Author Topic: suggest to disable forcesettlement for bitCNY  (Read 14683 times)

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Offline matle85

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I'm going to read up more today as I feel like I'm a bit poorly informed / haven't quite got my head around the interaction of the different mechanisms and how these are most fairly adjusted to achieve the best possible stablecoin.

My preference would be for calculating the feed price in a far way that recognises the liquidity and market for bitCNY. We want more bitCNY not less so I agree seeing liquidations on a token which is seeing good use and wider adoption is not desirable. That said it is also important that there remains a clear decentralised basis backing the value of the coin with sufficient BTS.

Let's see if I can get my head around it a bit more today.

We should all bear in mind BTS fell 90% and bitUSD / bitCNY survived, that's a pretty impressive stress test but it does mean a lot of people are hurting a bit / are close to the line now.

Basically the price of BTS needs to go up and all this just goes away... ;)
« Last Edit: November 09, 2018, 07:14:22 am by matle85 »

Offline bitcrab

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up to now about 2/3 of the voters say no to disable force settlement. I think it's clear that there's no enough support to disable force settlement.

to move things ahead, I'd like to reset the poll with adding one more option -  set force settlement offset for bitCNY to 20%.

in the past 2 days something happened in bitCNY - initially feed price fall to 5% more lower than DEX latest price and triggered a lot of settlement orders, and then some market activity are triggered to resist this - the feed price and latest price are pulled to be more close, and now the feed price is almost exactly 5% below the latest price.

the force settlement limit the DEX price to go up and the feed price to go down, for example, if there is no force settlement, we may have a 1CNY DEX price and a 0.8 feed price, but with force settlement, the market force lead to a 0.89 CNY DEX price and 0.85 feed price.

we need to make it possible for feed price to go far below the market price, in other words, we need to allow market price to go far above feed price.

to replace 5% with 20% is to make it possible for market price to be 20% higher than feed price.

please kindly consider and revote.
« Last Edit: November 09, 2018, 05:56:08 am by bitcrab »
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Offline abit

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Thank you @xeroc for the reply. Calling you out because I have very high expectations of you. You're so important.
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Offline yamtt

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I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.

同意支持提高清算补偿

一样的,喂价反馈一样可以反馈到无限低,难道清算补偿也要提高无限高?

the situantion is same.

不会无限提高 只是补偿喂价和现价的差而已

Offline yamtt

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     虽然BIP42已经可以保证BITCNY的锚定了,但是目前的喂价公式不利于活跃市场,灵敏度太低,反映迟于市场行情。压低喂价和强清都可以抑制抵押,但是强清也不是无风险套利,因为延后24小时执行,这就是市场风险了。用压低喂价的方式不如发起强清利于活跃市场,目前看市场已经很死了,不应该一味的打压市场活跃度了。
       如果想发起强清,那么玩家手里必须备有bitcny,这也是bitcny的需求来源。所以目前保留强清会更合适,没有理由移除强清。况且,强清目前也没有什么坏处,无非就是把高抵押的清算了而已,下调喂价一样会把高抵押的爆仓的。移除强清是保护抵押者的说法不成立。只要市场bitcny需求不足,那么高抵押行为必须抑制。
      强请补偿应该为零,而不是5%,会更有利于活跃内盘的。强清应该是很正常的市场行为,而不是偶尔来一次,习惯了就行了。阶梯式强清补偿可能更合适,可以避免恶意强清。

     总之,BTS系统是做市场的,不是国家机构,不能管的太死,否则会适得其反。
   另外,锚定精确不代表非要1:1才是锚定精确。只要在一定时间段保证汇率稳定,保证汇率可控就是锚定精确了。可以是1:1,也可以是1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03,都表示锚定精确。熊市行情应该是bitcny 适度贬值的锚定,比如1:1.02,这样会更有利于活跃市场。


你这是想完全把bts改成期货交易

Although BIP42 can guarantee the anchoring of BITCNY, the current feeding formula is not conducive to the active market, and the sensitivity is too low to reflect the market price later. Lower feeding prices and strong liquidation can suppress mortgages, but strong liquidation is not risk-free arbitrage, because delayed implementation of 24 hours, which is market risk. It's better to lower the feeding price than to activate the market by launching a strong Qing Dynasty. At present, the market is dead, so we should not blindly suppress the market activity.
If you want to be strong, then players must have bitcny in hand, which is also the source of demand for bitcny. Therefore, it is more appropriate to retain strong clearance at present, and there is no reason to remove Qiang Qing. Moreover, there is no harm in Qiangqing at present, just liquidating the high mortgage, and lowering the feeding price will also explode the high mortgage. It is untenable to remove strong clearing is to protect mortgages. As long as the market bitcny demand is insufficient, the high mortgage behavior must be suppressed.
Strong compensation should be zero instead of 5%, which will be more conducive to active internal market. Qiang Qing should be a normal market behavior, rather than once in a while, get used to it. Step by step compensation is probably more appropriate and can avoid malicious strong.

In a word, the BTS system is a market, not a state institution. It should not be too rigid, otherwise it would be counterproductive.
In addition, anchoring accuracy does not mean that 1:1 is anchoring accuracy. As long as the exchange rate is stable in a certain period of time, it is accurate to ensure that the exchange rate is controllable. It can be 1:1 or 1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03, which means anchoring accuracy. Bear market should be the anchor of bitcny moderate depreciation, such as 1:1.02, which will be more conducive to active market.

You want to completely change bts into futures trading.


Offline binggo

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I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.

同意支持提高清算补偿

一样的,喂价反馈一样可以反馈到无限低,难道清算补偿也要提高无限高?

the situantion is same.

Offline gghi

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     虽然BIP42已经可以保证BITCNY的锚定了,但是目前的喂价公式不利于活跃市场,灵敏度太低,反映迟于市场行情。压低喂价和强清都可以抑制抵押,但是强清也不是无风险套利,因为延后24小时执行,这就是市场风险了。用压低喂价的方式不如发起强清利于活跃市场,目前看市场已经很死了,不应该一味的打压市场活跃度了。
       如果想发起强清,那么玩家手里必须备有bitcny,这也是bitcny的需求来源。所以目前保留强清会更合适,没有理由移除强清。况且,强清目前也没有什么坏处,无非就是把高抵押的清算了而已,下调喂价一样会把高抵押的爆仓的。移除强清是保护抵押者的说法不成立。只要市场bitcny需求不足,那么高抵押行为必须抑制。
      强请补偿应该为零,而不是5%,会更有利于活跃内盘的。强清应该是很正常的市场行为,而不是偶尔来一次,习惯了就行了。阶梯式强清补偿可能更合适,可以避免恶意强清。

     总之,BTS系统是做市场的,不是国家机构,不能管的太死,否则会适得其反。
   另外,锚定精确不代表非要1:1才是锚定精确。只要在一定时间段保证汇率稳定,保证汇率可控就是锚定精确了。可以是1:1,也可以是1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03,都表示锚定精确。熊市行情应该是bitcny 适度贬值的锚定,比如1:1.02,这样会更有利于活跃市场。


Although BIP42 can guarantee the anchoring of BITCNY, the current feeding formula is not conducive to the active market, and the sensitivity is too low to reflect the market price later. Lower feeding prices and strong liquidation can suppress mortgages, but strong liquidation is not risk-free arbitrage, because delayed implementation of 24 hours, which is market risk. It's better to lower the feeding price than to activate the market by launching a strong Qing Dynasty. At present, the market is dead, so we should not blindly suppress the market activity.
If you want to be strong, then players must have bitcny in hand, which is also the source of demand for bitcny. Therefore, it is more appropriate to retain strong clearance at present, and there is no reason to remove Qiang Qing. Moreover, there is no harm in Qiangqing at present, just liquidating the high mortgage, and lowering the feeding price will also explode the high mortgage. It is untenable to remove strong clearing is to protect mortgages. As long as the market bitcny demand is insufficient, the high mortgage behavior must be suppressed.
Strong compensation should be zero instead of 5%, which will be more conducive to active internal market. Qiang Qing should be a normal market behavior, rather than once in a while, get used to it. Step by step compensation is probably more appropriate and can avoid malicious strong.

In a word, the BTS system is a market, not a state institution. It should not be too rigid, otherwise it would be counterproductive.
In addition, anchoring accuracy does not mean that 1:1 is anchoring accuracy. As long as the exchange rate is stable in a certain period of time, it is accurate to ensure that the exchange rate is controllable. It can be 1:1 or 1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03, which means anchoring accuracy. Bear market should be the anchor of bitcny moderate depreciation, such as 1:1.02, which will be more conducive to active market.

Offline xeroc

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I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see
https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount
. In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with
BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position
holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish
them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset
dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.
In fact, I came to the same conclusion. Sorry it took so long.

I think we all agree that BSIP42 leads to force settlement being **overly**
expensive to shorters. I also believe that "disabling" settlement can only
be a termporary solution until dynamic MCR can be used.
Instead of disabling it, why don't we reduce the percentage of supply that can
be settled per maintenance interval to something small? That would discourage
longs from using settlement but would still keep the option open.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain
again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.
Sorry for that, my fault.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards
a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the
ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning
the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All
discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid
argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve?
We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time
to learn a bit more?
I am sorry to appear reluctant and "slow" when it comes to understanding market
dynamics. As you know, I do not have an economics background. Still, being a
proxy it is a requirement to *understand* what I am doing. Given the amount of
time that I have put into understanding and even defending BSIP42 in the community
makes it odd you are calling me out :-/

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the
fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and
push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix.
This is great news, I didn't know that. How can we make sure this
makes it into the next upgrade?

Actually, adjusting MCR is
effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset,
so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going,
however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.
... except that adjusting MCR allows to keep the price feed reflect the 'actual
price'.

Update: Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied
is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point
of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can
be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when
a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly
apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a
few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO
not a fair enough rule.
I am still trying to figure out if incentives can be aligned for both sides
(shorts and longs) in bearish **and** bullish markets. IMHO, the ultimate goal
is to have a system where merely personal *opinion* about the market leads to
"taking" a side and not market-internal mechanics.

Offline ouresw

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Chance for speculator to exploit debt position owners is implicit arbitrage and will be healthy for the market. How can it be exploited? The Force Settlement Offset is 5%, which should make it hard enough. Please elaborate

Force settlement is a feature that must remain available IMO, it is a worst-case scenario measure. It will certainly never be used in a liquid market, the UI prominently shows the user if the market is the better choice.
But if there is any incident that the market crashes, the force settlement option must be available and I would not want to wait for anyone to activate it then.

I own a debt position with CR=3, now you force me to sell the collateral to you with a under market price, this is not exploiting, are you joking?

Since you choose to operate this mortgage, you should bear the corresponding risks. If you don't want to be liquidated, you can choose to actively buy back bitCNY to close the position. The rules are fair, and in the current negative feed price mode, liquidation has the effect of accelerating the balance of supply and demand stability of bitCNY, so it cannot be cancelled. Not to mention the forest model, because the liquidation is to give the liquidator the opportunity to close the position.
« Last Edit: November 08, 2018, 04:50:46 am by ouresw »

Offline yamtt

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I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.

同意支持提高清算补偿

Offline ebit

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bitcny has mellowed ,please remove the fence .
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Offline oxarbitrage

Without having an opinion in regards BSIP42 and related as they are beyond my understanding I really hope that the efforts from @abit are appreciated as i am sure he want the best for Bitshares as a whole. By what i saw in the last time his position and also @bitcrab are target of constant attacks, for the good of all us I hope rational consensus is achieved in this subjects that will allow bitshares to grow in the stable coin aspect, one of the most important pieces of our blockchain.

I believe Bitshares have the technology, experience and everything needed to be number 1 in the stable coin market, for this we should fight together as a community or die trying  :)

Offline abit

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I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.

I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.

I feel very very disappointed now.

After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?

These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.

OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.

Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.
« Last Edit: November 07, 2018, 10:15:05 pm by abit »
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Offline johnson

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强清导致内盘bts价格下跌,同时导致bitcny 产量减少。当内盘价格远远低于外盘价格,搬砖党开始
充值搬砖。然后拉低内外盘价差。搬砖的充值动作使充值费率上升,充值费率上升使喂价上升。
强清停止。
这就是当前喂价的调节逻辑啊,为啥要去掉强清呢?
强清有问题吗?没问题。
但是问题出在哪?出在调节的链路太长了。喂价应该包含市场成交价的信息,不论是外盘价格还是内盘价格,
喂价算法总要包含一个的。



Offline yamtt

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There is no need to cancel mandatory liquidation if the mandatory liquidation incentive is changed to 110% to offset the price difference due to negative feedback from the feed price

如果把强制清算奖励改成110% 来抵消喂价负反馈所产生的差价 那么就没必要取消强制清算