Quote from: alt on August 15, 2014, 03:21:51 pm

Quote from: xeroc on August 15, 2014, 03:11:22 pm

@alt: so all is fine now? market is still safe?

no,  control the average price to higher is still very quickly, only need 1 block.
control to low price is more difficult.

In fact, this is not a big problem, we can get the  medium price  just like  feed price, sort and use the middle price.
and use a time more than 1 hour.

what I am worried about is the rule:
1. margin call can create bts, this can be use to attack the whole system. I still prefer just clear the short position can't be cover.
2. the short price is limit, if the limit is too lower for some reason, like a sudden price grow of bts, nobody ask with a lower price, and no asset can be create.
I have post  for my thought here.

Quote from: alt on August 11, 2014, 11:07:22 am

I have no doubt that market consensus will make bitusd track the price of USD.
but the rules with leak will break the market consensus.
the rules with too many limit will stop the market consensus.

I think we should make a rule with  less limit, and without leak.
here is my solution.
the main different is the short bitusd is separate from bid XTS.
for example:
If I want to short 100 bitUSD with price 1bitUSD/xts, I need to  freeze 200 XTS, and I can get 100  bitUSD immediately.
then I can usd these bitUSD to buy XTS with a different price, for bit order. maybe 0.5 bitUSD/XTS or whatever, there is no limit for the price of bid order.
the same, there is no limit for the price of ask order. there is no limit for the market depth check.

the key is to limit the short price.
the maximum  short price is coming from the minimum matched bid price of latest blocks(maybe latest 24*60*6 blocks).
at the beginning there is no matched bid price, we can set a safety initial limit price, come from the central trade market, like 0.01USD/XTS.

What are your thoughts on bytemaster's latest revision?

Quote from: pendragon3 on August 16, 2014, 03:25:10 pm

The BTSX Price movement and strength are encouraging. But, dang, I was surprised to see this post from Bytemaster. He and the BTSX developers should try to refrain from commenting on or predicting short-term price movements. It doesn't seem objective and to outsiders it could be viewed as P&D or a conflict of interest.

Interesting thought. Since we have "known" BM for a while we know he's in this for the long haul but newcomers to the technology may be a bit more skeptical. Still, it's hard to resist dreaming about what is to come. I think we all have early retirement fantasies .

Quote from: Agent86 on June 25, 2014, 06:54:02 am

Quote from: pendragon3 on June 25, 2014, 05:30:58 am

Setting aside shares upfront and raising capital are but two examples of tried and true ways. Do you think there is a reason that these two methods have been commonly used in the capital markets for decades, while outright dilution has not?

Completely and provably false. see post: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=4713.msg61701#msg61701


Not so fast, my friend. "Dilution" in the VC world is actually a form of financing, i.e., capital-raising. That means the VC gets shares for providing money to the company company. Often, anti-dilution clauses are put in place as a safeguard to protect early investors. This is very different I think from the dilution in a crypto chain that you have in mind.

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There is another problem with dilution strategies that has not really been discussed. That is the following: who will decide exactly how the funds are allocated and used? Which employees get the spoils, and how much they get? Who will decide how much to spend, and on which projects? Which marketing initiatives or infrastructure projects should get priority?

Yes, as I said in my previous post, a smart dilution algo with the right incentive structures is not an immediately obvious problem to solve... it's "not easy"  And that's why it's such a big deal that BitShares is on the verge of cracking the nut.

I submit that the following algo works and creates the right incentives:

Employees are elected by "approval voting."  Along with your "approval" you indicate an appropriate annual salary in bips (gets paid out daily).  Only an employee with over 50% support of stake ends up paid.  Their salary is the median voted by stake (people who did not vote for the employee are included in the median as voting for a "0" salary).

Any "inactive stake" (no transactions for over 1 year and paid inactivity penalty) should be removed from the voting algorithm.  Stake may voluntarily "abstain" and thus remove their stake from the voting algorithm.
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=4660.0


Your proposed "algorithm" would be very inefficient and wasteful. It defies economic principles. The fact is, a diffuse set of thousands or millions of shareholders doesn't have the information and unity of objectives to efficiently make lower-level employee pay decisions. Why doesn't the median voter in Apple decide the salary of the CFO or a senior vice president? Because it would be terribly inefficient for shareholders to coordinate on a business decision like this, leading to waste and agency problems. That type of decision is best left to management.

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It will be governance by the masses

uh... it's governance by the shareholders... the only governance that makes any sense.


By "governance by the masses", I meant "day-to-day decision making by shareholders." Hopefully, that was clear.

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It seems that you think that a diffuse group of shareholders can coordinate effectively on the best way to invest and to compensate employees. That seems awfully naive.

yea... except that's how every single company works. 

Every company is ultimately governed by the shareholders; the shareholders elect the board of directors, they can fire the CEO and vote on his comp plan.  They can hire people to make informed decisions on their behalf but the "the diffuse group of shareholders" are ultimately the ones who voted in the leadership and call all the shots.


Name one publicly-traded company--out of the tens of thousands--in which shareholders make the day-to-day business decisions. I'm not talking about high-level governance and oversight, or hiring and firing a CEO, but decisions like paying and hiring rank and file employees or deciding on day-to-day spending, working capital management, and the like.

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Investors are capital-providers. They are not managers.

Wrong again.  If you think your job is done as soon as you write the check, in most cases you can kiss that money good-bye.  You, as the shareholder, are responsible for your investment.  You abdicate this responsibility and power to your own peril.

You seem to somehow acknowledge that investors are smart enough to find a capable trustworthy developer (such as bytemaster) and fund this developer.  And yet as soon as they do this they all of a sudden become incompetent idiots who can never be trusted to make a smart decision again.

Again, you're conflating high-level governance/oversight with day-to-day management of the enterprise. Shareholders almost surely should do the former, but they are ill-equipped to the latter. They don't have the right information or incentives for doing the latter.

Quote from: Troglodactyl on June 25, 2014, 04:21:38 am

Agent86, can you explain how you think dilution is so powerful and "right"?  It still just seems like a clever way of altering the deal to redistribute shares.  If the investors accurately price future dilution into the value assessment on which they base their investment, then dilution is equivalent to reserving shares to fund development from the beginning.  The only way dilution results in increased funding for development compared to reserved shares is if the dilution is more extreme than investors anticipate, meaning that the investors are effectively tricked into investing more than they would if they had realistic expectations.

Ok in more direct answer to your question.  Reserving some huge portion of stake up front for a developer is not at all equivalent or as powerful and useful as giving the shareholders the right to decide what investments make sense over time.

Quote from: Stan on June 23, 2014, 04:04:28 am

Quote from: tianshi on June 23, 2014, 03:53:58 am

So there will be two chains?  BTS1   AGS holders 50%   PTS holders 50%   
another one BTS2   AGS holders 10%  PTS holders 10%    delegate 80%

or maybe more? BTS 3\4\5\6………………………………

I feel quite doubtful about the whole thing, and I cannot see any promising future about the whole thing

First of all, with so many chains, if there is someone who wants to buy BTS, which one should he buy? he will be confused and he will be not sure which one to buy and will not want to buy because he will be not sure which one will be the final version.

second, before, all the people thought AGS\PTS would get 50%\50%, so they made the investment, but now they were told they might only get 10% or 10%?  plus, if you said you would let the market decide, the fact woule be that, if PTS AGS holders only get 10% instead of 50%,  the other people could get the rest 80%, of course people would like this plan. it is just like if the people who originally have a lot of money now have to spare their money to the poor people. of course this plan would be more welcome by the people, because poor people are much more.

sorry for my words, i am just very very XX right now.

The key point you are missing is that we do not control what variants others will make.  Neither does Bitcoin.
What is different here, is you get ownership in all the honorable variations.  You win if any one of them wins.  Maybe more than one will be successful.

Imagine you had been following Bitcoin for a while, but had not been following BitShares. You then start to hear a lot of talk about this bank & exchange which has been launched so you decide to look into it. If you discovered several variants, all competing with one another, would you not be deterred from using one out of fear of picking the wrong one?

I think this scenario could majorly hinder adoption by anyone not already invested into BitShares, at a time when an influx of new money is needed.
Ideally BitShares would launch a product good enough that it picks up a strong network effect so quickly that any competing chains would fall by the wayside. This would give people enough confidence to pour money in, seeing it as the REAL and ORIGINAL chain, like Bitcoin compared with flaky altcoins, (even if competitors come along with slight advantages).

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but I haven't  got it, why give 80% to delegate is better than now.

This probably deserves its own thread and is often discussed in the Mumble Hangouts

So the alternative of hardcoding minimal rewards (a fraction of TRX fees) for delegates is effectively making the decision to rely upon voluntary investment in infrastructure.  View this like a company and ask how much would a normal company spend to grow to be worth 100 Billion?    How much has this community put into the DAC to boot strap it?  Several million dollars.   To think that several million dollars is enough to take it to 100 Billion is very wishful thinking. 

In any case, the shareholders get what they want and the success of the DAC is entirely on their shoulders.