Author Topic: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions  (Read 2482 times)

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Online bitcrab

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Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« on: October 01, 2018, 06:31:22 pm »
Recently there are some BSIP42 relevant actions: proxy openledger and michaelx vote to oppose BSIP42, proxy xerox claimed that will unvote witnesses that apply BSIP to bitUSD.

Sad to see these, however, I think I can understand why these actions comes out, I was also an opponent to BSIP42 at the very beginning of discussion, but step by step I was persuaded by others, especially by abit, so here I’ll also try to  summary some key points of the solution and hope that can help to persuade.

First, let’s define the vision of smartcoin,  in my view, it is 1. enough accurate pegging and 2. enough liquidity. based on these smartcoin will seek wildly adoption comparing to USDT.

If you do not agree on these, if you think “premium is good, volatility is good, I am bitUSD holder don’t remove the premium” you need not to read follows.

to improve pegging and also liquidity, now there are 2 solutions:

1. BSIP42
2. To dynamically adjust MCR

The core ideas of these 2 solutions is negative feedback - while one smartcoin is in positive premium, loose the smartcoin creation condition, while one smartcoin is in negative premium, tighten the smartcoin creation condition.

this naturally lead to one question: in bear market both solutions lead to higher black swan risks, a higher feed price lead to higher called price and also higher global settlement price, while solution2 also may lead to a close to 1 collateral ratio.

Let’s do a idea test: if we disable black swan setting, what will happen:
My conclusion is: the actual CR has very low chance to fall below 1, even it fall below 1, it is easy for it to jump above 1.

Easy to understand: if one can borrow with actual CR < 1, he have a infinite leverage and can borrow smart coin and buy BTS endlessly, this is not sustainable as the rapidly increased smartcoin quantity will rapidly lower the smart coin premium, with the negative feedback mechanism  the actual CR will rapidly return above 1, either by lowering price feed in soluton1 or increasing MCR in solution2.

In practice, we can expect that when actual CR fall close to 1, the “borrow and buy” activity will happen in big quantity that can resist the actual CR to fall continually, there is a very very little chance for black swan to happen even we keep the black swan setting with solution1 or solution2.

“harsh collateral rule lead to high risk” is one essential experience we lernt in the past several years, increasing force settlement offset, target CR both follow an essential logic: try to be more friendly to debt position owners, request least to borrowers. In BSIP42 the new idea is to let the market decide what an actual collateral ratio is appropriate, this not only improve peg, but also help to convert the demand of smart coin to purchasing power to BTS. The latter make big sense for ecosystem grow up.

After BSIP applied to bitUSD the premium fell drastically, we hope we can keep this trend continue until to a close to 0 premium.

bitUSD belong to the people all around the world, in China there are also many big bitUSD players. it will benefit the whole ecosystem to keep better peg and better liquidity, I hope the whole community can take action to protect the good pegging status of bitUSD, if we remove BSIP42 at this moment, bitUSD will return to high premium and disappoint potential users again, don’t make the previous efforts wasted.

If anyone would like to try some other solutions like solution2, please leave BSIP42 there and develop the new BSIP, go through the voting->testing->implementation process, if there’s strong enough consensus, it can cover BSIP42.

it’s not easy for the whole community to make bitUSD to go on a right way, I now have no choice but try my best to protect BSIP42 from being removed from bitUSD, spring-team now only support the witnesses that apply BSIP42 to bitUSD, if later this week xeroc unvote the witnesses that support BSIP42 on bitUSD, proxy bitcrab will unvote the witnesses that do not support BSIP42 on bitUSD.

I also hope voters that prefer bitUSD to have a better peg/liquidity to take similar actions. save bitUSD, please!

The next work day I’ll visit finance office to request them to remove setting proxy of binance-bitshares-gvbdb84k6h as openledger.

Offline sschiessl

Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #1 on: October 01, 2018, 08:14:20 pm »
This is a lightly modified copy of a post in the other thread, but I think it applies in this context even better.

I believe one of the main concerns is lack of readily available information in the approach, which the (mostly english) community desires. I would also like to see a report in the matter (please don't mention that it's all on chain ...). Without even discussing the content of BSIP42 (and I personally don't oppose it) this is enough for me to think we should take a moment and properly analyze how it affected bitCNY.

For example, provide measures over past weeks since BSIP42 is active (and possibly before that timeframe for a comparison):
  • old price feed
  • effective values of MCR, MSSR and FSO (consider differences in the feeds)
  • effective offboarding ratios when
    • selling bitCNY for BTS (and BTS for CNY)
    • when settling CNY for BTS (and selling BTS for CNY)
    • offboarding directly with bitCNY (aka the peg)
Those measure are interesting for the common user. I believe you would see that there is a jump when BSIP42 was activated,
and it will show that the values are normalizing over time (which would show that the market accepts the peg, and what the consequences are).
The effectiveness of the BSIP 42 can directly be judged with those measure, furthermore it will be clearer where the premiums are paid now. It will at least paint a much clearer picture for the community.

All those values measures might be clear to you, but not to the common eye.

Offline abit

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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #2 on: October 01, 2018, 09:39:22 pm »
Someone with experiences about combining charts please help on this, try combine these 3 data sets into one chart:
1. DEX: BTS/bitUSD historical trading price. (data source: wallet.bitshares.org or any public API node)
2. DEX: BTS/bitUSD historical median price feed. (data source: elastic_objects plugin, kabana)
3. CEX: BTS/USDT historical price

Then calculate bitUSD premium = price_3 / price_1


By the way https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitusd/ has a chart for reference.


If you have better suggesting or data sources, please leave a comment.
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Offline armin

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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #3 on: October 02, 2018, 01:59:48 am »
Some thoughts:

The premium seems to be "the cost of securing collateral and preventing black swans"

Premium is not good for shorters, but good for the blockchain.

Shorters may seem disadvantaged, and actually it is true. But they are also disadvantaged in traditional markets, ie you need to pay interest on margin loans

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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #4 on: October 02, 2018, 04:44:01 am »


this biUSD/bitCNY chart can tell something.

bitCNY has pegged well for some days, as bitUSD is still in high premium, the ratio is kept above 7.1 for some days.

about 5 days ago, BSIP42 began working at bitUSD and the ratio fall from above 7.1 to below 6.9, a good trend to return to good peg.

however after xeroc's announcement, it seems some witnesses return back to the non-BSIP42 price feeding algorithms, and  the ratio begin to go up, an off-peg process begin.
« Last Edit: October 02, 2018, 04:49:36 am by bitcrab »

Offline clockwork

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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #5 on: October 02, 2018, 05:12:43 am »


this biUSD/bitCNY chart can tell something.

bitCNY has pegged well for some days, as bitUSD is still in high premium, the ratio is kept above 7.1 for some days.

about 5 days ago, BSIP42 began working at bitUSD and the ratio fall from above 7.1 to below 6.9, a good trend to return to good peg.

however after xeroc's announcement, it seems some witnesses return back to the non-BSIP42 price feeding algorithms, and  the ratio begin to go up, an off-peg process begin.

I'm very curious as to what you believe it tells seeing as the majority of the witnesses are still feeding BSIP42 feeds and median/price is still with premium.

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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #6 on: October 02, 2018, 05:24:58 am »
I'm very curious as to what you believe it tells seeing as the majority of the witnesses are still feeding BSIP42 feeds and median/price is still with premium.

I just said "seems", and actually some witnesses that had applied BSIP42 on bitUSD now returned back, they now feed price much lower than the median when there is still obvious premium, including delegate.freedom, sahkan-bitshares, witness.yao, xn-delegate, bangzi, witness.hiblockchain...

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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #7 on: October 02, 2018, 05:33:25 am »
I'm very curious as to what you believe it tells seeing as the majority of the witnesses are still feeding BSIP42 feeds and median/price is still with premium.

I just said "seems", and actually some witnesses that had applied BSIP42 on bitUSD now returned back, they now feed price much lower than the median when there is still obvious premium, including delegate.freedom, sahkan-bitshares, witness.yao, xn-delegate, bangzi, witness.hiblockchain...

Just wanted to clear that up because most people are not able to follow the bsip42 discussions. Yes some witnesses switched but the majority are still feeding w/ premium hence anything in the chart has nothing to do with xerocs announcement or a change in pricefeeding (since there wasn't one yet)

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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #8 on: October 02, 2018, 05:37:52 am »
Just wanted to clear that up because most people are not able to follow the bsip42 discussions. Yes some witnesses switched but the majority are still feeding w/ premium hence anything in the chart has nothing to do with xerocs announcement or a change in pricefeeding (since there wasn't one yet)

why nothing to do? it's clear that it's xeroc's announcement caused some witnesses to switch back, and then caused the median lower than it would be if they haven't switched back, this means the negative feedback power are not as strong as before.
« Last Edit: October 02, 2018, 08:31:25 am by bitcrab »

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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #9 on: October 02, 2018, 08:45:14 am »
First of all,
thank you, Jerry, for taking the time to put down in written.

This clears up a few things for me, in particular, the uncertainty
about why you see things the way you see them.

Secondly, I think we can fix this, let me address your points below.

Sad to see these, however, I think I can understand why these actions comes out, I was also an opponent to BSIP42 at the very beginning of discussion, but step by step I was persuaded by others, especially by abit, so here I’ll also try to  summary some key points of the solution and hope that can help to persuade.
Provided that the Eastern community is in discussion about this
for much much longer than the Western community, please give me
the benefit of the doubt. In a sense, I am now in the very same
situation that you have been in, namely as an opponent, while you
are trying to convince the community (and me) about why the approach
make sense. The concept behind BSIP42 is just so different that
most of the Western community need some time to understand and
I feel it is the obligation of the BTS voters and proxies to work
out a way forward together, as a community.

That said, I would like to request that we keep communications up
and try to find common ground where we agree and work forward from there.

First, let’s define the vision of smartcoin,  in my view, it is 1. enough accurate pegging and 2. enough liquidity. based on these smartcoin will seek wildly adoption comparing to USDT.
I think this is already where people may have a different vision.
For me (and others) the core value proposition of bitassets was:
* always fully collateralized
* settlement available to obtain collateral at a "fair" price.

With respect to settlement, the community has already moved from a
settlement at parity 1:1 with the introduction of the settlement
offset to incentivize shorters to increase liquidity.

My feeling is that those optimization criteria (tight pegging & liquidity
vs. backing and settlement) may not work out together, at least not in
the short term.

to improve pegging and also liquidity, now there are 2 solutions:

1. BSIP42
2. To dynamically adjust MCR

The core ideas of these 2 solutions is negative feedback - while one smartcoin is in positive premium, loose the smartcoin creation condition, while one smartcoin is in negative premium, tighten the smartcoin creation condition.
Here, I think we can all agree. The "premium" needs to be fed back into the
bitasset somehow. My understanding is that the first approach is chosen
solely because the second approach is currently not available due to
backend limitations (that abit is fortunately already working on - afaik).

With that said, I do think applying BSIP42 in the short term is quite o.k.,
but long term, I would like to see MCR adjusted instead so that we can
move back to the price feed describing the "fair" price - or at least something
that is very close to it. Who knows, maybe we find out that we need to do both
in the future.

this naturally lead to one question: in bear market both solutions lead to higher black swan risks, a higher feed price lead to higher called price and also higher global settlement price, while solution2 also may lead to a close to 1 collateral ratio.
Ultimately, I believe both proposals are effectively the same when it comes to
overall collateral ratio. BSIP42 just changes the price for settlement and margin
calls.

Also, I do not understand the fear people have with respect to "black swan" (global
settlement). From the perspective of bitCNY/bitUSD, a black swan (caused by a short dip
in BTS price) does not actually affect bitUSD pricing. However, what does change is the
excess collateral that is taken from the shorters. With that said, instead of
removing global settlement, why not try to find another solution for treating global
settlements so that short positions are not punished for a single position not being
collateralized, sufficiently? With that in mind, please think about what it could mean
to remove the short protection ratio if the collateral ratio goes below 150% (or so).

Of course, if we want to keep bitassets "fully" collateralized, then we cannot allow
OVERALL collateral ratio to go below 100%. We may find a way to still allow this for
individual call positions, as long as the OVERALL collateralization is provided. Also,
there needs to be a penalty for those not keeping collateral at over 100%, otherwise,
those that provide excess collateral need to pay the bill, which is unfair.

Let’s do a idea test: if we disable black swan setting, what will happen:
My conclusion is: the actual CR has very low chance to fall below 1, even it fall below 1, it is easy for it to jump above 1.

Easy to understand: if one can borrow with actual CR < 1, he have a infinite leverage and can borrow smart coin and buy BTS endlessly, this is not sustainable as the rapidly increased smartcoin quantity will rapidly lower the smart coin premium, with the negative feedback mechanism  the actual CR will rapidly return above 1, either by lowering price feed in soluton1 or increasing MCR in solution2.
If you have a call position with CR <1, and the MCR (solution 2) is raised, then
that call position will be margin called and needs to buy from the market. Are
you sure that will help liquidity, because I believe that will eat liquidity in
the markets.


In practice, we can expect that when actual CR fall close to 1, the “borrow and buy” activity will happen in big quantity that can resist the actual CR to fall continually, there is a very very little chance for black swan to happen even we keep the black swan setting with solution1 or solution2.
I agree with you that when there is a premium and it is "cheap" to borrow new bitassets,
that this will lead to a reduced premium.

“harsh collateral rule lead to high risk” is one essential experience we lernt in the past several years, increasing force settlement offset, target CR both follow an essential logic: try to be more friendly to debt position owners, request least to borrowers. In BSIP42 the new idea is to let the market decide what an actual collateral ratio is appropriate, this not only improve peg, but also help to convert the demand of smart coin to purchasing power to BTS. The latter make big sense for ecosystem grow up.
We both agree on bitassets having a supply side problem and that
we should allow shorters to easier borrow bitassets. According to
my optimization criteria, I still believe we must not allow bitassets
to become undercollateralized (overall - we may find a way to allow
individual positions to go CR < 1)

After BSIP applied to bitUSD the premium fell drastically, we hope we can keep this trend continue until to a close to 0 premium.
Well, arguable, that is expected behavior because we are "forcing" the marketing
to trade according to parity, we do not provide incentive for the market to
move to parity on its own. This difference is what does sit well with the Western
community.

bitUSD belong to the people all around the world, in China there are also many big bitUSD players. it will benefit the whole ecosystem to keep better peg and better liquidity, I hope the whole community can take action to protect the good pegging status of bitUSD, if we remove BSIP42 at this moment, bitUSD will return to high premium and disappoint potential users again, don’t make the previous efforts wasted.

If anyone would like to try some other solutions like solution2, please leave BSIP42 there and develop the new BSIP, go through the voting->testing->implementation process, if there’s strong enough consensus, it can cover BSIP42.
I agree with this approach - in particular I do want to see how well solution 2
may (or may not) work.

it’s not easy for the whole community to make bitUSD to go on a right way, I now have no choice but try my best to protect BSIP42 from being removed from bitUSD, spring-team now only support the witnesses that apply BSIP42 to bitUSD, if later this week xeroc unvote the witnesses that support BSIP42 on bitUSD, proxy bitcrab will unvote the witnesses that do not support BSIP42 on bitUSD.

I also hope voters that prefer bitUSD to have a better peg/liquidity to take similar actions. save bitUSD, please!
I agree that life as a proxy is not as easy as people may believe.

@Jerry, how about the both of us come to a compromise in that we allow the witnesses
to decide how to go forward and whether or not they want to run BSIP42 on bitUSD, or
not. I think, as a proxy, we shouldn't threaten them with the removal of our votes
just because they support(or not support) a BSIP that actually gives the freedom of
choice to them (the witnesses). With that said, I will retract my statement of removing
votes from BSIP2-bitUSD witnesses and would like to keep rational and
constructive discussion like this one going.
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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #10 on: October 02, 2018, 08:58:11 am »
I'm very curious as to what you believe it tells seeing as the majority of the witnesses are still feeding BSIP42 feeds and median/price is still with premium.

I just said "seems", and actually some witnesses that had applied BSIP42 on bitUSD now returned back, they now feed price much lower than the median when there is still obvious premium, including delegate.freedom, sahkan-bitshares, witness.yao, xn-delegate, bangzi, witness.hiblockchain...

Just wanted to clear that up because most people are not able to follow the bsip42 discussions. Yes some witnesses switched but the majority are still feeding w/ premium hence anything in the chart has nothing to do with xerocs announcement or a change in pricefeeding (since there wasn't one yet)
From my observation, although there were 15/27 witnesses trying to feed bitUSD according to bsip42, which is more than 1/2, the data says 2 of them have not configured the feedback algorithm well, that said, while bitUSD was still at premium, these 2 witnesses were feeding slightly lower-than-median price (BTS/bitUSD) (although higher than trading price), thus prevented the median feed price from adjusting towards to the "correct" direction. These 2 witnesses are: witness.still and btspp-witness. Likely they manually set a limitation on the adjustment that caused the result.
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Offline clockwork

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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #11 on: October 02, 2018, 09:11:19 am »
I'm very curious as to what you believe it tells seeing as the majority of the witnesses are still feeding BSIP42 feeds and median/price is still with premium.

I just said "seems", and actually some witnesses that had applied BSIP42 on bitUSD now returned back, they now feed price much lower than the median when there is still obvious premium, including delegate.freedom, sahkan-bitshares, witness.yao, xn-delegate, bangzi, witness.hiblockchain...


Just wanted to clear that up because most people are not able to follow the bsip42 discussions. Yes some witnesses switched but the majority are still feeding w/ premium hence anything in the chart has nothing to do with xerocs announcement or a change in pricefeeding (since there wasn't one yet)
From my observation, although there were 15/27 witnesses trying to feed bitUSD according to bsip42, which is more than 1/2, the data says 2 of them have not configured the feedback algorithm well, that said, while bitUSD was still at premium, these 2 witnesses were feeding slightly lower-than-median price (BTS/bitUSD) (although higher than trading price), thus prevented the median feed price from adjusting towards to the "correct" direction. These 2 witnesses are: witness.still and btspp-witness. Likely they manually set a limitation on the adjustment that caused the result.

ok...thanks for clearing that up Abit.

Still, BSIP42 feeds are relatively close clustered together around a higher price just as non-BSIP42 feeds are clustered around a lower price. Final median might not be as high as it would've been had all witnesses adopted BSIP42 but i don't think the difference is big enough to "blame" for the jump in the chart Jerry supplied.

I only mentioned it because both of you have very solid arguments FOR bsip42 (although harder to follow for a big part of the community) which I'm following with great attention and it's a shame to dilute them with a reference to what IMHO is a potentially unrelated market move.

Offline kwaskoff

Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #12 on: October 02, 2018, 10:28:47 am »
I hope any manipulations with bit assets and collateral not compromise bitshares for world.  ???
dm me to telegram t.me/kwaskoff
:)  :)   :)  :)

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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #13 on: October 02, 2018, 10:40:19 am »
I'm very curious as to what you believe it tells seeing as the majority of the witnesses are still feeding BSIP42 feeds and median/price is still with premium.

I just said "seems", and actually some witnesses that had applied BSIP42 on bitUSD now returned back, they now feed price much lower than the median when there is still obvious premium, including delegate.freedom, sahkan-bitshares, witness.yao, xn-delegate, bangzi, witness.hiblockchain...


Just wanted to clear that up because most people are not able to follow the bsip42 discussions. Yes some witnesses switched but the majority are still feeding w/ premium hence anything in the chart has nothing to do with xerocs announcement or a change in pricefeeding (since there wasn't one yet)
From my observation, although there were 15/27 witnesses trying to feed bitUSD according to bsip42, which is more than 1/2, the data says 2 of them have not configured the feedback algorithm well, that said, while bitUSD was still at premium, these 2 witnesses were feeding slightly lower-than-median price (BTS/bitUSD) (although higher than trading price), thus prevented the median feed price from adjusting towards to the "correct" direction. These 2 witnesses are: witness.still and btspp-witness. Likely they manually set a limitation on the adjustment that caused the result.

ok...thanks for clearing that up Abit.

Still, BSIP42 feeds are relatively close clustered together around a higher price just as non-BSIP42 feeds are clustered around a lower price. Final median might not be as high as it would've been had all witnesses adopted BSIP42 but i don't think the difference is big enough to "blame" for the jump in the chart Jerry supplied.

I only mentioned it because both of you have very solid arguments FOR bsip42 (although harder to follow for a big part of the community) which I'm following with great attention and it's a shame to dilute them with a reference to what IMHO is a potentially unrelated market move.

The effect is not linear. We can remember we were feeding around +15% offset on bitCNY price when the premium was around 3%. When the premium reduced to 0%, the offset didn't change/decrease much. Then in the following days, the offset decreased slowly while premium was kept around 0%. So, IMHO the manual limitation set by the 2 witnesses at 10% or so on bitUSD does caused the "jump".

Currently the median price is exactly the higher one fed by the 2 witnesses. If there is one more witness that is feeding according to bsip42 with looser limitation, median will no longer be one of the 2, but will move higher, then the premium will decrease consequently. IMHO xeroc's announcement yesterday did lead to less witnesses applying bsip42, then indirectly increased bitUSD premium.

One thing to clarify: some people misunderstood bsip42, thought witnesses need to "predict" the trend, which is incorrect. Actually BSIP42 is to feedback with existing data, the logic is clear as described by bitcrab, but we do need to explain it better to the community. I'm well aware that I'm not good at ELI5 at all, wish you guys can do better on this.

Quote
The core ideas ... is negative feedback - while one smartcoin is in positive premium, loose the smartcoin creation condition, while one smartcoin is in negative premium, tighten the smartcoin creation condition.
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Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« Reply #14 on: October 02, 2018, 11:34:57 am »
First, let’s define the vision of smartcoin,  in my view, it is 1. enough accurate pegging and 2. enough liquidity. based on these smartcoin will seek wildly adoption comparing to USDT.
I think this is already where people may have a different vision.
For me (and others) the core value proposition of bitassets was:
* always fully collateralized
* settlement available to obtain collateral at a "fair" price.

With respect to settlement, the community has already moved from a
settlement at parity 1:1 with the introduction of the settlement
offset to incentivize shorters to increase liquidity.

My feeling is that those optimization criteria (tight pegging & liquidity
vs. backing and settlement) may not work out together, at least not in
the short term.


If research a bit about economy, there is a famous "impossible trinity" theory. Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossible_trinity

"
The impossible trinity (also known as the trilemma) is a concept in international economics which states that it is impossible to have all three of the following at the same time:

* a fixed foreign exchange rate
* free capital movement (absence of capital controls)
* an independent monetary policy
"

Actually, IMHO, what we want for bitAssets are "a fixed foreign exchange rate" and "free capital movement (absence of capital controls)", so theoretically we have to give up "independent monetary policy". This means we have to have weaker promises, need to feed whatever price the market demands, but not what we think is fair (read: the trading price, or limitations, etc).

Being able to settle unlimited volume at par is a very strong promise, thus will certainly reflect on prices -- as a premium. Always having full collateral is another strong promise which will cause premium as well. As described in BSIP42, it is the too strong promises/guarantees that caused the premiums. That said, if we want a fixed exchange rate, we need to "break" the promises somehow, or to limit capital movement somehow. This sounds unacceptable for some people, but unfortunately it's the fact.

Having a hourly force-settle volume limit is actually limiting "free capital movement", which more or less helped "fixed exchange rate" plus "independent monetary policy". Having a delay on force-settlement is another limitation on free capital movement. Making more use of force-settlement will lead to more chance of hitting these limits, which effectively weaken the promise. On the opposite, traders are always able to trade freely on market which indicates free capital movement, so if we have enough liquidity around par, it's a win-win. In case when more people want to force-settle, actually they want to buy BTS with bitAssets, we look for a way to fulfill the demand, other than force-settlement, the approach proposed by BSIP42 is to create more sell orders aka margin calls by increasing requirements on collateral ratio, so actually this approach gives up "independent monetary policy" in the hope of maintaining "free capital movement" and "fixed exchange rate".

It's absurd to say that there are people have a lot of money want to buy but there is no enough liquidity. If they really have money and want to buy, please put orders onto the market, I believe the orders can get filled if they offered a fair price. Actions are louder than words. "want to buy if there is a lower price" is actually "don't want to buy", IMHO it means the demand is not strong enough. If there are real demands, they'll reflect as price movements. Being able to buy a lot in a short period even in an illiquid market, without affecting trading price, is just unrealistic. If we promised that, something else will certainly go wrong, E.G. unable to peg well or few participants/opponents.

All these are logical thinking. If someone is unable to think logically, It's really hard for me to explain.
« Last Edit: October 02, 2018, 11:39:08 am by abit »
BTS account: abit
BTS committee member: abit
BTS witness: in.abit