BSIP-0023 is somewhat relevant, however it focuses on external cryptocurrency snapshots: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0023.md

Several of the bitcoin forks have market caps 10x BTS, a single UIA worth billions could justify sharedrop BSIP research 👌

> 1. Was BitUSD mismanaged? If so, by whom and why?

bad debt holders mismanaged their margin positions, committee potentially mismanaged the configuration of bitUSD, feed publishers mismanaged the application of bsip42.

> 2. Was it the fault of BSIP42?

Not entirely, but bsip42 should never have been applied to bitUSD - afaik only CNY was in scope but some chose to apply it to many bitassets.

> 3. How will BitCNY be saved from the same fate?

Manipulation, or by increasing the price of BTS.

> 4. Was the GS inevitable?

Yes, the external market value of 1 BTS dropped like 95% within one year, we were bound to have squeezed margin positions to their breaking point.

Do not the worker proposal voting mechanism be  manipulated!?

Worker proposal mechanism counts BTS as vote weight, not individual accounts on a forum which is notoriously plagued with spam accounts to the degree that account creation is now manual. BTS vote weight is a far superior voting mechanism than a forum poll; I don't trust these forum polls at all - they're only good for gauging interest.

Replace BTS with another asset for fees? No thank you, i'd far prefer for the reserve pool to fill up with collected fees during downtrends like these.

If you're mourning bitUSD's GS state, use an alternative bitasset like CNY or Hertz instead of proposing changing how Bitshares core funding mechanism works.

The fastest way for bitUSD to recover is for BTS price to increase, I seriously cannot see how reducing reasons to buy BTS can be beneficial towards this goal.

Also please stop using the FUD term 'black swan', it was relevant when Dan created the blog post about how there wasn't recovery mechanisms for bitassets in global settlement states, but now we've got BSIP 18 so there are now multiple recovery routes - no longer definable as a black swan.

How about we start punishing bad debt holders? Stripping them of their LTM would be the simplest option.

Forum polls can be manipulated, take this to the committee or create a worker poll 👌

That said, I can't see how/why reducing MSSR is an attractive idea, it's just further pandering to bad debt positions, no?

It's not dead, just in a global settlement state which means no new bitUSD can be created until the state is over. If you miss this functionality you could always use Hertz or bitCNY

BSIP failed bitUSD, why should it be reactivated?

Quote from: bitcrab on November 27, 2018, 06:14:52 am

frankly speaking, bitCNY is already in black swan status if the feed price reflect the real market price.

however, I don't think it's good to return to feed real market price and leave black swan happen for bitCNY,  as we have seen in bitUSD, after black swan happened, now the peg break, borrowing stop, hard to revive.

I suggest to protect bitCNY from black swan by setting a black swan protection price, say black swan protection price = global settlement price*1.11.

feed price = max(market price, black swan protection price)

then when market price goes up, the margin called orders will be eaten step by step, the black swan protection price become lower and lower, and bitCNY has chance to revive.

Thoughts?

 
In any market you can't never be sure of anything, if the price never goes back bitCNY loses forever its PEG

Yeah, following BSIP18's bitasset revive process, bitCNY would automatically revive once the settlement fund value increases https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0018.md#auto-revive-after-increase-of-settlement-fund-value

With bitUSD's GS, vote weight slightly changed because the BTS is in the settlement pool which doesn't have voting rights. If bitCNY globally settles, perhaps there will be a larger shift in voting power which impedes experimental changes to bitassets?

There's some interesting threads:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27459.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27451.0;all

Disagree.

Increase MSSR to 30% (1.3) so that the margins are eaten.

We need a robust system that will work in the future. This stop gap doesn't do anything to improve the system it just breaks the promise of it.

30% would be highly attractive given recent crypto volatility, better to punish under collateralized positions than to punish everyone (all margin positions) for 1 bad-debt holder's behaviour.