forward to solidifying relationships with the global BTS community and constantly learning in order to serve all stakeholders effectively.

Kind regards,
JohnR

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #39 on: August 16, 2018, 06:01:21 am »
Thank you all for the amazing support.  At the moment I am out of the USA and will be more available after the upcoming week.  I look forward to solidifying relationships with the global BTS community and constantly learning in order to serve all stakeholders effectively.

Kind regards,
JohnR

Welcome and thank you in advance for all future (fresh for now) blood donations you will do for the blockchain.

Good luck! :)
Milos (Mike) Preocanin - General Manager @ Syntek Solutions
TOANDI Co., LTD. (BOI Approved) - TAX ID: 0205549016913 - 95/5 Moo 4 Siam Country Club Rd.
Nong Prue, Bang Lamung, Chonburi 20250, Thailand.

Offline ripplexiaoshan

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #40 on: August 16, 2018, 04:34:08 pm »
Welcome on board!
BTS committee member:jademont

Offline gghi

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #41 on: August 16, 2018, 05:43:24 pm »
     


              I hope you can work hard for 1BITCNY=1cny.    and   work hard for  1bitusd=1usd

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #42 on: August 27, 2018, 10:03:10 pm »
Thank you for the comment.  I had some recent conversations that enlightened me about the community demand for bitCNY and bitUSD to track their fiat counterparts more closely.  The committee is hard at work considering how to make this a reality.

     


              I hope you can work hard for 1BITCNY=1cny.    and   work hard for  1bitusd=1usd

Offline JohnR

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #43 on: September 09, 2018, 09:11:01 pm »
A Microeconomic Introduction to Market-Pegged Assets on BitShares
Active Committee Member: JohnR

For the economic analysis skip to section 2.

1. My Background with BitShares and the explanation for this post.
When I first discovered BitShares and its decentralized exchange I was only moderately interested.  When I discovered that its core asset: BTS functions as collateral for dynamic stable coins I became addicted to learning how it worked.  I am interested in understanding how the operate and their infinite applications.  As a nice bonus I started to realize the cryptoasset itself (BTS) had a strong price sensitivity to the usage of smartcoins.  In simple terms, every dollar demanded in smartcoins puts a lot of demand pressure on BTS itself (this means price will have a tendency to increase).  Not only is this good for holders looking to see appreciation, but I appreciate the mathematical elegance of such a relationship.  When I was a BitShares novice it seemed simple: clearly the demand for USD is huge.  There are billions of them floating around the world.  Also people in the crypto world seemed to be obsessed with stable coins and the front runner at the time: Tether, was facing a lot of scrutiny for being unbacked.  I felt that it was only a matter of time before the market realized this and BTS went to the moon.  The truth, as I am closer to understanding now, is more mixed and definitely more interesting.

1.0.  A special thanks to bitcrab for showing me the scalability risks associated with a loose peg to the USD (exchanges will think critically of bitUSD if it consistently trades above one USD).  And additional thanks to xeroc and clockwork for refining my understanding of smart-coin technical operations.

1.1 Background: bitUSD
One of the most practical use cases for BitShares are market-pegged assets.  Two of the most practical MPAs are bitCNY (Chinese Yuan) and bitUSD (United States Dollar).  These are cryptoassets which attempt to track the real-world value of their nominal counterparts.  The first challenge is quite obvious: the real-world currencies are backed by nothing but the ‘full faith and credit of each sovereign nation (or at least the respective central banks thereof).  The crypto-corollaries are backed by our native asset: BTS.  Currently one bitUSD mandates 1.75 x (n BTS = 1 USD).

Reference image 1: bitUSD https://i.imgur.com/HcyqBKf.png

BitUSD has value because it is collateralized by BTS.  Users can exchange bitUSD for any cryptoasset on the BitShares exchange.  They can post limit orders for whatever exchange rate they choose.  But where bitUSD technically gets its value, the backstop in an illiquid market, is from the settlement feature which allows a holder to exchange bitUSD for 100% of the feed price (after a 24 hour waiting grace period). 

2: Stimulus: bitUSD market price is “inefficient”.

Reference image 2: https://i.imgur.com/CrXsoTR.png . -  Notice something? 

Why does bitUSD trade at a premium for fiat USD?  Anything above or below that one USD mark is technically ‘inefficient’.

2.1 Explanation 1: Risk Premium
So now we know what the holder of bitUSD gets for holding, but what does the other side of the equation get out of this?  The user who created that bitUSD and puts it into the market (the bitUSD ‘short’) has a future liability.  He sacrifices the free use of some BTS for the present right to exchange the bitUSD.  Now the short would of course prefer that bitUSD never gets settled – an unanticipated forced swap may come at an inconvenient time.  Yet this risk is ever-present.  In financial theory, market participants are compensated for taking on risk.  Investors in highly distressed companies negotiate for higher premiums or returns.  In BitShares this demand for premium may take the form of an unwillingness to sell the bitUSD at par value – a reservation price of 1.02 or 1.03 may satisfy the short’s incurred risk for keeping the position.

2.2 Explanation 2: Cost of Capital
There is only one way for bitUSD shorts to minimize the risk of being called on a settlement: maintaining a high collateral ratio.  As the network currently functions, a call for settlement exchanges with the least collateralized position.  It is entirely possible that the least collateralized position may in fact be 2x collateralized.  This leads to the second potential explanation for a higher bitUSD price.  Notice in the first chart that perfect collateralization of BitUSD with BTS is 1:1.  Anything above this amount is categorized as ‘overcollateralization’.  Many critics of conventional private banking focus on the fractional reserve lending system: wherein a single bank will take in one dollar of deposits then proceed to issue ten dollars worth of loans on the same dollar.  BitUSD is the opposite of this: for one dollar worth of ‘deposits’ with the network, the network will issue ~ .5 USD worth of bitUSD (the true number depends on the average collateral ratio for all bitUSD but this simplification is sufficient to prove the point).  While the conventional monetary system is awash with digital dollars, the BitShares network suffers a lack of supply. 

Similar to the risk premium mentioned above, bitUSD shorts may seek to be compensated for the excess capital sitting idly in the position.  That individual could deploy his capital in various activities more productive than earning zero percent return.  If he has to put up so much capital it is rational to expect him to be reluctant to sell for close to par value (1 usd).  Here the motivation is slightly different than the risk premium, but the result is the same: a reluctance to sell one bitUSD for one usd. 


3 Supply/Demand/Equilibrium Models

A note.  Typically the models below are used to analyze discrete shifts in demand or supply.  I will bend the rules here.  I am not examining the impact of a shift in demand/supply for BitShares.  Rather I am seeking to prove that the reason bitUSD has shifted from its equilibrium price of 1 USD is driven by supply side forces rather than demand side forces.

Perfect Harmony a.k.a. Equilibrium.  When the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied the price and quantity are considered “efficient”.

Reference image 3: https://i.imgur.com/jhKnkoE.png

This is a theoretical situation that serves as a starting point for modeling the outcome we seek to achieve. 

When a good or service is undersupplied on the market, prices will increase and quantities exchanged at the market price will decrease.  The distinctive characteristic of an under-supply is that quantity exchanged is depressed from equilibrium.

When a good or service is overdemanded on the market, prices will increase and quantities exchanged at the market price will increase.  The distinctive characteristic of an over-demand is that a higher quantity are exchanged at the market price than would be exchanged at equilibrium.

Reference image 4: https://i.imgur.com/1kXua58.png

Reference image 5: https://i.imgur.com/GqdrU9l.png

4 Model Conclusion. 

Without perfect information we cannot know precisely what is causing the inefficiency (increase in demand or decrease in optimal supply).  But the key is to notice the difference in quantity; this supports a supply side problem rather than a demand side problem.  If bitUSD were facing a lack of demand we would expect to see a lower price and not a higher price.  More often than not, bitUSD trades above it’s par value.  Further I believe there is a sub-optimal amount of circulating bitUSD (compare Tether to bitUSD/CNY) and the inference is that the network faces a supply-side problem rather than a demand side.

The value in this exercise is to identify the most appropriate method for addressing a problem.  Supply side problems should be solved with supply side solutions.  Demand side problems should be addressed with demand side solutions.  Observing the charts above should give some intuition why mismatching problem and solution type will further exacerbate price/quantity dislocations.

5. Exploring solutions with members

Does the above analysis make sense to you?  We can concentrate our collective efforts on supply side solutions if so.

Offline gghi

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Re: [Committee Member] - johnr's proposal to join the BitShares Committee
« Reply #44 on: September 09, 2018, 11:13:49 pm »


      又见到降低MCR的理论,降低MCR是愚蠢的。相反,我们应该建立个长效机制,不断地上调MCR,以促进系统的稳定运行。人性是贪婪的,必须强制玩家降低抵押率,最好的办法就是不断的抬升MCR。同时,在bitcny需求不变的时候,MCR的上升和喂价是正反馈的关系,MCR的上升要求喂价上升,从而带动BTS市场价不断上涨。

Seeing the theory of reducing MCR, it is foolish to reduce MCR. On the contrary, we should establish a long-term mechanism to continuously increase MCR so as to promote the stable operation of the system. Human nature is greedy. We must force players to reduce mortgage rates. The best way is to keep lifting MCR. At the same time, when the demand for bitcny remains unchanged, the rise of MCR and feeding is a positive feedback relationship. The rise of MCR requires feeding to rise, thus driving the BTS market price to rise continuously.