Author Topic: Approval Voting vs Delegation  (Read 35783 times)

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Offline Agent86

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The only way for 51% to monopolize the delegates is if they all vote for the exact same slate of 101 delegates without deviation.  Would you invest in a network where 51% of stake miraculously was in complete agreement on all 101 of the delegates they liked and everyone else opposed these same delegates?  Would that be a red flag to you to take your money to a different chain?

You say "no group should control all 101 delegates unless that group owns ~100% stake".  Just a few posts ago you were saying it should require closer to a 10-30% coordinated minority to guarantee representation.

Offline emski

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Possible countermeasure to the above is limiting the number of delegates someone can vote for. The result is that minorities of certain size are guaranteed a delegate and point 2 and 3 will be impossible unless the majority ignores all the blocks from other delegates which will slow the network.

This is a false statement, limiting the number of delegates one can vote for does not guarantee a minority anything.   All it does is change the strategy of how someone allocates stake and lowers the threshold of attack.

OK. Does it guarantee that a group with 51% cant have all 101 delegates?

EDIT: Could you explain in more details?
EDIT2: Perhaps more important question are:
"Does it enable a minority of 49% to elect a delegate?";
"Does it enable a minority of X% to elect a delegate?";
"What could we do in order to prevent a group owning 51% stake from taking over all 101 delegates?" (Do you want this? Why?)
« Last Edit: July 02, 2014, 02:41:48 pm by emski »

Offline bytemaster

Possible countermeasure to the above is limiting the number of delegates someone can vote for. The result is that minorities of certain size are guaranteed a delegate and point 2 and 3 will be impossible unless the majority ignores all the blocks from other delegates which will slow the network.

This is a false statement, limiting the number of delegates one can vote for does not guarantee a minority anything.   All it does is change the strategy of how someone allocates stake and lowers the threshold of attack.
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Offline emski

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As I think the topic is high importance I'll compile again few facts of the pure Approval Voting system:

Any group controlling 51% stake can elect all delegates.
Controlling all the delegates enables you to :
1 No fees for your own transactions - even if the fees exist they come back to the controlling party
2 Increase transaction taxes for the rest of the world. - This could be made looking non-suspicious by generating large amounts of dummy transactions (free due to 1).
3 Banning lists of addresses from using the network at all. (while not processing their transactions effectively robbing them of their stake)

I think this will be partially resolved by setting limits discussed above.
I think that no group should control all 101 delegates unless that group owns ~100% stake.
I think that owning 51% stake is different than controlling all delegates. I believe delegate representation should be proportional to the stake owned.

Possible countermeasure to the above is limiting the number of delegates someone can vote for. The result is that minorities of certain size are guaranteed a delegate and point 2 and 3 will be impossible unless the majority ignores all the blocks from other delegates which will slow the network.

Offline emski

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A possibility should be market manipulation: Rise taxes - lower share prices. Buy cheap shares. Lower taxes. Sell shares a bit more expensive.

Or perhaps something more subtle - prioritize 51%'s transactions over the rest.
Either way, it's obvious that an untrustworthy group controls this DAC so no one plays along for these games with them.
Ok.
I think it is not obvious. And if done correctly (boiling frog) there will be enough players to buy-in.
However we shouldn't argue over speculations.
I think I've explained my vision which was my purpose.

Offline Agent86

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A possibility should be market manipulation: Rise taxes - lower share prices. Buy cheap shares. Lower taxes. Sell shares a bit more expensive.

Or perhaps something more subtle - prioritize 51%'s transactions over the rest.
Either way, it's obvious that an untrustworthy group controls this DAC so no one plays along for these games with them.

Offline emski

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If the majority (51%) adjusts the rules at will they can set share price at will.
I'm not understanding this

For example in the scenario where 51% while controlling 101 delegates adjust transaction taxes for the remaining 49%.
This should automatically lower the prices of ALL shares.
And enables "the 51%" the ability to increase taxes exclusively for "the 49%".
Ok, so that basically makes everyone's shares instantly worthless, until a new chain/fork is started with the 51% stake removed so trust/integrity is restored.  Why would the 51% do that to themselves?  How do they gain anything?
A possibility should be market manipulation: Rise taxes - lower share prices. Buy cheap shares. Lower taxes. Sell shares a bit more expensive.

Or perhaps something more subtle - prioritize 51%'s transactions over the rest.

Offline Agent86

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If the majority (51%) adjusts the rules at will they can set share price at will.
I'm not understanding this

For example in the scenario where 51% while controlling 101 delegates adjust transaction taxes for the remaining 49%.
This should automatically lower the prices of ALL shares.
And enables "the 51%" the ability to increase taxes exclusively for "the 49%".
Ok, so that basically makes everyone's shares instantly worthless, until a new chain/fork is started with the 51% stake removed so trust/integrity is restored.  Why would the 51% do that to themselves?  How do they gain anything?

Offline emski

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If the majority (51%) adjusts the rules at will they can set share price at will.
I'm not understanding this

For example in the scenario where 51% while controlling 101 delegates adjust transaction taxes for the remaining 49%.
This should automatically lower the prices of ALL shares.
And enables "the 51%" the ability to increase taxes exclusively for "the 49%".
« Last Edit: June 28, 2014, 06:22:59 pm by emski »

Offline Agent86

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If the majority (51%) adjusts the rules at will they can set share price at will.
I'm not understanding this

Offline emski

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There is HUGE incentive to resolve disagreement.
If a majority group tries to abuse their power, one of 2 things happen:
-The minority sells their shares
-They fork the network without honoring the unreasonable majority
Both of these actions leave the majority with a GIANT loss of value.  How does this unreasonable colluding majority profit??
Their shares will be worthless and there will be no "new minority" willing to buy shares and get abused.
My idea was to resolve disagreements without forking.

If the majority (51%) adjusts the rules at will they can set share price at will (changing rules). So when they begin abusing the system share value will be lower and these 49% already lost value. Even if they sell everything at lower prices the majority may readjust the rules again...

Adjusted how?  Adjusted to what?  If you adjust it back to 1% you have the same system we started with and just replaced - (you're back at square one)
If you wish to propose a change that is taken seriously you must articulate an actual proposal, not just "it can be adjusted."  You must specify something and defend its logic.
1% is too low. I was thinking about something in range 10% - 30% but the exact number should be further discussed.

Must I specify something? I was trying to express the idea that drives me to propose these changes. The actual values are not of significant importance until the idea is accepted/approved.

Offline Agent86

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Yes It will be obvious but there will be no incentive for controlling party to resolve the disagreement.
There is HUGE incentive to resolve disagreement.
If a majority group tries to abuse their power, one of 2 things happen:
-The minority sells their shares
-They fork the network without honoring the unreasonable majority

Both of these actions leave the majority with a GIANT loss of value.  How does this unreasonable colluding majority profit??

Their shares will be worthless and there will be no "new minority" willing to buy shares and get abused.

A DAC is a FREE ASSOCIATION of people who's interests are aligned (growing the value of the shares.)
I have no idea how you expect one party to gain 51% of the network at GREAT expense and then just blow it with bad decisions for no reason.

You also seem to be advocating that a minority should be allowed to slow down the network for everyone else if they don't like things.  How small a minority should be allowed to do this?  If you pick 33%, why that number?  Sometimes when you've just picked a number that "seems about right" to you, it can help to think about it more.
Yes. The number can be adjusted...
I believe that delegate representation for minority (above certain %) groups should be granted.
Adjusted how?  Adjusted to what?  If you adjust it back to 1% you have the same system we started with and just replaced - (you're back at square one)
If you wish to propose a change that is taken seriously you must articulate an actual proposal, not just "it can be adjusted."  You must specify something and defend its logic.

Offline emski

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emski, maybe these address your fears in some way?:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5205.msg69097#msg69097
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5205.msg69204#msg69204
I've read the other threads.

Even if the network "runs like no conflict exists" it would still be obvious from looking at the votes that the community is splitting down the middle into 2 opposing camps for some reason; you don't need a slow network to tell you that.
Yes It will be obvious but there will be no incentive for controlling party to resolve the disagreement.

You also seem to be advocating that a minority should be allowed to slow down the network for everyone else if they don't like things.  How small a minority should be allowed to do this?  If you pick 33%, why that number?  Sometimes when you've just picked a number that "seems about right" to you, it can help to think about it more.
Yes. The number can be adjusted.
I think if 49% of people disagree with the way the network is maintained they should have delegate representation and ability to slow the service down (or other significant way to express this disagreement).
The delegates shouldn't resort to such extreme measures even if a conflict arises (they will lose support anyway in this case). But the sole fact that this is possible should be enough incentive for all 101 delegates to reach a consensus.

I think that if a group gathers 51% stake and collects all the taxes from the other 49% (why not double or triple) the miniority group should have options other than forking.
I believe that delegate representation for minority (above certain %) groups should be granted.
« Last Edit: June 28, 2014, 04:28:03 pm by emski »

Offline Agent86

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It is counted in that all delegates are attempting to gain the highest possible approval rating to get in, so your vote matters to all delegates. 

The only time it doesn matter is when a single coordinated individual owns a majority stake.

Or a group of people the majority - 51%. Disagrees with another group of people 49% which I happen to support.
I already stated the two options in this case:
1 Network runs as if no conflict exists
2 Network is slower until consensus is reached

I personally think 2 is better.
emski, maybe these address your fears in some way?:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5205.msg69097#msg69097
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=5205.msg69204#msg69204

Even if the network "runs like no conflict exists" it would still be obvious from looking at the votes that the community is splitting down the middle into 2 opposing camps for some reason; you don't need a slow network to tell you that.

You also seem to be advocating that a minority should be allowed to slow down the network for everyone else if they don't like things.  How small a minority should be allowed to do this?  If you pick 33%, why that number?  Sometimes when you've just picked a number that "seems about right" to you, it can help to think about it more.

Offline emski

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It is counted in that all delegates are attempting to gain the highest possible approval rating to get in, so your vote matters to all delegates. 

The only time it doesn matter is when a single coordinated individual owns a majority stake.

Or a group of people the majority - 51%. Disagrees with another group of people 49% which I happen to support.
I already stated the two options in this case:
1 Network runs as if no conflict exists
2 Network is slower until consensus is reached

I personally think 2 is better.