Hello 👋

[binggo]

if using the global settlement to crash all the debtors, then the confidence and liquidity will lost very quickly, no one want to come in again.

if using the BSIP71 or lock the feed price, the devalue of bitasset will become very seriously, the market will lost confidence very quickly too, and will harm the benifit of the holder of bitasset, they will leave very quickly.

You think anyone has any confidence left in bitassets to lose? It's entirely gone now mate, people are already unlikely to return. bitCNY & bitUSD have already been SEVERELY devalued, upwards of 71% as mentioned above, there is ZERO benefit to the asset holder from this, thus there can be no confidence in these dead scam coins any more. BSIP76 proponents chose this future, it cannot be forgotten. IMO they should lose the 'bit' prefix for being confirmed scam assets.

We are talking different thing, you just want to complain something again and again, didn't have any new thoughts appears, just want to follow the failed design by BM, sorry about that, talking is over.

[sahkan]

if using the global settlement to crash all the debtors, then the confidence and liquidity will lost very quickly, no one want to come in again.

if using the BSIP71 or lock the feed price, the devalue of bitasset will become very seriously, the market will lost confidence very quickly too, and will harm the benifit of the holder of bitasset, they will leave very quickly.

You think anyone has any confidence left in bitassets to lose? It's entirely gone now mate, people are already unlikely to return. bitCNY & bitUSD have already been SEVERELY devalued, upwards of 71% as mentioned above, there is ZERO benefit to the asset holder from this, thus there can be no confidence in these dead scam coins any more. BSIP76 proponents chose this future, it cannot be forgotten. IMO they should lose the 'bit' prefix for being confirmed scam assets.

Good point. ScamCNY and ScamUSD should be more of their true reflection. I'm not sure why people even buy them anymore. But the good thing, nobody has to buy them if they don't want to. Unfortunate.

[R]

if using the global settlement to crash all the debtors, then the confidence and liquidity will lost very quickly, no one want to come in again.

if using the BSIP71 or lock the feed price, the devalue of bitasset will become very seriously, the market will lost confidence very quickly too, and will harm the benifit of the holder of bitasset, they will leave very quickly.

You think anyone has any confidence left in bitassets to lose? It's entirely gone now mate, people are already unlikely to return. bitCNY & bitUSD have already been SEVERELY devalued, upwards of 71% as mentioned above, there is ZERO benefit to the asset holder from this, thus there can be no confidence in these dead scam coins any more. BSIP76 proponents chose this future, it cannot be forgotten. IMO they should lose the 'bit' prefix for being confirmed scam assets.

[binggo]

https://cdn.bytom.io/res/MOV-Stable-EN.pdf

I went through your team's paper.  So it seems like you will try to achieve a targeted price by fee charge that will be determined by both your models and the price feed.  The fees charged will be the interest rate provided to the pegged asset holders.  Its almost acting like a federal reserve that tries to influence the federal funds rate, but without the ability to buy and sell reserves.

Correct me if I'm correct? 

This would have a real lag problem. 

Bonds also can deviate tremendous from their underlying assets they cover because of the lack of liquidity in the system.  Not sure how you solve that end of the problem.

Take part of it out, then use on bitasset.
Even have a little lag problem, we didn't need to copy all of it.

You should find there have two methods to adjust the liquidity from supply-side in 2.4, we seems didn't need to use all of these, we just use the Bonds to handle the bad debts.

 If the market can develop and have income sustainable, the liquidity will recover very quickly as the market environment become good and the Bonds will be bought back slowly.

Yes, the bonds also can deviate tremendous, the best result is ZERO, every bitasset market have different situation, then the time that buy back all the Bonds will be very different.
We must clear one point: The Bonds just a method, with it, the bad debt can be handled more quickly, if didn't have it, this will become very slowly.

The "liquidity" of stable coin market come from the confidence of the market.
if using the global settlement to crash all the debtors, then the confidence and liquidity will lost very quickly, no one want to come in again.
We have eight bitassets were global settlement, the truth is cruel.

if using the BSIP71 or lock the feed price, the devalue of bitasset will become very seriously, the market will lost confidence very quickly too, and will harm the benifit of the holder of bitasset, they will leave very quickly.
We knew the situation now.

if we use an account or a pool to take charge of the bad debts, the income and the Bonds of this bitasset market will slowly cover the bad debts, didn't need the global settlement and the BSIP71 or lock the feed price, if the holders of bitassets believe and be sure the market will become good, he should buy the Bonds.

[Bitcoinfan]

https://cdn.bytom.io/res/MOV-Stable-EN.pdf

I went through your team's paper.  So it seems like you will try to achieve a targeted price by fee charge that will be determined by both your models and the price feed.  The fees charged will be the interest rate provided to the pegged asset holders.  Its almost acting like a federal reserve that tries to influence the federal funds rate, but without the ability to buy and sell reserves.

Correct me if I'm correct? 

This would have a real lag problem. 

Bonds also can deviate tremendous from their underlying assets they cover because of the lack of liquidity in the system.  Not sure how you solve that end of the problem.

[sahkan]

Lol @Bytemaster, you probably don't even read these... but I think Bitshares promised to be a DEX but in reality it is just a blockchain interface for a CEX. And now some faulty DPOS fundamentals (like borrowed votes through bitAssets) are making the chain almost worthless, sad really. Only RUDEX and @litepresence are holding it up.

[binggo]

In other words, if the market can develop and have income sustainable, it can issue "stability bond" to handle these bad debts.

Can you explain the stability bond?

https://cdn.bytom.io/res/MOV-Stable-EN.pdf

[Bitcoinfan]

In other words, if the market can develop and have income sustainable, it can issue "stability bond" to handle these bad debts.

Can you explain the stability bond? 

[binggo]

The ratio of debt/collateral can't avoid this Black Swan global settlement trigger, price can fall down and down to trigger it.

I thought a global settlement trigger happens when there isn't enough collateral in $Value backing it to match the amount of BitUSD?  So having not enough collateral is part of the problem?

The problem of global settlement is if one debt became insolvent all debts will be global settlement，just like a customer of a bank can't pay off his debt and became insolvent，then the bank will be global settlement.

Yes, having not enough collateral is part of the problem, but shouldn't global settlement all the pledgor.

In other words, if the market can develop and have income sustainable, it can issue "stability bond" to handle these bad debts.

[Bitcoinfan]

The ratio of debt/collateral can't avoid this Black Swan global settlement trigger, price can fall down and down to trigger it.

I thought a global settlement trigger happens when there isn't enough collateral in $Value backing it to match the amount of BitUSD?  So having not enough collateral is part of the problem?

[binggo]

Hi Folks,

Haven't been here in a while, but intrigueing to see how things have changed.

What level of debt / collateral would have been sufficient to avoid this Black Swan global settlement trigger?  I assume 1.5X is still the minimum requirement?  Would a 3X or 4X have prevented it?  If I remember correctly, getting to 3X and 4X is a whole another question of liquidity, and no shorter is willing to put up that amount.

I'm gathering BTS avoided a global settlement by using a peg freeze that was introduced in BSIP76?

First, the global settlement is very foolish.

The ratio of debt/collateral can't avoid this Black Swan global settlement trigger, price can fall down and down to trigger it.

The right way is how to handle the bad debt, not use peg freeze, not use global settlement, we can find the right way easily in the realistic financial market, yes, it is  "stability bond"!

[Bitcoinfan]

Hi Folks,

Haven't been here in a while, but intrigueing to see how things have changed.

What level of debt / collateral would have been sufficient to avoid this Black Swan global settlement trigger?  I assume 1.5X is still the minimum requirement?  Would a 3X or 4X have prevented it?  If I remember correctly, getting to 3X and 4X is a whole another question of liquidity, and no shorter is willing to put up that amount.

I'm gathering BTS avoided a global settlement by using a peg freeze that was introduced in BSIP76?

[jckj]

How did BitShares handle the market crash?

  I still have 3 funder users could not work properly, could u solve those problem?

[jckj]

Your know the problem is starting  from your poor consideration. keydns,XTS all has became air now. So crash will be normal , bts, steem EOS all will crash, In my opinion。 You see,  Reinvent all will be the best solution but should move to further than most ones imagination.  We have started new things, Welcome to join the event. New world is coming... Big than bitcoin and blockchain... https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32236.0
En Version:Reinvent keyid keyhotee bitshares https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=31901

[R]

How did BitShares handle the market crash?

The Bitshares network remained fully operational, however bitUSD & bitCNY have not fared well at all.

BSIP76 established a 'minimum feed threshold price', once BTS price goes below this value the feeding mechanism stops accurately feeding the real reference feed price, instead resorting to a false fixed feed value.

This has triggered twice now, once back in late 2019 (https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=29654.0;all) which lasted several months, and now once again for more than a week due to the recent price collapse.

This is mandatory socialized loss of value to bitUSD/bitCNY holders to benefit debt holders (bad gamblers), as such these bitassets are no longer legitimate stores of value.

Vote weight should have been revoked once placed into debt positions, as bitasset holders had no say in this mandatory theft of value.

bitUSD with a fixed feed of 29 BTS/bitUSD at the lowest BTS price of $0.009265 (on 13th march 2020) equates to $0.268685 , 73% below the peg, even if you account for an MCR of 1.6x0.268685 that's only 0.429896 ie this is blatanty global settlement territory.

Since the price feeding and global settlement mechanisms have been cheated there exists no logical reason to hold these assets long term as that simply leads to theft of asset value instead of an opportunity to grow ones BTS balance.

What's pretty nuts though is that the official bitshares.org website still doesn't mention any of this thread's concepts/history, rather it continues to mislead investors with an old vision of what bitassets should have been. https://bitshares.org/technology/price-stable-cryptocurrencies/ Changes have been proposed to correct these inaccuracies, some feedback would be great https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares.org/pull/111

In the meantime, all participants can rest assured that BitUSD is always worth at least $1, and can consider the premium for entering the ecosystem as a one-time fee.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4Uw3m_dPpw

[bitcrab]

Currently bitRUBLE is best committee-owned MPA, as it's retain original MCR=1.75 and MSSR=1.1.

it do not make big issue as it is in too low supply to impact BTS price while market crash.

[pstrident]

Really....Bytemaster....Really!?!?

Really...Bitcrab...Really!?!?

lol...wtf....surreal

[binggo]

Currently bitRUBLE is best committee-owned MPA, as it's retain original MCR=1.75 and MSSR=1.1.

I think you make a big mistake.





and we have three black bitasset which retain original MCR=1.75 and MSSR=1.1.

[dh]

Currently bitRUBLE is best committee-owned MPA, as it's retain original MCR=1.75 and MSSR=1.1.

[binggo]

I think you didn't understand the mean of "dance", like an ostrich hiding his head in the sand so long time and just hope the market can rescue you, this is a shame for everyone,this is not "dance".
BTS can survive or not, not depend on these BSIPS,  didn't want to face problems squarely, and just want to skirt round them like an ostrich, so everyone will pay for this and will become zombie slowly, zombie still can walk and eat.

at least bts can dance with risk after the implementation of BSIP58, BSIP76, BAIP2.
nothing is perfect the outcome of above implementation is BTS is able to survive  and keep on

[twitter]

at least bts can dance with risk after the implementation of BSIP58, BSIP76, BAIP2.
nothing is perfect the outcome of above implementation is BTS is able to survive  and keep on
 

,

The painful history of BTS has taught us a lot, we realized that it is impossible to make smart coin peg exactly at any time,  and we need to change to stop the way of pegging from hurting the whole ecosystem, measures are taken accordingly.

After the implementation of BSIP58, BSIP76, BAIP2, bitCNY and bitUSD are no longer expected as exactly pegged asset at any time. they are derivatives of BTS that can peg under some conditions, and peg off under some other conditions, they can still be used as tools of leveraging, risk controlling, arbitraging and so on. the great benefits is, the death spiral disappeared. BTS holders need not to worry that market crash will lead BTS price to 0.

I observed Maker’s behavior in the recent market crash, it behaved like BTS in old times, and due to the booming gas fee and the settlement rule of DAI, many margin called CDPs are settled in very low price, some bidders get the collaterals in very cheap price and what they paid cannot cover the debt, Maker team has to pay the gap by selling MKR. Maker team and debt position owners are both losers in this market crash.

I am glad that BTS has left this page behind, although bitCNY and bitUSD are now in big devaluation due to BSIP76, we successfully avoid the crash of BTS price, I believe not only debt position owners, but also all BTS holders would like to see this.

We expect to restore the peg of the smart coin by making BTS price be stably above the threshold, the way to get this is to increase the system income by charging from margin call, force settlement and UIA market fee, and pay public expenditures and buy back BTS using the accumulated fees,  if all the things going well, we can get features for this in release 4.0.

I hope the ones who always call BSIP58, BSIP76 and BAIP2 “market manipulation” can update their idea, we are just utilizing creative solution.

FOOLISH AND STUPID WORDS.

掩耳盗铃与鸵鸟。

堵上耳朵就听不到声音了？头埋到沙子里屁股漏到外面就以为能够躲过危机？不想去真正的解决问题，却学会了怎么一味的去逃避。

You didn't have any ability to solve the risk, so destroy the smartcoin become your choice.

creative solution

？God，please help！These words winded me，i love these words so much！

[binggo]

The painful history of BTS has taught us a lot, we realized that it is impossible to make smart coin peg exactly at any time,  and we need to change to stop the way of pegging from hurting the whole ecosystem, measures are taken accordingly.

After the implementation of BSIP58, BSIP76, BAIP2, bitCNY and bitUSD are no longer expected as exactly pegged asset at any time. they are derivatives of BTS that can peg under some conditions, and peg off under some other conditions, they can still be used as tools of leveraging, risk controlling, arbitraging and so on. the great benefits is, the death spiral disappeared. BTS holders need not to worry that market crash will lead BTS price to 0.

I observed Maker’s behavior in the recent market crash, it behaved like BTS in old times, and due to the booming gas fee and the settlement rule of DAI, many margin called CDPs are settled in very low price, some bidders get the collaterals in very cheap price and what they paid cannot cover the debt, Maker team has to pay the gap by selling MKR. Maker team and debt position owners are both losers in this market crash.

I am glad that BTS has left this page behind, although bitCNY and bitUSD are now in big devaluation due to BSIP76, we successfully avoid the crash of BTS price, I believe not only debt position owners, but also all BTS holders would like to see this.

We expect to restore the peg of the smart coin by making BTS price be stably above the threshold, the way to get this is to increase the system income by charging from margin call, force settlement and UIA market fee, and pay public expenditures and buy back BTS using the accumulated fees,  if all the things going well, we can get features for this in release 4.0.

I hope the ones who always call BSIP58, BSIP76 and BAIP2 “market manipulation” can update their idea, we are just utilizing creative solution.

FOOLISH AND STUPID WORDS.

掩耳盗铃与鸵鸟。

堵上耳朵就听不到声音了？头埋到沙子里屁股漏到外面就以为能够躲过危机？不想去真正的解决问题，却学会了怎么一味的去逃避。

You didn't have any ability to solve the risk, so destroy the smartcoin become your choice.

creative solution

？God，please help！These words winded me，i love these words so much！

[bitcrab]

The painful history of BTS has taught us a lot, we realized that it is impossible to make smart coin peg exactly at any time,  and we need to change to stop the way of pegging from hurting the whole ecosystem, measures are taken accordingly.

After the implementation of BSIP58, BSIP76, BAIP2, bitCNY and bitUSD are no longer expected as exactly pegged asset at any time. they are derivatives of BTS that can peg under some conditions, and peg off under some other conditions, they can still be used as tools of leveraging, risk controlling, arbitraging and so on. the great benefits is, the death spiral disappeared. BTS holders need not to worry that market crash will lead BTS price to 0.

I observed Maker’s behavior in the recent market crash, it behaved like BTS in old times, and due to the booming gas fee and the settlement rule of DAI, many margin called CDPs are settled in very low price, some bidders get the collaterals in very cheap price and what they paid cannot cover the debt, Maker team has to pay the gap by selling MKR. Maker team and debt position owners are both losers in this market crash.

I am glad that BTS has left this page behind, although bitCNY and bitUSD are now in big devaluation due to BSIP76, we successfully avoid the crash of BTS price, I believe not only debt position owners, but also all BTS holders would like to see this.

We expect to restore the peg of the smart coin by making BTS price be stably above the threshold, the way to get this is to increase the system income by charging from margin call, force settlement and UIA market fee, and pay public expenditures and buy back BTS using the accumulated fees,  if all the things going well, we can get features for this in release 4.0.

I hope the ones who always call BSIP58, BSIP76 and BAIP2 “market manipulation” can update their idea, we are just utilizing creative solution.

[BunkerChainLabs-DataSecurityNode]

How did BitShares handle the market crash?

It broke.. detailed explanations already provided above. Ultimately self interests won out to network interests, again. You learned how this goes by the time you got through some time in Steem. However, the design premise in Bitshares remained and failed under pressure by debt holders to save their wealth at the expense of the integrity of the network. Since then it's been all downhill generally. This only became compounded in the downturn recently.

On the flip side, you can say that it worked as it was supposed too... but the current scenario only replicated the same manipulation of markets as we see in the financial world that has disillusioned many prompting them to sell off BTS and not look back till the integrity is restored.

Why do you ask?

[litepresence]

Binance CEX
BTC:USDT
https://cryptowat.ch/markets/binance/btc/usdt/4h


BitShares DEX
HONEST.BTC:HONEST.USD MPA
https://staging.bitshares.org/#/market/HONEST.BTC_HONEST.USD


BitShares DEX
bitBTC:bitUSD
https://staging.bitshares.org/#/market/BTC_USD


all charts are 4h candles FEB 1st to present

bitUSD plutocracy

Code: [Select]

Maximum short squeeze ratio         1010
Force settlement delay              24h
Force settlement offset             1%
Max force settle vol                0.5%
HONEST.USD noocracy

Code: [Select]

Maximum short squeeze ratio         1250
Force settlement delay              4h
Force settlement offset             0%
Max force settle vol                100%
@Dan to discuss changes to core required to enact noocratic governance catch me on telegram @litepresence

[EuropaSH]

How did BitShares handle the market crash?

Hello! Nice to see you here!
I represent the XBTS Dex exchange https://xbts.io/. We are an exchange for gamers and for traders. We are developing new technology for games on the DPoS blockchain. And by the way, we developed an absolutely honest lottery on the Bitshares blockchain. I remember you talked about this back in 2014). But from that moment no one was able to realize this idea. We did it! Be sure to invite you to the opening!



We are a close-knit team of developers who are passionate about decentralized technology.
We have many developments. How can I contact you to discuss them?

Regards,
  Europa
contact@xbts.io
(@EuropaSH in Telegram)
Our Core Tech Programmer TechnoL0g https://github.com/technologiespro

[sschiessl]

How did BitShares handle the market crash?

Hi bytemaster,

my name is Stefan, I have been working closely with various workers in the past years and am currently one of the reviewers for BSIPs.

I'm gonna take a guess and assume that you are interested in how the BitAsset/SmartCoin mechanism handled the market crash. I'm gonna try to objectively give a historical overview, links to the respective BSIPs were posted before. The mechanisms work as intended as we have seen last year when bitUSD went into global settlement. It got revived again when MCR was reached and re-pegged beautifully. Still, the global settlement mechanism has flaws: Everyone gets globally settled even if its just one individual with a bad CR, instant force settlement keeps the price off peg, new debt positions cant be created and the revival process takes too long (reaching MCR instead of CR 1) which is a big hindrance for adoption and liquidity and allows individuals with deep knowledge to gain massive advantage of unbenownst everyday users.

The flaws led to (controversial) refinements of the mechanisms: Global settlement protection price. Since core changes are slow and take time and immediate action was deemed necessary, a proposal was done that witnesses should feed a price that avoids global settlement (i.e. allow intentional undercollaterization to avoid global settlement). Ontop of that, MSSR and FSO were adjusted in a way to strengthen the peg. The global settlement price caused bitCNY to not global settle when bitUSD did. Looking at the markets after this event, bitCNY did significantly better in terms of liquidity and peg. Still, intentional undercollaterization while protecting debt position holders at the cost of a manipulated feed price is no longterm solution as it lacks transparency in the DEX (the feed price does not reflect a realistic external BTS price anymore). Some ideas that came to mind: a) Implement a selective settlement mechanism that only affects positions with CR < 1 instead of all b) refined margin call mechanism where the margin call price depends on CR and MCR c) incentivize force settlement for debt positions that have CR < MCR. All of them need core change and would take significant time to implement and d) give debt position holders the ability to set a TCR > MCR (target collateral ratio), then margin calls are selling only as much to reach that TCR (is now implemented). The chosen solution of a global settlement protection price could be implemented swiftly. A BSIP was written afterwards to replace this mechanism in a more transparent way in the core, although it is not realized atm.

This year another incident happened when there were alleged shorting attacks on CEXes (i.e. influence the price feed) to cause margin calls and take advantage of debt position holders. This was possible due to many debt position holders margining to the max and keeping their CR as close to MCR as possible, with no reserves to replenish and with no proactive way to close their debt position. Debt position holders demanded swift action and since they hold significant voting weight and at that time were (still are) a big part of the BTS voting power, consequently another debt position holder protection was proposed and implemented through the price feed: namely the threshold price (highly controversial). Which really just means that, if price below threshold, then feed threshold instead. Ultimately that meant that we now had a margin call protection price as feed price and pretty much all debt position holders kept their CR exactly above that price. This threshold price is still in effect, thus the latest crash had no impact on the BitAsset mechanisms. If no price feed alterations were in effect the BitAssets would all have globally settled. So the current solution is the ultimate protection of debt position holders, which is not a surprise because they hold the largest voting weight. Now that margin calls are effectively rendered inactive some individuals shifted to massive force settlements when profit was possible. Some ideas that came to mind: a) give the debt position holders a way to manually trigger a margin call with a price they can choose (BSIP is voted in) b) refine force settlement mechanisms and give them a fee that goes to the asset owner (similar to the stability fee of DAI). The peg is of course not maintained with this measure, and has not been for a while.

There exist a multitude of other ideas for refinement of the BitAsset mechanism which are currently in drafting status but paused mostly due to the funding issues, which were also caused through the voting behavior. Essentially, majority of BTS voting power has blocked all proposals a couple months back.

I hope I could describe it properly (anyone please correct me ), and you also were interested in that subject. If not, and other aspects of BitShares progress interests you please let me know.

Best regards,
  Stefan (@sschiessl-bcp in GitHub, @sschiessl in Telegram)

[ripplexiaoshan]

Hello Bytemaster, there is an account with -250 million BTS in the genesis file of BitShares 2.0, which was highly related to you. Do you want to comment on this in public? Thanks.

[CLains]

How about this - pull a Justin Sun, raise BitShares from the dead, and then use it as an EOS flux capacitor (side-chain) to alter the timeline where DeFi becomes synonymous with the one chain to ruleth them all. Anyhow, trust you're doing whatever it takes to mitigate the master-consolidation as always; the sound of helicopter money & prayers for fiscal injections in the name of The Savior FIAT is certainly on its way to becoming as intense as Stan and others here pointed out years ago!

[binggo]

How did BitShares handle the market crash?

BTC crashed recently due to liquidity problem and this happened in BTS frequently over the past few years. Few proposals was introduced to handle the market crash (Mainly apply to BitCNY & BitUSD).

1. BAIP2 - Price Feed Max (Current Price, 48 Hours Moving Average)
https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/4

2. BSIP76 - Threshold for price feeds through voting (At this moment is BitCNY/BTS = 0.22,BitUSD/BTS = 0.345)
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0076.md

3. BSIP58 - Global Settlement Protection Through Price Feeding
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0058.md

You lost this BSIP38 -Add target collateral ratio option to short positions
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0038.md

[Bangzi]

How did BitShares handle the market crash?

BTC crashed recently due to liquidity problem and this happened in BTS frequently over the past few years. Few proposals was introduced to handle the market crash (Mainly apply to BitCNY & BitUSD).

1. BAIP2 - Price Feed Max (Current Price, 48 Hours Moving Average)
https://github.com/bitshares/baips/issues/4

2. BSIP76 - Threshold for price feeds through voting (At this moment is BitCNY/BTS = 0.22,BitUSD/BTS = 0.345)
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0076.md

3. BSIP58 - Global Settlement Protection Through Price Feeding
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0058.md

[binggo]

We locked it long long time ago，everything is OK.

[bytemaster]

How did BitShares handle the market crash?