Xeroc I think 50/50 makes sense as a starting point.  That would more than double the income from network fees and referrers still retain a strong incentive to splash their ref links and bring on new users.

Your point of concern about trading fees I think is on everyone's mind here.  That's why I suggest leveraging some of the current asset variable fee towards maintaining the network.  I understand the original intent of the asset fee was to increase liquidity on those two asset in a neutral way, managed by committee.  That's a good objective.  But is it worth 10x the capital flow than accrues to the network?  Put more simply: is committee offered liquidity on two bitassets worth ten times more than all witness and worker proposal pay which power the entire platform?  To me it is clearly not worth the discrepancy.

Paliboy, are you suggesting unwinding prior accounts or making account names renewable on a going-forward basis?

I would like to build on the solid research already published by Clockwork (https://steemit.com/bitshares/@clockwork/bitshares-fees-the-fee-schedule-and-dex-profitability) and Abit (https://steemit.com/bitshares/@abit/bitshares-block-chain-historical-data-search-analysis-and-visualization) 

I was interested with Clockwork’s observation that the BitShares reserve pool is running at a chronic deficit.  So far as the community desires fiscal balance and sustainability, it’s clear we must decrease expenses (witness/worker proposals) or increase income (revenue from fees).  Decreasing expenses significantly is short-sighted because BitShares has a lot of growth ahead and doing so would be akin to cutting the legs from under ourselves.  So naturally we should have a conversation about increasing network operations and or the fees associated with those operations.

I am against raising networks across the board before considering how the bitUSD/CNY variable fee can be used to support the health of the network (witness/worker proposals).  As shown below, fees are already rather high, even by centralized exchange standards.  For some of the more popular trading pairs, users face fees over 0.3% in total.  With only a small fraction of that actually going to support the core infrastructure of the platform.

Fees in context:
Hypothetical fees incurred on 100 bitUSD round-trip trade for BTC and back         
              BTS Network Fee  bitUSD Variable Fee     Private Gateway Fee
OpenLedger   0.01156           $0.10                  $0.20
GDEX            0.01156           $0.10                  $0.10
RuDex           0.01156           $0.10                  $0.05


The private gateway fees are off the table for this discussion.  What is immediately noticeable is how much greater the bitUSD variable fee is than the network fee.  Of course, the difference is less on smaller orders and greater on larger orders.  Still, considering bitUSD/CNY have shown robust trading activity this is a data point that the market can bear significantly higher fees than the flat network fee.

When the bitUSD/bitCNY variable fees were originally introduced I was against them.  Notwithstanding the results of the liquidity market operations (the explicit intention of the additional fee) I have come around to realize a much bigger point.  The demand for trading bitUSD has proven rather inelastic with respect to the transaction fees. 

Elasticity is a short-hand economics term meaning how much market participants will alter their behavior in response to a given change.  E.g. alcohol and cigarette taxes are considered the most efficient taxes because they do not alter behavior significantly – people who smoke will likely continue to smoke whether the cost of a pack amounts to two USD or three.  The upshot here is that bitUSD is a unique token and the market demand for trading remains robust despite the increased fee.  If we want to increase the reserve pool, we should consider tapping some of the current fees levied on bitUSD/CNY or increasing network fees slightly on those assets alone.

A second observation is the 20/80% referral vesting mechanism.  Even a strong increase in network activity/revenue will have a muted effect so long as only 1/5 of the revenues are actually returning to the reserve pool.  I understand the original reasoning for such lucrative referral structures.  I also think it’s worth having a discussion whether this structure has yielded the results the community feels is worthy of such a high price to pay.  This is the most immediate way to increase the force multiplier of network activity.  At the same time I recognize this may be a sensitive topic because people may have planned according to this current 20/80 program.

So my calls for discussion are:
1) What do you think of augmenting the fee structure on bitCNY/USD to increase the flow to the reserve pool from the trading of those assets? 
2) What do you think of slightly modifying the ratio between referrer vesting and reserve pool income?

Already good feedback provided above.

I express my support for this solid work done so far by the BBF and look to support in the future.

Fav, a valuable opinion at that.  Thank you for the perspective.

Today I formally announce my intent to join the BitShares Committee. 

As a reminder: the Committee is approved by stakeholders and formally tasked with setting policy for the BitShares blockchain including:

Transaction and trading fees;
Blockchain parameters, such as block size, block interval; &
Referral and vesting parameters such as cash back percentage and vesting periods.

I discovered the Graphene-based chains last summer.  I was hooked.  I watched every public video with Dan Larimer talking about the potential for BitShares to revolutionize finance (BitShares TV: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UChtICzF0ZEhhgoMA8YWhULw/videos is a great resource for those new to the platform or interested in its beginnings).  For months I could not shake the question of why BTS had yet to have a bigger impact.

This lead me to become more active in the community.  Joining the Discord and Telegram channels where I met great individuals like Kimchi-King, Fav, and Fuzzy.  On BitShares hangouts and in the chat rooms I listened to the community and began taking more upon myself to contribute.  I identified two areas where I could bring value: network infrastructure and legal perspective. 

As many of you know Bittrex, halted trading in BTS in the fall of 2017.  This opened my eyes to the serious challenges facing a DAC like BitShares.  In many ways BitShares is vulnerable to adversaries in the real world who have not the time nor interest in understanding what we are doing here.  I believe this network can thrive and prosper within the current system of national boundaries and jurisdictions.

My platform principle is the support and sustainability of smartcoins on the DEX.  Native trust-less assets with autonomous and sound collateral ratios (e.g. bitUSD) remains one of the core advantages BitShares holds over the rest of the crypto world.  I will strive to foster innovation for new smartcoins and collaboration and support for existing smartcoins.

I hope to join the Committee and help the community make the most of every person working to make BitShares realize it’s full potential.  Thank you.

I spoke with Kimchi-King about this today.

Worker proposals are critical for getting things done around the BitShares DAC.  BitShares may be missing out on good work for the network with vote requirements as high as 300 million bts.  My suggestion is to have a lower bullpen of workers with lower vote requirements and lower amounts of funds.

Consider you want to print and spread flyers featuring all the great information about BitShares in your local town. This is exactly the type of action that would benefit each holder of bts and can be rewarded with treasury bts. This individual is unlikely to organize a coalition of bts voters to reach the 300 million or so bts votes required to pass a worker proposal. If the supplies for this activity cost only $10 then the individual is faced with the choice of eating the cost themselves (as many on the chain do now) or giving up the activity completely (unknown how many BitSharians were lost as a result of this structure).

What do people think of this idea? 

How could this be implemented in the best way.  Long term (with community support of course) probably a separate pool in the interface and everything.  Looking forward to hearing your thoughts.

John Robert

Would be happy to publish price feeds (and of course submit for white-list) but I would like to study the pricing mechanism you use.  Is there anyway to view this?