Fee Flow / Yield Info Graphic

[xeroc]

You still have the 5% fee on short orders (I assume you mean to say 5% fee on margin calls) going to the rewards fund. According to bytemaster's response, it should be going to the delegate's box instead.

you are totally right ... *fixed*

[bytemaster]

I think (eventually) all income collected by the network should go to the delegates and the delegates should determine how the income is distributed.

--> Rewards Fund
--> Burn
--> Delegate Income

The shareholders vote for delegates that distribute network income in a way they agree with.

This sounds like a reasonable... I think "burn" is probably the least effective option on the list.  The more BitAsset users/holders there are BTSX gets a 2x advantage.  Thus in my estimation driving demand for BitAssets is #1. 

[Method-X]

I think (eventually) all income collected by the network should go to the delegates and the delegates should determine how the income is distributed.

--> Rewards Fund
--> Burn
--> Delegate Income

The shareholders vote for delegates that distribute network income in a way they agree with.

[bytemaster]

If my understanding is correct, paying fees other than short fees out as interest should break the peg.  In an uncertain market in which demand due assets matches demand to short, the peg should work. If everyone wants to short, that breaks the peg, which is why we had to use the price feeds.  Allowing the shorts to pay the longs interest should recreate the balanced/uncertain market in which the peg works, but providing additional interest from other fees to asset holders would then break the peg again by increasing demand for assets.

The question is whether demand for bit assets is greater than the demand to short.   Considering demand for BitAssets increases demand for BTSX 2x... short demand should be in very high supply.  The game theory on the peg still holds.   Also, it doesn't matter *as much* if it breaks the peg to the upside (because a BitUSD will remain >= $1) which means people can accept it at face value with confidence. 

[arhag]

Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.

*fixed*

You still have the 5% fee on short orders (I assume you mean to say 5% fee on margin calls) going to the rewards fund. According to bytemaster's response, it should be going to the delegate's box instead.

[Troglodactyl]

If my understanding is correct, paying fees other than short fees out as interest should break the peg.  In an uncertain market in which demand due assets matches demand to short, the peg should work. If everyone wants to short, that breaks the peg, which is why we had to use the price feeds.  Allowing the shorts to pay the longs interest should recreate the balanced/uncertain market in which the peg works, but providing additional interest from other fees to asset holders would then break the peg again by increasing demand for assets.

[xeroc]

The yield on BitAssets is coming from the various fees the network collects. This is a value transfer from the participants paying the fees to the network (it doesn't really matter what it is denominated in). This value has three places it can go: the BitAsset holders, the BTSX holders, and the delegates. I am saying that we would be better off if we (the shareholders) could define how much value goes to which.

ok .. got it .. thx

[xeroc]

Margin call fee is in btsx.
Market fees are bitassets
Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.

*fixed*

Show bid ask overlap going to rainy day fund

*fixed*

[arhag]

Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.

I get that but shouldn't BTSX stakeholders have a way of defining how much interest they want to give to each particular BitAsset? Interest given to a BitAsset is money not given to the stakeholders. For some BitAssets this makes a lot of sense in the initial stages. I am perfectly fine giving up to 5% interest to BitUSD for example (anything more than that I feel would be more useful given back to the stakeholders). However, I don't care much about giving high interest on BitBTC for example. The reason is because making BitUSD more attractive can help marketing to new users and thus increase adoption of BitShares X and thus increase value in BTSX. Providing additional value to BitBTC on the other hand seems counterproductive to our interests.

So basically, I would like to see what I proposed in the second paragraph of this post: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=8396.msg109865#msg109865.

I dont really understand yet .. How is the btsx shareholder supposed to pay 'interest' for the bitAsset holder? have I missed sth?
please enlighten me!

The yield on BitAssets is coming from the various fees the network collects. This is a value transfer from the participants paying the fees to the network (it doesn't really matter what it is denominated in). This value has three places it can go: the BitAsset holders, the BTSX holders, and the delegates. I am saying that we would be better off if we (the shareholders) could define how much value goes to which.

[Shentist]

rainy day funds - is gone!

this funds are paid as yield/interest in advance to the bitAsset holders.

with the trading pattern from the last days bytemaster expects till 10% a year. so it will be a game changer, because now you can hold bitUSD and get paid a interest a year. it will be implemented tomorrow.

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=8520.0

[onceuponatime]

Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?

*confirmed*
"rainy day fund" sucks ..

but I am unaware of a community consensus about the new name

Rewards Fund is good.

[xeroc]

Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?

*confirmed*
"rainy day fund" sucks ..

but I am unaware of a community consensus about the new name

[xeroc]

Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.

I get that but shouldn't BTSX stakeholders have a way of defining how much interest they want to give to each particular BitAsset? Interest given to a BitAsset is money not given to the stakeholders. For some BitAssets this makes a lot of sense in the initial stages. I am perfectly fine giving up to 5% interest to BitUSD for example (anything more than that I feel would be more useful given back to the stakeholders). However, I don't care much about giving high interest on BitBTC for example. The reason is because making BitUSD more attractive can help marketing to new users and thus increase adoption of BitShares X and thus increase value in BTSX. Providing additional value to BitBTC on the other hand seems counterproductive to our interests.

So basically, I would like to see what I proposed in the second paragraph of this post: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=8396.msg109865#msg109865.

I dont really understand yet .. How is the btsx shareholder supposed to pay 'interest' for the bitAsset holder? have I missed sth?
please enlighten me!

[Method-X]

Should we start calling the "rainy day fund" the "rewards fund"?

[arhag]

Btsx holder benefits more paying interest on bit assets than from burning.

I get that but shouldn't BTSX stakeholders have a way of defining how much interest they want to give to each particular BitAsset? Interest given to a BitAsset is money not given to the stakeholders. For some BitAssets this makes a lot of sense in the initial stages. I am perfectly fine giving up to 5% interest to BitUSD for example (anything more than that I feel would be more useful given back to the stakeholders). However, I don't care much about giving high interest on BitBTC for example. The reason is because making BitUSD more attractive can help marketing to new users and thus increase adoption of BitShares X and thus increase value in BTSX. Providing additional value to BitBTC on the other hand seems counterproductive to our interests.

So basically, I would like to see what I proposed in the second paragraph of this post: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=8396.msg109865#msg109865.