Quote from: bitcrab on August 23, 2019, 03:24:11 am

BTS is already a disaster to investors, if we continue inflation and selling BTS without limitation to get funds, the disaster will continue.

Can you underline that statement with actual statistics and numbers on how much weight the daily worker payout carries in the daily volume and volatility of BTS? If not, maybe we should crunch some numbers now?

Request for votes for the Terradacs witness.

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28326.msg334199#msg334199

We are requesting the cn-voter upvote for the Terradacs witness on the BitShares blockchain. This witness is from the Terradacs Ltd. team which is a Maltese company which developed software that allowed the BLCA (BEOS Lmited Cooperative Association) to launch and operate, under license, the BEOS blockchain. The BEOS blockchain is a "middle chain" between bitshares and the EOS world. It is meant to make the advantages of each system available to each other and to bring value to both. The BLCA sharedropped 100% of BEOS tokens not reserved for non-profit development and support of the blockchain on participating bitshares holders under the now completed distribution called "RAINfall". The BLCA is continuing a distribution of "MANNA" tokens for 888 days to participating bitshares and BEOS token holders under the program called "SKYfall".
https://beos.world

Specs for the Terradacs witness (which was voted in temporarily for a couple of days and was supplying a full  range of price feeds and did not miss any blocks):

Ubuntu Linux 19.04
Processor information Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU @ 3.60GHz, 8 cores 64 GB RAMNVMe 500 GB storage
same specs for backup
Pricefeeds based on zappatas script but tweaked to our preferences

Here is an update of the Wirex worker, bilingual
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28313.msg334094#msg334094

I am Dr. Philip N. Brown, professor of computer science at the University of Colorado and lead on the 201907-uccs-research-project worker which aims to fund research on BitAssets and create simulation models to help improve price pegging and collateralization for BitAssets.

Current Project Status and activities

Before any funds came to the worker proposal, I wrote a paper to send to the Decentralized 2019 conference; the paper has already been made available to the BitShares community here: http://cs.uccs.edu/~pbrown2/papers/Decentralized_Preprint.pdf.

Work is progressing well. The PhD student who is attached to the project has been learning about financial modeling and this week we'll start developing our BitAsset simulator. The simulator will be a testbed which we will use to look at the effects of different choices of chain parameters, and as time goes on we will expand it to look at more advanced stabilization techniques also.

If the project receives sufficient funding (approximately $40k, to ensure the researcher/student is fully funded for at least one year), we will make sure that the simulation code is available for the BitShares community to use to test various aspects of pegging behavior on their own.

Accounting Information

This worker proposal is a BitShares Blockchain Foundation escrow worker, which means that any community member is free to examine the accounting information at any time: https://www.bitshares.foundation/workers/2019-07-uccs-research-project

We have not yet requested a payment from the foundation, since so far only $14,000 has been allocated and it would be considerably better for us to receive a larger amount as our first disbursement.

Project costs

The proposal originally requested $150,000 to fully fund a 2-year project. Approximately half of that money was slated to be used to fund the student's efforts; this means the original proposal asked for about $80,000 to pay for a full-time PhD student/researcher to work on the project for 2 years. The bulk of the remainder of the funds were to be used to pay me to devote some of my summers to the project full-time.

I will continue to stress that $150,000 would set this up as a very successful project, but I also understand that since the BTS price has decreased so much in the past months, the community is now hesitant to part with this much money all at once.

In light of this, I want the cn-vote community to know that this project will give the community results even if it is only funded at a level of $40,000. Even this extremely low level of funding would ensure that the project's student would be fully funded and completely committed to the project for a full year.

Thus, I am asking the cn-vote community to consider voting the research worker back in until at least $40,000 have been raised. At current prices, this should take about 3 weeks, and it would be a good balance between funding the project and reducing BTS inflation. $40,000 would allow us to make significant progress (build a complete simulator for the community to use for experiments, and then analyze the simulation results deeply and draw some conclusions about how to set the chain parameters optimally), and then if the BTS price increases in the future we can introduce a new worker to continue the work.

Some Questions

Q1. If $40,000 is enough for the project to generate value, why does the original proposal ask for $150,000?
A: At universities, students do most of the research work; at my university, a full-time student costs at least $40,000 per year. The extra money was going to be used to "buy my time" from the University so that I could devote large blocks of my time to the project as well. So: $40,000 buys the project a student for a year; $150,000 buys the project a student for 2 years plus a professor (me) full-time for a total of four months. If project costs are cut, I will always sacrifice my time first and keep the student working. However, of course the more effort that is devoted to the project, the more successful it will be.

Q2. Why does this worker ask for all the money at the start of the project?
A: I wish there were a better way to do this, but unfortunately the way research funding works at universities is that the money must be committed at the start of the project. Part of the reason for this is to make sure that the student is confident in their ability to continue working throughout the project. However, the BitShares community needs to understand that my reputation as a professor is at stake if I mis-manage the money: a very important part of my career is that when I tell people I'm going to be able to get research done, I absolutely need to deliver on my promise.

Q3. Why is this worker important for the BitShares community?
A: A (relatively) short answer is this: this worker brings 3 core benefits to the BitShares community.
First, we will provide specific recommendations to the community about how chain parameters such as MCR and MSSR should be chosen, along with detailed simulation results and mathematical analysis to support our recommendations. In turn, when the BitShares community advertises their product, they will be in a very strong position to say "we've had this looked at, and here are all the reasons why we do things the way we do them." This should make BitShares a stronger competitor.
Second, we will publish and present our findings at well-respected academic conferences (and tell everybody that BitShares sponsored us), which will directly increase the global awareness of the BitShares system.
Third, by funding high-level research, BitShares will help to define what kinds of problems are "interesting" and worth studying; when other researchers see money going to a particular topic, it increases their interest in that topic. Of course this benefit is the least tangible, but it really is an important piece of funding university research that many people forget about.

As always, please direct your questions to me and I will do my best to answer them.

建议：cn-vote治理机制

 概述：

1、多签账户成员由观察员提名，观察员名单：巨蟹、大山、abit。然后由工会所有人投票产生。工会成员不得干涉观察员提名，观察员不得干涉工会成员投票。
2、当选名单按照票数排序，第一名任期6个月，第二名任期4个月，第三到七名任期2个月。每两个月选举一次。
3、任何工会的成员有权利提出意见或建议，然后由多签账户成员讨论，通过则执行并公示，不通过则给出理由。

方案：
一、多签账户成员选举
1、观察员提名：
   (1)提名的多签成员应该对BTS具有一定的理解。(老韭菜)
   (2)提名的多签成员应该有时间并且积极参与社区治理,并把票投给了cn-vote。
   (3)观察员应该独立判断，提出自己的名单。
   (4)观察员不得干涉工会的投票。
2、工会投票
   (1)工会成员按照提名名单投票，选出自己心目中合适的人选。
   (2)工会成员不得干涉观察员的提名。
   (3)工会成员要尊重选举结果，不能要求重新选举
3、选举后的多签账户成员，在任期内不得更换。
   (1)多签账户成员应该独立判断事物。
   (2)多签账户成员无偿为工会服务的。

二、议事规则
1、工会成员、多签账户成员、观察员都可以提出自己的意见或建议。然后在工会群里讨论。
2、要求多签账户成员执行。
3、多签账户成员讨论或投票决定是否执行。不执行则给出理由，执行则进行公示。

总结：
1、  定期选举为了保持多签账户的活力，并给工会提供更好的服务。
2、 提名权与投票权分离，相互制衡。这样既可以防止“精英“(观察员)裹挟工会的意愿，又可以防止犯“群氓”的错误。
3、 建议权与决策权分离，是为了提高效率。人多了必然决策效率低下，人少了必然建议变少容易形成盲点。