I never understand these things at first but today we have the problem that shorts don't want to create BitUSD at 1-1 and demand a huge premium because BTS price expectations are neutral to negative and they can be force settled/margin called pretty easily.
This solution seems to require equal/more collateral from BitUSD creators, so the problem will remain/be exasperbated and very little BitUSD will be created?
I do not claim this proposal to be perfect. It just solves (well seems to solve) a bunch of issues and delivers improvements on several fronts. Until it is implemented it will remain just a theory [and as you might know there are people that use the "It is just a theory" and not a 'fact' argument even against Darwinism].
Besides the things already mentioned in the OP:
- It removes the BTS from the centralized exchanges. Something arguably very desirable.
- It moves
all the BTS trading in the DEX... this might not be the 40,000 BTC a day trading volume ETH has, but is a great start for the DEX
- The fee structure and bitUSD being the 'core/fee token' aims at among other things increasing the bitUSD in existence (and so arguably liquidity). How?
Let's say on day one bitUSD still trades with 7% premium (which is misnomer in this system as I explained earlier), but let's say that a person thinks BTS should be 7% higher right now. So instead of buying 50 bitUSD in the market, he issues 50 bitUSD to himself (using his 1/2 mill in BTS account, puts 17x collateral behind his 50 bitUSD borrowed!!!) and buys the name "Empirical888" for his token. The fee to create this asset, must be paid in bitUSD, so 50 bitUSD fee is collected by the system. 30 days later this 50 bitUSD (and all other fees all in bitUSD) are spread to all BTS holders as dividend.
Results: not only bitUSD creation is encouraged and more bitUSD start circulating in the system, but most importantly a use case for bitUSD is created (other then hedging against BTS price drops).