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Messages - bitcrab

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1
I feel 3.2 is acceptable in UX.

however sounds option 1 is an even better solution, but I am not sure whether it add extra complexity or uncertainty, seems need to do more evaluation to ensure the safety.

2

采用最高价的问题在于:

* 没有反馈机制,无法达成稳定结果,可能会矫枉过正

* 偏向一边,熊市时可能有点效果,会缓解bitCNY溢价;牛市时肯定会加剧bitCNY贬值,到时再提个方案采用“最低价”?

* 明显容易被操纵,比如恶意刷单、禁止充提等等,见证人发现操纵再调整喂价脚本,往往反应滞后;


而动态调整价格的方式则不会有这些问题,主要原因就是有负反馈机制(对“负反馈”理解有误的人自己去问谷歌),可以双向调整,会使结果趋于稳定。也就是说,一旦 bitCNY 价格回到法币附近,充值费率为0,动态调整的偏移也会变成 0 —— 特别的,如果偏移不是 0 ,那说明其他参数设的有问题需要调整。

最高价方案的出发点并不是解决锚定不精确的问题,而是解决长期以来规则过于有利于空头,BTS价格缺乏向上动力的问题。所建议的最高价也是来自正常市场中流动性足够好的交易所的价格。

需要强调的一点是,操纵价格向上和操纵价格向下这两件事并不是对称的。你见过禁止冲提导致价格下跌,见过禁止冲提导致价格上涨吗?其中的道理不难明白。操纵价格向下可以制造爆仓低位接盘,操纵价格向上有类似的红利吗?短时间的异常低喂价就有可能造成大伤害,短时间的异常高喂价有什么危害呢?

需要解决的就是熊市的问题,牛市的问题好解决,公市基金,源水基金加起来有上亿的BTS等着高位套现积累子弹呢。

还有,程序上可以设置价格防火墙,剔除异常的高价,这点很简单。




3
刚想到好像有个爆仓的问题啊,按前面的例子,DEX价格0.6bitCNY,公允价格0.66CNY,喂价0.712, 那么这个喂价处爆仓时挂的卖单价是0.712/1.1 = 0.66啊,这样的价格有谁会买?不是会导致风险积累加大黑天鹅风险么?

相比之下如果是根据bitCNY溢价调整MCR就没这个问题,还是上面例子,这时MCR会调整为1.75/1.1=1.59, 增大bitCNY供应上起到的作用相同,但喂价依然是0.66,该处爆仓卖单价0.6 。

当然,技术上MCR是否适合随时调整是另外一个话题。




4
我不认为系统运行逻辑必须绑定在“喂价”这个名字上。如果这个名字不合适,可以换个名字,比如“指导价”。在我看来,这个价和其他几个参数,都是参数而已.

调节参数的目的是 bitCNY 的精确锚定。如果连这个目的都不能达成共识,那么没什么好讨论的。

事实是,系统当前就这么几个参数。当前基本固定的规则【稳定输入价格 + 不变的 MCR / MSSR / 强清参数】看起来没有达成bitCNY的精确锚定(虽然有人说10%偏移也算是锚定成功),那么就应该调参数。调各个参数的效果/后果,前面已经说了很多,这里就不重复了。

采用最高价的问题在于:

* 没有反馈机制,无法达成稳定结果,可能会矫枉过正

* 偏向一边,熊市时可能有点效果,会缓解bitCNY溢价;牛市时肯定会加剧bitCNY贬值,到时再提个方案采用“最低价”?

* 明显容易被操纵,比如恶意刷单、禁止充提等等,见证人发现操纵再调整喂价脚本,往往反应滞后;


而动态调整价格的方式则不会有这些问题,主要原因就是有负反馈机制(对“负反馈”理解有误的人自己去问谷歌),可以双向调整,会使结果趋于稳定。也就是说,一旦 bitCNY 价格回到法币附近,充值费率为0,动态调整的偏移也会变成 0 —— 特别的,如果偏移不是 0 ,那说明其他参数设的有问题需要调整。

这不仅仅是个名字的问题,而是,目前为止的抵押爆仓强清一系列概念都是建立在“喂价反映真实的市场价格”这一假设上。

在这种新喂价法下,意味着喂价所要反映的不是简单的真实市场价格,而是加入了智能货币溢价因子的一种“指导价“。这是对以前的整个框架的一种改变,需要把这种改变解释清楚,尤其是向英文社区。

而且,这种改变也是需要有所限制的,如同对MCR需要有所限制一样,比如,假设极端情况下,bitCNY溢价超过75%,还适合这样做吗?恐怕不行吧?个人觉得作为一种在真实市场价格基础上再追加价格修正的”智能货币溢价因子“,应该限制在20%以内。

推广这个是否也需要一个BSIP? 因为这不仅涉及到见证人如何喂价,还意味着对喂价本身定义的一种改变,是需要一个达成共识的过程的。这事虽然是中文社区发起,但也不能”just do it“就完了,还是需要把老外拉进来,一起走达成共识的过程,毕竟bitCNY不只是中国的,也是世界的。

5
我依然觉得,既然叫喂价,那就应该是来自市场的真实价格,这是抵押爆仓强清的逻辑基础。

我的“最高价”方案也是基于这一原则的,虽然是各个来源的喂价中取最高,但依然是市场上真实存在的价格,而且来自流动性足够好的交易所。你要做空就把所有交易所价格都砸下去。

这当然对多头更友好而对空头更不友好,但依然恪守了基本的原则。

但如果喂价加上强行上调的因素,是否对所有玩家保持有基本的公平就很难说了。界面显示一个仓位抵押率1.75,但其实已经不是按市场价格计算的1.75了。

还有,以喂价的现状,更紧要也更理直气壮的让那些喂价偏低的见证人调高喂价,而不是让高的更高。

现有的见证人喂价有一些长期比加上溢价调整的内盘价低,少数长期低2%以上,得让这些先修正。

现在整个社区缺少好用的喂价监控工具,鼓鼓钱包已经计划开发一个用K线图显示喂价的工具,上线后每个见证人喂价和内盘价格,和加上溢价调整的内盘价格的关系会一目了然,方便社区倒逼见证人。

我甚至建议以后比特股网络报告里把见证人喂价的情况也加进去。

6
回答这句 (DEX里价格是0.6bitCNY,bitCNY溢价10%,当前喂价0.66,新的喂价法是说再加上一个溢价,喂0.726?)是的,建议喂价0.66+0.6=0.726
 

我自己不反对见证人个人采取这样的喂法,但这种喂法逻辑上是有点问题的。

钻牛角尖的老外:“喂价就应该是来自市场的真实价格,如果痛处在于抵押率太高,那就该在抵押率上做文章,你们这样为了自己的利益不惜采用虚假价格,是bad witness”。

7
强行修正喂价的方式可以让本已到达爆仓价的债仓因为喂价较高而不爆(喂价比市场价高),延缓因恐慌抛售而导致的集中爆仓。但我认为爆仓单依然以打9折的方式卖出,买盘还是会退缩,谁傻呀,卖单打9折我非去原价买。

DEX里价格是0.6bitCNY,bitCNY溢价10%,当前喂价0.66,新的喂价法是说再加上一个溢价,喂0.726?

如果还是喂0.66,那现在很多见证人已经是这种喂法了啊,而且光这样也用处有限啊,因为0.66也许比外盘价格还低呢,还不如去推我的“最高价”喂法呢。

如果是喂0.726,那效果等于降低了MCR。但社区,尤其是国外社区应该更容易接受降MCR - 至少这样逻辑清楚。

MCR似乎确实应该有一定的可调整性 - 与智能货币的溢价挂钩,似乎最好加一个“锚定货币溢价”的参数,由见证人喂,系统取中间值作为依据来调整MCR,不过感觉技术上太麻烦。

现在强清的问题是补偿不和抵押率挂钩,加上喂价有时保证不了准确性,一不小心就会成为割抵押者的镰刀,剧情已经上演过许多次,正因如此才用5%将其封存。放出来也要慎重。如果下次硬分叉能把强清挂钩抵押率的功能做好应该就好用了。

现在bitCNY的流动性这么好,基本不用担心黑天鹅,要担心也首先是担心bitUSD的黑天鹅。

我感觉高MSSR是用牺牲抵押者的方式来弥补流动性不足的,流动性足够好的时候,完全应该调低MSSR.



8
BSIP drafted: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/97

I suggest big proxies who unvoted the witnesses that has already changed MSSR now revote them, witnesses who plan to change MSSR now stop and wait, let's discuss sufficiently under peaceful atmosphere to reach consensus first.

9
I agree that the margin call as such is neither good nor bad. It is, however, an indication of a bad (read: dangerous) situation, i. e. short positions without sufficient collateral, which increases the likelyhood of a black swan.

The health of the system depends on shorters providing sufficient collateral. In bitCNY, shorters don't do that. They prefer being margin called. They even deliberately try to keep the collateral as low as possible, perhaps because only the least collateralized positions can profit from the 5% settlement offset.

IMO this is an indication of a very unhealthy situation. The settlement offset is an incentive for shorters to keep their collateral as low as possible, and the current MSSR isn't sufficient incentive for providing enough collateral. Your suggestion increases the likelyhood of a black swan, as you correctly pointed out above.

the "just 1.75" debt position is not relevant to 5% force settlement, as the latter seldom happen and are always in very little quantity.

they have their own logic, the logic is that "to be margin called as early as possible", this is one kind of policy of "stop loss", this logic does not always works well, some time they lose because of this.

anyway, they do not do harm to the system, actually they provide more liquidity. so just let them play like this if they like. in bitUSD market there is no such players, do you think bitUSD market more healthy than bitCNY market?

it's hard or impossible to tell what collateral is enough, when the market price is 1.05CNY do you think it enough to set the margin call price = 0.67?

maybe it's safe enough to set call price=0.2, but what sense does this make?

increasing MSSR really increase the likelihood of black swan, however at the same time it lower the shorting incentive, we need a balance here. for bitCNY thanks to the help of target CR and good market depth, I feel bitCNY has very very little chance to reach black swan even with MSSR = 1.05. I hope we can try this after sufficient discussion.
 

 

10
MSSR has one specific purpose: to incentivize shorters to avoid being margin called (or rather to punish them if they are). Margin calls are bad for the health of our smartcoins and should be avoided. Shorters are expected to actively manage their positions so they are *not* margin called.

It is clear, IMO, that bitCNY shorters are doing a very bad job here. As can be seen here (https://wallet.bitshares.org/#/asset/CNY ), most shorters make use of the recently introduced target_collateral_ratio to keep their collateral at the bare minimum. Obviously, they *prefer* being margin called. At the same time, they are *rewarded* from the settlement offset of 5% everytime someone settles a long position!

The logical conclusion is that the MSSR must be increased so its original purpose is fulfilled.


*Once again*, while BTS is in a downtrend, certain people come up with creative ideas to protect their own interests. So tired of this.

margin call is not bad or good, it will always happen, no use to blame bitCNY shorters who prefer being margin called, they have their risk and they provide liquidity.

in current condition it's clear one should not do force settlement, to just buy is obviously cheaper.

from the perspective of the whole system, the rules need to guarantee the risk being released in time and the BTS longers being encouraged enough.

Yes, while BTS is in a downtrend, I always think a lot on how to protect the interests of BTS longers, I feel this is  a BTS committee members' responsibility.

11


actually China community has discussed this topic a lot, it's not a very new idea. witnesses like magicwallet has suggested to reduce MSSR before, they are not "just do it".
That is good news. The point I am trying to make is that the english-speaking community was not made aware prior to the fact.

How about using the BSIP framework (which offers to write so called "informational" proposal) to bring this proposal before the (english-speaking) community in a known format.
These days, many voters actually read the shareholder summary of BSIPs to build an opinion.

Please craft a BSIP and get it discussed ... that way actions of witnesses would be based on "some" document.

Currently, the actions of those witnesses that go for 5% already just forces me to flag them as bad actors ...
I'd rather keep them approved - considering I actually consider reducing the MSSR worth testing - maybe not to 5% but rather 7% - but that is what needs to be discussed with the BTS voters)

I can draft a BSIP, but seems a little strange...

why initially MCR and MSSR are not set as committee controlled parameters but are determined by witnesses? I don't know, I feel maybe setting them as committee controlled parameters is better but I am not sure.


 

12

I believe, once we have the custom operations BSIP approved and ready on chain, we might actually be able to technically hire someone for trading and pay them for doing so. (different topic)


any detail about the custom operations BSIP?
This is in development and allows to setup keys that are restricted, for instance, to only trade a specific market and do not have access to the funds in general - trading only.
Or another key could be used to allow only adjusting of collateral ratios etc ....

any doc that describe the design? I haven't found any in https://github.com/bitshares/bsips

13
as I know, 2 witnesses has switched to push 1.05 as MSSR, more witnesses are working for the change.
While I agree with the proposal in general, I do *not* agree with the witnesses just flipping their opinions singlehandedly .. without even having discussed things with the BTS voters ..
For me, I saw this proposal only today and haven't been given sufficient time to let the proposal sink in properly.

The consequence might as well be that I need to look into removing my vote for witnesses that just "do" without community engagement. So far, the consensus has been a 10% MSSR.
I understand that the english-speaking community is not the target-audience for bitCNY, but I do feel a responsibility towards the BitShares Blockchain as
a platform with bitCNY being a prominent "product" - that is why I engage in discussions around bitCNY frequently and try to provide my point of view.

Rushing changes without proper discussion rarely results in good outcome. Let's rather argue here in the forums and see where the community and wisdom of the crowd puts us.

actually China community has discussed this topic a lot, it's not a very new idea. witnesses like magicwallet has suggested to reduce MSSR before, they are not "just do it".

to make the new MSSR take effects need more than 14 witnesses to change, I feel it will take more than 1 week, we can discuss this topic sufficiently in this time and stop the change immediately if community reach an consensus that the change is dangerous.

14

I believe, once we have the custom operations BSIP approved and ready on chain, we might actually be able to technically hire someone for trading and pay them for doing so. (different topic)


any detail about the custom operations BSIP?

That said, I would propose the following procedure:
0. let's continue discussion about how much the MSSR should be lowered
1. let's define a metric that allows us to identify if that has had any effect
2. a proposal shall be created for committee to lower it with an expiration of at least 2 weeks!
3. 3 months after the proposal has executed, the MSSR should be re-evaluated in public discussion together with the metrics of 1.
4. 2 other proposal shall be created to the committee to either approve the lower MSSR or to reset it to 10.
actually MSSR is pushed by witnesses like feed price, it's not a committee controlled parameter, so witnesses can push the MSSR value which they think proper.

as I know, 2 witnesses has switched to push 1.05 as MSSR, more witnesses are working for the change.


15
we all trust market, but in the real market the arbitrage is not always easy, if you want to do arbitrage between polo "BTS/BTC" pair and DEX "BTS/bitCNY" pair, you need to go through a long trading chain and always cost much time, so if in the referenced exchanges there are big price difference, adopt the highest is a good choice - always select the highest price make sense.

feed price do not necessarily reflect the instant market price fall, system should avoid the feed price be pulled down by sudden events in single exchanges,.that's why "the highest one" suggestion comes out.

surely there should be some "price fire wall" setting to avoid adopting unreasonable too high prices.

Let's not start "fighting the market" .. if *VOLUME SUPPORTS* a price crash, then the feed should acknoledge that fact and call for margin.

A price firewall is nuBits-style manipulation and we all know how that ended. So, either the market decides or the reserves are wasted into the markets for trying the achieve the impossible: "force a price".

I feel here is misunderstanding to the price fire wall.

for example, if many witnesses adopt "the highest price" model, and at one moment in one referenced exchange some unusual event happen and provide wrongly too high price that do not reflect the market status, how should the witnesses handle this? directly adopt the price will bring a disaster, I think witness need to have some logic, such as "if one exchange price is 20% higher than the average, give up it" , to filter out this kind of price.

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