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Messages - fractalnode

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1
General Discussion / Re: 2021-02-22 bitCNY parameters adjustment
« on: February 23, 2021, 12:53:19 am »
the sudden changes you make are more dangerous for users than the market itself that these users are watching. Next time I ask you to announce the changes in advance (at least 24 hours) on the telegram, pinning the appropriate message and announcing it to all users.

2
Quote from: abit
The question is who gets to decide who are good and who are bad, if it's code to decide, how to define the rules so that good behaviors and bad behaviors can be identified, and bugs are avoided. It's not only what to do, but how to do.

I put forward the following thesis:
let's measure the engagement based on the expenses incurred on the selected list of fees.

I proposed to reward:
* trading on strictly defined tokens (decided by the committee) - here is voting power for everyone
* some of the above-mentioned fees specify specific gateways and reward them for running a business based on BitShares
* the third point concerns remuneration of the dev-team (core & ui) on the basis of the WP community accepted
This is how I see the starting point for further considerations.

Of course, there is a technical question of how to approach it, but at this stage I am interested in the opinion on this approach to Vote Power and nothing else.
What are loopholes?
What could you add to make it even better to measure?

BitShares distinguishes 68 different types of fees, there is a lot to choose from.

In this approach, Voting Power comes directly from building BitShares and its active use. I can't imagine anything more pure.


//
~ maybe Vote Power could be some sort of Vesting balance, but without claim option and with Vote Power decay

3
My thoughts were written here: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/83.

There are many good ideas in BSIP83 and it's hard to disagree with them. Let me quote a few.
Quote
IMHO, for a healthy ecosystem, decision making on important things should be serious and relatively stable, so governance voting should only be allowed for long-term self-owned stake only, and interests should be aligned.

* stakes in balances can be liquidized / transferred / sold at any time, allow voting with balance means instability, may negatively impact decision making, because everyone can obtain (buy) some stake and participate in and influence decision making (voting) at any time immediately, then sold them at any time immediately when no longer want to participate, with no consequence;

* utilized stakes should be considered as "used" but not "being owned", thus stakes in collateral or market orders should not be counted in;
for stakes in collateral, it means debts exist and the positions can be liquidized in various ways, thus the stakes are not 100% owned;
for stakes in market orders, it means they're for sale, which showed unwillingness to hold;

That is why I proposed a token that cannot be exchanged or transferred. Vote power is generated by good work, you don't transfer or trade your reputation.
Good work, just like a good reputation degrades over time, and so does VOTE token. (OL vote ! sic)


Quote
one controversial topic is, should people be allowed to suddenly start influencing decision making with a big stake, especially if said decisions will invalidate earlier efforts made by other stake holders. IMHO it's better to minimize influence of this behavior, e.g. requires a holding period for voting.

I think this is the biggest problem DPOS has to deal with in the real world and we can observe all of this, so it deserves the most attention. Neither the BSIP83 nor what we have at the moment solves this problem.

Even when using a stake, a fractional reserve can be used. You surely remember when poloniex had 300 million in a cold wallet and 300 million in a hot wallet. You also remember that their BitShares wallet was kept in maintenance for many months, and it was the same with Steemit. Each of these exchanges is able to put in the "Stake" such amount of tokens, which is able to significantly disturb the functioning of the management structure, especially if we introduce a multiplier.



There is another element that nobody mentioned on the occasion of BTS in Stake. Consider such a situation.

You wrote a great WP and it was successfully accepted by the community, you yourself put few millions BTS in stake. The community is happy that BitShares will be even better, so the BTS price as in March 2017 soars + 13,000% (x130). People who did not put BTS in Stake, but Short bitAssets increase the amount of BTS, and their potential Vote Power increases. "Bad capital" is catching up with "good capital". This is the reward for "misbehavior" and you, in a way, "lose" instead of gain.

Now let's come back to my idea for a moment. There are many fighting camps in BitShares, let's just take cn-vote and beos as an example.

BEOS team put a bot on HERO, maybe GS would not show up. The team earns money by providing liquidity and also increases their vote power by paying a trade fee. HERO works, everyone is happy.
At the same time, BEOS is working on its chain, but in the meantime they offer a gateway to EOS tokens, it turns out that you can trade EOS tokens on BitShares. Each of the new dApps communities on EOS gains knowledge about their ancestor BitShares and it suddenly turns out that BitShares DEX is more efficient than newdex.io There is a topic in the media space that newdex is not really DEX, because you have to send them your tokens, in the case of BitShares it is unnecessary because you are trading account to account. There is attention from a dozen hot communities at once.

CN-VOTE creates a fund, issues a token in exchange for shares in the trading bot on bitCNY, ... etc. The cn-vote account pays a lot of fees and provides a lot of liquidity in the market, maybe there wouldn't even be a GS threat on bitCNY and no feed price locking. At the same time, they gains vote power and pays dividends from the profits from his MM bot to his community.

The dev core & ui team realizes WP, in return for successfully completed projects, they receive a VOTE token. Of course, as talented people they also generate a lot of vote power by trading bots on DEX.

Gates: GDEX, RUDEX, XBTS, IOBANKER compete with each other by offering their clients viral tokens from TOP 50 CMC, plus a whole family of tokens from ETH and EOS and other viral tokens. Their turnover increases, they pay more and more fees, and in return their vote power increases. In addition, their revenues increase and the sense of security of the business.

A new WP is created that creates a connector for the humminig bot, bitshares appears on the existing DEX lists. New speculative capital flows into BitShares DEX.

CEX and large external capital, as well as inactive people, do not have the right to vote. why should they? Why should we allow them to meddle in our affairs?

4
Thank you for your answer.
I am primarily interested in your opinion about gamification, I proposed as resistance to threats and a natural selection of people with greater voting power.
I am not sure if the proposed method of measuring engagement is good enough.
I would love to know your proposal of such a measurement and the loopholes you see in it.

5
I was hoping you would refer to the idea and the changes in the theory of the game for influence.

  • we need to attract users to trade
  • we want gateways to introduce tokens attractive to users and help ensure liquidity on them
  • we want development proposals that are interesting for everyone and we want to reward the people who implement them. asap.

You don't have to explain the status quo to me.
I live long enough that I know these rules and I'm here long enough to know that these rules are slowing us down terribly.
I was hoping that we could afford some innovations that would attract the attention of the entire DPOS community.
We were the best 5 years ago. Today, everyone else is quick to achieve goals, and we are constantly fighting for power instead of implementing solutions that will allow us to maintain an advantage.

6
General Discussion / A proposal for a new look at the governance model
« on: August 27, 2020, 08:41:31 pm »
"Governance powered by engagement"

A.) Vision

I believe the best intentions and the best vision have people who actively build BitShares and people who actively use it. These people should have the greatest influence on how BitShares develops in the future. In other words, you must have "skin in the game" or "dirty hands". Outsiders won't have any influence on our platform until they naturally deserve it. Too often I have heard criticism and advice from people who don't even know how it works, or hardly ever use it.
Traders are basically customers, each company must listen to its customers and in order to grow.
Another group are those who build this "framework", that is programmers and gateways. We can measure the effectiveness of programmers by accepting their projects (i.e. accepting a vision for further development)
We can also measure the effectiveness of the gates by the number of customers they have (turnover on their tokens). I would exclude all the rest as an uninvolved or even dangerous group → CEX, ~ Justin Sun, Custodial Wallets



B.) We have the following problems to solve and we all know examples of where they occur:

1) Preventing CEX exchanges from voting, as well as other wallets holding other people's tokens
2) Hostile takeover by purchasing large amounts of tokens and attempting to forcefully change the existing community
3) buying votes
4) manipulating other people's opinions by providing incomplete information

C.) Proposal to solve the problem.

1) The right to vote gives a separate token, eg VOTE
2) The VOTE token's voice strength decreases over time. Parameters for discussion.
3) The VOTE token cannot be exchanged for other tokens or transferred to another account.
4.) 1 token = 1 vote
for all categories separately
- Witnesses
- Committee
- WP
- BSIP

D) The VOTE token is airdroped on the accounts in proportion to the costs incurred for only selected transaction fees.

a.) *trading fees
b.) fees incurred on WP if accepted by the community
c.) *issue asset (I mean the issue of eg GATEWAY.BTC in exchange for a deposit, to further strengthen the business, on tokens also approved by Committee)
d.) *feed price fee
e.) and maybe some other fee ....

*applies only to a specific list of tokens accepted by the committee

Notes on point "D"

Certainly, some fees, such as those incurred for a transfer, should be excluded because of the fact that CEX exchanges pay the most.
In addition, the remuneration received by people during the work on WP should be taken into account. It will certainly be difficult to calculate the appropriate factor, it should be high enough to appreciate this work, but also not to create hegemony. Some statistical analysis should be performed before such a conversion is applied.

E.) In fact, we do not want a lot of people to vote, we want people who have an opinion on a given topic or want to speak on a given matter to vote. Therefore, it could be done quite classically.

1.) New projects under WP are visible in the chain from the first day of the month and their maturity date is at the end of that month. There is a month for everyone to get to know the project and discuss it. There is no room for unexpected votes that no one knows about, as new WPs are always 1 day of the month.
2.) We always vote for or against.
3.) WP pass by most votes 50% +1 (or 2/3 for discussion)
4.) only LTM account can become proxy, as long as we want the proxy to still exist?

Notes on point "E"
I am not really sure if the proxy is a good idea. It kindles emotions of a political nature, and I don't know if it serves us well. We certainly want whoever is involved to vote, but not everyone has to. I guess this approach filters out a lot of random and manipulated votes and leaves only the ones that are really involved. Moreover, it does not exclude the impact on other people via social media who may want to imitate our votes and opinions, but it excludes the votes of people not involved in social media, or those with whom we do not have direct contact.

In this way, the number of voters will certainly be smaller, but for the same reason the discussion between them will certainly be of better quality.

7
Quote
Poll-BAIP9-Set bitCNY FSFP to 1% and FSO to 1%

Not better FSO 0% and FSFP 2% ?

the concept behind it is that:
1% FSO is the compensation for the one on whom FS is performed
1% FSFP is a discouraging fee and increases the income in the reserve pool

maybe it's not that bad



8
Many thanks to the k-witness Witness for restoring this market!

9
The BTS / RUBLE market lost its seventh witness again yesterday.
RUBLE was one of the two markets, alongside EUR, which worked fine when CNY and USD were locked.
Many people still have open positions there.

I am asking witnesses to resume production of feed prices.
Alternatively, I am asking Committe members to reduce the minimum number of producers from 7 to 5-6 to resume the proper operation on this market.

Please coordinate activities on closed Telegram channels and take appropriate action asap.

Here is a list of 6 witnesses currently supporting this market, 1 is missing.

Quote
btspp-witness
blckchnd
clone
bhuz
zapata42-witness
delegate.freedom

10
Voted!
GoBitShres!

#BitShares2020
#DeFi

11
At the same time, I propose to increase Force Settlement Delay to 48 hours. The risk of changing prices during this period may somewhat stop the tendency to use this feature frequently and get people to buy straight from the market.

Increase force-settlement offset to 5% or more higher is the suitable way, increase Force Settlement Delay to 48 hours can't change anything, there have some trading skills in Force Settlement, offset is the main factor, time is not so important.

we already had force-settlement offset at 5% level, don't you remember?
the result was that the bitCNY price fell by 5% and nothing more.
increasing the delay from 24h to 48h increases the risk. It may just be more profitable to buy at the current market price.
And if there is not enough BTS in DEX, you can always buy some from CEX
Only force settlement that exists in the world is in Steem / Hive and lasts 3.5 days. Experience teaches that maybe 24h is not enough.

12
At the same time, I propose to increase Force Settlement Delay to 48 hours. The risk of changing prices during this period may somewhat stop the tendency to use this feature frequently and get people to buy straight from the market.

13
BAIP2 can be helpful during short price drops.
But to fight the abuse of Force Settlement, a good tool is to Delay its execution.
That's why I am asking you to start this tool and increase Settlement Delay from 24h to 42h

delay won't work because there are no bts on the market.Noone willing to sell BTS against biteur.
So the only possibility to accuire more BTS via debt is force settlement.
Delay won't change anything on a non liquid market


Short price drops are also not a problem in biteur.
CR's there are over 4.5


I'm not saying that this is the only possible way.
I claim that this is an important ingredient in the fight against abuse of this functionality. We still have settlement offset available, but this should be as small as possible.
That is why I think that if we increase the Delay to 42h and additionally raise the Settlement Offset, e.g. to 2% 3% (max), it can bring favorable results.

Delay introduces an additional risk element to consider if you want to use this feature. Within 2 days a lot can happen with the price, which is why more people may want to buy BTS from the market at the current market price or slightly higher → and here arbirage occurs, which is why the price increases on CEX


in less than a month we have halving, and with the increasing price of BTC
BAIP2 is irrelevant for situations where Force Settlement is abused

besides, we have 4 popular MPA tokens
let the different settings show us what works best


Delay is increasing risk that's correct but in biteur there is no other option to gain BTS other than force settlement.You can't buy BTS from market as there are no sellers.Increasing offset will only make that price on market will increase to new settlement price or above making biteur more unpegg.

ok, but this :
Code: [Select]
If (current price >  two-day moving average price) {
  feed price = current price;
}
Else{
  feed price = two-day moving average price;
}

brings nothing new to the case

But increasing Delays, reduces the number of risk takers - that's certain.

And when it comes to Offset, you definitely know that the credit is taken at Feed Price, and the Force Settlement is at the price:
Feed Price + Force Settlement and this discourages, of course not everyone.

The third tool we have is a larger fee for Force Settle, but it should not be flat, it should be relative if it is to be fair. Otherwise it favors the rich.

14
BAIP2 can be helpful during short price drops.
But to fight the abuse of Force Settlement, a good tool is to Delay its execution.
That's why I am asking you to start this tool and increase Settlement Delay from 24h to 42h

delay won't work because there are no bts on the market.Noone willing to sell BTS against biteur.
So the only possibility to accuire more BTS via debt is force settlement.
Delay won't change anything on a non liquid market


Short price drops are also not a problem in biteur.
CR's there are over 4.5


I'm not saying that this is the only possible way.
I claim that this is an important ingredient in the fight against abuse of this functionality. We still have settlement offset available, but this should be as small as possible.
That is why I think that if we increase the Delay to 42h and additionally raise the Settlement Offset, e.g. to 2% 3% (max), it can bring favorable results.

Delay introduces an additional risk element to consider if you want to use this feature. Within 2 days a lot can happen with the price, which is why more people may want to buy BTS from the market at the current market price or slightly higher → and here arbirage occurs, which is why the price increases on CEX


in less than a month we have halving, and with the increasing price of BTC
BAIP2 is irrelevant for situations where Force Settlement is abused

besides, we have 4 popular MPA tokens
let the different settings show us what works best

15
BAIP2 can be helpful during short price drops.
But to fight the abuse of Force Settlement, a good tool is to Delay its execution.
That's why I am asking you to start this tool and increase Settlement Delay from 24h to 42h

more in this thread:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32256.msg341755#msg341755

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