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Messages - tbone

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241
General Discussion / Re: Would you support 2% dilution to BitAsset Yield for a 6 month limited trial?
« on: March 12, 2016, 04:26:08 am »
Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 11, 2016, 11:27:40 am
The immediate overnight impact of a temporary yield promotion would be a rapid expansion of the BitUSD supply. Becoming the crypto USD, Smartcoin market leader will significantly impact the perception of the DEX and it's future potential at a time when we have received a lot of positive momentum and attention.

What we've seen though is the amount of BTS on Polo increasing, if we want all those people who are suddenly interested in BTS to move their BTS off the exchanges, learn about Smartcoins and participate in the DEX then we need to give them a reason/incentive and the yield promotion is a great way to do that.

Now is definitely the time to do this.  Why don't you write up a draft proposal and start getting final inputs before putting it to a vote?

242
General Discussion / Re: too many bts in centralized exchanges. Danger!
« on: March 11, 2016, 09:00:04 pm »
I agree with those saying Poloniex's UI is not one that we should emulate to a tee.  It's a decent interface, but not great by any stretch.  The reason they are so popular is that they have almost any coin one might want to trade, they are US-based and trustworthy, and they get a lot more right than Bittrex (whose UI is a total abomination).  So that's why Poloniex has been so successful and Bittrex is getting very little traction.  Not to mention Poloniex has lending.  Obviously we could greatly benefit from lending, but that is a big project and there is other lower hanging fruit, although hopefully a growing market cap will afford us the opportunity to work on more projects in parallel.   

In any event, we should take what is good from Poloniex and improve what isn't so good.  In fact, that's what @svk has been trying to do and the UI has come a long way.  I can't imagine the reference wallet is ever going to be a professional trading platform.  That will likely have to be delivered by 3rd parties.  I imagine even an MT4 integration will likely be delivered by a 3rd party.  Either way, that is not going to happen instantly, and in the meantime there are obviously improvements we can and should make. 

For example, we need basic position management capability (e.g. showing open positions with P/L, etc), which I started bringing up recently.  We also need order types beyond the standard limit and market orders, such as stop-loss, stop limit, take profit, trailing stops, etc.  The chart also needs a lot of work (especially the indicators), although I don't see it as the highest priority since it's not difficult to use external charting.  So for the time being (until higher priority items are completed), basic charting without useful indicators is good enough.   

Finally, the issue of multiple versions of the same base asset (i.e. BTC, USD, etc) is not caused by the interface.  It's just the nature of the DEX.  Although sidechains should help eliminate multiple versions of BTC and other digital assets.  And perhaps much more liquid fiat BitAssets will help eliminate the need for the fiat IOU tokens.  In the meantime, the way the markets are grouped now should at least help in this regard.  I think we should give @svk credit for a lot of excellent work on the UI.  Let's keep making progress. 

243
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: March 11, 2016, 12:04:37 pm »
Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 11, 2016, 08:38:16 am
Quote from: CoinHoarder on March 11, 2016, 04:38:22 am
Let me ask you this. Why should someone be allowed to place an order 50% away from the peg and earn any points towards the "reward system"? or 40%? or 30%? How useful are orders that far away from the peg, really? And why would shareholders want some of the funds going to those who place such useless orders? Obviously, some restrictions need to be in place.

 +5%

Given the current BTS momentum and spotlight, BTS will gain much more value from implementing an imperfect liquidity subsidy now and adjusting it based on participant behaviour than waiting a few weeks/months to get one right. So if the cost is reasonable to start one, <$100/200 a day, then I would start it sharpish to build on the current attention and momentum & get more people onto the DEX.

I agree, we should do this ASAP, before momentum dies down. 

244
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: March 11, 2016, 11:58:16 am »
Quote from: CoinHoarder on March 11, 2016, 04:38:22 am
Quote from: tbone on March 09, 2016, 01:49:42 pm
Quote from: CoinHoarder on March 09, 2016, 04:26:49 am
Quote from: tbone on March 07, 2016, 10:48:07 pm
I assume the algorithm can take into account a 4th factor - buy/sell order imbalances - to reward market makers more for placing orders on the weak side of the book.  So 4 factors now include:

1. order size
2. time on book
3. proximity to best bid/ask
4. strong/weak side of book

Thoughts about coding this @abit, @xeroc?

The fourth factor seems "gameable". Someone could place a large amount on the opposite position that their order is on, for a small cost (just a cancel order fee,) effectively boosting their portion of the liquidity pool for fairly cheap. To combat this and other issues consider adding the following restrictions:

A. There should be a maximum percentage away from the price feed that someone can qualify for these awards. This ensures that the funds they put on the books will be at risk of market making (which can be profitable and unprofitable). This makes sure they are providing useful liquidity to shareholders. After all, shareholders are paying for the liquidity fund.
B. A minimum amount of time for each user to have orders on the books in each trading pair separately is also necessary to combat this. Requirement A makes sure they are providing useful liquidity, and subject to market making risks.  Requirement B makes sure that they are providing that useful liquidity and subject to market making risks for a reasonable amount of time. It makes sure they are not "farming" the liquidity fund using the method I described above right before the "snapshots" for rewards are taken.

This would need to start with strict restrictions, which shareholders loosen up until a good compromise as to liquidity, spread, and costs is found. All parameters should be able to be easily tweaked.

@CoinHoarder, with #1-3, there is already incentive to place orders on either side of the book.  Nasdaq's incentives require placing orders on both the bid and the ask, presumably to promote balance.  Which kind of makes sense, although the point of #4 above is to further recognize that in some market conditions it is more risky to be on one side of the book than the other.  So the point is to provide more incentive to be on the riskier i.e. weak side in order to avoid a situation where market makers pull their orders in fear of getting steamrolled.  At the end of the day, if a market maker wants to put larger orders on the weak side of the book, then that is a good thing and they should earn more.  If they choose not to, then they will earn less and that is up to them.  I don't see what is gameable about this in particular.  If you still disagree with that, can you explain further?

I agree that #4 is useful and should be a part of the equation. I think restrictions should still be implemented in the "liquidity reward system" to increase shareholder's acceptance of the proposal, increase its usefulness to non-participating users (not participating in the "reward system",) and decrease the chances it can be gamed. I feel like implementing restrictions would help in all of those areas.

Let me ask you this. Why should someone be allowed to place an order 50% away from the peg and earn any points towards the "reward system"? or 40%? or 30%? How useful are orders that far away from the peg, really? And why would shareholders want some of the funds going to those who place such useless orders? Obviously, some restrictions need to be in place.

Furthermore, it can't simply be a 25%/25%/25%/25% split for each of the criterion. We need to analyze each criteria separately, and deem which should count for more or less weight. Personally, without thinking about it too deeply,  I feel like #3 is more important than #1 is more important than #2 is more important than #4, but this would need a lot of debate to land on something most can agree on.

I'm still not seeing how #4 can be gamed and what restrictions would prevent it.  But I think we should just get something going and tweak it later, so it would make sense to leave #4 out for now considering that it would be more complicated to specify and track, not to mention it's more of a fine tuning that would make sense to add later anyway. 

As for #3, I think orders deeper in the book definitely have value, just not as much value as those closer to the peg.  So this factor could be used to ensure that orders closer to the peg get rewarded much more than those deeper in the book.  Although for the sake of simplicity, perhaps we should just start with 2 bands around the peg, perhaps 1% and 5%.  Question is, how much more valuable is an order within 1% vs 5%, 2X?  3X?  5X? 

By the way, I'm not sure what you mean by 25%/25%/25%/25% split.  Each factor would have it's own range/set of values and when all factors are combined, each order would generate a score. 

In any event, I would imagine we would set a reward pool for each given period and each market maker could earn a total score for the given period and therefore earn a % of the available rewards depending on their share of the overall total score among all market makers during the period. 

245
General Discussion / Re: Would you support 2% dilution to BitAsset Yield for a 6 month limited trial?
« on: March 09, 2016, 05:02:31 pm »
Quote from: cylonmaker2053 on March 09, 2016, 04:21:00 pm
Quote from: Akado on March 09, 2016, 03:28:33 pm
What happens when the trial ends? Won't people be disappointed? However, if we keep it going, what if there's a point where we can't dilute any more? People won't care about it any more

it'd be an experiment with the expectation of continuing if successful. i agree with @Empirical1.2 in that it shouldn't be advertised as a yield promotion event, but rather as a trial permanent feature. those who want it to remain a fixed feature have more incentive to participate up front.

Definitely agree that we should continue if the experiment is successful.  But I think what @Empircal1.2 was saying is that it SHOULD be advertised as a promotion.  That way it will be expected if/when it's discontinued.  Or if we continue it, people will be pleasantly surprised.  I agree it should be communicated as a promotion for these reasons.

246
General Discussion / Re: too many bts in centralized exchanges. Danger!
« on: March 09, 2016, 03:28:37 pm »
Quote from: mf-tzo on March 09, 2016, 03:22:14 pm
Please consider withdrawing your bts from external exchanges if you do not intend to sell them.. More than 30% of BTS are in the top two exchanges. This is very dangerous and if something goes wrong with any of these exchanges you can kiss goodbye your bts investment forever.

If you do not sell your bts, why not just held them in your wallet and be the king to your castle?

If we offer yield during the bootstrapping phase, it will encourage many people to move their BTS off the centralized exchanges and onto the DEX and many good things will result.  If you think that is important, I hope you will get behind @Empirical1.2's idea.

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,21597.msg284481.html#msg284481

247
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: March 09, 2016, 01:49:42 pm »
Quote from: CoinHoarder on March 09, 2016, 04:26:49 am
Quote from: tbone on March 07, 2016, 10:48:07 pm
I assume the algorithm can take into account a 4th factor - buy/sell order imbalances - to reward market makers more for placing orders on the weak side of the book.  So 4 factors now include:

1. order size
2. time on book
3. proximity to best bid/ask
4. strong/weak side of book

Thoughts about coding this @abit, @xeroc?

The fourth factor seems "gameable". Someone could place a large amount on the opposite position that their order is on, for a small cost (just a cancel order fee,) effectively boosting their portion of the liquidity pool for fairly cheap. To combat this and other issues consider adding the following restrictions:

A. There should be a maximum percentage away from the price feed that someone can qualify for these awards. This ensures that the funds they put on the books will be at risk of market making (which can be profitable and unprofitable). This makes sure they are providing useful liquidity to shareholders. After all, shareholders are paying for the liquidity fund.
B. A minimum amount of time for each user to have orders on the books in each trading pair separately is also necessary to combat this. Requirement A makes sure they are providing useful liquidity, and subject to market making risks.  Requirement B makes sure that they are providing that useful liquidity and subject to market making risks for a reasonable amount of time. It makes sure they are not "farming" the liquidity fund using the method I described above right before the "snapshots" for rewards are taken.

This would need to start with strict restrictions, which shareholders loosen up until a good compromise as to liquidity, spread, and costs is found. All parameters should be able to be easily tweaked.

@CoinHoarder, with #1-3, there is already incentive to place orders on either side of the book.  Nasdaq's incentives require placing orders on both the bid and the ask, presumably to promote balance.  Which kind of makes sense, although the point of #4 above is to further recognize that in some market conditions it is more risky to be on one side of the book than the other.  So the point is to provide more incentive to be on the riskier i.e. weak side in order to avoid a situation where market makers pull their orders in fear of getting steamrolled.  At the end of the day, if a market maker wants to put larger orders on the weak side of the book, then that is a good thing and they should earn more.  If they choose not to, then they will earn less and that is up to them.  I don't see what is gameable about this in particular.  If you still disagree with that, can you explain further?

By the way, I would imagine that determining which side of the book, if any, is weak at any given time is not a trivial matter.  Although it really shouldn't be too difficult to take into account a short time-frame running average of cumulative trades at the ask vs. trades at the bid, and perhaps also comparing short-term price delta to medium-term price delta.  I would imagine that ultimately people will create bots to most effectively take advantage of these reward factors, which is fine because that means they are putting liquidity where we need it most.  Thoughts?

248
General Discussion / Re: Testing Stealth UI
« on: March 09, 2016, 01:03:46 pm »
Quote from: valzav on March 08, 2016, 04:52:03 pm
Quote from: tbone on March 08, 2016, 02:11:31 am
Can you explain what a private contact is?  It appears that if you "add" one, it simply changes the name of the private account.  And if you "add" another one, it just changes the name of the private account again.  So it appears this is nothing more than an alias.  If so, then why is it called a contact?  And why is the process of creating one so convoluted?

Also, when I try to send, I am unable to do so because the fee is 2,000,000.  I don't get any of this.

Private contactaccount is an alias to a private key.
Private contact is an alias to a public key.
If you already have a private account, adding private contact with the same key will just rename your private account, this is not a bug.

This is needlessly convoluted.  Average users will be completely turned off and will not use it.  Surely you can see that.

249
General Discussion / Re: Potential BitShares Road Map for 2016
« on: March 08, 2016, 12:46:16 pm »
Quote from: Chris4210 on March 08, 2016, 11:12:22 am
Quote from: Akado on March 07, 2016, 09:26:56 pm
I think marketing should be done by each one of us or as a community effort. No need for worker funds, it has already been proven it doesnt work, funds go to waste and we are not yet at a level where its worthy to use big funds for that since we still need to improve a lot of stuff.

Marketing will be done by each service using BitShares, the question is finding those services, not how to advertise BTS. If we have a good product, people will surely come, maybe it will take more time but they will. We should focus on that,

I strongly disagree. Looking at the great success of Ethereum I think we need a coordinated, Blockchain funded(worker), marketing approach that drafts a story around our technology. I do not believe that people will just "come". That might have been the case with Bitcoin, since it was all new. Now 99% of people know the Name Bitcoin, while 1% have ever bought a Bitcoin. No IT-geek will start to look over again for the best technology out there. They looked at Bitcoin and see it fail.

If you look for Blockchain solutions today, we have over 200 stand alone Blockchain providers alone. All those Blockchain consultants and independent IT Software solutions are loud and negotiating with corporate and governments about trail projects today. There will be no second Overstock scanning the whole market for the best solution. Let alone R3 & IBM and is providing working solutions for their clients already.

In these days BitShares can not allow to be quite and just build feature after feature to hope that maybe somebody will discover us in our little corner of the market.

BitShares needs to be loud. It needs to show presence at conferences and market the hell out of it. @Dan must go back on the road and challenge Ethereum in an epic battle of super Blockchain masterminds.

At the end we will all benefit from that. Every BitShares company will take off like a rocket as soon as the marketcap rises and we can sell our BitShares depots to fund further development. What if you have been an Ethereum Startup with a few thousands ETH in reserves? You had enough time to liquidate at ~$10 USD and are now sitting on a working capital of $+100.000 to market, build and create awesome products. BitShares does not have that luxury, so we need to come all together, use the resources we have today and promote our main features - Price stable Crypto Currencies!! That beats Bitcoin alone!

We do not have 4 months time to wait. The train will be gone for us.

Obviously every business that builds on top of Bitshares will do some form of marketing for their own business/brand.  But I agree with @Chris4210 that Bitshares itself very much needs a coordinated, focused marketing effort.  Isn't CNI going to be handling that?

250
General Discussion / Re: Is Bitshares attempting to get on Microsoft Azure?
« on: March 08, 2016, 11:45:22 am »
Quote from: fuzzy on March 08, 2016, 06:05:37 am
#sharebits tbone 5 SHAREBIT

Ok, that didn't work.  So it's entirely down.  Has been for at least 24 hours. 

251
General Discussion / Re: Is Bitshares attempting to get on Microsoft Azure?
« on: March 08, 2016, 05:34:43 am »
Quote from: fuzzy on March 08, 2016, 05:20:09 am
Quote from: ccedk on March 07, 2016, 09:23:11 pm
make sure to get noticed, start sending bts to all microsoft decision makers telling them thats only the beginning

collaterized assets shared via twitter using www.sharebits.io

which better way to get noticed showing value and whats possible in 3 seconds

Honestly cant think of one...there is only one thing better than telling someone about something, and that is showing them.

@fuzzy, are you aware that sharebits is not currently working?  Can't log into it, at least. 

252
General Discussion / Re: Testing Stealth UI
« on: March 08, 2016, 02:11:31 am »
Quote from: valzav on March 07, 2016, 10:34:22 pm
The stealth demo is updated http://stealth.cnx.rocks/ here. A lot of issues have been fixed.
Known issues:
1. It won't keep your old stealth.cnx.rocks - you need to create your accounts again.
2. It doesn't show your accounts right away if you are creating it with faucet - you need to refresh the page.
3. It won't show your accounts until you unlock the wallet.

Can you explain what a private contact is?  It appears that if you "add" one, it simply changes the name of the private account.  And if you "add" another one, it just changes the name of the private account again.  So it appears this is nothing more than an alias.  If so, then why is it called a contact?  And why is the process of creating one so convoluted?

Also, when I try to send, I am unable to do so because the fee is 2,000,000.  I don't get any of this.

253
Freebie / Re: Open Beta: Testing the Tip/Sharebot Today @ Noon!
« on: March 07, 2016, 11:35:58 pm »
Is it just me, or has everyone else also had trouble logging into sharebits.io today?  Every time I try, it says "waiting for www.sharebits.io" for several minutes before timing out.  Any ideas?  I haven't had trouble accessing any other sites.   

254
General Discussion / Re: Liquidity Pool Discussion
« on: March 07, 2016, 11:17:37 pm »
Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 07, 2016, 10:53:14 pm
Quote from: tbone on March 07, 2016, 08:51:13 pm
Quote from: Empirical1.2 on March 07, 2016, 06:14:40 pm
Quote from: cylonmaker2053 on March 07, 2016, 06:00:02 pm

wow, $120k in yield payments to bitUSD short sellers in 6 months? is that just an estimate of what 2% APR on borrowed funds would entail? i thought the proposed experiment was 2%?

interesting point re: NuBits. still, i'd rather start with wider upper and lower bounds around a single smartcoin to experiment; something like 20% spread would be a good starting point IMO, but i'm a fan of experimenting and adjusting based on results.

I think a 20% spread on fixed settlement ranges would be OK but not on the spread in which we subsidized liquidity. If the spread was very much wider than 0.99 - 1.01 the majority of the time, I don't think BitUSD would be very appealing to the man on the street but I also agree with experimenting and adjusting results. (If we have a liquidity pool and there is excess demand at 1.01 we would either raise the interest to attract more BitUSD to the pool like the implementation in the OP or raise it to 1.02 and so on. You could also have daily limits.)

Regards the yield, the poll was for diluting BTS at a rate of 2% a year for 6 months. (Or as some prefer to say, using 30% of the  daily worker budget https://bitshares.org/technology/stakeholder-approved-project-funding/ ) Of course you could yield harvest and provided total BitUSD was < 1/2 CAP of BTS your return would be greater than the % BTS was being diluted, so basically it's a cost every sharholder can at least mitigate. 

Quote
wow, $120k in yield payments to bitUSD short sellers in 6 months?

Not to short seller but to BitUSD yield or a combo of BitUSD yield and BitUSD shorts.
(If we added yield we would also probably lower forced settlement which would also be a positive for shorts.)

I think using 30% of available worker funds might be a bit much considering we still need to fund liquidity, not to mention we don't want to crowd out other development.  And don't forget, some here would rather we stagnate and die on the vine as long as we don't spend any money.  So we'll have somewhat of head wind on this by default. 

However, looking at the numbers, you mentioned $120k total yield over 6 months equating to 10% APR on $1.2M.  Correct me if I'm wrong, but 10% APR on $1.2M over 6 months would only be $60k, which would be $10k per month, no?  And based on current prices, our worker budget is ~$60k/month.  So if my math is correct we would be looking at only about ~17% of total budget for workers.  Am I missing something?

You are correct the numbers I mentioned in that particular reply were wrong. 120k over 6 months would be the equivalent of 10% yield on $2.4 million.

We could certainly use a lower amount, I'd certainly still support it, though if you look at the poll only 3.5% of voters were in favour of 1% instead. Personally I'm in favour of using the higher amount as I'd like to see where the market finds the BTS to create that much BitUSD... (I think we'd see a lot of positive effects very rapidly.)

I'm all for really seeing how it works out.  But I would hate to overpay with more yield than is necessary to incentivize the behavior we seek.   Also, let's assume we do 10% and it works great.  Do you think that would be sustainable going forward?  Do you not think 5% would do the trick? 

Also, I'm sure we won't get the full desired results (or support for this to begin with) without liquidity measures done in conjunction.  So the question is, how much will the liquidity incentives cost and will we be able to add that to the tab?  And let's not forget that there will also be some dev costs. 

255
General Discussion / Re: Subsidizing Market Liquidity
« on: March 07, 2016, 10:48:07 pm »
Quote from: cylonmaker2053 on March 07, 2016, 09:29:22 pm
Quote from: tbone on March 07, 2016, 08:15:45 pm
Quote from: cylonmaker2053 on February 20, 2016, 04:56:14 am
Quote from: Erlich Bachman on February 20, 2016, 03:48:12 am
i would suggest paying these kickbacks on a sliding scale based on length of time on the order books so if someone had a real safe hedge on the books for months that saved us from having a black swan event then he would deserve more than someone who put an order up for 10 min then sold to himself

i like a sliding scale concept, but actually think it should work in the reverse. open orders deep in the order book don't add real liquidity IMO, the action happens on the margin and closing the bid-ask spread is key. if there's going to be any subsidy for liquidity, it would best be spent narrowing spreads. that said, i'm more a fan of fee discounts than kickbacks; rewarding higher frequency trading and/or open orders near the highest bid and lowest ask.

I'm not sure I agree with any rewards based on filled orders (HFT or otherwise) since that's where there's an incentive to do self-trading.  Whereas if we reward based only on placing orders on the books, then there's no incentive to self-trade, only to provide liquidity. 

Beyond that, I agree with larger rewards for open orders closer to best bid and ask.  So we can factor in size of orders placed, time on order book, and proximity to best bid/ask.  We should probably also factor in balance between buy side and sell side, although I imagine at any given time we can skew this more toward either the buy side or the sell side depending on market direction.

good point re: varying incentives on buy/sell sides. from my experience, when prices move quickly being a market maker is a terrible business to be in! when there's skewed demand on either the buy or sell side, it hurts liquidity providers who get stuck with inventory that's rapidly losing value. it'd be interesting to consider subsidization models that support market makers when conditions skew.

I assume the algorithm can take into account a 4th factor - buy/sell order imbalances - to reward market makers more for placing orders on the weak side of the book.  So 4 factors now include:

1. order size
2. time on book
3. proximity to best bid/ask
4. strong/weak side of book

Thoughts about coding this @abit, @xeroc?

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