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Messages - bitcrab

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61
中文(Chinese) / Re: 【讨论】后BSIP42时代bitCNY的规则改进
« on: January 01, 2019, 03:11:04 pm »
巨蟹,黑天鹅防护你能确保吗?虽然现在确实是有黑天鹅防护,但是我也看到某些见证人的喂价很低,在社区没有明确的共识之前大家不敢抵押啊

我将起草BSIP,并通过投票形成共识。

62
General Discussion / Re: suggestion on bitCNY rules update after BSIP42
« on: January 01, 2019, 07:19:24 am »
suppose now:

feed price is the real market price.
feed price black swan protection implemented, feed price is ensured to be above GS price to protect GS from happening.

then while the BTS price is from high to low, bitCNY premium is from low to high, the whole market condition can be divided into 4 phases:

1.bitCNY discount > force settlement offset (current value 2%)
because of the force settlement, even bitCNY enter into phase it will soon get out.

2.bitCNY discount < force settlement offset & bitCNY premium < (MSSR-1) 
in this phase, the margin call orders will be eaten immediately after it is generated, risk will not be accumulated and bitCNY peg well, this is the ideal phase.

3.bitCNY premium > (MSSR-1)
in this phase the margin call orders will stay there without being eaten, GS price will not drop while the feed price drop, risk accumulate.

4.market price drop below the GS price
as black swan protection measure implemented, GS will not happen, feed price will stop to drop following the market price, if BTS price continue to drop, bitCNY will devalue.

in smartcoin system, debt and supply are the 2 sides of the same thing, increasing supply also means increasing debt, paying debt also means reducing supply.

so it make little sense to manage the risk just base on "ensuring the margin call orders being eaten", we need to consider more to optimize the system.

in the "dynamic MCR"way, system allow debt position be in lower collateral ratio without being margin called, to provide more supply. this way try to make the smartcoin in phase 2.

while "dynamic MCR" is not available until the necessary bug fix and hard fork six months later, reducing MSSR can also help to improve the bitCNY supply.

currently MSSR=1.05 and bitCNY is with a premium of about 10%, margin called orders stay there without being eaten, if MSSR is reduced to, say 1.02, we can expect bitCNY holders will have less will to eat the margin call orders, speculators will be encouraged to borrow more bitCNY.

it is not too bad that we have margin call orders there without being eaten, in another world, it is to reduce CR to increase bitCNY supply without changing MCR.

both measures lead to risk accumulation and increase the possibility of black swan...wait, isn't black swan totally avoided by the feed price protection?

Yes, there will be no black swan, there will be only "black swan protection phase", we should also try to avoided smartcoin to enter this phase, and try to enter with an as low as possible GS price to make the smartcoin easy to revive.

but here one key index is smartcoin premium, if the premium is too high, we should select to take the measures to trigger more supply with bearing the risk of entering black swan protection phase.

black swan protection phase is much better than black swan.

63
中文(Chinese) / Re: 【讨论】后BSIP42时代bitCNY的规则改进
« on: January 01, 2019, 05:58:58 am »
假设现在是这样的情况:

喂价真实反映市场价。
黑天鹅保护实施,喂价下限为不触发黑天鹅的价格。

那么基于BTS价格从高到低,溢价从低到高,市场情况可分为几个阶段。

1.bitCNY折价>强清补偿
因为强清补偿的缘故,这个阶段即便出现也会很快因为强清的缘故而消失。

2.-强清补偿<溢价<(MSSR-1)
这个阶段爆仓单随爆随吃,风险及时释放,锚定相对准确,是比较理想的阶段。

3.溢价>MSSR-1
这个阶段爆仓单会积累,全局清算价不会随着BTS价格下跌而下降。

4.市场价跌到全局清算价之下
因为黑天鹅防护,喂价将下降到全局清算价时停止下降,之后如BTS价格继续下跌,bitCNY会由于抵押不足而贬值。

智能货币系统的一个基本逻辑是,一个用户用来还债以降低风险的bitCNY一定是另外的用户抵押借来的。

所以“让所有的爆仓单都被吃掉”不应该成为风险管理的基本逻辑,因为这个系统有许多事情比爆仓单是否被吃要更重要。

动态MCR的思路是,让系统尽可能处于阶段2,为此可以降低系统的整体抵押率。

而在动态MCR尚无实施条件时,调低MSSR比如到1.02,会带来什么呢?

可以预料,把MSSR降到1.02后,原本许多系统处于阶段2的情况,都会进入阶段3。

比如当前系统,溢价高达10%,如果实施了动态MCR,可能结果是MCR被一路调到极低如1.4,然后溢价回到2%,当前状态下的所有爆仓单都消失。

而当前系统,MSSR=1.05,爆仓单都处在没人吃的状态。
可以想象,如果进一步调低MSSR到1.02,爆仓单会更加没人吃。会鼓励投机者冒险抵押借入。

虽然都会鼓励抵押借入,但显然是动态MCR更好,因为爆仓单不被吃的状态毕竟是不稳定的,随着市场供需变化,随时都可能被吃。

这两种措施都可能导致风险积累,从而增加黑天鹅发生的可能,不过慢着,黑天鹅不是已经通过防护措施避免了吗?

黑天鹅防护只能说是一种最不坏的措施,应该尽量避免系统进入黑天鹅防护状态(阶段4),即便进入也在尽量低的全局清算价进入,以便日后恢复。

但无论如何,黑天鹅防护状态比发生全局清算要好得多。

这里的指标是bitCNY溢价,如果溢价足够大,则冒着进入黑天鹅防护状态的风险刺激供应是值得的。

64
中文(Chinese) / Re: 【讨论】后BSIP42时代bitCNY的规则改进
« on: January 01, 2019, 04:46:22 am »
可是内盘大户们还有上亿的bts没有任何抵押,无疑让观望的人们更加不敢抵押
人家是澳洲良田千顷财务自由的农场主,你是小岗村连年歉收快要饿死的农民,你现在要决定在不在联产承包的契约上按血手印,你要看人家的脸色?

开个玩笑,别当真。 :P

65
中文(Chinese) / Re: 【讨论】后BSIP42时代bitCNY的规则改进
« on: December 31, 2018, 02:11:03 pm »
@bitcrab 蟹老板一贯低调的作风,总是埋头做事,疏于公开宣传,反而造成了很多误解和票权的流失,偶尔高调的两次宣传,一次2元铁底,一次1.05不会破,尽管被现实打了脸,但是,可以看到,绝大多数社区成员是积极响应,愿意追随的,希望现在深陷泥沼中的时候,蟹老板能更多的振臂一呼,把社区成员的心聚一聚。
现在bitCNY溢价10%,MSSR已降为1.05,再接下去还要尝试降为1.02,喂价保护已避免黑天鹅的发生,BTS价格在底部盘旋已久,现在不把外盘的BTS提到内盘杠杆加仓,还等什么时候呢? :P

66
贬点值不算什么,怕的是不贬值,还稍有溢价。

MSSR=1,那么bitCNY稍有溢价爆仓单就吃不掉,如果BTS价格从高处跌下,风险就会一直积累,直至黑天鹅。

到时如果用喂价保护的方式防止黑天鹅,就会导致喂价偏离市场价,bitCNY贬值。

总之,即便用喂价保护的方式防止黑天鹅,也依然需要防范爆仓单吃不掉导致的风险积累。

67
MSSR意义在于促进消除爆仓单,防止风险积累。

MSSR过低,则不能有效促进bitCNY持有人吃爆仓单,易导致风险积累,过高,则对抵押形成负激励,不利于形成有效供给。

所以需要平衡,个人觉得1.02差不多应该是下限了,不能再低了。

68
General Discussion / Re: Why Need BSIP For Everything?
« on: December 30, 2018, 05:20:24 am »
They have the ability to change feed/mssr however they like, if you want to use BSIP for everything, feed/mssr should be set by proxies instead. What's the point in witnesses just copying the proxies decision? May as well just set the numbers themselves

ya, maybe it will be better to set MSSR&MCR as committee controlled parameters, but it is designed as witnesses feed value.

no point, but it's a consensus that things like MSSR&MCR are so important parameters that should not be changed without sufficient discussion and strong consensus.

69
General Discussion / Re: Why Need BSIP For Everything?
« on: December 30, 2018, 05:05:36 am »
It seems like every time the proxies want witnesses to make a change, they write a BSIP for the witnesses to make the change.

The witnesses are already voted in and have the ability to change the feed/mssr however they like, if proxies do not like what a witness is doing, they can just vote him out.

BSIP stands for BitShares Improvement Proposal and changing parameters is not an improvement/feature, it is simply a tuning of numbers.

In fact, it is much better if witnesses decide parameters on their own (AND on their own opinion), this way we are more robust to decisions that could be destructive to Bitshares because some witnesses will disagree and tune their parameters accordingly


Please share your thoughts.

No, witnesses are the employees of the system, they're supposed to do things based on the consensus of the community, not based on their own decision.

BSIP and the voting is the way for the community to reach consensus.

70

I don't think "whether you want margin call orders be eaten" is a senseful question.


If you allow margin call to be eaten, it won't go to black swan in the first place because it will recollateralize. This is why I'm asking this question


I am considering to draft a BSIP to request witnesses to ensure the feed price be higher than the global settlement price, to avoid the global settlement to happen.


If global market cap drops further, it will black swan before you can change anything. If global market cap increases, it will recollateralize by itself.

actually bitCNY has been very close to trigger black swan, witnesses have take the price feed protection measure to avoid the black swan to happen.

community has also suggested to do the same to bitUSD, it's a pity that it is not executed well.

as I know, now most witnesses include "black swan protection algorithm" in their price feeding script, what I want to do is just to write down this consensus in a BSIP.

71
I don't think "whether you want margin call orders be eaten" is a senseful question.

I'd like to answer some senseful questions:

1.what do you think is a good way for the system to handle black swan?
2.do you want bitCNY peg more exactly? and how?

my answer:
1. as has been discussed a lot, the current global setting operation is not satisfactory, it is like system suicide, we need better way to handle black swan, one key point is not to stop smartcoin borrowing operation.

I am considering to draft a BSIP to request witnesses to ensure the feed price be higher than the global settlement price, to avoid the global settlement to happen.

2. YES
one way is dynamic MCR with the negative feedback mechanism, but as shown in https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/pull/1324, this need a bugfix and hard fork that will happen in June, 2019.

in short term, what we can do is continue to reduce MSSR, from 1.1 to 1.05, to 1.02 or even to 1.

if the feed price is the market price and black swan is surely avoided, I don't care whether the margin call orders be earten or not.



72
General Discussion / Re: suggestion on bitCNY rules update after BSIP42
« on: December 30, 2018, 04:16:22 am »
so in short term, seems what we can do is just to continue reducing MSSR.

how about reduce MSSR from 1.05 to 1.02 after some days?

73
中文(Chinese) / Re: 【讨论】后BSIP42时代bitCNY的规则改进
« on: December 30, 2018, 03:47:04 am »
短期内可用的手段似乎唯有继续调低MSSR。

先让1.05飞几天,再调到1.02如何?

74
中文(Chinese) / Re: 【讨论】后BSIP42时代bitCNY的规则改进
« on: December 30, 2018, 03:16:01 am »
   明明控制喂价不下跌就可以避免现在的高溢价,折价由强清处理就行的。社区不去推动,还说没有办法,舍近求远。BTS的发展主导者无药可救了。一群猪!

来人,把这整日里妖言惑众的混蛋叉出去,乱棍打死。

75
中文(Chinese) / Re: 【讨论】后BSIP42时代bitCNY的规则改进
« on: December 30, 2018, 03:14:37 am »
bitCNY 承担了一部分保值需求,比如之前ICO的几个团队都是因为这个原因持有 bitCNY
但是这部分需求又会降低bitCNY的流动性,特别是在现在爆仓压力很大时对这部分 bitCNY 的释放显得更迫切。

既然如此,我觉得可以由理事会直接发行一种IOU CNY 代替 bitCNY 来实现保值需求。
因为 BTS 系统是有盈利的,承诺用收入获得的 bitCNY 按1:1回购 IOU CNY应该就能基本满足。
另外可以用盈利的部分按月支付IOU CNY 持有者利息,进一步刺激这种需求。

而对应的 IOU USD 除了可以代替保值的需求,还可以用来给 worker 发工资,免得像现在这样定期咋盘买美元发工资,尽量减少理事会参与市场操作的可能性。

理事会的收入太少,支撑不起大体量的资产

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