Is it a good idea to lower MSSR of bitCNY from 1.1 to 1.05 or even lower?

[zhouxiaobao]

This suggestion is very good!

[fav]

BSIP drafted: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/97

I suggest big proxies who unvoted the witnesses that has already changed MSSR now revote them, witnesses who plan to change MSSR now stop and wait, let's discuss sufficiently under peaceful atmosphere to reach consensus first.

thanks!

[xeroc]

BSIP drafted: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/97

I suggest big proxies who unvoted the witnesses that has already changed MSSR now revote them, witnesses who plan to change MSSR now stop and wait, let's discuss sufficiently under peaceful atmosphere to reach consensus first.

Thank you VERY much. I believe this is the right way to go and address all pros and cons.

I would also like to thank everybody in here for participating and providing valuable inside that hopefully leads to resolving that issue to the better of the entire community.

I'll revote as soon as i get to a desk, acknowledging the fact the communities are starting to work together.

Thank you!!

[bitcrab]

BSIP drafted: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/97

I suggest big proxies who unvoted the witnesses that has already changed MSSR now revote them, witnesses who plan to change MSSR now stop and wait, let's discuss sufficiently under peaceful atmosphere to reach consensus first.

[Yao]

margin call is not bad or good, it will always happen, no use to blame bitCNY shorters who prefer being margin called, they have their risk and they provide liquidity.

I agree that the margin call as such is neither good nor bad. It is, however, an indication of a bad (read: dangerous) situation, i. e. short positions without sufficient collateral, which increases the likelyhood of a black swan.

The health of the system depends on shorters providing sufficient collateral. In bitCNY, shorters don't do that. They prefer being margin called. They even deliberately try to keep the collateral as low as possible ......

In the past year or so, if you take REAL MONEY to participate in the BTS:bitCNY market, you will find that this is the real market, isn't it? This is the result of full competition in the market under the existing mechanism of SmartCoins. Each participant is a real sample, each market participant truly shows their intentions in the market. The market is chasing interests, as long as they are profitable, they will make the actions that they think are most beneficial. The market is not as static as it was written in the white paper.

I have been a participant in the BTS:bitCNY market since 2016 and are also a bitCNY shorter. From the bear market to the bull market (2014~2017), and then from the bull market to the bear market (2017 to the present), I used REAL MONEY to participate, trade and short.

In the past year or so, the Chinese community has been committed to increasing the supply of bitCNY, so that it can be widely used as the exchange's withdrawal and deposit method like USDT.

Over the past year, on the battlefield of bitCNY, we took REAL MONEY enters the market, and the SmartCoins (bitCNY) mechanism is tested adequately by the market (BTS:bitCNY). We have discovered and summarized some market laws, so we have the proposal to try to change the parameters and test it by action. I admit that it is reckless to take action without consulting the non-Chinese community. So witness.yao changed MSSR back to 1.1 and waiting for consensus.

[gghi]

        目前的问题就是bitcny的需求没有有效的传递到喂价，我们的喂价仅仅采集了交易所的价格而已，不是交易所控制了喂价，而是我们没有根据bitcny的需求及时确定合理的喂价。喂价应该是反映出合理的BTS的价格，然而目前的喂价明显很低。


      The problem is that the demand for bitcny is not effectively transmitted to the feed price. Our feed price only collects the price of the exchange. It is not that the exchange controls the feed price, but that we do not determine the reasonable feed price according to the demand of bitcny in time. The price should reflect the reasonable price of BTS, but the current price is obviously low.

[pluswave]

So now magicwallet.witness is voted out as a backup witness, we can see that many stakeholders or big proxy are against this operation but not discussed here.

we just changed back to MSR of CNY to 1.1 and wait for broader consensus.

[xeroc]

.... perhaps because only the least collateralized positions can profit from the 5% settlement offset.

IMO this is an indication of a very unhealthy situation. The settlement offset is an incentive for shorters to keep their collateral as low as possible, and the current MSSR isn't sufficient incentive for providing enough collateral. Your suggestion increases the likelyhood of a black swan, as you correctly pointed out above.

So you are saying that the premium in bitCNY could well be the result of unaligned incentives with respect to MSSR and settlement offset.
Good call, need to think about this...

[bitcrab]

I agree that the margin call as such is neither good nor bad. It is, however, an indication of a bad (read: dangerous) situation, i. e. short positions without sufficient collateral, which increases the likelyhood of a black swan.

The health of the system depends on shorters providing sufficient collateral. In bitCNY, shorters don't do that. They prefer being margin called. They even deliberately try to keep the collateral as low as possible, perhaps because only the least collateralized positions can profit from the 5% settlement offset.

IMO this is an indication of a very unhealthy situation. The settlement offset is an incentive for shorters to keep their collateral as low as possible, and the current MSSR isn't sufficient incentive for providing enough collateral. Your suggestion increases the likelyhood of a black swan, as you correctly pointed out above.

the "just 1.75" debt position is not relevant to 5% force settlement, as the latter seldom happen and are always in very little quantity.

they have their own logic, the logic is that "to be margin called as early as possible", this is one kind of policy of "stop loss", this logic does not always works well, some time they lose because of this.

anyway, they do not do harm to the system, actually they provide more liquidity. so just let them play like this if they like. in bitUSD market there is no such players, do you think bitUSD market more healthy than bitCNY market?

it's hard or impossible to tell what collateral is enough, when the market price is 1.05CNY do you think it enough to set the margin call price = 0.67?

maybe it's safe enough to set call price=0.2, but what sense does this make?

increasing MSSR really increase the likelihood of black swan, however at the same time it lower the shorting incentive, we need a balance here. for bitCNY thanks to the help of target CR and good market depth, I feel bitCNY has very very little chance to reach black swan even with MSSR = 1.05. I hope we can try this after sufficient discussion.
 

 

[pc]

MSSR is an important parameter here, it determine the gap between margin call price and the margin call order sell price, and will impact the behavior of different roles.

the higher the MSSR, the bigger the gap, the easier the margin call order will be eaten, but at the same time, the higher profit of shorting and the bigger the shorting incentive.

the lower the MSSR, the smaller the gap, more difficult the margin call order will be eaten, however at the same time, the lower the profit of shorting and the smaller the shorting incentive.

I'm glad to see that we agree about the mechanisms.

margin call is not bad or good, it will always happen, no use to blame bitCNY shorters who prefer being margin called, they have their risk and they provide liquidity.

I agree that the margin call as such is neither good nor bad. It is, however, an indication of a bad (read: dangerous) situation, i. e. short positions without sufficient collateral, which increases the likelyhood of a black swan.

The health of the system depends on shorters providing sufficient collateral. In bitCNY, shorters don't do that. They prefer being margin called. They even deliberately try to keep the collateral as low as possible, perhaps because only the least collateralized positions can profit from the 5% settlement offset.

IMO this is an indication of a very unhealthy situation. The settlement offset is an incentive for shorters to keep their collateral as low as possible, and the current MSSR isn't sufficient incentive for providing enough collateral. Your suggestion increases the likelyhood of a black swan, as you correctly pointed out above.

[bitcrab]

MSSR has one specific purpose: to incentivize shorters to avoid being margin called (or rather to punish them if they are). Margin calls are bad for the health of our smartcoins and should be avoided. Shorters are expected to actively manage their positions so they are *not* margin called.

It is clear, IMO, that bitCNY shorters are doing a very bad job here. As can be seen here (https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/asset/CNY ), most shorters make use of the recently introduced target_collateral_ratio to keep their collateral at the bare minimum. Obviously, they *prefer* being margin called. At the same time, they are *rewarded* from the settlement offset of 5% everytime someone settles a long position!

The logical conclusion is that the MSSR must be increased so its original purpose is fulfilled.


*Once again*, while BTS is in a downtrend, certain people come up with creative ideas to protect their own interests. So tired of this.

margin call is not bad or good, it will always happen, no use to blame bitCNY shorters who prefer being margin called, they have their risk and they provide liquidity.

in current condition it's clear one should not do force settlement, to just buy is obviously cheaper.

from the perspective of the whole system, the rules need to guarantee the risk being released in time and the BTS longers being encouraged enough.

Yes, while BTS is in a downtrend, I always think a lot on how to protect the interests of BTS longers, I feel this is  a BTS committee members' responsibility.

[gghi]

锚定不成功主要表现为bitCNY的短缺和过剩，其实感觉跟这些参数关系不大，原因在于bitCNY的市场需求和BTS价格没有直接的决定关系，需求无法有效传导给供应。

BSIP38等改动意义很大，可以很有效地降低出现黑天鹅的风险，但对于调节bitCNY供给来说，个人认为还是要靠公开市场操作这样的方式。

这两个参数虽然是BM拍脑袋得出，但个人觉得还算比较合理，不象当初40BTS的转账费用，以及0清算补偿那样明显不合理。

如果改怎么改呢？比如现在的价格下，把1.75改为1.5？虽然增加了供应量，但也增大了黑天鹅的风险吧？不一定是个好主意。

       巨蟹的认识很清楚，锚定偏差很大的确不是这些参数决定的。主要还是bitcny的市场需求和bts 的价格之间脱节了。应该是bitcny需求大，那么喂价随之升高才对。bitcny过剩那么喂价降低才合理。应该随着bitcny 的需求动态调整喂价的价格才是根本解决办法。bitcny的市场需求目前从鼓鼓的充值费看的比较清楚，所以鼓鼓给我们提供了bitcny的供求状况。那么我们应该参照鼓鼓的充值费率来动态调整喂价，是时候让喂价掌握在内盘系统手里了，不应该伸长脖子被外盘割了。

        靠巨蟹以及资金救市其实不是好办法，应该从机制上改变。只要让bitcny的需求和喂价之间联动，那么爆仓惩罚下调为20%，或者更高都行，做到无论牛熊锚定都很稳定。这样BTS就成功了。我的建议是只要鼓鼓充值费率为正值，那么就不断的抬高喂价，动态调整直到充值费为0而无法拉高为止。

        目前的问题应该是不合理的市场定价,从而导致了”喂价“不能很好的与bitcny需求联动。所以现在急需调整喂价，让喂价很好的反映出bitcny的需求。也就是根据bitcny的需求动态调整喂价，那么这些问题就迎刃而解了。智能货币bitcny的锚定人民币必将会更加精确，波动范围一定会很小很小。


     bitcrab  knows very well that anchoring bias is not really determined by these parameters. The main reason is that the market demand of bitcny is out of line with the price of BTS. It should be the demand of bitcny, so the price of the food is higher. Bitcny surplus, then the price reduction is reasonable. It is the fundamental solution to dynamically adjust the price of feed with the demand of bitcny. At present, the market demand of bitcny is clearly seen from the drum charge, so drum provides us with the supply and demand situation of bitcny. So we should adjust the price dynamically according to the drum charging rate. It's time for the price to be in the hands of the internal disc system. We shouldn't stretch our neck and be cut by the external disc.

Relying on cancer and capital saving is not a good way to change the mechanism. As long as there is a linkage between bitcny's demand and feeding prices, the penalty for bursting can be reduced to 20%, or higher, to be stable regardless of the bull-bear anchor. So BTS succeeded. My suggestion is that as long as the charging rate is positive, the feeding price will be raised continuously and adjusted dynamically until the charging rate is zero and can not be raised.

The current problem should be unreasonable market pricing, which leads to "feeding" not well linked to bitcny demand. Therefore, it is urgent to adjust the feed price so that the feed price can reflect the demand of bitcny very well. That is to say, according to the needs of bitcny, the price adjustment is dynamically adjusted. The anchor of the smart money bitcny will be more accurate and the fluctuation will be very small.

      参见  https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26315.0

[binggo]

MSSR has one specific purpose: to incentivize shorters to avoid being margin called (or rather to punish them if they are). Margin calls are bad for the health of our smartcoins and should be avoided. Shorters are expected to actively manage their positions so they are *not* margin called.

It is clear, IMO, that bitCNY shorters are doing a very bad job here. As can be seen here (https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/asset/CNY ), most shorters make use of the recently introduced target_collateral_ratio to keep their collateral at the bare minimum. Obviously, they *prefer* being margin called. At the same time, they are *rewarded* from the settlement offset of 5% everytime someone settles a long position!

The logical conclusion is that the MSSR must be increased so its original purpose is fulfilled.


*Once again*, while BTS is in a downtrend, certain people come up with creative ideas to protect their own interests. So tired of this.

very simple to solve the problem of keeping their collateral at the bare minimum.

1. Charge the mortgagor Margin Called（mandatory liquidation）deal  fees, charge 5% or higher

4. Change the collateral ratio to two parts: Margin Call ratio（175%）and Maintenance collateral ratio(185%or180%).

i don't want to explain why.

But Increased the MSSR is the worst idea, can't take any advantage to the bitasset.

110% MSSR was harming the system, i don't want to explain this too.

WHY?! WHY?! WHY?! EVERYONE WANT "BALANCE“， WHO GOT IT？

[pc]

MSSR has one specific purpose: to incentivize shorters to avoid being margin called (or rather to punish them if they are). Margin calls are bad for the health of our smartcoins and should be avoided. Shorters are expected to actively manage their positions so they are *not* margin called.

It is clear, IMO, that bitCNY shorters are doing a very bad job here. As can be seen here (https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/asset/CNY ), most shorters make use of the recently introduced target_collateral_ratio to keep their collateral at the bare minimum. Obviously, they *prefer* being margin called. At the same time, they are *rewarded* from the settlement offset of 5% everytime someone settles a long position!

The logical conclusion is that the MSSR must be increased so its original purpose is fulfilled.


*Once again*, while BTS is in a downtrend, certain people come up with creative ideas to protect their own interests. So tired of this.

[xeroc]

I can draft a BSIP, but seems a little strange...

Why strange? There are many informational BSIPs and BSIPs that merely show commonly used procedures. Not ever BSIP
must come with a hard fork. Also no need to have a worker voting for every BSIP (IMHO) ..

[xeroc]

I am glad to see we finally have a discussion.

1. Charge the mortgagor Margin Called（mandatory liquidation）deal  fees, charge 5% or higher
2. Change the MSSR to 105%
4. Change the collateral ratio to two parts: Margin Call ratio（175%）and Maintenance collateral ratio(185%or180%).

IF want to change the MSSR to 105%, must have 1 or 4, can't separate!!!

And the time is not the good chance to change the MSSR, must wait the market turnning to good!!!

What makes you believe those settings are objectively good and *balanced*?
I am not sure what point 4) does, there only is a maintenance ratio and a short squeeze ratio. Never heard of a margin call ratio ..

witness.yao
delegate.freedom
magicwallet.witness

Please change back to 110%, must wait the market turnning to good!!!

This, allthough my reasons is that they changed the MSSR without broader discussion (at least in the rest of the world).
A simple BSIP could be enought to let people know about the conclusions made in discussions!

[Yao]

Chinese community discussion about "bitCNY premium of up to 10% leads to poor user deposit experience(The deposit fee is too high and Fiat CNY is not willing to enter to DEX.)" and "10% off sell BTS has led to a chain of mandatory closed positions" for a long time, abit posted an ideas  on April 16, 2018: dynamic adjustment of maintenance collateral ratio and Maximum short squeeze ratio.

See the topic post by @abit :https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26315.0 using Google Translate.

and this topic：https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26762.msg319760#msg319760

[binggo]

1. Charge the mortgagor Margin Called（mandatory liquidation）deal  fees, charge 5% or higher
2. Change the MSSR to 105%
4. Change the collateral ratio to two parts: Margin Call ratio（175%）and Maintenance collateral ratio(185%or180%).

IF want to change the MSSR to 105%, must have 1 or 4, can't separate!!!

And the time is not the good chance to change the MSSR, must wait the market turnning to good!!!

witness.yao
delegate.freedom
magicwallet.witness

Please change back to 110%, must wait the market turnning to good!!!

If the market weight of BITUSD is large, the BITUSD MSSR must be changed too.
 

[Yao]

Sorry for so quick changing from 1.1 to 1.05 without any statements here. Yes magicwallet  suggested to have change MSSR in wechat witness group days ago, but MSSR is unlike price feed itself,   it has a long time consensus for most bitAssets (which is 1.1).  we should discuss more and make a scheduled change statement. For now, it happened and react to the opinion of magicwallet, we just leave it as is until next change (this time make a statement before changing back or any other number). If we can agree on make a test for some time (i.e 3 m),
at the end of the test, will also make our opinion public available before action.

In fact, we have been discussing the parameters of MSSR in "BTS witness internal discussion" WeChat Group 8 months ago.

Here is the screenshot of the discussion:
https://steemit.com/bitshares/@imyao/bts-witness-wechat-talked-about-mssr-from-2017-12-29

In the past eight months, I have repeatedly expressed opinions on this issue in the group. @bitcrab finally posted this post to face this problem, I have already been eager to try.

Of course, I am too hasty, but the users of the Chinese community have complained about the high premium of bitCNY for more than a year. Why not try to do an experiment?

[bitcrab]

actually China community has discussed this topic a lot, it's not a very new idea. witnesses like magicwallet has suggested to reduce MSSR before, they are not "just do it".

That is good news. The point I am trying to make is that the english-speaking community was not made aware prior to the fact.

How about using the BSIP framework (which offers to write so called "informational" proposal) to bring this proposal before the (english-speaking) community in a known format.
These days, many voters actually read the shareholder summary of BSIPs to build an opinion.

Please craft a BSIP and get it discussed ... that way actions of witnesses would be based on "some" document.

Currently, the actions of those witnesses that go for 5% already just forces me to flag them as bad actors ...
I'd rather keep them approved - considering I actually consider reducing the MSSR worth testing - maybe not to 5% but rather 7% - but that is what needs to be discussed with the BTS voters)

I can draft a BSIP, but seems a little strange...

why initially MCR and MSSR are not set as committee controlled parameters but are determined by witnesses? I don't know, I feel maybe setting them as committee controlled parameters is better but I am not sure.


 

[pluswave]

Sorry for so quick changing from 1.1 to 1.05 without any statements here. Yes magicwallet  suggested to have change MSSR in wechat witness group days ago, but MSSR is unlike price feed itself,   it has a long time consensus for most bitAssets (which is 1.1).  we should discuss more and make a scheduled change statement. For now, it happened and react to the opinion of magicwallet, we just leave it as is until next change (this time make a statement before changing back or any other number). If we can agree on make a test for some time (i.e 3 m),
at the end of the test, will also make our opinion public available before action.

[Yao]

First 3 witnesses who changed MSSR :

witness.yao
delegate.freedom
magicwallet.witness

If you got them as witness voted you can unvote them if you don't agree to their actions

To be more precise, those three changed MSSR on bitCNY.

witness.yao changed it also on bitUSD and bitEUR that was not part of the discussion!!!

Sorry, a hand mistake has been corrected.

[xeroc]

any doc that describe the design? I haven't found any in https://github.com/bitshares/bsips

https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/86

actually China community has discussed this topic a lot, it's not a very new idea. witnesses like magicwallet has suggested to reduce MSSR before, they are not "just do it".

That is good news. The point I am trying to make is that the english-speaking community was not made aware prior to the fact.

How about using the BSIP framework (which offers to write so called "informational" proposal) to bring this proposal before the (english-speaking) community in a known format.
These days, many voters actually read the shareholder summary of BSIPs to build an opinion.

Please craft a BSIP and get it discussed ... that way actions of witnesses would be based on "some" document.

Currently, the actions of those witnesses that go for 5% already just forces me to flag them as bad actors ...
I'd rather keep them approved - considering I actually consider reducing the MSSR worth testing - maybe not to 5% but rather 7% - but that is what needs to be discussed with the BTS voters)

[paliboy]

First 3 witnesses who changed MSSR :

witness.yao
delegate.freedom
magicwallet.witness

If you got them as witness voted you can unvote them if you don't agree to their actions

To be more precise, those three changed MSSR on bitCNY.

witness.yao changed it also on bitUSD and bitEUR that was not part of the discussion!!!

[gghi]

     是的，必须充分讨论。充值费用很高就是个畸形，为什么市场上炙手可热的bitcny我们不敢生产。why? 好比一种商品市场上很吃香，然而我们不敢生产，不是造不出来，而是我们不敢生产。因为只要设法拉高喂价就可以生产更多的bitcny。是因为我们的思想被禁锢了。

     
Yes, we must discuss it fully. The high cost of recharge is a deformity. Why do we dare not produce bitcny in the market?why?  It is like a commodity market is very popular, but we dare not produce, not make, but we dare not produce. As long as we try to raise the feed price, we can produce more bitcny. It is because our minds are imprisoned.

[bitcrab]

I believe, once we have the custom operations BSIP approved and ready on chain, we might actually be able to technically hire someone for trading and pay them for doing so. (different topic)

any detail about the custom operations BSIP?

This is in development and allows to setup keys that are restricted, for instance, to only trade a specific market and do not have access to the funds in general - trading only.
Or another key could be used to allow only adjusting of collateral ratios etc ....

any doc that describe the design? I haven't found any in https://github.com/bitshares/bsips

[Thul3]

as I know, 2 witnesses has switched to push 1.05 as MSSR, more witnesses are working for the change.

While I agree with the proposal in general, I do *not* agree with the witnesses just flipping their opinions singlehandedly .. without even having discussed things with the BTS voters ..
For me, I saw this proposal only today and haven't been given sufficient time to let the proposal sink in properly.

The consequence might as well be that I need to look into removing my vote for witnesses that just "do" without community engagement. So far, the consensus has been a 10% MSSR.
I understand that the english-speaking community is not the target-audience for bitCNY, but I do feel a responsibility towards the BitShares Blockchain as
a platform with bitCNY being a prominent "product" - that is why I engage in discussions around bitCNY frequently and try to provide my point of view.

Rushing changes without proper discussion rarely results in good outcome. Let's rather argue here in the forums and see where the community and wisdom of the crowd puts us.

actually China community has discussed this topic a lot, it's not a very new idea. witnesses like magicwallet has suggested to reduce MSSR before, they are not "just do it".

to make the new MSSR take effects need more than 14 witnesses to change, I feel it will take more than 1 week, we can discuss this topic sufficiently in this time and stop the change immediately if community reach an consensus that the change is dangerous.

First 3 witnesses who changed MSSR :

witness.yao
delegate.freedom
magicwallet.witness

If you got them as witness voted you can unvote them if you don't agree to their actions

[bitcrab]

as I know, 2 witnesses has switched to push 1.05 as MSSR, more witnesses are working for the change.

While I agree with the proposal in general, I do *not* agree with the witnesses just flipping their opinions singlehandedly .. without even having discussed things with the BTS voters ..
For me, I saw this proposal only today and haven't been given sufficient time to let the proposal sink in properly.

The consequence might as well be that I need to look into removing my vote for witnesses that just "do" without community engagement. So far, the consensus has been a 10% MSSR.
I understand that the english-speaking community is not the target-audience for bitCNY, but I do feel a responsibility towards the BitShares Blockchain as
a platform with bitCNY being a prominent "product" - that is why I engage in discussions around bitCNY frequently and try to provide my point of view.

Rushing changes without proper discussion rarely results in good outcome. Let's rather argue here in the forums and see where the community and wisdom of the crowd puts us.

actually China community has discussed this topic a lot, it's not a very new idea. witnesses like magicwallet has suggested to reduce MSSR before, they are not "just do it".

to make the new MSSR take effects need more than 14 witnesses to change, I feel it will take more than 1 week, we can discuss this topic sufficiently in this time and stop the change immediately if community reach an consensus that the change is dangerous.

[MrFrismint]

How come 3 witnesses are already changing to 5%?

[xeroc]

I believe, once we have the custom operations BSIP approved and ready on chain, we might actually be able to technically hire someone for trading and pay them for doing so. (different topic)

any detail about the custom operations BSIP?

This is in development and allows to setup keys that are restricted, for instance, to only trade a specific market and do not have access to the funds in general - trading only.
Or another key could be used to allow only adjusting of collateral ratios etc ....

actually MSSR is pushed by witnesses like feed price, it's not a committee controlled parameter, so witnesses can push the MSSR value which they think proper.

Good point!

as I know, 2 witnesses has switched to push 1.05 as MSSR, more witnesses are working for the change.

While I agree with the proposal in general, I do *not* agree with the witnesses just flipping their opinions singlehandedly .. without even having discussed things with the BTS voters ..
For me, I saw this proposal only today and haven't been given sufficient time to let the proposal sink in properly.

The consequence might as well be that I need to look into removing my vote for witnesses that just "do" without community engagement. So far, the consensus has been a 10% MSSR.
I understand that the english-speaking community is not the target-audience for bitCNY, but I do feel a responsibility towards the BitShares Blockchain as
a platform with bitCNY being a prominent "product" - that is why I engage in discussions around bitCNY frequently and try to provide my point of view.

Rushing changes without proper discussion rarely results in good outcome. Let's rather argue here in the forums and see where the community and wisdom of the crowd puts us.

[xeroc]

First of all, users who have been trading in the bitCNY market can notice a phenomenon: bitCNY is basically not a premium in the BTS uptrend, and basically has a premium of about 10% in the downtrend.

That is *EXPECTED* behavior. Nothing new. It was even mentioned in the original bitshares whitepaper!

And because bitCNY can be freely exchanged with Fiat CNY (legal currency) through the acceptance service provided by MagicWallet (the exchange rate is dynamic and market-oriented), bitCNY becomes the channel for Fiat CNY (RMB in bank account) to enter and exit DEX, and The exchange rate is basically linked to the premium of bitCNY: when the premium is about 10%, the Deposit fee is about 10%, and the Withdrawal fee is about -10%.

Erm, excuse my ignorance, but why do you figure this out only now?! We've been telling people for years that this is one of the major problems of
bitassets and that a market that trades a bitasset against its underlying asset will experience **EXACTLY** what you are describing now.

Why is there a long-term premium of 10% in the downtrend? Not 5%, 15%? A very likely reason is that because the Maximum short squeeze ratio (MSSR) = 1.1, the BTS that is forced to close the position will sell at 10% off (10% below the market price), so the market price of the BTS When falling, buyers can foresee that once the market price declines will trigger a large number of mortgages to be forced to close the position, and the auction BTS is 10% cheaper than the market price, then you will buy at the market price or 10 % off (10% cheaper) price to place an order and wait? As a result, the buying price will gradually retreat, starting at 1% off the market price (on the BTS price of the central exchange), then 2% off to 5% off, 10% off or even 12% off , 15% off. At this time, in the MagicWallet acceptance platform, bitCNY's deposit and withdrawal fees are also linked.

That's accurate! And that is why liquidity will narrow down that premium. However, you need more market participants to obtain sufficiently closed peg. Fortunately, bitCNY is more liquid than others
and is probably the first and only bitasset for which such as discussion makes sense.

Second, adjusting the MSSR (Maximum short squeeze ratio) from 1.1 to 1.05 may be an experiment that can be tried. We can use this to observe for a period of time, and see if the premium (the deposit and withdrawal fee) that is maintained at around 10% for a long time will be reduced to about 5%. If this is the case, MSSR will be a tunable tool for responding flexibly to market trends: in the downtrend, it can be adjusted to 1.05, 1.02, 1.005, 1.001 or even 1.0, and in the uptrend, if necessary ( For example, when the bull market is crazy, it can be adjusted to 1.1 or even 1.2, 1.3, or even 1.5 to combat aggressive high-leverage mortgages, so that the system leverage is not too high.

Agreed

In addition, I recommend that the Force settlement offset of SmartCoins, which is controlled by the commit-account, should be used as a combination tool with the MSSR: the high-leverage mortgage will become more aggressive after the MSSR is lowered. This further pushes up the system leverage. However, if we adjust the Force settlement offset of SmartCoins from 5% or 2% to 0% or even -1%, we can use the power of the free market to combat mortgages with too high leverage: Encourage Those who want to buy a large number of BTSs at market prices buy BTS by initiating Force settlement – ​​Margin positions with the lowest mortgage rate will be forced to settle at market prices one by one.

-1% is not possible, technically.
There has been many voices that request settlement offset to be reduced to 1% again.

[gghi]

              事实上，当我们修正了喂价之后，这个问题也就没有了。因为新的喂价=目前的喂价+充值费率，



     As a matter of fact, when we corrected the price, the problem was gone. Because the new feed price = current price plus recharge rate.

事实上，鼓鼓几个月前就提供了bitCNY提费率率API，国内见证人基本都在发布喂价前加入bitCNY充提费率对喂价进行了修正，但这个操作无法改变bitCNY溢价问题。

          确实MSSR是影响充值费率很高的一个因素，但是目前的喂价并没有按照我的方案修正。因为如果修正了的话，在充值费十个点的时候喂价可以上升10%，这样可以对冲MSSR的10%。
      降低MSSR可能有作用，但是风险也是显而易见的，那就是会没人吃爆仓单，市场流动会变差，黑天鹅的可能性会变得更大了，当然可以先试试。不改革肯定是不行了，我还是觉得提高喂价的方案风险小些，因为鼓鼓的充值费率是动态变化的，这样喂价也可以跟着动态调整。

     It is true that MSSR is a factor affecting the high charge rate, but the current feeding price has not been revised according to my plan. Because if corrected, the charge can rise by 10% at 10 points, which hedges 10% of the MSSR.
Reducing MSSR may be helpful, but the risk is obvious, that is, no one will eat the exploded warehouse receipts, market liquidity will become worse, the possibility of a black swan will become greater, of course, you can try. It's definitely not going to work without reform. I still think the risk of raising the price of feeding is less, because the drum charging rate is dynamic, so the feeding price can be adjusted dynamically.

[Thul3]

@JonnyB, it is a little unfair to claim he is changing anything. If at all, it is the committee that has the power to modify parameters. That includes more than just bitcrab.

Thats why i asked what changed on the OMO fund for bitcrab,jademont,ebit who broke community consensus.
You are leaving that question and it seems for part of the community like a free ticket.

0.Currently nothing because we are in a bear market and BTS price could go way lower.The market is already dried out at 10%.
It would create an additional risk when currently lowering to 5% that there will be a gap which can't be filled by external funds
anymore and could lead to a quicker dump of the BTS price.
It would also cause that the USD/CNY price will diverge even more seeing a USD price of arround 7.35 CNY which is also not anatural price .

1.

2.Only when the bear market ends.Else the commitee adds even more uncalculated risk to the community which could harm it.

3.Change from 2 weeks to 3 months i don't understand.Please explain this to me

4.If i understand it correctly during that time you let the MSSR  stay at 1.05 and will only reset it if there is enough opponents to it raising their concern ?
Turning arround the way it should be that it will only get changed if there will be enough for worter for it into it only won't get changed if there are not enough against speaker ?

as I know, 2 witnesses has switched to push 1.05 as MSSR, more witnesses are working for the change.

These witnesses have changed the MSSR based on community consensus ?


JUST AS INFO I'M GOING TO PUBLISH THE WITNESSES NAME WHICH CHANGED IT ALREADY TO 1.05 WITHOUT ANY CONSENSUS.

I hope the community will show you their love for it

[bitcrab]

I believe, once we have the custom operations BSIP approved and ready on chain, we might actually be able to technically hire someone for trading and pay them for doing so. (different topic)

any detail about the custom operations BSIP?

That said, I would propose the following procedure:
0. let's continue discussion about how much the MSSR should be lowered
1. let's define a metric that allows us to identify if that has had any effect
2. a proposal shall be created for committee to lower it with an expiration of at least 2 weeks!
3. 3 months after the proposal has executed, the MSSR should be re-evaluated in public discussion together with the metrics of 1.
4. 2 other proposal shall be created to the committee to either approve the lower MSSR or to reset it to 10.

actually MSSR is pushed by witnesses like feed price, it's not a committee controlled parameter, so witnesses can push the MSSR value which they think proper.

as I know, 2 witnesses has switched to push 1.05 as MSSR, more witnesses are working for the change.

[Bangzi]

"2. a proposal shall be created for committee to lower it with an expiration of at least 2 weeks!"

MSSR set by witnesses

[Yao]

              事实上，当我们修正了喂价之后，这个问题也就没有了。因为新的喂价=目前的喂价+充值费率，



     As a matter of fact, when we corrected the price, the problem was gone. Because the new feed price = current price plus recharge rate.

事实上，鼓鼓几个月前就提供了bitCNY提费率率API，国内见证人基本都在发布喂价前加入bitCNY充提费率对喂价进行了修正，但这个操作无法改变bitCNY溢价问题。

[Yao]

首先，一直在bitCNY市场交易的用户都能注意到一个现象：bitCNY在BTS上涨趋势中是基本不会有溢价的，而在下跌趋势中基本都会溢价10%左右。

而且因为bitCNY可以通过MagicWallet提供的承兑服务与 Fiat CNY（法定货币）进行自由兑换（兑换汇率是动态的，市场化的），bitCNY 成为了 Fiat CNY（银行账户里的RMB）进出DEX的通道，而且兑换汇率基本与bitCNY的溢价联动：溢价10%左右的时候Deposit fee （充值费率）是10%左右，Withdrawal fee（提现费率）是-10%左右。

为什么下跌趋势中会长期溢价10%？不是5%、15%？一个很可能的原因是：因为 Maximum short squeeze ratio（MSSR）=1.1，被强制平仓的BTS会以10% off（低于市场价10%）的价格挂卖单卖出，所以当BTS的市场价格下跌时，买家可以预见到：一旦市场价格下跌形成趋势将会触发大量的抵押仓被强制关闭仓位，而拍卖的BTS比市场价便宜10%，那么，你会在市场价买入还是以10% off （便宜10%）的价格下订单并等着？这样一来买盘价格就会逐步后退，一开始会低于市场价（在中心化交易所的BTS价格）的1% off ，然后2%off再到5% off、10% off甚至12% off、15% off。而这时，在MagicWallet承兑平台，bitCNY的出入金手续费也跟着联动。所以你会看到：市场中有这样一种力量，他们在市场上升期逐步囤积bitCNY，然后在市场反转时，通过打击中心化交易所的BTS价格，可以让越来越多的 bitCNY 抵押债仓被强制关闭仓位，他们会获得超过10%的收益。因为MSSR=1.10，市场可以预期爆仓单将会打九折卖出，买一价格就会撤退10%，所以，他们可以毫不费力地快速将DEX里面的BTS价格砸到比中心化交易所低10%，然后bitCNY就溢价10%了。

其次，将MSSR（Maximum short squeeze ratio）从1.1调整到1.05也许是一个可以尝试的试验。我们可以借此观察一段时间，看长期维持在10%左右的溢价（出入金手续费）会不会降低到5%左右。如果结果确实如此，那么MSSR将可以成为一种灵活应对市场趋势的可调参数工具：在下跌趋势中，可以调整为1.05、1.02、1.005、1.001甚至1.0，而在上升趋势中，如有必要（比如牛市市场疯狂的时候）则可以调整到1.1甚至1.2、1.3、甚至1.5以打击激进的高杠杆抵押，让系统杠杆率不至于太高。

另外，我建议由 committee-account 控制的参数 Force settlement offset of SmartCoins （强清补偿比例，目前bitCNY为5%）应该与MSSR一起作为组合工具：在MSSR降低后高杠杆抵押仓会变得更激进，从而进一步推升系统杠杆率。但，如果我们将Force settlement offset of SmartCoins （强清补偿比例）从5%或者2%调整为0%甚至-1%，我们就可以用自由市场的力量来打击杠杆率太高的抵押仓：鼓励想以市场价购买大量BTS的人用发起Force settlement的方式购买BTS——抵押率最低的Margin positions（债仓）将逐个被强制以市场价进行结算。


Non-Chinese users can use Google Translate to understand this Chinese, for example, translation into English would be like this:

First of all, users who have been trading in the bitCNY market can notice a phenomenon: bitCNY is basically not a premium in the BTS uptrend, and basically has a premium of about 10% in the downtrend.

And because bitCNY can be freely exchanged with Fiat CNY (legal currency) through the acceptance service provided by MagicWallet (the exchange rate is dynamic and market-oriented), bitCNY becomes the channel for Fiat CNY (RMB in bank account) to enter and exit DEX, and The exchange rate is basically linked to the premium of bitCNY: when the premium is about 10%, the Deposit fee is about 10%, and the Withdrawal fee is about -10%.

Why is there a long-term premium of 10% in the downtrend? Not 5%, 15%? A very likely reason is that because the Maximum short squeeze ratio (MSSR) = 1.1, the BTS that is forced to close the position will sell at 10% off (10% below the market price), so the market price of the BTS When falling, buyers can foresee that once the market price declines will trigger a large number of mortgages to be forced to close the position, and the auction BTS is 10% cheaper than the market price, then you will buy at the market price or 10 % off (10% cheaper) price to place an order and wait? As a result, the buying price will gradually retreat, starting at 1% off the market price (on the BTS price of the central exchange), then 2% off to 5% off, 10% off or even 12% off , 15% off. At this time, in the MagicWallet acceptance platform, bitCNY's deposit and withdrawal fees are also linked. You see, there is such a force in the market that they gradually hoard bitCNY during the market upswing, and then when the market reverses, by hitting CEX's BTS price, more and more bitCNY shorter can be forced to close the position, they will get more than 10 % of revenue. Because MSSR=1.10, the market can expect the margin call order sell price to be 10% off,  then bid price will retreat by 10%. So they can effortlessly quickly push the BTS price in DEX to 10% lower than CEX, and then bitCNY is 10% premium.

Second, adjusting the MSSR (Maximum short squeeze ratio) from 1.1 to 1.05 may be an experiment that can be tried. We can use this to observe for a period of time, and see if the premium (the deposit and withdrawal fee) that is maintained at around 10% for a long time will be reduced to about 5%. If this is the case, MSSR will be a tunable tool for responding flexibly to market trends: in the downtrend, it can be adjusted to 1.05, 1.02, 1.005, 1.001 or even 1.0, and in the uptrend, if necessary ( For example, when the bull market is crazy, it can be adjusted to 1.1 or even 1.2, 1.3, or even 1.5 to combat aggressive high-leverage mortgages, so that the system leverage is not too high.

In addition, I recommend that the Force settlement offset of SmartCoins, which is controlled by the commit-account, should be used as a combination tool with the MSSR: the high-leverage mortgage will become more aggressive after the MSSR is lowered. This further pushes up the system leverage. However, if we adjust the Force settlement offset of SmartCoins from 5% or 2% to 0% or even -1%, we can use the power of the free market to combat mortgages with too high leverage: Encourage Those who want to buy a large number of BTSs at market prices buy BTS by initiating Force settlement – ​​Margin positions with the lowest mortgage rate will be forced to settle at market prices one by one.

[xeroc]

FFS bitcrab, I thought BitShares was supposed to be decentralised.
You adjust all the parameters to suit your whale positions.
you run the open market operations (a major conflict of interest.)
you got the committee to change force settlement on BitCNY to 5%(supposedly temporarily) when all other bitassets are 1%
now you want to change MSSR for your own ends.
lets just rename it Crabshares

@JonnyB, it is a little unfair to claim he is changing anything. If at all, it is the committee that has the power to modify parameters. That includes more than just bitcrab.
In the forums, we should keep a friendly environment to proposals and learn from discussions.
@bitcrab merely proposed a change to get things started with discussions.

Have you been around here when Dan Larimer proposed to have only 7 block producers? Same thing: A controversial proposal

All of these potential changes should be considered for all bit assets.  No reason for CYN to be different, this is more confusing for users.

I need to disagree here, bitCNY has much more liquidity than any of the other assets. Disconnecting its parameters from others makes sense IMHO.



With respect to the actual proposal, I think it is worth exeperimenting with the MSSR for bitCNY (only bitCNY!) given the increased volume there (we had over 100M BTS volume there yesterday).
We've known from the beginning that eventually some bitassets will be more prominent than others, and bitCNY certainly went through the charts compared to others. It should be allowed to have
a different set of parameters *AS LONG* as we let all market participants know about those changes before they get implemented.

To the change of MSSR, I believe it makes sense for CNY which has quite some liquidity near the spread. Lowering the MSSR might bring the premium of CNY down in case of BTS price decline.
However, it also reduces the potential profits for those that shortsell into the margin calls (because their profit is less then).

The other concern I have is the use of OMO in bitCNY. I am unclear how much of the liquidity is offered by OMO and how much comes from 3rd party traders. Certainly, yesterday, the 100M volume
has not been caused by OMO. The more I think about OMO the more I believe it should be replaced by a more something that is called "community hedge fund" and allows for actual market making
to act as a regular market participant with profits for the reserves.

I believe, once we have the custom operations BSIP approved and ready on chain, we might actually be able to technically hire someone for trading and pay them for doing so. (different topic)

To conclude the discussion about MSSR, I think we should continue discussion about lowering it. I would like to see its effect on bitCNY.
However, we should learn from the lessons of raising settlement offset of 5% and make clear that we all understand when an expiriment is a success or when it failed.

That said, I would propose the following procedure:
0. let's continue discussion about how much the MSSR should be lowered
1. let's define a metric that allows us to identify if that has had any effect
2. a proposal shall be created for committee to lower it with an expiration of at least 2 weeks!
3. 3 months after the proposal has executed, the MSSR should be re-evaluated in public discussion together with the metrics of 1.
4. 2 other proposal shall be created to the committee to either approve the lower MSSR or to reset it to 10.

[MrFrismint]

Thanks for the explanation @bitcrab. Sounds like a possible try out to be done.

[lovegan007]

投一票 YES，支持
必须支持，这样以后暴仓溢价在5%左右了，以前需要10%暴仓保护是因为怕黑天鹅，担心锚定问题。而现在有了新功能暴仓目标价后，已经远离了黑天鹅了，本次大熊市下跌只达到了171%，所以相当安全的了，经过该次大暴跌下跌测试后，已经反映出来了各种问题，所以设5%是合理的，能跟得上其它的修改变化，让BTS更合理的成长，本人很支持BTS，对BTS又爱又恨，虽然上涨的时候它涨得极少，下跌的时候跌得最多，但始终对BTS持有好感，本次大跌本人在一块以下加仓了104.7万元钱的BTS，注意是加仓而已，我原有的仓位的币也并没有清仓，以前上到6块也没有清仓，想想是不是很傻X啊！没办法的，熊市如此，这个怪不得谁的，幸好买的还是BTS，如果买的是ACT CDC BTN BCX GRAM ......这类的估计都快归零了。我本人不贪多，只玩老币玩有项目有应用落地的币，有创新有发展的币，BTS不会死，永远也不会死，只是它的发展需要的路子还很长很长，我还带动了我身边的一些朋友加入了鼓鼓钱包玩币，身边的朋友也充了不少钱，基本都过百万的了，有的朋友还套在3块钱，他们都是中长线，这段时间他们见我加仓了他们也在加仓位。我始终相信下次牛市就是现价10倍起步了。当年我也 是早期参与 BTS的用户，当年我持有的BTS还是2.5分钱的，但最终没能坚持持有下去，后悔万分。也许是我太心急了。
有许多人不同意修改5% 暴仓价，极大可能原因是这类人是靠囤BITCNY 发财的人，靠炒BITCNY收益的人，靠暴仓做空捡便宜货的人，靠恶意砸盘吃10%差价黄单的人，此类人在BITCNY 溢价为0%的时候就准备着了大量的BITCNY，当熊市时，BTC下跌时，配合做空砸盘，并且把10%的溢价砸出来后，再慢慢套现，赚那10%。一年有十来次10%出现，做空者的本金就翻倍了。
其次是鼓鼓承兑商也出现了10%的溢价，普通用户不知道外盘多少价，也不懂计算这溢价的关系，一般用户都比较难接受那10%的手续费，这样就严重的影响了入金量，对BTS的内盘发展不利。所以投票修改为5%是大多数人都能 接受的溢价和手续费，另一方 面也能增加抵押量，有暴仓目标价的功能设置了后，恶意暴仓贴线抵押也不会造成太负面的影响了。

[gghi]

              事实上，当我们修正了喂价之后，这个问题也就没有了。因为新的喂价=目前的喂价+充值费率，



     As a matter of fact, when we corrected the price, the problem was gone. Because the new feed price = current price plus recharge rate.

[bitcrab]

Why not 1.001? Why not 1.5?

let me try to explain why.

as shown below, when feed price fall down and reach margin call price, the calling process begin. debt positions are margin called and the collateral will be sold at feed price/MSSR, this is the process to release risks of not-enough-collateral.

MSSR is an important parameter here, it determine the gap between margin call price and the margin call order sell price, and will impact the behavior of different roles.

the higher the MSSR, the bigger the gap, the easier the margin call order will be eaten, but at the same time, the higher profit of shorting and the bigger the shorting incentive.

the lower the MSSR, the smaller the gap, more difficult the margin call order will be eaten, however at the same time, the lower the profit of shorting and the smaller the shorting incentive.

so what a MSSR is appropriate depend on the market status.

after 719 fork provide the target CR new feature, we can see in bitCNY market most of the time the margin called orders are filled instantly at the price close to market price, only when the market price is too low and bitCNY has a premium of more than 10%, there will be margin called orders stay there as sell pressure.



in my view, the depth of bitCNY market is well enough that no need to set a too high MSSR, it's possible to lower MSSR to 1.05 to lower the sell pressure as well as shorting incentive.

but I don't think it's a good idea to do the same to bitUSD now, as the market depth is not good enough yet.

I am not sure whether one day we can set MSSR to 1.001. but I think it is not feasible now, let's lower the shorting incentive step by step.


 

 
 

[bitcrab]

All of these potential changes should be considered for all bit assets.  No reason for CYN to be different, this is more confusing for users.

bitCNY has a much better market depth than bitUSD and will face much lower risk to implement this than bitUSD does, that's why I suggest to try this in bitCNY first.

[bitcrab]

FFS bitcrab, I thought BitShares was supposed to be decentralised.

You adjust all the parameters to suit your whale positions.

you run the open market operations (a major conflict of interest.)

you got the committee to change force settlement on BitCNY to 5%(supposedly temporarily) when all other bitassets are 1%

now you want to change MSSR for your own ends.

lets just rename it Crabshares

you can also suggest.

decentralized does not mean no one can try to push some change. and now I am just collecting opinion on this topic.

[binggo]

This is my suggestion:

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26762.msg319760#msg319760


Chinese froum:

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26798.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26764.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26776.0

[Thul3]

I agree with this proposal, it can help balance the bitCNY price closer to 1: 1 with CNY, but please set up settlement offset back to 1%

Could you explain how ?

All of these potential changes should be considered for all bit assets.  No reason for CYN to be different, this is more confusing for users.

BitUSD isn't able to buy out the margin calls on the market currently as they are still there and you want to lower the MSSR for it so they will be even bigger ?

[Brekyrself]

All of these potential changes should be considered for all bit assets.  No reason for CYN to be different, this is more confusing for users.

[fractalnode]

I agree with this proposal, it can help balance the bitCNY price closer to 1: 1 with CNY, but please set up settlement offset back to 1%

[JonnyB]

FFS bitcrab, I thought BitShares was supposed to be decentralised.

You adjust all the parameters to suit your whale positions.

you run the open market operations (a major conflict of interest.)

you got the committee to change force settlement on BitCNY to 5%(supposedly temporarily) when all other bitassets are 1%

now you want to change MSSR for your own ends.

lets just rename it Crabshares

[Thul3]

A 1.1 MSSR isn't able to arbitrage all called margins on DEX.Would you lower it to 5% it would mean that on bigger falls like now the external funds which will come from CEX will be even smaller buy off margin calls.

The only real solution would be getting more users to DEX.

[abit]

Why not 1.001? Why not 1.5?

MSSR punishes shorters upon force settlement yeah? Why not increase it for failing to collateralize their shorts?

MSSR has nothing to do with force settlement.

[R]

MSSR punishes shorters upon force settlement yeah? Why not increase it for failing to collateralize their shorts?

[bts-qs]

recently in China community someone suggest to lower MSSR of bitCNY, I'd like to have a public discuss and opinion survey on this topic.

thanks to the new feature target CR and the good market depth, recently most of the time the bitCNY margin called orders are eaten instantly at the price close to market price, when the price fall down to very low point, some margin called order are stay there for long time without being completely, and normally at this time the bitCNY premium is more than 10%.

when margin called orders stay there, then the sell order price will keep falling down when the feed price come down, shorters always can sell to make the feed price even lower and the buy back from DEX, this process make the price even lower.

so is it possible to lesson the positive feedback by lower the MSSR?

I think it's possible, as lower MSSR can reduce the profit expectation of shorting.

more ideas and opinions are welcome to clarify this.

I think this is a good idea. This has reduced the disastrous effect of the chain explosion caused by shorting. In fact, setting 1.05 may be more appropriate. Of course, this needs to be tested by practice.

[paliboy]

I think that this one is much safer experiment than the one influencing the CNY feed price. Definitely don't implement both at the same time, otherwise you cannot judge the effect of one or the other. Give people long enough time (counting in months) to adjust their behavior.

[bitcrab]

recently in China community someone suggest to lower MSSR of bitCNY, I'd like to have a public discuss and opinion survey on this topic.

thanks to the new feature target CR and the good market depth, recently most of the time the bitCNY margin called orders are eaten instantly at the price close to market price, when the price fall down to very low point, some margin called order are stay there for long time without being completely, and normally at this time the bitCNY premium is more than 10%.

when margin called orders stay there, then the sell order price will keep falling down when the feed price come down, shorters always can sell to make the feed price even lower and the buy back from DEX, this process make the price even lower.

so is it possible to lesson the positive feedback by lower the MSSR?

I think it's possible, as lower MSSR can reduce the profit expectation of shorting.

more ideas and opinions are welcome to clarify this.