Quote from: pc on May 01, 2016, 12:15:17 pm

You cannot make sure that every holder of bitassets will notice.

The settlement function is the "guarantee" that holders can exchange their bitassets for the equivalent worth of BTS. Bitasset holders have bought under the assumption that this guarantee will hold. Now you want to reduce that guarantee from "equivalent worth" to "99% of its value", which will automatically devalue the affected bitassets and effectively rob bitasset owners of 1% of their holdings.

IMO we're going to lose all credibility if we start changing the rules in mid-game.

in 0 offset setting, the holder is ok but the shorter is always hurt. why should the holder have power to force the shorter to sell BTS to him without any compensation? the 0 offset setting discourage shorting, means it discourage bitasset supply.

this is not changing rules in mid-game, the design of BTS2.0 set the committee mechanism for parameter change, now and then there are necessity to review some parameters and make necessary change,  a reasonable change with good notice work will benefit the whole economy.

in China community - the main area that use bitCNY - bitCNY is accepted well, but always the supply is not enough, considering there will be more assets be traded in DEX, the supply of bitCNY is far from enough, this change mainly intent to encourage shorting.

I'll check and draft a BSIP.

OK, next thought experiment.

How much of a (properly used) investment would it take to drive the market cap of BitShares to equal Bitcoin?
(I don't think it would take 6 billion in new cash to get there.  What do you think it would take?)

How much actual investment did it take to drive ETH to 1 Billion?

The immediate overnight impact of a temporary yield promotion would be a rapid expansion of the BitUSD supply. Becoming the crypto USD, Smartcoin market leader will significantly impact the perception of the DEX and it's future potential at a time when we have received a lot of positive momentum and attention.

What we've seen though is the amount of BTS on Polo increasing, if we want all those people who are suddenly interested in BTS to move their BTS off the exchanges, learn about Smartcoins and participate in the DEX then we need to give them a reason/incentive and the yield promotion is a great way to do that.

I think I've underestimated the difficulty and/or workload of off-chain data analysis. Current data fetching APIs are not friendly enough to do the analysis work. If it's me to implement this, I may write a plugin of witness_node first to output more data.

they're using DPOS



3. Consensus

Lisk is based on the DPoS[4] (Delegated Proof of Stake) consensus mechanism. This method of consensus was originally created by the BitShares team.

为了改善内盘流动性不足、挂单差价大、体量小的状况，最近社区在讨论做市商激励机制。

本来是BM提出一个设想，在BTS里内置（核心开发）一个激励机制，规则是挂单时间超过10分钟后被吃掉有奖，所以可以刷单挖矿。

现在讨论变得更有趣了，最优价格挂单超过一定时间就有奖，并且不需要在BTS内部实现奖励分配（不需要核心开发），而是使用外部脚本来统计发奖 https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,21544.msg281415.html#msg281415

@alt 这方面你最擅长，不管是做市机器人，还是发奖脚本，都可以参与一下。当然前提是制定一个好规则。意下如何？

Quote from: tonyk on February 22, 2016, 01:13:01 am

Quote

Nasdaq is incentivizing the display of orders for (a) 500 shares at the best bid and 500 shares at the best offer, 30% of the time, and (b) 2500 shares at no wider than 2% of the best bid and 2500 shares at no wider than 2% of the best offer, 90% of the time.  I don't think we need to specify a minimum number of shares or what % of the time they need to satisfy the above conditions, but perhaps we could simply make the reward proportional to the length of time MMs have orders on the books, the size of the orders, and the distance from the price feed.  And maybe we should require that orders be on the book for a minimum period of time, as some have already suggested. 

1.Min percent of the time, 2.having the best bid (or ask) 3.For reasonable amount of shares[ probably as % of average volume in our case]. 4. With max spread [or distance from the feed for our case]

Is a very good rule imho.
Points 1 and 2 are very key elements here. It eliminates my the main issue with volume only based distribution of reward. The aim is good prices most of the time not just 10-15 min a day.

@abit and BM - how computationally doable is the above rule for a blockchain?  Keep in mind that ".Min percent of the time" may (and usually will) include  multiple orders and their sum must > Min.

I think the reward program doesn't have to be built INTO the system. Since all trading data is on the chain, any asset issuer is able to analysis the data, then make their own decisions on HOW to reward market makers on her markets. Off-chain data analysis is usually better than on-chain analysis, more flexible, easier to adjust, more cheating resistant, more people are able to help, will never affect the stability of the network. Apply a worker, distribute the funds according to pre-defined rules (better if special scripts are made already), all these can be done by the committee.

下一步，ccedk就将配合bm的交易激励机制，给大家发钱了。