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Topics - Empirical1.2

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General Discussion / Should BTS end merger vesting BTS early?
« on: April 16, 2016, 01:29:39 am »
The merger failed to prevent BM focusing on other, possibly competing projects, failed to retain Toast via merging DNS and failed to bring in FMV who are now crowdfunding separately.

The market would probably agree that you shouldn't continuing paying for a merger in these circumstances.

Currently I think over 700 000 BTS a day are being released, that would be a huge saving to BTS & also mean shareholders should be willing to spend more on development.

While most of my BTS is currently in the form of vesting merger shares, I think it would be better to end the merger early, does anyone else agree?

EDIT: Apologies for unclear question, poll is to delete/remove/void/cancel remaining merger shares.

SmartCoin buyers are often willing to pay a premium to buy above the peg, however this is of little incentive to shorts because when it comes time to cover they have to compete with those same SmartCoin buyers and pay a similar premium to purchase SmartCoins to cover.

Is it possible to have a 'Buying Market' where SmartCoin buyers can only buy from people looking to short?

& a 'Selling Market' where if you want to sell your SmartCoins you have to do so to people who are closing shorts.
(SmartCoins bought in this market only extinguish existing shorts in the same account.)

This way covering shorts wouldn't have to compete against SmartCoin buyers because SmartCoin sellers would have to sell to covering shorts first.

Other: If  there was no demand for short covering above 1-1 the BitUSD sell order could be transferred to the BitUSD buying market.

Is this possible/beneficial?

Edit: Doh, nevermind, even if it was possible, I imagine a third market would naturally form that brought together BitUSD buyers willing to pay above 1-1 & BitUSD sellers.

/Delete thread (I can't delete my own on this board apparently)


General Discussion / Competiting at 1-1 on negative fees?
« on: March 21, 2016, 07:55:45 pm »
This might be dumb but would immediately payable bonuses/negative fees incentivise more trading than just offering to buy above the peg?


Participants can only buy BitUSD at exactly 1-1

Participants can only sell/short BitUSD at exactly 1-1.

No forced settlement (Or much lower like 0.95)

Participants compete on the negative fee they are willing to offer the other side & the order book is ranked accordingly.


I want to buy BitUSD but there are no sellers at 1-1
There is already $1000 of BitUSD buy orders with zero bonus at 1-1
I offer to buy $100 of BitUSD with a 1% bonus.
My order goes to the top of the order book and would be filled first.
Whoever sold/Shorted BitUSD to me would receive a 1% immediate bonus/negative fee.

Subsidising liquidity

If BitShares wants to subsidize liquidity they can add to the existing bonuses/negative fees offered by market participants.


BTS could offer 0.3% a day on $33 000 worth of BitUSD, ($100 daily cost) This would mean if you sold or shorted USD at 1-1 you would receive the bonus offered by the BitUSD buyer and an additional 0.3%.

Muse/SoundDAC / Muse on Azure and other
« on: March 17, 2016, 01:06:55 pm »
Being added to Microsoft Azure is still creating a lot of exposure for DACs atm and some have been added despite technically not being released yet.

- If possible get onto Azure and prepare a compelling one paragraph sales pitch. (Perhaps contact forum member Fox who handled it for BTS.)
- If possible coincide this with the release of the promo video which I believe is in the works.
- Create an official announcement thread to keep people updated about the upcoming release in Bitcointalk announcements

Follow the fairly professional format of Lisk
Muse Logo
Social Media Links
Embedded promo video
One paragraph sales pitch
Muse Distribution
Relevant articles link
Team members with photos

Folow up efforts to get listed on Bittrex/Polo should be much easier with the above.

The DAC market is really hot at the moment, there's no reason Muse shouldn't be in the $6-10 million range at current stage of development.

General Discussion / Liquidity Pool Discussion
« on: March 07, 2016, 10:41:20 am »
Below is an example of a liquidity pool implementation. I imagine if we created millions of BitUSD via yield harvesting and we lowered forced settlement to $0.95 & attempted a similar implementation with a wider peg say $0.99 - $.1.01, that we'd be able to achieve a similar result for a similar cost?

My concern is that there will be excess BitUSD demand initially at $1.01 but the below implementation attempts to raise interest rates when that is the case. If anyone with experience in market making or liquidity pools, could give their input on the following

Questions/Input Required

1. Is this a cost-effective way of achieving liquidity and a tighter peg for BitUSD?
2. Would having a lot of BitUSD created via yield harvesting make it easier/more BitUSD available to be attracted to the pool.


Pool A:


1. Pool A will accept deposit in BTC and NBT. The BTC deposit address is: xxxxx, and NBT deposit address is: yyyyy. Deposit transactions will be published.

2. The send-from address of every deposit transaction will be the address to receive fund withdraw in future.

6. The number of shares of participants will be: Amount of NBT deposit / NAV in effective day or Amount of BTC deposit * BTC price at 10:00am in effective day / NAV in effective day.

7. The asset of participants will be The number of shares * NAV

8. If participants withdraw fund, they will get The number of shares * NAV in NBT or The number of shares * NAV / BTC price in BTC

Fee and Calculation

1. When the pool begin operate, I will propose a motion to let Nu shareholders approve the daily custodian fee rate of 0.34%. 0.07% will be manage fee rate, 0.27% will be participant expected return rate.

2. When the total liquidity in buy side of Nu network is greater than 110% of the total liquidity in sell side for 7 consecutive days, the daily custodian fee rate will be decreased by 10% at next accounting period, and the manage fee rate and participant expected return rate will be decreased accordingly.

3. When the total liquidity in buy side of Nu network is not greater than 90 of the total liquidity in sell side for 7 consecutive days, the daily custodian fee rate will be increased by 10% until it reaches 0.34%, the maximum of daily custodian fee rate, at next accounting period.

4. NAV of the pool will be calculated in the following formulas:

Total asset = Holding of NBT + Holding of BTC * BTC price at 10:00 AM - Total asset in previous accounting day * manage fee rate

Custodian Fee wait to be granted = Custodian Fee to be granted in previous accounting day + Total Asset * custodian fee rate * days

NAV = (total asset + custodian fee wait to be granted) / total number of shares

Here is the performance of that implementation over time.

* I don't think we should confuse the way Nubits are created/backed, (which most of us don't agree with) with the way they provide liquidity which is something that we might be able to learn from.

General Discussion / Alt-Coin/DAC BOOM 2.0 :)
« on: February 28, 2016, 09:03:07 am »
Excluding Bitcoin, the Crypto Market is valued at >$1.2 Billion today  (Even more once Augur officially begins trading)

Only for 1 week in December 2013 (When Bitcoin was valued at >$1000) was the Alt/DAC market valued higher.


1. A centralized company can benefit from Sign-up/Deposit bonuses but a DAC/Alt-Coin usually can't, especially in the short term.
2. A DAC/Alt-Coin can benefit in the short and medium term from delayed bonuses such as subsidizing yield but a centralized exchange usually can't.

1. Sign-up/Deposit Bonuses or in Crypto, 'Sharedrops'

Centralized Companies: When a company decides to give away free money. Say the historic PayPal bootstrapping example or Coinbase offering lets say $20 to each new customer. Coinbase/PayPal will either have money set aside or they will have borrowed at very low interest.

Say they attract 10 000 people to that promotion, that will cost them $200 000. Provided say 1000 of those people become regular customers and they generate $201 in trading fees from them over the next 1-3 years, then that could be a positive EV investment and could also help bootstrap their exchange.

DACs/Alt-Coins: When a DAC decides to give away free money. Say the DEX decides to offer $20 to each new customer. We do not have funds set aside and we will be paying for that out of BTS shares.

BTS clearly cannot easily support $200 000 of new sell pressure so that initiative would decrease the value of BTS by much more than that, possibly many millions of dolllars of value will be lost from BTS during that promotion. (This is why you see nearly every DAC that attempts a Sharedrop/New User bonus loses most of it's value, often 90%+ and fails to bootstrap it's product and often even recover at all.)

Caveat: It's OK to sharedrop in the very beginning as a distribution method because your DAC has no value yet.

Conclusion: A DAC/DEX cannot attract users the way Coinbase/PayPal can (Because the cost of acquisition is often many multiples higher.)

2. Subsidizing Yield and Exchange liquidity

Centralized Companies: If Coinbase offered their customers a bit of yield on their balance & subsidized liquidity that promotion would represent a massive loss to them for an extended period of time with no near term benefit. (For example if they had obligations of 3% on exchange balances annually they would be losing $300 000 a year per $10 million on their exchange with no income coming in.) The more successful that promotion was, the more money would be flowing out of their business every month over the next 1-3 years. This would not be a good way for them to bootstrap their exchange.

DACs/Alt-Coins: If a DAC/Alt offered their customers a bit of yield on their balance & subsidized liquidity that promotion would need to be funded via BTS sales which would represent a loss in value (Due to BTS being sold to fund it) unless those sales were offset by equal/greater BTS demand as the result of the same promotion.   


Lets say the obligations amounted to 3% per year. For every $30 000 of BTS put up for sale to fund the obligation over the next 12 months ($2500 a month) there would have been $1 000 000 in new BTS demand (To purchase the BitUSD to be entitled to that obligation) So rather than the short term valuation loss experienced with Sharedrops/Bonuses, BTS would experience very large BTS demand growth & so the promotion would rapidly increase the value of BTS in the near term.

In fact until such time as annual new BTS demand attracted by that specific promotion was less than 3% of BitAssets currently in circulation it would be a net gain to BTS.

So during the bootstrapping phase of the DEX's product life-cycle you can actually offer yield and some conservative liquidity subsidies which a centralized exchange never could.

As the product matures you decrease and ultimately remove the incentives (yield and liquidity subsidies) so your monthly obligation goes down to zero.

Again, while the promotion is attracting new BTS demand there is no value loss to the DAC and once new demand is not sufficient to offset the cost of that promotion it is curtailed and the monthly obligation of BTS goes down to zero while having experienced all that net new BTS demand. (& hopefully have bootstrapped the DEX to the point that those promotions are no longer needed.)

(Not to be confused with a ponzi. In a ponzi when there is not enough new money coming in to offset obligations to previous investors it collapses because members can't be re-imbursed. In BTS, all the BitUSD previously created would still be there and be fully collateralized but the promotion which offered yield and perhaps some liquidity would be phased out. Though if you suddenly stopped a very large promotion, such as suddenly removing very high yield or lots of liquidity, some people might force settle their BitAssets and sell BTS creating downward pressure on the price. )

Conclusion: A DAC/Alt-Coin can experience a rapid short and medium term valuation increase by subsidizing yield and possibly liquidity while also bootstrapping it's product long term at the same time.

Up until now, most DACs/Alt-Coins have been attempting to bootstrap using option 1 and have experienced large losses and little bootstrapping as a result. Option 2 is the way to bootstrap a DAC imo as it increases share value & helps bootstrap the product in a way that centralized companies/exchanges can't because their shares aren't the product.

2% BTS dilution to BitAsset Yield for 6 months.  (At the current BTS valuation that would translate to circa $100 000 total over 6 months)

Cost to Shareholders
Low cost to you, if you yield harvest.  (Go long and short the BitAsset, so your BTS position stays the same but you get the yield)

Expected Benefits
- BitUSD would go from having the lowest Crypto USD market share to being the Market Leader
- BitUSD will offer more variable yield than you could get on a USD based savings account virtually anywhere
- BTS would be removed from centralized exchanges (Polo & BTC38 currently hold >300 million BTS I believe)
- BitUSD liquidity incentive operations may be cheaper once millions of BitUSD have been created
- BTS shareholders would become users of the DEX and holders of the Smartcoin product we are trying to bootstrap.

The cost to shareholders if they yield harvest is very low but the benefits are possibly very large.
It will be a 6 month trial and can be discontinued if shareholders are unhappy with the results.

Optional Variations
- The BitAsset Yield trial can either be applied to BitUSD only or BitUSD and BitCNY.
- 1% dilution could be used instead, the impact would be lower but so would the cost.
- Up to half the dilution can go to BitAsset shorts so that we bring them closer to the peg.   
-Due to forced settlement at 100%, BitUSD already trades above the peg. It may be a good idea to reduce forced settlement to a lower amount if this was implemented.
- There will be probably be a coding cost to implement yield

The thread discussing the concept in more detail is here,21547.0.html

BM recently suggested diluting BTS at a rate of up to 3% a year to subsidize market liquidity,,21544.0.html

This got me thinking about diluting for BitAsset yield and I realised the cost to shareholders could be fairly neutral? provided they were willing to yield harvest but doing so possibly has a lot of worthwhile benefits...

What are the benefits of diluting for BitAsset yield, (which you could mitigate by yield harvesting.)

- BitAssets would offer the mythical +5% yield at a time when banks will be moving to negative interest rates.

- The BitAsset CAP would increase and we would become in nominal terms the Crypto USD market leader.
(Instead of only being percieved to have 2% market share atm.)

- Hundreds or thousands? Of BTS shareholders who haven't used the DEX before would be holding BitAssets.
Now we and other businesses  can start pricing & offering products in BitAssets because most shareholders hold it.

- This would get people to remove their BTS from the centralized exchanges and move it to the DEX

- With hundreds of people moving in and out of BitAssets and also lots of demand for them due to yield it would positively affect liquidity.
(That's not to say other liquidity centric measures couldn't be adopted if shareholders agree the cost of diluting for yield is fairly low considering it can be mitigated by yield harvesting?)

This is not dissimilar to POS minting rewards where the coin is diluted but to avoid it, you just have to make the effort to take part in the minting process which usually infers some benefit to the coin such as security/mining/removing supply etc.


Diluting 2.5% creates at least  +5% BitAsset yield because at most only 1/2 of all BTS could be in BitAssets while most of the other 1/2 would have to be short those BitAssets? So 2.5% dilution translates to at least circa 5% yield on BitAssets I think.

BTS could decline in value reducing relative yield but as not everybody would yield harvest, a lot of BTS remains unclaimed, many remains on exchanges and many short term speculators and traders would not get involved, it's likely the BitAsset yield would consistently be much higher than  +5%

Edit: (There might be something simple I'm missing here of course)

General Discussion / Simple SmartCoin Accounts
« on: February 17, 2016, 08:01:26 pm »
Imagine if basic SmartCoin customers rarely had to see a complicated exchange again...

Mr. Example Account

BTS Balance           888 888
BitUSD Balance:     $88                   Buy BitUSD $1:01         Sell BitUSD $0.99
BitCNY Balance:     ¥8                     Buy BitCNY ¥1:01        Sell BitCNY ¥0.99
Buy/Sell Smartcoins with Bitcoin/Bank/Card/Other via our trusted partners.

Visit Exchange (Advanced)


*Terms and Conditions

24 hour settlement
When you sell BitUSD to the system, the equivalent BTS will be credited to your account in exactly 24 hours, based on the average BTS price over that time. Alternatively you can seek an instant price on the exchange or cash out instantly for Bitcoin/Fiat via a trusted partner

Speculators Fee
Balances held for less than 30 days are subject to an additional 1% fee and cannot claim yield. This is because BTS offers a tight spread which could otherwise be exploited by short term traders. You can seek a better price on the exchange or via a trusted partner.

Hourly Limits
There is a limit to the amount of BitAssets that can be bought and sold by the system.
If there is not enough available you can either wait for the following hour, visit the exchange or a trusted third party.

Smartcoin backing
BTS used to purchase BitAssets are put into a collateral pool.
In addition to that BTS pays others to put their BTS into a long term Black Swan collateral pool. So that BitAssets are always heavily collateralized.

View BitAsset collateralization over time chart.


Notes: The hourly limits & speculators fee are designed to stop BTS getting overly exploited in trending markets and from traders able to influence the price of BTS to get a favourable purchase or settlement price. (These limits can be adjusted over time based on observation, if they are wrong at first, BTS doesn't lose money but the collateral backing BitAssets would be less than it otherwise would be.)

BTS could also charge 0.1% trading fee which would could go to BitAsset Yield. This would benefit longer term holders to the point that over time it would compensate for the spread and provide a positive return.


There are various methods of removing shorts from the equation and offering a tight peg.

BTS can either use the reserve pool or incentivize others to put up additional collateral.

My first attempt was fractional reserve smartcoins which used trading fees to incentivize BitAsset holders to lock up their BitAssets so that those in circulation were sufficiently collateralized.,21078.0.html

Smartcoins^ could pay interest if you were willing to lock them up. (SImilar to NuBits parking rates which haven't been needed. )


BTC38 for example does about $50 000 volume of BTS a day, with a 0.2% trading fee that could generate $100 a day, $35-40k a year.

They have circa 300 million BTS I believe, with a market value of $900 000?

If the trading fee rewarded those willing to lock up their BTS for a year, then 40% of BTS on the site could be locked up and receive 10% interest per year.   Similarly 40% of BitUSD could be locked up and receive 10% a year.

The Smartcoins^ that are locked up for an extended period reduce the pressure on the collateral pool and may make at it over-collateralized in most market conditions.

Another alternative is diluting BTS to fund a Black Swan Collateral pool.

BTS Black Swan Investors Fund (BSF)

The problem
Requiring a long to meet a short to create BitAssets is innefective at creating a tight, liquid peg because depending on the markets medium to long term price expectations for BTS, the price people are willing to short at can vary significantly from 1-1 over long periods of time.  However if BTS simply issued and redeemed BitAssets close to the peg itself, there would be a lot less collateral backing BitAssets and the system may be exploited.

The Solution
- The Black Swan Investors Fund (BSF) is an alternative to the additional collateral that currently comes from shorts.
- This is achieved by diluting BTS 1% per annum and awarding it to holders of BSF.
(Once there is a bond market this fund can look to seek additional income from there too.)

How it works
-To be a holder of BSF you must lock up your BTS for a period of one year.
In return you will receive your share of 2 million BTS a month less your percentage share of BSF forced settled that month.
However there may never be any BSF forced settlements...

Collateral Pool A
When a customer purchases a BitAsset created by the system, the BTS goes into collateral pool A.
Whenever there is a forced settlement it draws from Collateral pool A first.

So even if BTS declined 75% in value, Collateral pool A would still be worth 25% of all BitAssets and it would take forced settlement of 25% of all BitAssets in that period for BSF (Collateral pool B) to be called into action at all.

Example: NuBits has existed for well over a year on much, much less than Collateral pool A.

Funds used to purchase Nubits have been spent on shareholder dividends (>$400 000), Market Maker subsidies, advertising and development and yet they have not needed additional collateral to meet redemptions. The BTS collateral pool A will have none of these expenses and so will be far more collateralized. (Over time BitAssets will also be lost forever due to various reasons.)

So as a holder of BSF you receive a very generous interest rate to put up additional collateral

This should provide up to 250 million BTS worth of voluntary collateral which would earn 10% per annum less collateral B redemptions.


BitShares can now issue and redeem BitAssets very close to the peg without the need for shorts and still have heavily collateralized BitAssets.

This means a bridge can sell BitUSD to users for BTC/Fiat without needing to put up additional collateral. 

General Discussion / Cash banned, NIRP, Smartcoins Opportunity coming...
« on: February 16, 2016, 06:41:16 pm »
After Davos this year...

"We should move quickly to a cashless economy so we could introduce negative rates well below 1%"

Less than a month since Davos, we've seen Euro voting to ban the €500 and a Harvard professor calling for a ban of the $100 bill.
It's also likely gold and silver will be restricted again in such a scenario.

Of the $1.4 trillion in total U.S. currency in circulation, $1.1 trillion is in the form of $100 bills. Eliminate those, and suddenly there is nowhere to hide from those trillions in negative interest rate "yielding" bank deposits.

There is somewhere for those trillions in negative interest rate yielding bank deposits to go... BitUSD.

if BTS can offer reasonably collateralized Smartcoins at close to 1-1 there will be a huge market if Western citizens are forced to use insolvent banks with negative interest rates 'far below 1%'.

Personally I think BitShares should come up with a way to offer Smartcoins at 1-1 and rather than spending a lot of money on periphery development, mainly use dilution if anything to help Smartcoins gain initial traction. This is the big opportunity still imo.

There are a lot of ideas floating around on how to do this - using the reserve pool, creating a BTS bond etc.,21453.0.html

Whatever system we use will be more collateralized than NuBits and Uphold(BitReserve) also won't be able to compete as their customer funds are in centralized banks.

General Discussion / BTS should pay yield to SmartCoin Shorters?
« on: January 23, 2016, 12:39:31 pm »
In the beginning when BTSX was experiencing rapid growth, BTS bulls were willing to short far below the peg for long periods to get a leveraged BTS position.

Today we have the opposite problem. BTS has been flat/declining for an extended period and today shorts also have the added burden of forced settlement so they are charging a premium high above the peg.

BTS holders should offer Shorts Yield

- People shorting close to the peg are both removing that BTS from centralized exchanges and from available supply.
  (BM has explained why this is valuable )

- A tighter peg will incentivize longs. New Smartcoin demand creates demand for BTS. This increases the value of BTS shares. 

- Tightly pegged Smartcoins will attract more businesses to BTS than any other development or marketing initiative. 

- is the fastest growing money platform in the world on the back of their BTC to centralized BitAssets.
  BTS could be the fastest growing DAC in the world on the back of ours & leave competitors in the dust.

It might even be 'free'

Poloniex has $450 000 worth of BTS. They do $50 000 worth of BTS volume a day. They charge 0.2% trading fees. This equals $36 500 a year in trading fees. Ignoring other expenses Poloniex could pay BTS holders 8% per annum just from their trading fees and break even.

This means BTS may be able to offer general yield to shorts of up to 8% on their first 100% of collateral and break even on trading fees.

(When BTS is rising strongly there will be plenty of short demand so the committee can bring down the variable yield.  Therefore during times of low shorting demand like the now the yield could be made as high as 10-15%, with BTS still breaking even on trading fees over the course of the year.)


General Discussion / Fractional Reserve Smartcoins
« on: January 19, 2016, 10:48:12 am »
The DEX should be able to offer BitLTC^ in exchange for LTC and vice-versa via a bridge like Metaexchange

NuBits shows that there is market demand for fractional reserve but liquid Smartcoin offerings.

Fractional Reserve Smartcoins^

(I'm not suggesting removing the current Smartcoins but am suggesting introducing a new seperate set of Fractional Reserve Smartcoins^.)

The DEX can issue BitLTC^ up to a certain daily quota at LTC feed price + X% if there is demand above the feed.
BitLTC^ can be force settled at feed price - Y% from the collateral pool.

There are two situations that could make the BitLTC^ collateral pool under-collateralised.

- LTC could rise in current value including vs. BTS
- BTS could fall in current value, including vs. LTC.

Smartcoins^ rising in current value, including vs. BTS

The first problem is partly solved by putting all Smartcoin^ collateral into a common pool. So if LTC rises vs. BTS, BitLTC^ won't be under-collateralized because it will be drawing from a common pool that would have remained fairly stable in such an event.

Such an event is negative to the collateral pool, as a result the cost to issue new BitLTC^ could be increased to reduce demand.

BTS falling in current value against the majority of Smartcoins^

In this case BTS would want to encourage new Smartcoins^ to be created at the new level and discourage forced settlements.

So BTS could increase the available daily quota for Smartcoins^ and issue them very close to the feed price, thereby increasing demand. 

Smartcoin^ Interest

Smartcoins^ could then pay interest if you were willing to lock them up. (SImilar to NuBits parking rates which haven't been needed. )


BTC38 for example does about $50 000 volume of BTS a day, with a 0.2% trading fee that could generate $100 a day, $35-40k a year.

They have circa 300 million BTS I believe, with a market value of $900 000?

If the trading fee rewarded those willing to lock up BTC38-BTS for a year, then 40% of BTC38-BTS could be locked up and receive 10% per annum.
What percentage of BitUSD^ holders would lock up for  +5% +5% per annum? 

The Smartcoins^ that are locked up for an extended period reduce the pressure on the collateral pool and may make at it over-collateralized in most market conditions.


Over time due to loss of private keys/death/other a percentage of Smartcoins^ will never be redeemed thus also reducing pressure on the collateral pool.


A good Fractional Reserve Smartcoin^ System would allow BTS to be a decentralized alt-coin, currency and stock exchange where users could deposit USD for BitUSD^ and DASH for BitDASH^ and vice versa for a reasonable cost.

Good liquidity and a well managed collateral pool, could make Smartcoins^ much more popular and useful than the current over-collateralized Smartcoins.


General Discussion / DECRED Crypto-Currency
« on: December 29, 2015, 05:19:30 pm »
Decred is an open and progressive cryptocurrency with a system of community-based governance integrated into its blockchain.

Main contributors are the developers responsible for btcsuite (est. early 2013 – present) – a suite of Bitcoin packages and tools, including btcd, a full node, mining capable, Bitcoin implementation

Project bound by the Decred Constitution on the core principles of finite issuance, privacy, security, fungibility, inclusivity, and progressive development of the technology that keeps these principles together

I know nothing about this, just saw an article on cointelegraph. Anybody have any thoughts on it. BTSX 2.0?

General Discussion / The 0.13% BTS Attack
« on: December 23, 2015, 02:22:03 am »
Maybe you don't need 13% stake to attack BitShares maybe you only need 0.13%...

As a proxy offer to pay 1% interest per month to accounts that proxy their stake to you. That would be a lucrative 12%+ p.a

1 months interest payments on 13% of proxied stake would only cost you 0.13%

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