2206
DAC PLAY / Re: Blockchain RNG with DPOS
« on: April 19, 2014, 06:54:57 pm »
I believe refusing to reveal should be punished very harshly. There could be huge economic gain here. If you are playing a game with a 50/50 proposition and wager 10 BTC. If I am a delegate and do this when it will be my turn to reveal then my 10 BTC which had 0 expectation, now has 5 BTC expectation (at cost of refusing to reveal punishment). This can be done in multiple small wagers. This type of ability will attract nefarious delegates if the barrier to entry is low.
On the other hand if my delegate server goes down during the wrong time I don't want to be kicked off my position as a delegate.. Is there some way a delegate could give their S to another delegate to avoid the situation where they are removed from being a delegate due to network/server fault ? Some form of redundancy? I'd hate to lose all the investment towards being a delegate due to at technical glitch. (Possibly server redundancy?)
This also opens up a counter-exploit where someone can be DDOS'd into preventing their S revelation. How can the network decide intent !?
This last revealer aspect may have some underlying truth/law where you basically can not make RNG 100% fair. I have thought about this stuff before and it always seems to come down to some variation on the problem.
EDIT -
There is another thought I had. It might very well be that the volume of RNG relying transactions on any given block could be measured. This volume could be weighed in the punishment phase. If i refuse to reveal and there was a 10x spike in wagers, then well... that looks a lot worse than if the volume of transactions relying on the RNG is typical. Using this sort of technology you could use game-theory type stuff in the punishment phase and might have an alternative workable solution.
On the other hand if my delegate server goes down during the wrong time I don't want to be kicked off my position as a delegate.. Is there some way a delegate could give their S to another delegate to avoid the situation where they are removed from being a delegate due to network/server fault ? Some form of redundancy? I'd hate to lose all the investment towards being a delegate due to at technical glitch. (Possibly server redundancy?)
This also opens up a counter-exploit where someone can be DDOS'd into preventing their S revelation. How can the network decide intent !?
This last revealer aspect may have some underlying truth/law where you basically can not make RNG 100% fair. I have thought about this stuff before and it always seems to come down to some variation on the problem.
EDIT -
There is another thought I had. It might very well be that the volume of RNG relying transactions on any given block could be measured. This volume could be weighed in the punishment phase. If i refuse to reveal and there was a 10x spike in wagers, then well... that looks a lot worse than if the volume of transactions relying on the RNG is typical. Using this sort of technology you could use game-theory type stuff in the punishment phase and might have an alternative workable solution.