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Messages - bitcrab

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76
General Discussion / Re: Investigating the reasons for BitUSD GS
« on: December 08, 2018, 04:02:44 pm »

anyway, I think this is much better than just let global settlement happen.


Would you say this is an accurate way to rephrase your statement: "better to lose the peg via a nonconsensus hack than to lose the peg via a GS."

I'm pretty sure that I agree with that sentiment.

That makes it sound like it's worth looking in to a major protocol update which would soften the GS nuclear option in some way.

I don't think "nonconsensus hack" is a suitable name for that.

there is already a lot of discussion on an update handle method on black swan, most of key opinion leads agree to adopt some new methods to handle that without stopping borrowing feature, such as what are mentioned here. https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27522.0

but as you know, to do such update in a public blockchain need long time to go through the discussion->BSIP draft->voting->develop and test->hard fork process. when the real risk is nearby, I think it's good for the witnesses to feed the black swan protection price, as it is based on public discussion, not private manipulation.

and you can see bitCNY and bitUSD are in different status now, although neither of them peg well, but bitCNY has a 2-6% premium, however bitUSD has a 30% discount.

77
General Discussion / Re: Investigating the reasons for BitUSD GS
« on: December 07, 2018, 10:10:57 am »
now bitCNY has a global settlement price of 0.2568.

the current BTS price is 0.247CNY.

this means if now witnesses feed real market price bitCNY is already in black swan status.

now most of witness add "black swan protection" logic to ensure they feed price > global settlement price*1.11

this help to avoid black swan, and now bitCNY still has a premium of about 4%.

anyway, I think this is much better than just let global settlement happen.

actually we have suggest to add same protection logic in bitUSD price feeding, but seems only little witnesses has done that.




78
发展智能货币与发展其它生态不矛盾。发展生态的事情从来都没人拦着。

向交易所推广从来都不是妄想。

bsip42有固有缺陷,新版的负反馈方案见这里 https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27506.0

当然,现在的形势下,新版有没有机会获得足够支持来实施,是另外一个问题。

79
General Discussion / Re: suggestion on bitCNY rules update after BSIP42
« on: December 07, 2018, 07:59:56 am »
中文贴在这里 https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27506.0 中文请到该贴回复。

Chinese version is here https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27506.0 please switch to there if you use Chinese.

80
General Discussion / Re: suggestion on bitCNY rules update after BSIP42
« on: December 07, 2018, 02:52:44 am »
if you mix it all, it's more difficult to get consensus.

to help the ecosystem to grow, we can't relies on high risk market action.
again, to judge the risk, you shouldn't mix two thing togother: one is borrow CNY, the other is use CNY.
in fact there are no risk if you just borrow CNY without spent it.
the real risk depends on how you spend it.
if mainy CNY debt owner spent CNY to buy BTS, it's a high risk action, while if they trade CNY for fiat CNY, it's a low risk action.
we need to encourage more fund to help the ecosystem grow, not manipulation economy.
teaching them get profit from low risk market action, buy bitCNY with fiat CNY at price less then 1.0, sell at price high than 1.0.

2 is the core of the whole solution, 1 can be implemented independently and make big sense, however 3,4 will make little sense if 2 is removed.

actually the negative feedback mechanism does not encourage to buy BTS with borrowing bitCNY.

if BTS price in DEX is higher than in CEX, bitCNY will have discount and MCR will increase according to the logic.

in the dynamic MCR solution, the key point for controlling risk is to ensure that the margin call orders be eaten quickly, I believe this will happen as feed price will be the market price and MSSR will be kept high enough (at least 105% I think)

we cannot demand what the user do, we can just ensure that the high risk operation will not bring high risk to the system.

it's very difficult to ask people to enter the ecosystem with buying bitCNY at current time, as there is a 6%+ premium, if witnesses just feed market price, there will be even higher premium. how to keep enough supply of bitCNY with controllable risk is a big topic that the community have to face, it's not manipulation, it's just designing rules, maybe bsip42 really behaved not well because of some flaws, but the dynamic MCR solution remove these flaws.

81
General Discussion / Re: suggestion on bitCNY rules update after BSIP42
« on: December 06, 2018, 03:16:35 pm »
It seems we kind of agree on the general direction so my suggestion would be to implement things in an incremental way.

To start:
Settlement offset as low as possible (would like it to even be 1% on par with all other bitassets)
Some kind of GS protection

and personally I think our first attempt to improve things should be to allow for variable MSSR according to circumstances.

in most of the cases margin call orders are filled at the market price in CNY market, so it make almost no difference either to set MSSR to 10% or 5%, maybe only when in very serious bear market 5% or 10% make some difference.

82
General Discussion / Re: suggestion on bitCNY rules update after BSIP42
« on: December 06, 2018, 11:32:22 am »
you don't need to make things complex, don't need to mix all together especially bsip42.
personally I support 1,3,4, but not 2

I make things complex because the world and the financial logic is complex.

if we can get better peg while at the same time do not introduce obvious more risk, why not?

if the margin call orders can always be eaten quickly, setting MCR=1.4 do not introduce obvious more risk than setting MCR=1.75, however it can bring much more bitCNY supply to support the ecosystem.

no reason to ignore this.

another fact is that BTS smartcoin system is not as same as the common traditional margin call system -  in smartcoin system the currency is based on debt, it's not a good idea to always keep the debt in minimum, debt need to be extended while necessary as it is the debt that support the currency supply.

surely this solution will bring less volatility of BTS price, some traders do not like to see this, but more important, the solution will help the ecosystem to grow as a whole.

we need bitCNY to peg well, only then it will be possible to introduce bitCNY to more application scenarios.

83
General Discussion / suggestion on bitCNY rules update after BSIP42
« on: December 06, 2018, 08:35:16 am »
we learnt a lot after BSIP42 implementation, now we need to consider more on how to update bitCNY, actually there are a lot discussion on this topic in the community, especially in Chinese community, here I'd like to propose some new solution summarizing all the opinions.

1. change the way to handle black swan, keep the borrowing operation alive.

global settlement is a too direct  and too hard way to handle black swan, it stop the smartcoin borrowing business, while it happen it always give big negative impact on smartcoin ecosystem, we can see that bitUSD devalued a lot after the global settlement, the community require a more soft  way that has more little negative impact on the smartcoin ecosystem.

abit has suggested 2 new ways to handle black swan, one is to settle the accounts independently: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27273.0, one point is that this way may cause one phenomena that "to be settled earlier is better than later".

the other is to set feed price floor to provide black swan from happening: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27449.0
the current bitCNY is similar to be handled in the second way.

either way we will choose, it is important not to stop the smartcoin borrowing operation.

2. replace BSIP42 with dynamic MCR solution

the key point of dynamic MCR is also to introduce negative feedback mechanism to adjust smartcoin supply, different with BSIP42, in dynamic MCR solution the feed price will return to reflect the market price, then this solution will not bring the troubles of "margin call orders not being eaten" or "exploiting debt position owners with force settlement".

considering that in BSIP witnesses take the key responsibility and authority, this introduce much uncertainty and put witnesses at the place that undertake much doubts of feed price manipulation, here I suggest a new way to implement dynamic MCR:

2.1.  other than settlement price, CER, MCR, MSSR, introduce a new parameter premium to be fed by witnesses。witnesses need not to design complex negative feedback algorithm, they just need to get the price data from the market and feed to system.

2.2 add committee controlled parameters as below to each smartcoin:

low premium limit: when the fed premium is lower than this parameter, the process to make MCR higher will be triggered, default value: -2%
high premium limit:when the fed premium is higher than this parameter, the process to make MCR lower will be triggered, default value: 1%
max MCR:MCR will not increase while it reach this value, default value: 1.75
min MCR:MCR will not decrease while it reach this value, default value: 1.4
MCR tuning step:the value that MCR can be added or subtracted in each administrative period(1 hour), default value:0.001

at each administrative time system will check the feed premium and decide how to adjust MCR, if the parameters are set as default values shown above and at the time MCR=1.75, and premium=2%, then MCR will be adjusted to 1.749.

in this way the traders can expect the adjustment time and step, the can reflect in time to avoid being hurt, no manipulation doubt can be put to witnesses.

3. adjust MSSR to 105%

4.change force settlement offset to 2%, this will ensure that the discount of bitCNY will be no higher than 2% even after MCR reach the max limit.

what will this solution bring?

1. good peg of bitCNY
2. less volatility of BTS price
3. more risk?
4. less free market?

easy to understand that this solution will lead to good peg of bitCNY, as BSIP42 has proved, negative feedback mechanism works well on making a good pegging.

as MCR will change according to the premium of bitCNY, when bitCNY is in shortage and has a big premium, system will increase MCR and make more bitCNY supply possible and vice versa, for example, if we implement the solution at the current market status, we can expect that the MCR will be tuned to min value(maybe 1.4) in about 2 weeks, this will increase bitCNY supply obviously and can prevent BTS price from falling rapidly.

so will this solution introduce more risk to the system?
I believe this will depend on whether the margin call orders will be eaten quickly, the main issue of BSIP42 is that is make the margin call order price higher than the market price and accumulate big quantity of margin call orders without being eaten. but in the dynamic MCR solution, as feed price reflect the market price, we believe the margin called orders will be eaten just after they comes out, if necessary MSSR can be keep unchanged to ensure this.

and, I don't agree that this rule will bring a manipulated market that has been free when there is no such solution, they are just markets with different rules,  if the rules are certain and base on strong consensus, it will not bring manipulation, it just bring better user experience.   

I also suggest that witnesses can implement updated BSIP42 before community can reach consensus on above described solution and implement it.https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27492.0

84
Would rather this worker proposal go towards paying listing fee + some bonus bounty for the person who lobbied it. This is how you get listed, yep most exchanges are fake volume but nobody cares when it can bring new actual users to Bitshares. I'd support this with our vote with the above change^.

I would like to support the change too. How do you think @bitcrab ?

I agree to pay listing fee and bounty to lobbyist from this worker proposal, it's reasonable.

85
I didn't see any point to  get profit from it, if you have you should do it.
As a trader I will never borrow a cent  if you can make me margin call without  price of BTS change, sometimes even when BTS price increase.

can I manipulate the feed price at will? or any witness can? if I can why I let my accounts be margin called?

I understand that because bsip42 let witnesses feed price following a complex logic, it introduce some uncertainty that make traders do not feel good, so in the newly advised alternative solution witnesses only feed price and premium data, which are easy to verify accurate or not, the negative feedback logic will be done by the system in a low frequency.

the system need negative feedback logic, the rule of original system is far from satisfactory and cannot sustain the dream of Bitshares. and I don't think we can call DEX free market only when we make no change to the rules.

86
Imagine the national adjust the interest rate dynamic, totally free to increase or reduce, whatever if they have the logic or not.
The rate could increase today while decrease tomorrow.
would you still regard reduce rate as stimulate the economy? would you borrow more when you don't known if they will increase the rate again next second?

I haven't seen any serious central bank has reduce interest rate first and increase rate at the next second, interest rate is an important tool for central bank to push the currency policy.

whatever adjust the feed price or MCR, the problem is a normal rational trader should not consider reduce MCR as they can borrow more safely.
In fact, it only affect to those risk short position which is very close or already margin call.
Do you wish to encourage them borrow more or decrease the debt ?

whether borrowing is safe not only depend on the market, but also on the rule.
one simple example/logic: at the time that bitCNY is in high premium as of now, when MCR is reduced, one can borrow say 100K bitCNY and get 102K CNY, when premium go down to -1%, MCR return to high level, he can buy 103KbitCNY with 102KCNY, pay the 100K debt and get 3K as profit.

does this business make sense? yes, one can make profit with it, and help to balance the ecosystem.

why not encourage this kind of business?


87
中文(Chinese) / Re: 【讨论】后BSIP42时代bitCNY的规则改进
« on: December 03, 2018, 02:57:20 pm »
2.1和2.2部分,我不觉得这样喂溢价合适。如果有人觉得见证人操作喂价,他们也会认定操作溢价。没什么区别。反而这样会失去灵活性,如果这种方式最后发现不太合适。要修改,估计又需要等到下次分叉了。

关于mssr我建议动态调整,可以根据一定规则评估黑天鹅风险系数。风险系数大的时候mssr增加,鼓励搬砖吃爆仓单。风险系数小的时候mssr降低。

那你觉得怎样合适呢?

MSSR也搞动态的话感觉太复杂了。

喂的数据还是直接喂“价格”就行,只是算法调整,保留灵活性。
MSSR动态确实需要一些规则,复杂性会上升。目前来说就固定测试一些参数就可。105 102都可以测测看到底哪些适合。

没有一种反馈机制,就无从通过自适应调整来匹配市场需求。
不获取溢价信息,系统就无从知道该向什么方向调整。
价格和溢价都是很明确的,见证人喂的质量如何是不难判断的。
MSSR起的作用不如MCR明显,直接。

88
I will not regard the price as 0.35 CNY when I known the witness can change the price back to 0.32 CNY at anytime.
so what's the point of increase the feed price to 0.35CNY? did it really  increase the supply?

higher feed price/lower MCR means user can borrow more bitCNY with the same collateral.that's how it increase the supply.

witnesses has the logic that feed price depending on the market price and premium, not to feed price at will.

 

89
中文(Chinese) / Re: 【讨论】后BSIP42时代bitCNY的规则改进
« on: December 03, 2018, 02:06:07 pm »
2.1和2.2部分,我不觉得这样喂溢价合适。如果有人觉得见证人操作喂价,他们也会认定操作溢价。没什么区别。反而这样会失去灵活性,如果这种方式最后发现不太合适。要修改,估计又需要等到下次分叉了。

关于mssr我建议动态调整,可以根据一定规则评估黑天鹅风险系数。风险系数大的时候mssr增加,鼓励搬砖吃爆仓单。风险系数小的时候mssr降低。

那你觉得怎样合适呢?

MSSR也搞动态的话感觉太复杂了。

90
you guys really don't realize how critical  this manipulation will result.
A very simple example, when a potential buyer(buy BTS with CNY) known there is a posibble the margin call order will lower than 10%,
he will just stop buy until it reach.
And a potential seller(sell CNY for fiat CNY) will stop sell CNY for even 5% profit, instead they will wait for 10% profit.
The results is that traders don't known what will happen next, they just stop and wait.

if this poll get more support than 1.4.119, trader will know that bitCNY will not have a 10% premium, they know what to do.
maybe bitCNY holders will regret to lose chance to buy cheaper BTS, but it benefit the whole ecosystem as BTS need not to reach lower price and traders need not to suffer high premium of bitCNY.
this method is far from perfect, hope you can participate more in the discussion of the alternative solution of BSIP42.

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