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之前之所以存在爆仓惩罚和强清是因为锚定不精准，但是现在解决了锚定不精准的问题我的想法就是暴仓单都进一个池子，不直接砸市场，然后大家发起强清。但是强清和爆仓都没有奖励和惩罚。
现在的爆仓惩罚和强请存在的意义等于是做期货，但也没达到平衡，
bts是一个去中心化交易所 一个钱包 一个银行，而不是bts期货交易
至于喂价应该是由市场自己调节，不用系统干预。
I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.
I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.
I feel very very disappointed now.
After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?
These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.
OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.
Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.
同意支持提高清算补偿
一样的，喂价反馈一样可以反馈到无限低，难道清算补偿也要提高无限高？
the situantion is same.
虽然BIP42已经可以保证BITCNY的锚定了，但是目前的喂价公式不利于活跃市场，灵敏度太低，反映迟于市场行情。压低喂价和强清都可以抑制抵押，但是强清也不是无风险套利，因为延后24小时执行，这就是市场风险了。用压低喂价的方式不如发起强清利于活跃市场，目前看市场已经很死了，不应该一味的打压市场活跃度了。
如果想发起强清，那么玩家手里必须备有bitcny,这也是bitcny的需求来源。所以目前保留强清会更合适，没有理由移除强清。况且，强清目前也没有什么坏处，无非就是把高抵押的清算了而已，下调喂价一样会把高抵押的爆仓的。移除强清是保护抵押者的说法不成立。只要市场bitcny需求不足，那么高抵押行为必须抑制。
强请补偿应该为零，而不是5%，会更有利于活跃内盘的。强清应该是很正常的市场行为，而不是偶尔来一次，习惯了就行了。阶梯式强清补偿可能更合适，可以避免恶意强清。
总之，BTS系统是做市场的，不是国家机构，不能管的太死，否则会适得其反。
另外，锚定精确不代表非要1:1才是锚定精确。只要在一定时间段保证汇率稳定，保证汇率可控就是锚定精确了。可以是1:1，也可以是1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03，都表示锚定精确。熊市行情应该是bitcny 适度贬值的锚定，比如1:1.02，这样会更有利于活跃市场。
你这是想完全把bts改成期货交易
Although BIP42 can guarantee the anchoring of BITCNY, the current feeding formula is not conducive to the active market, and the sensitivity is too low to reflect the market price later. Lower feeding prices and strong liquidation can suppress mortgages, but strong liquidation is not risk-free arbitrage, because delayed implementation of 24 hours, which is market risk. It's better to lower the feeding price than to activate the market by launching a strong Qing Dynasty. At present, the market is dead, so we should not blindly suppress the market activity.
If you want to be strong, then players must have bitcny in hand, which is also the source of demand for bitcny. Therefore, it is more appropriate to retain strong clearance at present, and there is no reason to remove Qiang Qing. Moreover, there is no harm in Qiangqing at present, just liquidating the high mortgage, and lowering the feeding price will also explode the high mortgage. It is untenable to remove strong clearing is to protect mortgages. As long as the market bitcny demand is insufficient, the high mortgage behavior must be suppressed.
Strong compensation should be zero instead of 5%, which will be more conducive to active internal market. Qiang Qing should be a normal market behavior, rather than once in a while, get used to it. Step by step compensation is probably more appropriate and can avoid malicious strong.
In a word, the BTS system is a market, not a state institution. It should not be too rigid, otherwise it would be counterproductive.
In addition, anchoring accuracy does not mean that 1:1 is anchoring accuracy. As long as the exchange rate is stable in a certain period of time, it is accurate to ensure that the exchange rate is controllable. It can be 1:1 or 1:1.01,1:1.02,1:1.03, which means anchoring accuracy. Bear market should be the anchor of bitcny moderate depreciation, such as 1:1.02, which will be more conducive to active market.
I've foreseen the situation when drafting BSIP42, see https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0042.md#uptrend-and-discount . In short, a static force settlement offset is not quite compatible with BSIP42 when a bitAsset is oversupplied. BSIP42 aims to let debt position holders reduce debt at market/fair price, but not at higher price to punish them. If we agree with BSIP42, we either need to adjust force settlement offset dynamically, or disable force settlement temporarily.
I've explained why disabling force settlement is doable in this thread https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27170.0 . I'm not going to explain again. I'm not going to push anything. It's no fun.
I feel very very disappointed now.
After experimented BSIP42 for 2 months, which has shown obvious effects towards a tight peg, people still didn't understand the ins and outs, including the ones who appeared to support BSIP42 (e.g. Fabian @xeroc), not even mentioning the ones who voted "NO" without even written anything in this forum. All discussions came to a dead end. No progress. Nothing. Not even a valid argument. When people just say no but don't tell you why, how you can improve? We're all 5? It's that hard to discuss rationally? It's that waste of your time to learn a bit more?
These are our community? These are our voters / stake holders? These are the people who will decide the future of BitShares? I'd say there is no future. It's easy to make an experiment fail but hard to make it succeed. You decide. I'm out. I'm tired.
OK, some of you asked for a fix for the MCR issue. I've submitted the code (the fix) to github 2 months before, whoever wants to test it and push it online can go ahead, or write your own fix. Actually, adjusting MCR is effectively the same as adjusting price feed + force settlement offset, so, before the fix is online, we can do something to keep things going, however, whether to do and what to do also depends on you.
Update:
Properly punishing debt position owners when a bitAsset is oversupplied is fine, since it encourages them to reduce supply proactively. From this point of view, forced settlements can still play a role in the game, although it can be replaced by forced margin calls. The thing is, target CR doesn't apply when a debt position is being forced settled, so, not like margin calls which evenly apply to all positions with (relatively) low CR, force settlements may punish a few positions too hard, but don't punish other positions at all, so it's IMHO not a fair enough rule.
Bts system can only be short after the feed price reform
You can do more and short before you reform.
Now that bitcny is stable, why not make a way to do more?
My method is to add the borrowing function to bitcny to bitcny lender interest.
The bitcny mortgaged by bts should be loaned according to the interest of the day like zb
The mortgage function of bts is the role of the printing machine rather than the interest-free loan.
This could be easily achieved by creating a bitasset which uses bitCNY as its backing collateral, then apply a x% increase against the reference price feed every year continuously, think HERO except backed by bitCNY instead of BTS. No need for any changes to the BTS DEX.
What % price feed appreciation per year were you thinking?
