I've lost control of @litepresence on telegram

I've been using telegram for years as an anon with burner phone and I got pinched on the latest app update; all my desktop app and servers got disconnected at the same time and phone number is required to reconnect - which has been dead for a long time.   Seems they recycled / sunset my auth token.   

If you're on telegram, please post a notice in @bitsharesdev regarding my account
If you need me, I monitor finitestate@tutamail.com

if you add ".patch" to my recent commit you can see this email address is associated with my github on the second line here:

https://github.com/litepresence/BitShares-Gateway/commit/500b7a85a566aa8d64466fb6039cba208662e794.patch


I have a few tricks potentially up my sleeve for re-acquisition, but I may just have to come back with a new userid.   If it comes to that I'll post the new id here and on my github.   Apologies for any inconvenience.   

litepresence

ps, if I could get email from ammar or chris sanborn it would be appreciated.   

The scope is quite large, is this BSIP all or nothing? Or could it be broken down into multiple BSIPs?

could be broken down

1) currently the oracle is either "witness cartel" (eg. bitCNY) or "private cartel" (eg. HONEST.USD).   I would think first step is to gamify the oracle so that it could actually be trusted as a decentralized protocol rather than an hierarchical elected clique.

2) then we get into what exactly are we to do with this new legit oracle.   seems there is considerable pressure to keep the bitasset MPA's as they stand... so they do not necessarily benefit from the new oracle.   So step two would be to give that oracle purpose; "mint and burn haven swaps" become the second phase.

3) they're not really "haven" swaps in the absence of stealth.    3rd phase then... we add requirement that swaps occur blind that blind transfers are signed with ring signatures.   

4) finally we can resolve the gateway honey-pot issues by leveraging the new oracle procedures to provide gateways for major cryptos

The "Simplex Oracle Mediated Atomic Cross Chain Swaps" tech sounds good for liquidity, however I'm concerned about haven protocol considering Terra's collapse when using a similar underlying protocol. Do you believe planned attack mitigations would prevent such a scenario? Would Terra have collapsed like it did had such mitigations been in place?

The Terra protocol and the Haven protocol swaps are quite different.   

Haven is very simple.  You have DFX.  DFX has some oracle rate it exchanges for USD... you burn your DFX and get USD at any time at oracle spot rate.   The process takes some time and staking to mitigate the possibility arbitrage attacks.   

Terra on the other hand has a "Supply and Demand Dynamics" algorithm: When the demand for UST increases, the protocol automatically mints new UST tokens. Conversely, when the demand decreases, the protocol burns UST tokens to reduce supply. This algorithmic adjustment mechanism helps stabilize the value of UST.  Terra Protocol also employs a mechanism called "Seigniorage Shares" to manage the stability of its stablecoins. When the protocol mints new UST tokens to meet increasing demand, these newly minted tokens are distributed to holders of Terra's governance token, LUNA. This distribution is intended to incentivize LUNA holders to stake their tokens and participate in the stability of the Terra ecosystem.   So the exploit vectors of the two protocols are not the same.

How much more complex does making everything stealth ring signature based make it? Would initially forgoing this stealth tech reduce complexity and cost?

By far the consensus mechanism behind a secure decentralized oracle is the most complex, unique, and dev hours taxing element of the design.   

Ring signatures, while complex in implementation... the path has largely been forged on other chains and the "blind balances" already exist.    So while it requires high level technical expertise... the lines of code involved should be much more limited.

Tokenization contracts for both Haven Swaps and ACCS swaps should be far less challenging both technically and in dev hour terms. 

Approx 30m BTS for this work is quite a lot, breaking the BSIP down to the most profitable bits for less might make it more feasible?

Sure that could be one path.   IMO... with value of the chain falling below $20M... 30M BTS probably will no longer cover what developers will ask to be involved.   So... I'd expect "either you're doing it or your not" that is... we view DFX Protocol as a Hail Mary to save a dying institution... or we let it bleed... Part of what creates value for "the developers" is that getting paid in tokens that have developer based "novel crypto magic" behind them makes them worth developing for.   That's the OG way things were done and that's the way I'd like to see this unfold.   That is... the whole package makes each BTS the dev gets paid worth more.   In cash terms... I think the build approaches $1M.    In crypto terms... I think it can get paid out closer to $300k in embued "magic tokens" that hold new and novel dev.

Is DFX only distributed to oracle data providers? Or is there a distribution planned?

There is mention in the paper of an initial "federation" of approved providers and there may be necessity to give away some "dust" to kick off the mechanics of the system.   that dust would go to those approved data providers; bitshares historical github contributors.

 工会凉不凉没关系了，因为像abit这样私自决定修改的，投票已经失去了意义。都可以私自添加修改了，还要投票啥的？
私自添加修改这种事，坚决不妥协。投票已经失去了意义。
去中心化共识已经破坏。绕过理事会，绕过投票，自己一个人骗了整个社区，自己一个人说了算，abit一个人即是社区天下，BTS是他的？以后投票有什么意义吗？直接改就行了。
虽然木已成舟，我虽然无力改变，我也要喷他几个月，虽然人家BM也直接改，但人家BM是创始人，人家权力大，不过BM也照样被喷了不久，所以abit准备好被喷几个月了没有啊？
实在不行，支持巨蟹硬分叉BTS。
我虽然不反对abit这添加的规则，永久锁仓这不是让人家的BTS废了？锁仓不应该有回报的么？没回报的锁仓简直。。。。但我反对的是他的做法，程序不按规定走，这以后的再多的投票又显得有什么意义？就算你有30亿票权，也敌不过一个abit。这共识，没意义了。

translation attempt:

It doesn't matter if his merged hotfix is cool or not:  If the outcome can be decided privately by abit, voting thereafter has lost all meaning.  If one can make changes without consensus, what else is left to be voted on? In making changes privately without compromise, the vote has lost its meaning.

The decentralized consensus has been broken.   Bypassing the committee and voters, one man deceived the entire community alone; seizing the final say.   So is abit the the community overlord; BitShares is his?   What is the point of anyone voting thereafter?  He will just change it again.

Although it is already done and I cannot change it, I will disparage him for a few months.   Although Bytemaster (BM) is also directly affected, he is the founder and has great power and insomuch he's been ridiculed for a long time.  Is abit ready to be disrespected for a few months?  I doubt it.

Supporting this cancerous hard fork just does not work.

Although I don't object to the changes abit made, isn't it effectively burning BTS for permanent lockup?   Shouldn't there be some additional reward? Instead the permanent lock ticket simply has no return. 

What I really oppose is the approach:  The voting rules were not followed in the upgrade procedure.  Why vote again in the future?   Even if you have 3 billion votes you cannot outvote abit; therefore any consensus is meaningless.

1. 投票权重衰减机制 (vote decay)

新注册的账户，投票权重为零，主动投票后，票才开始生效。

每次主动更新投票后，投票权重更新为 100% ，第360天衰减 12.5% ，然后每过 45 天衰减总权重的 12.5% ，到第 675 天投票完全失效。

代理投票的，代理人和被代理人投票权重按【乘数关系】叠加生效。

via google

1. Voting weight decay mechanism (vote decay)

For newly registered accounts, the voting weight is zero, and the votes will only take effect after actively voting.

After each active update of the vote, the voting weight is updated to 100%, and it decreases by 12.5% on the 360th day, and then decreases by 12.5% of the total weight every 45 days, and the voting is completely invalid on the 675th day.

For proxy voting, the voting weights of the proxy and the proxy are superimposed according to the [multiplier relationship].

my sinology

1. VOTE DECAY

For newly registered accounts, the user's voting power (VP) is zero.  VP only apply after you begin voting.

    After each active update of the vote, the user's VP is updated to 100%. 
    On the 360th day, the VP decreases by 1/8th (to 87.5%).
    Thereafter the user's VP decreases by another 1/8th ​​of the initial VP every 45 days,
    (to 75% then, then 62.5%, then 50% and so on...)
    until after 8 decay periods, on on the 675th day, the user's VP is zero.

For proxy voting, the relative voting weights of each proxy are multiplied by element wise with regard to their respective remaining VP.

2. 理事会选举一票一投机制

如果一个投票人投了多个理事会成员，则每个理事得票数 = 投票人总票数 / 投票人投的理事会成员数量

via google

2. One vote, one vote mechanism for council election

If a voter casts multiple board members, the number of votes for each board = the total number of votes of the voter / the number of board members voted by the voter

my sinology

2. Voting Mechanism for Council Election

If a voter elects more than one board member, the voting power applied toward each candidate is equal to:

    ( The user's voters power ) / ( Number of board members chosen )

3. 锁仓投票机制

参考 https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32357.0

新增一个锁仓操作 ticket_create_operation 和一个修改锁仓的操作 ticket_update_operation ，可指定锁仓帐号、时间和金额。

锁仓和修改操作手续费固定为 50 BTS ，理事会不可修改。

锁仓时间有几个选项： 180 天， 360 天， 720 天，永久
其中，
锁仓 180/360/720 天，则锁仓的 BTS 获得 2/4/8 倍投票权重
永久锁仓，则这部分 BTS 失去投票权，但帐户剩余的等量 BTS 获得 8 倍权重加成
推论：一个帐户最多可以获得 32 倍权重。

永久锁仓获得的权重加成，每 180 天衰减 2 倍， 720 天后失效。

锁仓导致的投票权重变化，采用升级/降级机制。
发起锁仓交易后，投盘人并不是马上获得对应倍数的投票权重，而是逐渐升级到指定的锁仓级别。
升级：每升一级需要 15 天。
如果 15 天内取消升级，资金从取消时间开始继续锁 7 天。
降级：即时生效，资金按之前指定的锁仓时间释放。

每个帐户可以有多个锁仓仓位，各仓位的时间、金额各自独立。
锁仓仓位可以拆分，不能合并。

锁仓仓位升级到“永久锁仓状态”前可随时修改；
锁仓仓位升级到“永久锁仓状态”后不可修改。

via google

3. Lock-up voting mechanism

Reference https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32357.0

A new lock operation ticket_create_operation and a change lock operation ticket_update_operation are added, which can specify the lock account, time and amount.

The operating fee for lock-up and modification is fixed at 50 BTS, and the board cannot modify it.

There are several options for lock-up time: 180 days, 360 days, 720 days, permanent
among them,
Locked for 180/360/720 days, the locked BTS will get 2/4/8 times the voting weight
Permanent lock-up, this part of BTS loses the right to vote, but the remaining equivalent BTS in the account gets an 8 times weight bonus
Corollary: An account can get up to 32 times the weight.

The weight bonus obtained by permanent lock-up will attenuate by 2 times every 180 days and expire after 720 days.

The change of voting weight caused by lock-up adopts an upgrade/downgrade mechanism.
After initiating a lock-up transaction, the investor does not immediately obtain the corresponding multiple of the voting weight, but gradually upgrades to the designated lock-up level.
Upgrade: It takes 15 days to upgrade each level.
If the upgrade is cancelled within 15 days, the funds will continue to be locked for 7 days from the cancellation time.
Downgrade: Take effect immediately, and funds will be released according to the previously specified lock-up time.

Each account can have multiple locked positions, and the time and amount of each position are independent.
Locked positions can be split but cannot be merged.

The locked position can be modified at any time before it is upgraded to the "permanent locked state";
The locked position cannot be modified after it has been upgraded to the "permanent locked position".

my sinology

3. Voting Power Lock Mechanism

Reference https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32357.0

A new lock operation and a change lock are added, `ticket_create_operation` and `operation ticket_update_operation` respectively. 

These new operations can specify the lock `account`, `time`, and `amount`.

The operating fee for lock-up and modification is fixed at 50 BTS.  This fee cannot be modified by the board.

There are 4 options for lock-up time; 180 days, 360 days, 720 days, and permanent lock.

TIME LOCK:

When locked for 180, 360, or 720 days, the locked BTS will generate 2X, 4X, and 8X the voting power respectively

PERMANENT LOCK:

When locked permanently - effectively burned - the locked BTS loses the right to vote
and the remain equivilent BTS in the account gets an 8X weight bonus. 
The weight bonus obtained by permanent lock-up will be halved every 180 days and expire completely after 720 days.

MAXIMUM POWER:

The maximum allowed VP weight is 32X which can be obtained through both permanent lock and timelock of 360 days or more.

UPGRADE / DOWNGRADE MECHANISM

The change of voting weight caused by lock-up adheres to an upgrade and downgrade mechanism as follows:

UPGRADE:

After initiating a lock-up transaction, the investor does not immediately obtain the corresponding multiple of the voting weight.  Instead the investor gradually upgrades to the designated lock-up level. It takes 15 days to upgrade each level.  If the upgrade is cancelled within 15 days, the funds will continue to be locked for 7 days from the cancellation time.

DOWNGRADE:

Downgrading takes effect immediately upon the user's request, however the funds will be released according to the previously specified lock-up time.

FAQ:

Can you have more than on locked position?

    Each account can have multiple locked positions, and the time decay and amount locked, of each position, are independent.

Can locked positions be split or merged?

    Locked positions can be split but cannot be merged.

When can locked positions be modified?

    The locked position can be modified at any time before it is upgraded to the "permanent locked state".
    Once permanently locked, it can never be modified again.

4. 永久锁仓生效后的投票规则

当链上出现第一个“永久锁仓状态”的锁仓仓位后，如下投票规则生效：

4.1 不持有“永久锁仓状态”仓位的帐号，投票权重为零
4.2 抵押的 BTS 和挂单的 BTS 不再有投票权


更新：如何通过 cli_wallet 命令行进行锁仓相关操作，请往下翻页查看。

更新2： BitShares Mobile (BTS++) 手机钱包 v6.2 已经加入锁仓功能

via google

4. Voting rules after permanent lock-up takes effect

When the first "permanent lock state" locked position appears on the chain, the following voting rules will take effect:

4.1 Accounts that do not hold positions in the "permanent lock-up state" have a voting weight of zero
4.2 Mortgage BTS and BTS with pending orders no longer have voting rights


Update: How to perform lock-up related operations through the cli_wallet command line, please scroll down to see.

my sinology

4. Voting Rules in BitShares 4.0.0

When the first user's "permanently locked state" position appears on the chain, the following voting rules will take effect:

4.1 Accounts that do not hold at least 1 BTS in "permanently locked state" have a no voting power
4.2a BTS held as MPA collateral no longer has voting rights
4.2b BTS held as limit orders no longer has voting rights

Please scroll down to see how to perform the lock-up related operations via the command line interface

The asset owner is currently against the price feed manipulation of bitUSD and CNY, hence the creation of this new asset HONEST, I suggest you read the details of the asset before making your judgement.
1. The asset owner is not anonymous he is well known in the bitshares community his ID is litepresence on bitshares telegram you can contact him if you have queries to his assets.
2. There are only three price feed producers because of lack of interest, the assets price have never been manipulated since creation either

3. The wash trading you are currently seeing is called sceletus in the asset description, it's meant to make the asset chart have a similar pattern to what it represents, it is being done until more users begin to trade it organically.

all of this is generally true ^

HONEST began as a protest; and to some degree still is... simply to show that there was nothing wrong with the technology itself:  It was maleficent political control over the "mpa settings" that has forced core BitAssets off peg to benefit the few who have control.  Rest assured they profit by flicking voting switches.

1. Do you have his photo? If he run away, can you help HONEST Holders to sue him? Anonymous itself is not a big problem but a single anonymous person as Asset Owner is VERY VERY HIGH RISK for HONEST Holders & Borrowers.

all you have of me is my social media presence; I have a long history as a liberty and free market activist.   I also have long history of creating open source crypto related botscript.   I have considerable interest in the underlying cryptocurrency technology from client side perspective since mtgox/2013.   


To the best of my knowledge I don't have any on internet photos of myself.  If your doxing skills are superb I'm sure you could pin me down...    Please don't... but know that if I am a scammer surely the feds will catch me should you have valid complaints.   

currently I am:

litepresence.com
@oraclepresence twitter
presence ronpaulforums.com
litepresence telegram reddit github stackoverflow
litepresence1, user85 on BitShares
email: finitestate@tutamail.com

and I am not:

I have an impersonator that uses a number 1 instead of a letter L on telegram.  Also an impersonator @litepresence on twitter.  my bitcointalk account litepresence has been hacked and owned by another party for about 4 years now.   there are localbitcoin and localitecoin litepresence's that are not me and surely scammers.  These kind of things come with using the same pseudonym since Bitcoin's beginnings.

2. Lack of interest because how investors/traders trust a Single Anonymous Person as Asset Owner? Even this guy is not Anonymous, putting money on one single person is VERY VERY HIGH RISK for HONEST Holders & Borrowers.

No doubt.   I dove into this protesting as a dev.   Did not have any business plan at that time.  "Fuck you for ruining bitassets - that's why" was the plan.  Now I'm asset owner of something that just might matter.  Oops.

What is the next step then?  Surely I have no interest in owning this thing long term as its "VERY VERY HIGH RISK for HONEST Holders & Borrowers" - I agree that is a single point of failure.   Also as you point out it puts me in a position of considerable legal risk... which I have nil interest in.   So... I do think at some point in near future we need to begin assessing joint ownership; multisig wallet ownership.    We've also created a general "gentleman's agreement" that is in print but not ratified in any way among feed producers as to the producer general expectations.

Until then, I do not suggest you trust my issuance with your life savings.   But please do use HONEST with notional amounts to explore the technology.  It works... that in my eyes is very cool.   I think graphene mpa's are too important a technology to let go to waste because of corrupt governance issues of dpos.   graphene mpa's concept can exist without dpos voting flaws.   This is a nascent experimental blockchain project as explained in the ANN thread.  This said, I am dev'ing daily.   I'm becoming familiar with gateway technology.   @Bench is becoming familiar with reference UI forking.   @Ammar is working on a core fork "Onest Chain" with improved voting mechanisms.  Where exactly we are headed as a brand is still foggy and "becoming".   Our intention though, is advancement and legitimacy of graphene mpa tech.  We're in dev mode; bear with us.

My fairy tales and rainbows solution to multisig... I was going to simply invite all the people in Bitshares community that I trusted into a room... offer them all co ownership multisig.   I assumed most would say yes and we'd dance off into the sunset.   I did that, invited 25 well known community members, with good ethics, and graphene technical skillset - into a room and polled their interest of being co owner of multi sig:  2-3 showed interest.   So that put a bit of kibosh on my distributed ownership desires as it hardly makes broad population sample for internal voting.    What I was hoping for was for 10 others to become co-owners.  11 of us voting on internal decisions thereafter.   Not sure how to rally the troops at the moment.    From there, I'd like ownership succession to proceed with a script we all use to create ownership change proposals.   We'd also need such scripting for proposals to change all asset settings, or create new assets thereafter.    Also... at the moment I'm not entirely sure I'm done creating new mpa's; the project is only a few months old.   For example, I have interest in dev'ing HONEST.BTS1 backed by HONEST.BTC. Once the project goes multisig... adding new assets becomes more of a hassle without proposal scripting.   To date all the asset creation and feed price scripting is me running solo.

At the moment I'm dev'ing python graphene gateways for an unrelated project; nonetheless becoming a better client side graphene dev.

3. The Asset description wrote about Sceletus for Wash Trading and then you see it no problem because it HONESTLY WASH TRADING. 

"Wash Trading" is typically done to create a volume chart for the sake of promoting yourself as a "high volume" market when in fact you have low volume.     Our sceletus ops are dust amounts; < 1 USD daily in each market.   

The current deployment of the BitShares Reference UI does not allow you to plot the mpa feed price.   To show the feed price, we've submitted - graphically to the user - we perform 3 operations every hour:

publish(feed_price)
buy(dust_amount, feed_price)
sell(dust_amount, feed_price)

It is all open source and the result is a visual chart of the published feed price.   At no point are we inflating the volume; we are buying and selling the absolute minimum possible to allow the graphene integer fractional price to represent within 1/3 of 1% of traditional human readable decimal price.   The aim is to show "it was possible" given the state of the order book on chain, at that time, to execute an order at that price.   The volume is nil and often appears as simply 0 in the UI.
In effect, I hacked the Reference UI to plot - at least - the feed price when there are no other trades. 

Then Bitcrab is HONESTLY Set Price Threshold because is written down too in BSIP. So HONEST Asset Owner no different than Bitcrab, we can call him Bitcrab No.2, maybe the person behind actually is Bitcrab.

lol

RUDEX has whitelisted all HONEST MPA's

thanks Dima

From the poll result it should be 1%

There were 81% voting for change.
When you consider the weighted average its 1.46 (assuming >3 means 4).   
When you consider weighted average of the super majority voting other than zero; its 1.81
If you consider those who voted > 3 as potentially seeking more than 4:  Then 2 is quite plausibly the weighted sentiment.

It was a non anon poll as we certainly consider weight of opinion; so there is also that.

Also, considered heavily was technical analysis of daily candles in python simulation for Average True Range Percent (ATRP)(ATR%).   You can plot BTSUSD binance ATR at tradingview and ATRP if you have an account there.
https://www.tradingview.com/symbols/BTSUSD/?exchange=BINANCE

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/atr.asp
https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/trading-investing/technical-analysis/technical-indicator-guide/atrp

The aim is to achieve desired effects of allowing the red shorter to avoid the blue force settler in pursuit of the "ten day trending outlook" at green.  Admittedly, no matter how you spin it, there is a degree of shoot from the hip in any arrangement involving fine tuning of an MPA's parameters.   2% seems like a solid compromise after a few days of reviewing relevant data.

You'll note I initially voted 0% in the poll myself. I have been swayed both through other's rhetoric, thoughtful consideration of data, and ongoing contemplation of game theory. 

 






Ensure you always have adequate collateral backing each debt.
Ensure you never have too much collateral backing each debt.

In either case, when out of bounds:
Returns your collateral to the middle of the band specified by the user,
by via

Call_order_update(collateral_delta)
https://github.com/litepresence/BitShares-Shorting-Attack-Avenger