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Messages - fractalnode

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16
I am against that. Because who is to decide who gets excluded and who doesn't? That's just another way to manipulate the votes.


if the lock will count from the time of the last outgoing transfer, say 30 days. Then the algorithm will decide, not a human. After another 30 (60 days of lock) the voting power could increase slightly and, for example, to reach its maximum value after 90 days.

However, this does not protect against selling the entire account, as was the case with STEEM..
So it should be combined (with logical AND) with something like an updated list of well-known scam accounts and here comes the human factor but if you manage it with 2/3 + 1 votes of the committe account, it could work.


I suggest a new coin for voting, the coin will be airdropped to active accounts through a form of whitelisting, this removes BTS core token's responsibility as a coin for voting. Whitelisting will ensure only active accounts can receive the coins, it also removes the possibility of proxy voting as the airdrop will happen to single accounts....

there are many who are able to sell their own mother and there is a monster who wants to buy her from these motherf#ckers. I've seen it somewhere before ;|

17
in relation to the link above
I propose to consider 2 additional aspects, namely people who really use the platform on a daily basis.
1) value of funds in open orders on the market - market making
2) the value for the ecosystem which is issuing bitAssets

That is why I propose:
1. blocking funds understood as not being able to transfer funds between accounts, e.g. for 30 days. At the same time, we must eliminate the risk of exchanging BTS or bitAssets for junk UIA. Therefore, during the blockade, trading should be limited to MPAs owned by the committe-account and null-account

2. voting rights for bitAssets - as you can see their holder also risks a lot.

3. voting right for collateral, but only for real valuation - minus debt. If I count correctly, for MCR 1.6 the number of BTS in collateral can be 2.66 times higher than their real value. Therefore, voting rights should be limited to real BTS valuation.

I don't like the idea that those who decide about the future of the platform are forced to not use it. It threatens detachment from reality.

Transfer lock will do the trick with exchanges and other custodial wallets

18
Hi guys.

I started to write a short message for a telegram, but the content increased so much that this forum post came out.

English is not my mother tongue, try to read my thoughts between lines ^^

What happens with a Force Settlement Delay of <=24h can be compared to "ignition advance angle"
in our engine this angle is zero or it is near zero
the engine is not running
for the engine to start, the following scenario must occur:

1) Force Settlement Delay must arouse *uncertainty as to whether it will be profitable or not and whether or not it would be better to buy from the market at a slightly higher price.

* Force Settlement is not a speculative tool, or at least it should not be. FS is a tool that sets the real price of an asset at the end of the day (or like a final judgment).

2) higher price on DEX, causes the appearance of DEX-CEX arbitration, even the manual one, because arbitration at DEXbot is still not ready [facepalm] - probably due to problems with financing or whatever ...
Only this step will start to push the price on CEX. Because outsiders will not buy BTS based on news. It is only when the DEX price starts to rise regularly and people from outside join it slowly - they will be attracted by the formation on the chart of small but stable growth - then they start reading about how.bitshares.works. - Who remembers new people on the telegram asking for beautiful organic growth? - I remember.

3) Loop in the form of a continuous hassle Force Settlement is like wheel slip in mud or on snow. This force should push us up, but it doesn't. To prevent this, we should change the delay periods in such a way that:

(-) 12h, 24h is for the time of market maturity, strong liquidity, bear market

(+) 34h, 42h, 48h, 55h at a time when the bull market wakes up, or when "the wheel is sliding".

In sum. The more bearish the market is, the lower the delay should be and vice versa. Today we should have at least 42h delay or more, in my opinion.

I also think that we should not touch such options as moving EMA, SMA for Settlement Offset, this should always be 1% as compensation, not fixed 3,5 or 8%

# auxiliary events are liquidity on DEX markets, e.g. to BTC, so that arbitration is possible at all. Besides, at this level of development we should have several dozen people using arbitration (DEX-CEX) with bots and several hundred people using bots on DEX. BitShares GUI and DEXBot should be like brother and sister to each other, and every single user should be aware that they can use their own bot on their own PC / Mac / Linux and even Android TV!

Please share your thoughts and comment

19
Have you ever considered increasing the 24-hour delay instead of messing up with offset and moving averages? At the moment we have 24h delay, Steemit for SBD is 84h (with Settlement Offset at 0%). A large proportion of all crypto smart contracts set their unstaking period to 72 hours. I think that in our case it is enough to slightly increase the period from 24h to 42h to give good results. In the bull market, 42 hours is a lot of time. I think that few people will risk buying at a price that will occur in 42 hours instead of buying here and now at the market price.

In my opinion, the risk associated with 24h is too small and therefore this functionality is abused. After that, increasing the delay is a much more elegant and honest solution.

In addition, in case you didn't know, "The answer to the ultimate question of life, the universe and everything is 42."

20
I hope that the next WP is in preparation and we will see the further development of DEXBot. We can't waste what has already been done, there are still many strategies to code :)

21
General Discussion / Re: I want to play a game
« on: December 23, 2019, 02:44:18 pm »
Christmas :
0.0167 USDT
0.00000219 satoshi


New year day:
0.01797 USDT
0.00000240 satoshi

22
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [poll] BTS repurchase destruction proposal
« on: December 06, 2019, 08:32:36 pm »
         execute Instant Settle for this amount and send those BTS to reserve pool

in this way we create a permanent source of partial financing of bad debt, but I also like the idea of additional funding for the WPS fund

Settling at the fake feed price rewards bad debt. Speaking of it, when will you start feeding the true price again?


I think it would be good to use this approach when the price returns to normal.

There are several new solutions that will help us fight the negative effects of margin call wall, including:

- bsip73 - Match force-settlement orders best-price
- bsip62 - Close Margin Position

Instant Settle from funds collected from trading fees would also help.

Today another idea came to my mind, but I don't know if it is possible

Allow users to set non-default MCR and MSSR for their positon as long as they are greater then default values.

it's worth to keep in mind that People use MCR like Stop Loss

that's why I would happily set values other than most people, e.g. MCR 1.69 nobody would know who and when is in the margin call area, or MSSR 1.03 so that a possible margin call would definitely close at market price at first time before most other orders start being fulfilled.

23
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [poll] BTS repurchase destruction proposal
« on: December 05, 2019, 10:37:32 pm »
6, repurchase BTS and destroy it immediately.
Destroy by sending BTS back to the reserve pool. Everything else is destroying funds.

the money comes from the reserve pool for the needs of WP, which is why BTS is sold on the market.
It would be better if we pay employees in bitCNY (or bitUSD), and then that these employees exchange these bitCNY for BTC on external exchanges (CEX), so that bitCNY can be traded (circulated) there.
The more bitAssets on the markets outside DEX, the better.

in other words, funds should not be burned or transferred to the reserve pool in the form of previously purchased BTS, but should be stored for the same purpose as the reserve pool.
On the other hand, the more bitCNY being on CEX or elsewhere, the less liquidity in the DEX for debt holders to close positions, so it's not a thing with only benefits (aka "the better").

it's also true. I have another idea ...

- maybe the funds accumulated from transaction fees could be used in a similar way to this formula.

Instant Settle from funds collected from trading fees
Code: [Select]
if ((lowest CR <= MCR) AND (fee pool >= 10 USD))                                             // → a small amount has mainly psychological effects
         calculate the amount betwean ( lowest CR <= MCR && MCR ) and
         execute Instant Settle for this amount and send those BTS to reserve pool

in this way we create a permanent source of partial financing of bad debt, but I also like the idea of additional funding for the WPS fund

24
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [poll] BTS repurchase destruction proposal
« on: December 04, 2019, 10:54:06 am »
6, repurchase BTS and destroy it immediately.
Destroy by sending BTS back to the reserve pool. Everything else is destroying funds.

the money comes from the reserve pool for the needs of WP, which is why BTS is sold on the market.
It would be better if we pay employees in bitCNY (or bitUSD), and then that these employees exchange these bitCNY for BTC on external exchanges (CEX), so that bitCNY can be traded (circulated) there - if possible.
The more bitAssets on the markets outside DEX, the better.

in other words, IMO funds should not be burned (transferred to the reserve pool) in the form of previously purchased BTS, but should be stored for the same purpose as the reserve pool.

25
General Discussion / Re: suggestion on new OMO fund
« on: October 17, 2019, 08:50:38 pm »
committee are now continuously buying BTS with the accumulated market fees, and now there is more than 5M BTS in committee-account.
how to use these BTS? just leave them there? or burn them as someone suggested?
Why not mint smartcoins and release to the market? Can we find a way to maintain a debt position with enough safety margin?if we can, why not do that?
there is no working agreement between voters and worker proposal owners, every worker proposal owner should be aware that the worker may be voted down, I cannot suggest a man with serious illness to sell blood without stop.
If BTS price fall to zero, any worker will make no sense.

I'd send those BTS back to the reserve pool, the BTS quantity chart in the reserve pool is constantly falling. We should aim to maintain a ratio of 1/3 (reserve pool) to 2/3 (BTS in circulation)
But from now on I would accumulate these bitAssets and add them to the budget for further development (Worker Proposal System) - I would treat this fund as an additional one.
All funds accumulated in the form bitAsset other than bitCNY should be exchanged to bitCNY on DEX and then bitCNY should be sent outside DEX and sold on external CEX to pay salaries.
It is in our interest that as much bitCNY as possible exists in circulation on external exchanges.

26
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [Poll] BSIP59:Reduce MCR of bitCNY to 1.6
« on: April 05, 2019, 11:27:39 am »
(...)
maybe we need to set a insurance fund of GS and use the TARGET COLLATERAL RATIO to handle the CR of 1.10, if the insurance fund of GS can't handle, then black swan protection, if the CR which 40% of the whole system debit is down to 1.10, then settle the bitasset. 8)
(...)
thoughts?

IMO insurance fund is "unhealthy" and makes people more prone to risk because someone else will pay for their mistakes.
###

in the current market state, reducing the "MCR" from 1.75 to 1.6 is not so bad, but we must be able to react quickly to market situations. But first and foremost I think that controlling parameters through constantly new BSIP is not a good way. These parameters should be dealt with by Witnesses (MCR, MSSR) or by the Committe Mambers (Settlement offset). I do not agree with the opinion that they lack economic knowledge to do it. This game is quite simple and the rules of this game are well known to witnesses.

Witnesses can even increase the value of the MCR parameter because it is not fully known when the majority will be achieved. If only 1 or 2 changes this parameter, it announces changes and tells investors that maybe they should increase their CR, if not they will be margin called


Please, encourage witnesses you vote for to change parameters, that is their task and they should be more pro-active. At the moment only two of them have a different opinion.

27
I think that the modification of the settlement option could be helpful in keeping the price of bitCNY from the bottom. Then the settlement could buy everything between the market price and the feed price for 24 hours, with dynamic buy feed price (same way as "Margin Call Price" sells BTS) If the whole order of the Settle would not be done within 24h, then the rest would have done according to the current method.
The settlement option reduces the amount of bitAssets, and this is not good. It's better to let the owner change on the market if he offers a better price.

this solution would give as 3 benefits:
1. provides additional buy pressure up to the feed price level
2. prevents the capitalization of bitAssets from shrinking
3. if the amount of settlement is small, the user would not have to wait 24 hours, Settlement could be instant.

in other words, Settlement could behave same as margin call but in opposite direction for 24h. After this time, all the rest would settle according to the current method.

28
I see no reason to set it arbitrarily in advance. This is the role of Witness, they should determine such things and, among other things, on this basis should be voted on. Unless it is impossible to get the median out of these parameters. In my opinion, these parameters should be determined dynamically even several times a day. It would introduce an interesting element of the game. @zhouxiaobao please add option "witness decide"

29
General Discussion / Re: New mechanism to prevent bad debt (black swan)
« on: October 28, 2018, 04:34:42 pm »
@FractalNode: You want to use fees to pay interest ?

it would be necessary to make some calculations first, but yes
for everyone who keeps at least 100 bitUSD maybe more, and bitCNY of course also for bitAssets shorters 50/50
passive income is a growing trend in crypto space and will become more and more important. IMO it's time to start working to be in this circle
imagine at least 30% of unique accounts holding at least 100 bitUSD and 690 bitCNY and the effect it has on the BTS price

Quote
We can archive market peg by changing at first:
1. MCR
2. MSQR
http://docs.bitshares.org/bitshares/user/dex-short.html

The difference of feed price and DEX price should be seen in context of EMA and DEX Price.

I would not mess with those parameters as long as possible

30
General Discussion / Re: New mechanism to prevent bad debt (black swan)
« on: October 20, 2018, 08:45:03 pm »
in my opinion, we should redirect revenue from the transaction fee that is currently being transferred into the committee-trade account and return it to MPA Shorters (and MPA holders), at the same time we should start implementing BSIP 0019 and BSIP 0020. These features should be the heart of BitShares from the very beginning available to every user.

related thread
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26072.msg321168#msg321168

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