Before talking about this worker, please wrap up the DevCon worker by itself. It is not clear how this deficit came to be since the funds of the DevCon worker are not accounted for, or at least I don't understand how yet.

Now on this worker:
It is a good example of reporting and escrow intent gone wrong.

There is no public information available how much funds have been spent on what. Just looking on the blockchain, BTS with an equivalent value (at the time of transfers) of 130k bitUSD have been paid out, which exceeds the asked for budget. This has been done with no clarification on the increased spendings whatsoever, or even reporting what the money has been spent on. On top of that, the escrow that was publicly communicated was only for show. The worker owner still had access to the owner key of the escrow account, and made use of it.

I don't see at the moment how funds of this worker can be re-used without calling a vote of the community. If funds are to be returned, return it by burning and not to committee.

TOP! I'll correct myself and real apology goes to Jerry (bitcrab). Thank you for finally hearing me out.

The main message of this paper will be that the specific choice of MCR and MSSR can have some strong and surprising effects on the risky behavior of BitAsset shorts (collateral holders), and that a small change in MCR can have a massive effect on the likelihood of a short position becoming undercollateralized. For example, I have one set of simulations that shows that changing the MCR from 1.6 to 1.5 can make undercollateralization 134 times more likely. Now, I'll point out that this doesn't mean I'm going to panic and immediately write a BSIP to argue for MCRs of 1.6; instead, it motivates me to look deeper into this phenomenon and start to understand how we can protect against it without harming liquidity and pegging. As many will be quick to point out, there is certainly a tradeoff involved here: reducing MCR from 1.6 to 1.5 may make the BitAsset less risky, but it will also make people more willing to provide collateral for it, which should improve price pegging. Understanding how to balance these tradeoffs wisely is a major focus of this project.

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