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Messages - tbone

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1
1. Createing bitAssets with a margin position takes some risk
2. You can decrease the reserve pool spending by voting for the refund workers
3. We should introduce a margin call fee (0.1-0.2%) to increase income
4. We should also increase the costs for make/take an order to increase income
5. The committee could raise the network cut from fees from 20% to ... erm .. 80%

I've always liked the idea of raising the network's share of fees. However, 80% might be too much. How about 40% or maybe 50%?

2
I don't think fee adjustments need to be done according to an arbitrary schedule.  I think it should depend on price fluctuation, e.g. if BTS:USD changes by 10-15%.  Of course, ultimately such fee adjustments should be automated.  Speaking of which, here is some discussion on github:

https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/48

3
YOYOW / Re: Cannot withdraw YOYOW
« on: September 05, 2017, 11:36:51 am »
Has anyone successfully withdrawn YOYOW from ICO365 to myetherwallet?  I did a test withdrawal almost 2 days ago and ICO365 UI says it was successful but it's not showing up in my Ethereum wallet or in the blockchain explorer.  I don't see YOYOW in the list of ERC20 tokens, so maybe it's necessary to add a custom token in order to see it in the wallet?  Any help would be appreciated.  Thanks.  @ripplexiaoshan

4
Traders often place orders outside the spread (i.e. buy orders above the best offer, or sell orders below the best bid).  The expectation is that the order matching engine will walk the order book sequentially until the order is filled.  This is how the trading engine of every platform I have ever seen works. 

However, this does not work on the DEX as expected under one particular condition.  It appears that when there is a margin call order on the book and the user places an order with the same price, the order matching engine matches the user's order with the margin call order, completely skipping the orders on the book that are inside the margin call order. 

This issue was discovered by @alexpmorris, who posted about it on steemit.com, which sparked some discussion:

http://bit.ly/2tKiDfb


The ability to place orders outside the spread is particularly necessary in cryptocurrency trading, where the quantity of tokens available at the best bid or best ask is so often less than the quantity a trader is interested in buying or selling.  In the vast majority of cases, the DEX handles such orders as expected.  But this edge case could cause people to lose confidence in the platform and should therefore be corrected ASAP.

P.S.  I understand there are several fixes queued up for the next hard fork.  Does anyone know when that is expected to happen?  If it's not soon, perhaps a temporary fix should be made in the UI pending the next hard fork containing this fix?

5
General Discussion / Re: BlockPay in Serious Trouble
« on: May 24, 2017, 02:56:08 pm »
I got tired of wondering what's going on with stealth, so I asked @kenCode what the deal is and he said his team resumed work on it some time ago and the public testnet is probably less than a month away.  That was really great to hear! 

Not to mention, apparently libsnark has been replaced by Confidential Assets (CA).  This is fantastic because with CA, transactions are much faster than with libsnark (which apparently slow down transactions by at least 40 seconds).  Also, with CA there is no "trusted setup" issue like zcash and other libsnark implementations have.  Anyone who has followed the "trusted setup" controversy even a little bit knows that it's a big deal.  So this is a very positive development for Bitshares!

https://blockstream.com/2017/04/03/blockstream-releases-elements-confidential-assets.html

6
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: Tool / website: Bitshares Witness Log
« on: May 02, 2017, 11:33:33 pm »
@roelandp, this is really excellent work!  A tool like this has been sorely needed.  There was a nice discussion a while back about what features would be useful for such a tool. I can't find it right now, but beyond what you've done so far, some of the ideas I can remember included monitoring latency and uptime (which you may have in the works already), measuring server processor speed and memory, and there was discussion about combining all of the various factors into a score.  And finally, there was talk about creating some charts in order to help visual the data.  I hope this gives you some ideas to continue taking this excellent tool forward!

7
You need to try margin trading at other exchanges to see how screwed is bitshares shorting. I tried shorting at poloniex last night, and now very regret that I did not try this earlier, because it makes so much more sense than shorting in BTS. At poloniex, you deposit 1 BTC, and this allows you to short 2.5 BTC worth of any assets by simply placing sell orders. When your order is filled, BTC which you got from short selling, is added to your initial deposit to back up the debt which you just created. You settle your debt by simply placing a buy order. When it is filled, your collateral is transferred to other party and your debt is settled. This is how margin trading is actually supposed to work. You deposit only 40% collateral upfront, but your position is 140% collateralized.

The guys who coded shorting in BTS clearly had no clue what are they doing. To issue bitAsset, we need to deposit a double collateral upfront, and to settle the debt we need to deposit 100% on top of double collateral. This is ridiculous and defeats the whole purpose of margin trading, which is to trade large amount with small funds. MPA is a very nice concept, which is buried under flawed implementation. Shorting is a central piece of BTS monetary system, but it is totally screwed. This has to be fixed ASAP. BTS shareholders should hire somebody who has expertise in developing trading software, pay them well through worker and let them fix shorting and all other flaws. Before this is done, don't dream about mass adoption, because other exchanges offer much cleaner products.

What a strange thread.  First of all, leverage with Poloniex is based on p2p lending.  Bitshares could offer this feature via a bond market, which has been proposed and discussed in the past but never implemented due to lack of consensus on whether and how it should be funded.  Were you not paying attention?   

Also, even if Bitshares had a bond market for leverage, that is a totally different feature than shorting on Bitshares, which is designed for the purpose of creating bitAssets.  So why are you comparing "margin trading at other exchanges to...Bitshares shorting"?  LOL.   Obviously these are 2 completely different things, each with utterly different purposes. 

Finally, in your apples to zebras comparison, you've also managed to oversimplify the process of using margin on Poloiniex.  For example, you failed to mention that you have to move funds into a special margin account, where the funds will be totally segregated from your other funds.  And once you have a margin position, the only way to get off margin is to close the position (and move funds back to the regular trading account if you just want to trade without margin).  This is far more complicated than it needs to be.  With a traditional brokerage, for example, there's no separate margin account.  Simply buying more assets than you have enough fiat funds to cover (i.e. causing your collateral ratio to go below 100%) automatically puts you on margin.  To get off margin, you just bring your collateral ratio back to 100% or more by simply closing some or all of any position(s), or by adding more fiat, or both.   

In any event, there's one thing I kind of agree with you on.  On the DEX it would be nice if your collateral ratio was calculated based on all short positions combined, not individually.  That would be easier to manage.  But doing it that way is not a total no-brainer because I can see how some people would prefer to manage collateral separately for each asset.  I imagine users could be given the choice of managing collateral combined or separately.  Another thing to consider, though, is that combined collateral would introduce some complexity when it comes to forced settlement of least collateralized positions.  Although I'm sure that could be worked out.

8
General Discussion / Re: Force Settlement Insurance
« on: April 12, 2017, 05:29:49 pm »

Couldn't we offer shorters an insurance option? For x% of collateral a day if they get forced settled it would be at the minimum 1.75 margin. This insurance could be used to interest to bitasset holders.

I think this is a GREAT idea.  More sophisticated shorters (i.e. true market makers) are able to hedge themselves on external markets.  Less sophisticated shorters (mostly ordinary traders) are not able to hedge themselves.   Your idea can gives such market participants the protection they need to more confidently short bitAssets into existence.

This idea should be seriously considered for the supply side of the equation.  However, the far bigger problem is the demand side.  And at least initially, I seriously doubt this idea will generate nearly enough fees to incentivize the kind of demand we currently need for bitAssets if we want Bitshares to do anything more than continue limping along.  So an idea like this should be done in conjunction with (or after) implementing a solution for the demand side.

For the demand side solution, see this thread:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php/topic,23981.msg304518.html#msg304518

9
I mean the balance between shorters and longers are dynamic,
you can't give a simple rule to encourage shorter or longer
but the free market have already give the best direct to keep the balance.
when you see the bid price of CNY/BTS market is much high than others, it means we need encourage CNY  holders, you sell BTS for CNY then you get profit.
when you see the ask price of SILVER/BTS market is much lower than others, it means we need encourage SILVER shorters, you borrow SILVER, sell for BTS, then you get profit.
if you want to get rid of the price change risk of BTS, you just need to borrow CNY and SILVER, sell SILVER for CNY, arbit bot will take your order, and you will get your profit.

be a market maker, keep the balance, increase the liquid, you create value for Bitshares, and you get profit. this is the right way.

Yes, the market will always find a balance.  That's my point.  If the demand increases, then the supply will increase to meet it.  Why?  Because it's profitable for suppliers to do so.  @bitcrab is ready to supply more bitUSD, but he has said there is not enough demand.  So let's increase the demand by giving people more reasons to want bitAssets (esp. bitUSD and bitCNY to start)! 

For now that means offering an interest rate better than any bank (the interest rate can be reduced over time as bitAssets become more useful in commerce and natural demand increases).  Then supply will increase to meet this increased demand and find the balance.  With more users wanting to get in and out of bitAssets, there will be more opportunities for suppliers (market makers), and more opportunities for ordinary traders as well. 

Supply will definitely rise, but if it does not meet demand fast enough (which is a GREAT problem to have), then we can always offer some liquidity rewards with perhaps 5-10% of fees (coming from all the extra funds going back to the network).  These are the kinds of things we need to be doing, not just sitting around hoping something will happen. We have to MAKE it happen.

Either people here will understand this and we'll make the necessary adjustments so Bitshares can flourish.  Or we won't and Bitshares can just continue limping along.  We have a choice here.  Are we going to be winners or losers?  Now is the time to decide once and for all.

10
bitAssets represent the primary value proposition of Bitshares.  Increased demand for bitAssets will attract more liquidity providers.  More liquidity will attract more traders.  And so on.  This positive feedback loop would be accompanied by a rising price of BTS. 

So what is the missing ingredient?  Duh, it's demand for bitAssets!  We have a golden opportunity to fix this problem.  I don't know why people are having such a hard time understanding this.   But we better figure it out soon, otherwise we should just give up. 

11
let me know if  I'm misunderstanding
I thought you are talking about attract more users with something like earn easy money.
you think this is huge, even want to change many rules.

my point is there is no  easy money totally,
we have profit as a DEX, but I don't think it's a good idea to wast these money attract some fake user.
I have no interesting in this easy money trick

if you are talking about something like adjust balance for the shorters and longers, it should be another thread.
bank have many real business to pay the divident.
where is the business based bitshares?
I believe we'll get divident too after we have some real business.
pay divident is the result, not the reason.

In fact I feel sick for the "+5%"
this title make Bitshares looks like a scam
I wish never see this title in the official site.

@alt, what's wrong with paying a rate of return to bitAsset holders?  Banks have traditionally offered interest on savings accounts.  And in crypto, chains like DASH, NEM, PIVX, and others enable users to get a return on their holdings.  There's nothing scammy about it!

Also, Bitshares used to pay an interest rate of return and had $1M+ bitUSD in circulation.  Now we pay no such interest and have just $100k bitUSD in circulation.  Is this just a coincidence?

Finally, as you know, currently the network gets 20% of collected fees.  This proposal wants to raise that to 50%.  Don't you love that?  You should.  You should love this whole proposal.

We are talking about paying the dividends by using a percentage of the fees collected.  Those are fees that users paid for utilizing the services offered by bitshares.  This is not real business being conducted?  This is not value created by bitshares?

No, please tell me if *I* am misunderstanding.  Are you saying that people who buy bitAssets are "fake users"?  Maybe you should let @bitcrab know about this.  After all, his transwiser business depends on demand for bitAssets.  Without such demand, he has no business.  And we know that demand is much lower now than it was in the past when bitAsset holders were able to earn a rate of return on their holdings.

So tell me, do you want bitcrab's transwiser business to have customers?  What about other shorters and traders in general?  Do you want an active market for bitAssets where a large number of users means there is always market activity because then, aside from the traders, there will always be someone looking to put some money into bitAssets...and there will always be someone looking to take money out?  There is no point in having bitAsset order books just so traders can trade back and forth with each other if there is no real use case for the asset they are trading.  Now THAT would be fake users!

So tell me, what is wrong with offering a better interest rate to people who store some money in bitUSD instead of in the bank?  It is very early in the game for cryptocurrencies right now.  To attract regular people, we need to give some extra incentive. In the future, it may not be necessary.  But at this point, it IS necessary.  This is just smart business.

Lastly, no one is talking about "changing many rules".  We are only talking about shifting a portion of the income that currently goes to the referral program (see below).  This enables us to: 1) replenish the reserve pool 2.5x faster, 2) drive much more demand for bitAssets, and 3) make the referral program more effective by rewarding LTM accounts.  This would be a huge win for all parties involved, and would be extremely bullish for BTS.



Current fee allocation:
20% -- network
80% -- referral

Proposed fee allocation:
50% -- network
20% -- referral program
20% -- interest to bitAsset holders
10% -- dividend to LTM accounts

12
If you put $10 from one of your pockets to another one, how much do you owe at the end?

You can technically borrow whatever on DEX, but until you give away or sell whatever you borrowed, you are not in short position and you debt is zero. By allowing yield harvesting you are not going to increase liquidity.

Bob borrows $10 from Alice.  Then Bob moves it from right pocket to left pocket.  It changes nothing.  Bob still owes Alice $10.

You are confused here.  The problem is that people can short to themselves by just setting up another account.  What does that accomplish that is worth paying for?  This is a widely understood issue that people have dubbed "yield harvesting".

No, I'm not confused here.  The blockchain tracks collateral-to-debt ratio.  This is not a problem if dividend is sent only to those with current debt and not holders.  If dividend was to shorters and holders then yes, I see the problem.

Trust me, you're confused.  The point of paying shorters would be to incentivize them to provide liquidity.  In other words, we want them to borrow bitAssets and short sell them to someone else who wants/needs to buy them.  That is useful activity and is worth rewarding.  But if that person just shorts the bitAssets to himself in another account, then that is NOT useful activity and should not be rewarded.  That is the definition of "yield harvesting".  There is no way we can know if someone is legitimately shorting to other market participants, or just yield harvesting.  That is why we can't reward bitAsset short positions.  Please stop insisting otherwise.

Anyway, I'm shelving the idea in favor of the simpler "market fee revenue to holders" I outlined above.

What you're describing is not simpler.  You keep talking about market fees vs. transaction fees, as if we should be directing one type of fee for one purpose, and another type of fee for another purpose.  Right now we have general income from fees paid, period.  That income is split 80/20 between the referral program and the network.  We're talking about shifting a portion of that income currently going to the referral program in order to 1) replenish the reserve pool 2.5x faster, 2) drive demand for bitAssets by paying interest, 3) reward LTM accounts with a dividend. 

Another thing.  You keep saying you prefer "market fee distribution" because there is "no need to convert BTS to bitAsset for dividend payment."  Again, your idea of separate "market fee distribution" and "transaction fee distribution" is overly complicated.  Also, no one is talking about converting BTS to bitAssets.  You are either confused with some other proposal on another thread. Or you are intentionally confusing matters. 

13
Quote
And I honestly don't see why it can't be paid only to shorters (collateralized positions, only those who have current debt).  The 'yield-harvesting' "problem" mentioned above would not seem to apply if dividends are paid only to those with current debt.

The 'yield-harvesting' "problem" mentioned above does seem to apply, because there is no way to know who actually have current debt and who shorted to themselves.

Can you explain this?  It is my understanding that the blockchain retains a collateral-to-debt ratio per account and is enforced at a blockchain protocol level -- so this (debt portion) is the metric I'd choose.  How could someone short to themselves?


Someone can borrow bitUSD and send it to his other account. He is not in debt in this case and he shorts nothing on the market, but he is eligible for receiving yield. And you can't tell if someone is a legit shorter or a yield harvester just by looking at account debt, because you don't know who owns which account.

Um, no.  You can't erase your debt just by sending bitUSD to another account.  The debt remains on the original account.  The second account now holds bitUSD with no debt.  This argument makes no sense.

You are confused here.  The problem is that people can short to themselves by just setting up another account.  What does that accomplish that is worth paying for?  This is a widely understood issue that people have dubbed "yield harvesting". 

14
bank have many real business to pay the divident.
where is the business based bitshares?
I believe we'll get divident too after we have some real business.
pay divident is the result, not the reason.

In fact I feel sick for the "+5%"
this title make Bitshares looks like a scam
I wish never see this title in the official site.

@alt, what's wrong with paying a rate of return to bitAsset holders?  Banks have traditionally offered interest on savings accounts.  And in crypto, chains like DASH, NEM, PIVX, and others enable users to get a return on their holdings.  There's nothing scammy about it!

Also, Bitshares used to pay an interest rate of return and had $1M+ bitUSD in circulation.  Now we pay no such interest and have just $100k bitUSD in circulation.  Is this just a coincidence?

Finally, as you know, currently the network gets 20% of collected fees.  This proposal wants to raise that to 50%.  Don't you love that?  You should.  You should love this whole proposal.

We are talking about paying the dividends by using a percentage of the fees collected.  Those are fees that users paid for utilizing the services offered by bitshares.  This is not real business being conducted?  This is not value created by bitshares? 


15
In fact I feel sick for the "+5%"
this title make Bitshares looks like a scam
I wish never see this title in the official site.

@alt, what's wrong with paying a rate of return to bitAsset holders?  Banks have traditionally offered interest on savings accounts.  And in crypto, chains like DASH, NEM, PIVX, and others enable users to get a return on their holdings.  There's nothing scammy about it!

Also, Bitshares used to pay an interest rate of return and had $1M+ bitUSD in circulation.  Now we pay no such interest and have just $100k bitUSD in circulation.  Is this just a coincidence?

Finally, as you know, currently the network gets 20% of collected fees.  This proposal wants to raise that to 50%.  Don't you love that?  You should.  You should love this whole proposal.

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