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localhost sent 5,000,000 BTS to poloniexwallet
4 hours ago
Literally every time I see these posts it reminds me of a major flaw of bitshares and makes me want to sell it.
But go ahead you guys, keep posting this every time anyone with a decent amount of BTS sends soem to poloniex.
Exactly!
Btw localhost is probably enjoying this transfer, anyone in the future that transfers so many bts in an exchange without stealth will be viewed with distrust.
Shouldn't there be another rule that the ask/bid be placed with 5% of the feed?
Assuming we implement this feature in the BTS / USD market and voters approve workers funding this at a rate of 2.5 BTS / sec (50% of allowed dilution) and the internal exchange had $100,000 of daily volume then users trading on the internal exchange would see a 1% more than they would get by trading off chain. If daily volume was $50,000 then they would see a 2% profit over doing the same trades off-chain. The impact of this should be a major influx of new traders who can make more money trading on the internal exchange than the external exchange. This added liquidity will dramatically tighten the USD / BTS peg and give shorters much more confidence.
That's $365 000 a year of dilution. That could beon $7 500 000 worth of BitUSD.
Even with a lot of yield harvesting that would rapidly make BTS the undisputed Crypto USD market leader.
Uphold: $2 Million
Tether: $1.4 Million
Nubits: $0.76 Million
BitUSD: $0.098 Million
Liquidity is already guaranteed for the longs via forced settlement & with that much in circulation, shorts should have confidence there will be sufficient amounts for sale when they need them.
What about at least putting 1/2 of the proposed dilution towards BitUSD yield? That way you would rapidly increase the BitUSD CAP to >$3.5 million dollars while significantly increasing volume at the same time?
(I would also decrease forced settlement to 98/99%.)
There are two key differences between Casper's schelling game and a schelling game for something like a price feed that make the price feed case more difficult:
1. In a consensus schelling game, all that really matters is that you come to consensus on **something**. If someone pulls off a P+epsilon attack, and makes it confirm 0 instead of 1, that's fine; as long as it doesn't flip-flip forever and as long as it converges to 1 at least some of the time. In the price feed case, converging on the wrong price even once is BAD.
2. A price feed has a few failure modes that don't exist in the consensus case. Particularly, (i) there is a centralization incentive for the feed to converge on the feed of one single exchange, and (ii) if that exchange pulls a MtGox then it's hard to tell if the feed will actually be able to coordinate on decoupling itself from the exchange in time.
That said, I think that it should be possible to overcome both of these issues, for (2) there are a few multi-level antifragility tricks that I think could do the job; essentially you would have a second-level schelling game that only gets called very rarely, the theory being that it's called too rarely for it to be worth automating, and that game, if called, is what determines the rewards for the first round; this incentivizes the first round to do not what people think the first round will do, but rather what people think the second round will do, at last in extreme cases.
CASPER rewards people for moving toward consensus and punishes those who deviate. It is claimed that the incentives are structured to reward some deviation and incentivise participants to defect from attempted collusions. I have my doubts on this, but for now I will assume this is true.
Sorry but already being implemented. Your describing Augur and Truthcoin Hivemind.
