Quote from: yvv on March 21, 2016, 10:46:44 pm

Quote from: liondani on March 21, 2016, 10:32:22 pm

  for the initiative !!!


some thoughts...

I think if you want to stick to the "best" 20 crypto's you should use the first 20 with the biggest volume NOT the 20 with the  biggest marketcap.... because we will see many shitcoins on the list very often....
if bit20 is depended from marketcap only it will be very misleading...  And not only use the 24h volume of course... we can use the top 20 crypto with the biggest weekly or monthly volume....

if you want to stick only with the marketacap then I prefer a bit10 index instead of the bit20 so that crap coins get out-filtered...

I support this point. Market cap is a bad measure of performance. Issue trillions of shit coins and get #1 market cap. Look at ripple for example. Trade volume is the only good way to evaluate crypto token performance.

trade volume is also easily faked

It depends what exchanges you reference I guess. You can't fake volume very easily/for very long when you're paying 0.2% per trade can you?

(Coinmarketcap for example excludes the BTC exchanges with no fees from their calculations http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/#markets )

Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 22, 2016, 07:32:25 pm

Quote from: cylonmaker2053 on March 22, 2016, 02:20:33 am

Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 21, 2016, 03:45:39 pm

Work in progress...

I looked at the BSIP outline https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0001.md

Here is some stuff I have written for one, if anyone wants to turn it into a proper BSIP or suggest changes or create their own variation cool. My main goal is that BTS trials using some of the worker budget for SmartCoin yield in one form or another.

---------------------------

BitUSD Yield Promotion BSIP

100 000 BTS per day, 23% of BTS Worker Budget, for 6 months directed to a BitUSD yield promotion. (75% to going to BitUSD Yield and 25% going to BitUSD shorts)

Lower BitUSD forced settlement to 0.95

good cut at this experiment. i'd recommend flipping the split and making it 75% to shorts and 25% to yield on holding the asset. from my experience, those who borrow our smartcoins into existence are the real heroes. they're tying up a ton of collateral and our markets wouldn't exist without them. those who buy and hold the assets still do some good, but incentivizing buy-and-hold over shorting would likely reduce market liquidity by drying up the order book.

also, diverting 20% of worker funds for just bitUSD seems excessive. what happens if it is a success? we have no slack to start subsidizing other markets without changing the rules of the game for new investors/traders who bought in with those lavish conditions. personally, i think 20% of worker fund diversion for overall systemic trading support is great, but that'd include all subsidies to all smartcoins, not just one test case. we have to consider the impact of reducing dev/worker budget on our long term system health. personally, i'd start with something like 5%.

Regards the 20% of worker funds with 75% to longs, that's because it will be the equivalent of p.a. on 500 million BTS worth of BitUSD and tie up 1 Billion BTS. That's the kind of amount that will remove supply from the market, remove BTS from centralised exchanges & create BTS (For BitUSD demand) & so be extremely positive.

As it's just a 6 month promotion you can remove/curtail/mix it after among other SmartCoins without effecting the market too much.

Whereas using 5% with 75% going to Shorts would provide p.a interest on just 45 million BTS. This amount could easily be met with BTS already on the DEX. So it would have very low/no impact on removing supply, BTS from exchanges and generating new BTS (For BitUSD) demand.

@Empirical1.2, what about leaving it at 75/25% for longs vs. shorts, but use only 8-10% of worker funds?  This way it's more politically palatable and doesn't crowd out development, but still ties up upwards of half a Billion BTS.  Also, you are assuming 5% APR will be required, but isn't it very possible that it might require a lower APR to achieve the same effect, therefore fewer funds utilized may still tie up the desired amount of BTS?

Correct. It's possible a lower variable APR may also suck up a similar amount of BTS into BitUSD. 

The original poll though was for 2% dilution or 140 000 BTS per day, the BSIP outline already reduces that to 100 000. You could reduce it further still to make it more palpable. However as you can see from the example I gave cyclonmaker above, if it's too low it can achieve low/no positive results because it will only suck in BTS that is already active on the DEX. So my personal preference would be to keep it at the already reduced number which we can still be confident will very likely achieve the expected outcomes.

SmartCoin buyers are often willing to pay a premium to buy above the peg, however this is of little incentive to shorts because when it comes time to cover they have to compete with those same SmartCoin buyers and pay a similar premium to purchase SmartCoins to cover.

Is it possible to have a 'Buying Market' where SmartCoin buyers can only buy from people looking to short?

& a 'Selling Market' where if you want to sell your SmartCoins you have to do so to people who are closing shorts.
(SmartCoins bought in this market only extinguish existing shorts in the same account.)

This way covering shorts wouldn't have to compete against SmartCoin buyers because SmartCoin sellers would have to sell to covering shorts first.

Other: If  there was no demand for short covering above 1-1 the BitUSD sell order could be transferred to the BitUSD buying market.

Is this possible/beneficial?

Edit: Doh, nevermind, even if it was possible, I imagine a third market would naturally form that brought together BitUSD buyers willing to pay above 1-1 & BitUSD sellers.

/Delete thread (I can't delete my own on this board apparently)


 

Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 21, 2016, 11:15:45 pm

So as a BitUSD buyer competing at 1-1, if I offer 2% on 100 BitUSD that means I am willing to pay $102 of BTS for $100 BitUSD. (The extra $2 going specifically to the person who sold/shorted me the 100 BitUSD)

Correct!

Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 21, 2016, 11:15:45 pm

...]&[/u] I'll pay 2% per annum in interest for the duration I hold dUSD, gradually reducing my dUSD, which will be distributed proportionally among all shorts?

Partially correct .This is a bit more complicated.
You will pay the weighted interest determined by all trades.
So for example if:
- there is another trade say at month #6 for another 100 dUSD at 1% you will be paying from that moment on:
1.5% annually  = (100 dUSD @ 2% + 100 dUSD @ 1%)/ 200 dUSD

additionally if 50 dUSD short is closed, we will start removing amounts from the highest interest first going to lower ones (i.e. start with the 2% in this case) and you will pay from then on:
 (50 dUSD @ 2% + 100 dUSD @ 1%) / 150 dUSD

Thanks for that simple example, I understand much better now 

I will think about it more but atm, my thinking is that the interest part is a little more complicated for the average BitUSD buyer to understand and because BTS is so volatile, low interest paid to shorts may not be a strong incentive but could be a negative/barrier to BitUSD adoption. So I think I would be more in favour of competing solely on negative fees.

Though I guess the negative of a fee only approach at 1-1 is that longer term BitUSD holders would be favoured over traders and shorts would need a larger upfront fee to be motivated?

Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 21, 2016, 09:32:01 pm

In this system can people short to themselves (Yield Harvest) and earn interest thereby driving the dUSD yield down & make it less effective?

When you short to yourself you neither gain nor lose anything. THe money collected as a negative interest on your dUSD go imidiatly into reducing your short dUSD position.

Thanks for the reply. Next question. Does this favour short term traders?

For example, person A might want 1000 BitUSD intending to hold it for a few months and be willing to pay 5% per annum to shorters.  Person B might want 1000 BitUSD because BTC is crashing but he intends to hold it only for a few hours or a few days so can offer 30% interest per annum but that is effectively only $1 or a 0.1% fee. But the one offering 30% would win. It seems this would always favour the person intending to hold for the shortest time even though they are less valuable?

Whereas if they competed on negative fees at 1-1, the one who was really willing to pay the most to the short for the BitUSD would win?

I am trying to formulate the content of my

"A case for Demurrage bitUSD" thread.

It has some common elements (as well as some differences) from what you are thinking about in this OP, so I for one do not find it 'dumb' on the opposite I have extended much further some of the ideas expressed here.

 

  thanks, cool 

Work in progress...

I looked at the BSIP outline https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0001.md

Here is some stuff I have written for one, if anyone wants to turn it into a proper BSIP or suggest changes or create their own variation cool. My main goal is that BTS trials using some of the worker budget for SmartCoin yield in one form or another.

---------------------------

BitUSD Yield Promotion BSIP

100 000 BTS per day, 23% of BTS Worker Budget, for 6 months directed to a BitUSD yield promotion. (75% to going to BitUSD Yield and 25% going to BitUSD shorts)

Lower BitUSD forced settlement to 0.95

Motivation

SmartCoins are one of the great innovations & USP's of BitShares & bootstrapping SmartCoins is fundamental to BitShares future success.

However SmartCoins have struggled to gain traction or trade within a reasonable range around the peg. Attempts to offer yield by market participants in the past have failed because BTS shareholders engage in yield harvesting effectively driving the yield to zero.

Directing a small amount of BTS to SmartCoin rewards in a manner similar to POS minting offered by the majority of POS competitors solves this because yield harvesting becomes the method of receiving the reward whilst still incentivising additional SmartCoin adoption in a way that is able to offer lucrative yield.

Rationale

The promotion represents an increase in total BTS supply of 0.75% which is negligible when compared to others in the space & can be mitigated by yield harvesting. However this small, easy to mitigate cost is still the equivalent of BitUSD interest on 500 million BTS worth of BitUSD which will tie up 1 Billion worth of BTS in total collateral. So it should remove a lot of BTS from centralized exchanges and increase demand for BTS (For BitUSD). 

Specification

....................


Discussion

Positive Impacts

This promotion should rapidly propel BitUSD from it's current 2% market share to market leader status which will...

Attract Businesses

Encourage a plethora of real world and blockchain based businesses that could benefit from providing real world products and services for price stable crypto USD to integrate BTS or even base themselves on the BTS blockchain.

Attract new customers

Attract people looking for a Swiss 'Bank' with interest on the blockchain. Switzerland is currently charging negative rates for bank deposits and is also sharing customer information with other jurisdictions. A more private BitUSD that pays yield will be extremely attractive.  As Bytmaster said...

If the largest banks can achieve deposits of over $1 trillion dollars with no meaningful interest, how many deposits could BitShares attract and what would that mean for the value of the bank?

 

Increase BTS valuation

Attracting new businesses, users and rapidly becoming SmartCoin leader in a space where many players are attempting to establish themselves, (Uphold, Maker, Nubits, Tether to name a few)  will change the valuation investors place on BTS because our future potential becomes much greater.

The reward will either be going to existing BTS holders in the form of yield harvesting and so be fairly neutral or to new BitUSD holders who will create much more BTS demand (For BitUSD) than the BTS that will be used to fund the promotion.

Removing BTS from Centralized Exchanges

A large percentage of BTS remains on centralized exchanges thereby exposing BTS to centralized exchange failure risk which is counter-productive to the primary goal of the BTS Decentralized Exchange. This proposal will see many BTS holders move to the DEX.

Create long term BitUSD customers

BitUSD has a lot of great advantages and once people can be incentivized to join BitShares and try it many will become long term supporters regardless of the promotion especially given traditional 'banks' pay no interest and many are already charging negative interest.
 
UK research on short term bonuses also suggests a large number join to receive the bonus but then don't move once it ends...

3.78 million savers over the past five years had money in accounts paying attractive short-term bonuses, but failed to move their cash once the deal ended.

Negative impact

If the demand for new BTS is less than the BTS sold to fund the promotion, it will be price negative.

It may create demand for BitUSD above the peg, lowering forced settlement to 0.95 and giving 25% of the yield to shorts should encourage trading closer to the peg. (This promotion should also increase the price of BTS thereby encouraging more people to short.) 

It's even possible that this may create healthy demand on both sides of the peg and thereby significantly reduce the need for other liquidity subsidies.

Summary for Shareholders

The proposal would direct 23% of the worker budget to BitUSD yield for a 6 month promotion in order to help bootstrap SmartCoins. This should increase BitUSD demand,  make BitUSD the Crypto Market leader, remove BTS from centralized exchanges and hopefully be price positive as a result for BTS. You can participate in the yield in a fairly low risk way by yield harvesting with your current BTS stake.