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General Discussion / Re: Encrypted Mobile Application Ran On BitShares Network...Yes Please
« on: September 25, 2015, 09:44:44 pm »can you get them to spell Bitshares correctly? It's not "Bitchares"
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but after time expires you open up the same attack we are trying to avoid? better to lock away until you stop signing blocksWhy wouldnt you lock as long as you are witness? You remove witness status to get collateral back.
Because you don't have any idea how long you are going to be a witness. When we say lock, we mean locking it in an unacceptable smart wallet that is programmed to only give it back after a certain amount of time that you decide prior to locking.
If you lock 1000 away for 6 months, then I can lock 1000 away for 7 months, and I get the votes. This promotes political activity, and healthy competition. Now you must lock more away to compete with me for the apathetic vote.
Maybe the apathetic vote should only apply to 50% of the total number of allowable witnesses!?
Ios 8.1 and safari which scores 405 out of 555 on html5test.comOn my ipad i can create an account and login but nothing works in the dashboard.. No links workingthe browser must support html5, you can try chrome, it works good in my android phone.
i see where roach is coming from he thinks that later on people(countries) will be buying up delegates indirectly anyway so they have voting power, perhaps buying multiple.I don't think that "game theory candidates" is true. You have to demonstrate there is not a benefit to having the majority or a large portion of candidates under the control of 1. It is sort of a half-assed game-theoretical approach, but nothing says it is a optimal/un-exploitable solution.
A flat rate only puts an upper limit on number of sybil nodes, while a bid system improves on it much further. The only thing needed is to lock the collateral and make it unable to be used for your sybil delegates to vote for each other. There are numerous different ways to accomplish this lock. This is not the most optimal way, but if you wanted to do a rush job for BTS 2.0, one of the more exotic methods would be to have some type of asset on the exchange people purchase at a 1:1 ratio, "delegate token" or whatever you want to call it, then the voting list sorts people by how many delegate tokens they have in their account and puts them at the top.
Like I said, not the best way to do it, but just thinking of a way it could be rushed for BTS 2.0 on time.
I would think that the amount of capital to vote someone in is significantly more than the collateral people will be willing to put up to be a witness. So locking up the collateral to not vote is probably not that important.
The real question is whether the price to purchase a delegate is more than the harm than can be done. To me, that would be more of a game theoretical way of looking at it and that is a very hard question.
Isnt firewall of china adding latency? Well going fwd they will introduce latencies anyway so will other countries, would it be port 80 traffic only then hmm? Seems odd, unless those people are unaffected I thought that it was w country wide thing.What will you do about not having any witnesses from China or thailand or any country that purposely crnsors internet aswell as slows connections down to a crawl? A 1 second or heck even 10 second confirmation time wont work there will it?I'm pretty sure we currently have nodes operating from China on the test net with 3 second blocks.@r0ach
The tradeoff with your approach is electing block producers solely because they are putting up the largest stake vs electing block producers that are most trusted by stakeholders, especially if larger stake-holding candidates are elected by default unless the user manually changes the vote. Some of the most trusted candidates may not have the largest stake. I like users having no vote by default and having to manually change their vote. This also works to reduce the effects of voter apathy because those who are most involved in the system and have the largest stake will make sure to vote.
Anyway, I don't think the cost/benefit of implementing your suggestion would be worth it at this point. What are the chances of a failure directly resulting from not implementing your solution vs the chances of failure if your solution were to actually be implemented. I don't think its going to make a difference at this stage. Perhaps it is something that can be explored at higher levels of adoption once the chain becomes profitable and there is plenty of money in the coffers to explore such a solution. At this point, the current solution is probably sufficiently decentralized for this stage in the game.
I am also of the opinion that we should explore r0achs proposal after launch of bts 2.0. In addition to the down sides you pointed out it also requires us to set a default number of witnesses. I'm of the opinion that the number should be set by the network. If we set a default of voting for the top 101, we are almost stuck with 101.
If we can get the currently designed system to work well. With proxy voting and witness number set by the network I think we will be in better shape than if we need to go with r0aches proposal.
For the uninitiated:I think it was someone else
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=12156.0
I swore the OP of that thread was the infamous rpietila, but it has since been changed to anonymous.
Huh?