So, you are essentially proposing to feed back the internal trading price of BTS in the DEX.

So, lets say we have a CEX price (some price derived from external trading) and the DEX price (the price internally).

Ideally, both prices are 'close' to each other but apparently, arbitrage isnt as efficient as it should. PLUS bitassets have a premium in bear markets (which is btw known to happen for years).

The hope was that when volume grows, the premium may go down, but apparently, the incentives of shorters are not sufficiently aligned for traders to sell into margin calls at 10% mssr, hence the premium in bear markets.

The only thing that i think might offset this is to 'tune' the price feed in (external) bear  markets to make margin calls execute at the external price. Hence the price feed would need to take dex liquidity into account and be tuned by up to MSSR or 10%.

That way, in bear markets the price feed could be up to 10% away from fair price but margin calls would execute up to the external price.

As a consequence, we will see the entire market shifted by 10% but the margin calls execute at the external price instead of 10% above external price.

This may well work for bear markets BUT as usual, this only shifts the problem because now we add an extra 10% "artificial" buffer for black swans. Consequence would be that bitassets (considering the external price of bts could be undercollateralized BEFORE the internal price feed actually triggers it).

There is one thing to consider though, a bitasset goes into black swan when the least collateralized position goes into 100% collateral ratio AND NOT if the total collateralization goes into 100%. That said, even if there is a black swan on USD, the longs are still collateralized by (potentially much) more than 100%.

This might well be worth experimenting with, but it needs proper specification, limits and IMHO it should be a timely limited experiment.

Thank you for changing the tone of your posts.

Another update:
I just voted for the Trusty community wallet worker: 1.14.117

They have provided quite some cool product already and have proven themselves before even asking for compensation!

Couple things today:

1.)
Voted for witness btspp-witness: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26903.new#new

2.)
A rather long topic: CNY MSSR.
TL;DR; I removed my vote from gdex-witness, magicwallet.witness, and witness.yao.

I'd like to go a little into the details here: Certainly I would like this move to be temporary. The people behind those witnesses are good people and they are constantly delivering!
It is important to me to acknowledge the fact that it took me a day to come to a conclusion on how to deal with this situation. Unfortunately, I have not seen proper
discussion around the change of MSSR prior to these witnesses changing the parameter. Even though I understand that these have much more experience with the CNY
market (they brought in the volume to begin with) and thus should be given some "freedom" to experiment with their asset, I would have preferred to use current market conditions
to improve the governance system by establishing some processes instead of going forward with only a part of the community. The english speaking part of the community hasn't
been given notice and thus wasn't able to contribute to this rather important discussions - we are all sitting in the same boat.
Those wanting to look deeper into the topic should read through here: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26928.0;all

I'd like to emphasis again that I would love to put back the votes for those witnesses as they are delivering excellent work to the entire community. Let's learn how to deal with this together!

It may be worthwhile adding a "code of conduct" to the bitshares-ui repo just to have something there that you can argue *with*

I am glad to see we finally have a discussion.

1. Charge the mortgagor Margin Called（mandatory liquidation）deal  fees, charge 5% or higher
2. Change the MSSR to 105%
4. Change the collateral ratio to two parts: Margin Call ratio（175%）and Maintenance collateral ratio(185%or180%).

IF want to change the MSSR to 105%, must have 1 or 4, can't separate!!!

And the time is not the good chance to change the MSSR, must wait the market turnning to good!!!

What makes you believe those settings are objectively good and *balanced*?
I am not sure what point 4) does, there only is a maintenance ratio and a short squeeze ratio. Never heard of a margin call ratio ..

witness.yao
delegate.freedom
magicwallet.witness

Please change back to 110%, must wait the market turnning to good!!!

This, allthough my reasons is that they changed the MSSR without broader discussion (at least in the rest of the world).
A simple BSIP could be enought to let people know about the conclusions made in discussions!

for example, if many witnesses adopt "the highest price" model, and at one moment in one referenced exchange some unusual event happen and provide wrongly too high price that do not reflect the market status, how should the witnesses handle this? directly adopt the price will bring a disaster, I think witness need to have some logic, such as "if one exchange price is 20% higher than the average, give up it" , to filter out this kind of price.

Most witnesses have a fail-safe that does not push prices that are outside boundaries .. a price fall of 5% or more within 5 minutes must be manually confirmed.

Other strategies could well be to tune a price feed script to filter our "misbehaving" exchanges (outliners), but that's up to the witnesses to implement.

What we have seen recently was not an outliner but general market sentiment.

First of all, users who have been trading in the bitCNY market can notice a phenomenon: bitCNY is basically not a premium in the BTS uptrend, and basically has a premium of about 10% in the downtrend.

That is *EXPECTED* behavior. Nothing new. It was even mentioned in the original bitshares whitepaper!

And because bitCNY can be freely exchanged with Fiat CNY (legal currency) through the acceptance service provided by MagicWallet (the exchange rate is dynamic and market-oriented), bitCNY becomes the channel for Fiat CNY (RMB in bank account) to enter and exit DEX, and The exchange rate is basically linked to the premium of bitCNY: when the premium is about 10%, the Deposit fee is about 10%, and the Withdrawal fee is about -10%.

Erm, excuse my ignorance, but why do you figure this out only now?! We've been telling people for years that this is one of the major problems of
bitassets and that a market that trades a bitasset against its underlying asset will experience **EXACTLY** what you are describing now.

Why is there a long-term premium of 10% in the downtrend? Not 5%, 15%? A very likely reason is that because the Maximum short squeeze ratio (MSSR) = 1.1, the BTS that is forced to close the position will sell at 10% off (10% below the market price), so the market price of the BTS When falling, buyers can foresee that once the market price declines will trigger a large number of mortgages to be forced to close the position, and the auction BTS is 10% cheaper than the market price, then you will buy at the market price or 10 % off (10% cheaper) price to place an order and wait? As a result, the buying price will gradually retreat, starting at 1% off the market price (on the BTS price of the central exchange), then 2% off to 5% off, 10% off or even 12% off , 15% off. At this time, in the MagicWallet acceptance platform, bitCNY's deposit and withdrawal fees are also linked.

That's accurate! And that is why liquidity will narrow down that premium. However, you need more market participants to obtain sufficiently closed peg. Fortunately, bitCNY is more liquid than others
and is probably the first and only bitasset for which such as discussion makes sense.

Second, adjusting the MSSR (Maximum short squeeze ratio) from 1.1 to 1.05 may be an experiment that can be tried. We can use this to observe for a period of time, and see if the premium (the deposit and withdrawal fee) that is maintained at around 10% for a long time will be reduced to about 5%. If this is the case, MSSR will be a tunable tool for responding flexibly to market trends: in the downtrend, it can be adjusted to 1.05, 1.02, 1.005, 1.001 or even 1.0, and in the uptrend, if necessary ( For example, when the bull market is crazy, it can be adjusted to 1.1 or even 1.2, 1.3, or even 1.5 to combat aggressive high-leverage mortgages, so that the system leverage is not too high.

Agreed

In addition, I recommend that the Force settlement offset of SmartCoins, which is controlled by the commit-account, should be used as a combination tool with the MSSR: the high-leverage mortgage will become more aggressive after the MSSR is lowered. This further pushes up the system leverage. However, if we adjust the Force settlement offset of SmartCoins from 5% or 2% to 0% or even -1%, we can use the power of the free market to combat mortgages with too high leverage: Encourage Those who want to buy a large number of BTSs at market prices buy BTS by initiating Force settlement – ​​Margin positions with the lowest mortgage rate will be forced to settle at market prices one by one.

-1% is not possible, technically.
There has been many voices that request settlement offset to be reduced to 1% again.