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Topics - bitcrab

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1
中文(Chinese) / 一个基于GDEX.BTC抵押的智能货币?
« on: August 21, 2019, 04:17:33 pm »
好处:
1.BTC市值远大于BTS,供应量潜力大。
2.BTC可以抵押借款,可以吸引BTC入金。活跃交易。

问题:
1.GDEX.BTC不是原生货币,需要GDEX背书。
2.是否真能吸引用户存疑。

Thoughts?

2
As the poll worker proposal 1.14.210 has been voted active and got more support than the "do not change" worker proposal 1.14.211, MCR of bitUSD will change from 1.6 to 1.5.

The change will happen after  UTC 00:00 21st, Aug, 2019.

Every witness is requested to update the feeding script to publish 1.5 as MCR of bitUSD, please do the job after UTC 00:00 21st, Aug, 2019 and finish before UTC 00:00 23rd, Aug, 2019.

For more information about the poll for this change, please check https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28670.0

3
General Discussion / suggestion on new OMO fund
« on: August 15, 2019, 11:11:59 am »
More than 1 year ago, I have suggest a open market operation worker proposal and get it voted up, a fund get BTS from worker proposals has been built and operated for months, unfortunately, in the great bear market the fund experienced big failure, big amount of BTS were sold in low prices comparing to bought price due to margin call, the OMO failed to play the role of market stabilizer.

In early this year, I also have suggested to restart the OMO fund but get little support, However, currently, I feel even more necessary to restart the OMO operation, I understand that the failure in previous OMO will make me difficult to get sufficient support on doing so, anyway, I'd like to start a serious discussion on the possibility of restarting the OMO fund and reach consensus on the key setting of the new OMO fund, it's OK for me to be excluded out of the operation team. the important thing is to make the new OMO work well and can really help the ecosystem to grow.

why we need the New OMO fund? what's the mission of the New OMO fund?

In China in the past months, we can feel that investors kept on leaving BTS, as BTS behaved bad in market.

China community has suggested to repurchase and burn BTS, this process is ongoing, this reflected how eager the community want BTS price to go up, however, I don't think it's a good idea to burn the bought BTS, why don't we manage a debt position with the bought BTS and supply more smartcoin to the market?

Why don't we show to public that it's possible to manage a debt position well, especially with continuous income?

Recently cn-vote took an action to vote refund400k, this action make several big workers voted down and lose the income, either this action is good or bad, I understand why there is always high voice in China community to cancel some workers, BTS ecosystem is so weak at this moment and the selling pressure from workers always play a big role in pressing down the BTS price, we need to find ways to make BTS ecosystem more robust. 

Comparing to burning BTS, another way to support the ecosystem is to put more BTS into debt position and release more smartcoins to the public.


what shall we learn from previous OMO fund?

I admit that as the key organizer of the previous OMO fund I have some unfeasible idea at that moment, I have hoped that OMO can provide a strong sustain to BTS price, but the market told that no one can counter with extreme market trend, even you have hundreds of millions of BTS.

another key factor is that, at that moment, smartcoin rules is not robust enough to resist shorting attack. that's why I tried my best to push GS protection and MSSR&MCR reduction after the disaster.

now smartcoin is more rubust than before to resist shorting attack, although the GS protection still depend on witnesses' work.

what a strategy is suitable?

the fund will manage debt positions and focus on BTS/smartcoin trading.

at this moment, the fund need to focus on BTS/bitUSD trading.

two price are defined to differenciate the current market status.

price A: BTS is underestimated if price<A
price B: BTS is overestimated   if price>B

1.the debt position margin call price should be always less than GS price, otherwise, the incoming fund can only be used to increase the CR.
2.margin call price should always < A.
3.while price < A, it's not allowed to sell BTS.
4.while price > B, it's not allowed to buy BTS.

to get A & B at this moment.

first suppose that 0.2175CNY is the long term bottom price.

for underestimated price I'd like to define like this:

0.2175*MCR = 0.348 CNY, or 0.05 USD

which means, if the price is underestimated, if you borrow with setting your margin call price < GS price, you have no worry for margin calling.

top price in the last 9 months is 0.5377CNY

overestimated price = 0.5377/1.05 = 0.512CNY, or 0.073USD.

A=0.05USD, B=0.073USD

A&B can be adjusted in long run.

how to organize the operation team? will the operation team be paid?

I suggest to operate with a 2/3 or 3/5 multisig account, the members should be the ones who are trusted by the committee.

every quarter the fund will be calculated net worth based on BTS. 50% of the profit will be paid to the operation team.


threads of previous OMO fund:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26072.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=26107.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27790.0

relevant threads:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27835.0
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28706.0
will update soon...

4
中文(Chinese) / 重启OMO的想法
« on: July 29, 2019, 08:41:14 am »
生搬硬套是兵家大忌,对BTS做回购销毁真的是生搬硬套。

对总量固定的币种,销毁可以减少流通量,提升升值预期,但具体能有什么效果还得看具体指标。

GXC回购很有效果,因为黄老板有钱啊,确实能拿出大笔资金回购啊。

BNB销毁也很有效果,因为销毁的比例不小啊。

但YOYO,NAS前面也跟风搞回购,有效果吗?可能有几天效果,但很快被打回原形,本来就没啥钱啊,纯粹搞噱头,市场会被你这么忽悠吗?

回到BTS这边,BTS的特点是什么?

1.worker这边不断在增发,一年通胀大约4%。
2.自带做多杠杆。
3.能用来回购的资金有限,一天的收入大约2000-5000CNY,年化万八到千二。

回购的资金与通胀比不值一提,做销毁最多也就给韭菜一点心理安慰,等韭菜明白过来,照样骂你骗炮。

但BTS自带杠杆的属性是大有文章可做的,这种属性决定了BTS的价格和这个指标很有关系:

负债率:系统内所有智能货币价值/BTS市值

BTS系统现在的负债率大约是10%。

这个数值偏低,而且负债结构不尽合理,既有大量的的低抵押率债仓,也有大量的完全不抵押的的大账户。

拓展BTS生态,提升BTS价格预期,需要提升这个负债率,并且优化负债结构。

OMO当初失败的重要原因之一,是当时还是1.1的MSSR,规则对做空攻击没什么抵抗力。

但现在MSSR改为1.01之后,规则对做空攻击的抵抗力提升了很多对吧?

现在理事会账户有392万BTS。

如果用来抵押借出bitUSD,以当前的GS price 0.0385为爆仓价,可以借出9.4万bitUSD

在当前的低价位,用这些钱再去回购BTS,不好吗?

既提高了偏低的负债率,也优化了债务结构,向市场释放了紧缺的bitUSD。

为什么非要销毁呢?那些本来都可以看成是锁仓状态的BTS,你烧不烧毁,有多大区别?

要有金融工程的头脑啊小伙伴们。

现在这个时候,重启OMO正当其时。

我想象中的新的OMO操作规则

1.不再从worker中获取BTS来操作,而是基于现在理事会账户中的BTS,以及以后理事会账户中积累的market fee。

2.OMO账户应适当借债,确保债仓的爆仓价不高于当前全局清算价,当爆仓价高于全局清算价时,新入的资金只能用来提升抵押率。

3.基于当前BTS的价位来决定操作策略,价格低估是策略是买入,价格正常时不操作,价格高估时策略是卖出。

当前由于CNY市场流动性良好,基金应该重点操作USD市场。

如何?

5
General Discussion / how market fee is sharing?
« on: July 24, 2019, 10:15:40 am »
I tested this with new created account vesting-tester.

the member stats is like this

Fee Allocation

Network   20%
Lifetime Referrer   (bitcrab)   30%
Registrar   (gdex-faucet)   25%
Affiliate Referrer   (bitcrab)   25%
Membership Expiration   N/A

then I use this account to buy 10000 GDP, GDP has a 0.1% market fee, and 50% market fee sharing. which means in this trade there are totally 5 GDP shared.

I saw bitcrab get 2.5 GDP, gdex-faucet get 2.5GDP

what's the rule in this fee sharing? registrar get 50% and referrer get another 50%?

6
General Discussion / New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 19, 2019, 07:04:34 am »
I plan to draft a BSIP to implement GS protection via core code, before doing that, I'd like to do some explanation here:

Global Settlement may be the worst way to handle bad debt, because:

1. it settles all the debt positions, including the ones with CR>1
2. it stop the borrowing feature.
3. it make it not easy for the smartcoin to revive, and it's easy to make whales in the revive process, as what happened in bitUSD in recent past.

GS is just like suicide.

another mechanism has been discussed for long time at https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=27273.0, which can be called "individual settlement", the core idea is that when bad debt appears, instead of triggering GS, only convert the bad debt positions to sell orders at settlement price of that individual debt position.

but this solution also have big issues.

if force settlement is still active after settlement order appears, for example, bad debt positions have been converted to sell orders in 0.04~0.06bitUSD with debts, however, as the market price fall sharply to 0.02bitUSD, bitUSD is off peg, devaluated to about 0.6USD.

which means, feed price is 0.02USD, DEX price is 0.033 bitUSD.

then bitUSD holders begin to exploit debt position owners with force settlement.

even worse, the last bitUSD balance cannot do force settlement, it can only fill the settlement orders with higher price.

this process is unfair to the debt position owners and the last bitUSD holders, and will not help things to recover.

then how about disable force settlement feature while settlement order appear?

then bitUSD holders can only fill the settlement orders from lower price to higher price, in other words, from debt positions from higher CR to lower CR, and filling some settlement orders will devalue bitUSD more, as the left settlement orders has higher price.

after considering this, I think a good mechanism need to follow base principle:

1.do not stop the borrowing feature.
2.ensure smartcoin holders to settle bad debt positions from lower CR to higher CR.
3. accept the possibility that the smartcoin will devalue, just try to minimize the hurting to the ecosystem.

GS protection is perfect to suit the above principle.

GS protection ensure the feed price be above the GS price, this is irrelevant to market manipulation or price faking, it is just to force the smartcoin holders to settle the bad debt position with lowest CR first. and filling margin call orders will reduce GS price and also feed price as well and have chance to end the bad debt, this is a way to let the market do the choice.

in the last several days we have seen that this mechanism protect bitUSD from one more time black swan, it works well, however now it depend on witnesses' work and not 100% reliable, to switch to realize the mechanism via core code will help to make it 100% reliable.

 


7
Stakeholder Proposals / [Poll] BSIP59:Reduce MCR of bitUSD to 1.5
« on: July 17, 2019, 05:46:31 am »
Based on BSIP59, https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0059.md, now 2 poll worker proposals have been created:

1.14.210   Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MCR of bitUSD to 1.5
1.14.211   Poll - BSIP59 - Keep MCR of bitUSD as 1.6

We have to save bitUSD.

bitUSD is in illiquidity for long time, partly because the black swan hurt its brand seriously, partly because now bitCNY is in good liquidity and pegging so even less traders would like to trade in bitUSD.

However, we need to find ways to change this, to make bitUSD still play an important role in BTS financial ecosystem.

To reduce MCR of bitUSD to 1.5 will reduce the cost to mint bitUSD, hopefully this will attract users switch from CNY market to USD market, as MCR of bitCNY will be kept as 1.6 at the same time.

On the other hand, GS protection for bitUSD already worked to avoid the risk of black swan.

Please vote according to your opinion.
----------------------------------------------------------------

智能货币的三个状态:

A:随爆随吃
B:黄单高悬
C:黑天鹅防护

bitCNY现在大部分情况下处于A状态,少量时间处于B状态,基本不进入C状态,比较健康。
bitUSD现在大部分情况下处于B状态,BTS价格较高的少量时间处于A状态,进入C状态的概率比较大,比较不健康。

Alt这类用户属于典型的低风险偏好型,有明显的尽量减少负债囤积智能货币的倾向,bitUSD供应量一直难以增加,加上bitCNY好得多的市场深度和活跃度更能吸引用户,如没有相对有力的措施,bitUSD将难以摆脱困局,这对整个生态是非常不利的。

bitUSD的黑天鹅防护已经生效,当前,通过降低MCR来促进bitUSD供应显得更加可行。

8
As the poll worker proposal 1.14.207 has been voted active and got more support than the "Keep MSSR of bitUSD as 1.02" worker proposal 1.14.208, MSSR of bitUSD will change from 1.02 to 1.01.

The change will happen after  UTC 00:00 22th, July, 2019.

Every witness is requested to update the feeding script to publish 1.01 as MSSR of bitUSD, please do the job after UTC 00:00 22th, July, 2019 and finish before UTC 00:00 24th, July, 2019.

For more information about the poll for this change, please check https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28558.0

9
Proposal 1.10.38714 is created to set force_settlement_offset of bitCNY to 1%. the proposal will expire in UTC 18th, July, 00:00

To do this is based on below considerations:

1.the feed price quality is obviously better than before.
2.bitCNY is in obvious discount, A lower offset can help to limit the discount.
3.other smartcoins, like bitUSD&bitEUR, all have a force settlement offset of 1%, it make sense to set same force settlement offset for them.

Committee members, please check and vote according to your opinion.

Code: [Select]
unlocked >>> get_object 1.10.38714
[{
    "id": "1.10.38714",
    "expiration_time": "2019-07-18T00:00:00",
    "review_period_time": "2019-07-17T23:00:00",
    "proposed_transaction": {
      "ref_block_num": 0,
      "ref_block_prefix": 0,
      "expiration": "2019-07-18T00:00:00",
      "operations": [[
          12,{
            "fee": {
              "amount": 12650000,
              "asset_id": "1.3.0"
            },
            "issuer": "1.2.0",
            "asset_to_update": "1.3.113",
            "new_options": {
              "feed_lifetime_sec": 86400,
              "minimum_feeds": 7,
              "force_settlement_delay_sec": 86400,
              "force_settlement_offset_percent": 100,
              "maximum_force_settlement_volume": 50,
              "short_backing_asset": "1.3.0",
              "extensions": []
            },
            "extensions": []
          }
        ]
      ],
      "extensions": []
    },
    "required_active_approvals": [
      "1.2.0"
    ],
    "available_active_approvals": [],
    "required_owner_approvals": [],
    "available_owner_approvals": [],
    "available_key_approvals": [],
    "proposer": "1.2.121"
  }
]

10
中文(Chinese) / 市场呼唤有历史使命感的大户和机构
« on: July 09, 2019, 03:23:15 am »
alt的USD大债仓最近引起不少抱怨。

alt的策略大致是,当BTS喂价升高,就从债仓撤出一部分BTS,贴线抵押,这样等喂价降低,就爆仓,当价格高于某一基准线时,不设TCR,否则,设TCR=1.6。

因为USD流动性不好,所以大的USD债仓面临着较大风险,有可能当市场大跌时被摁在地上抹茶,大USD债仓有较大的出货平仓意愿是可以理解的。

从个人角度讲,这种策略也许是最优的,毕竟这样可以直接卖抵押物。

但对整个系统讲,这种策略却影响很坏。因为这种策略客观上造成了一定程度上对价格的压制。

但这也不是alt一个人的问题。

要彻底解决这个问题,就需要培养USD市场的流动性,需要更多的人去抵押借出USD。

如果能把流动性搞成跟bitCNY一样,那也不存在这个问题了。

但几个月来,USD的供应量是在下降的。

值此bitCNY已经折价,USD溢价很高的情况下,大户们能平掉一些CNY债务,多去借借USD吗?

alt能不能换换出货方式,直接拿BTS现货挂USD卖单,尽量别用爆仓方式出货?

11
General Discussion / topics to be discussed in Shanghai
« on: July 02, 2019, 10:30:01 am »
1. core team discussions

2. marketing WP https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28444.0

3. GS protection (updated BSIP58, protection is guaranteed by core code)
4. BSIP62:close short position https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/156
5. BSIP40:Custom active permission https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0040.md
6.committee work organization.

7. BSIP70: Lending for Margin Tradinghttps://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/170
8. mobile App WP. https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28460.0
9.GXC&BTS cooperation.
10.smartcoin marketing/ZBG
11.cn-vote

12
Stakeholder Proposals / [Poll] BSIP59:Reduce MSSR of bitUSD to 1.01
« on: June 24, 2019, 10:25:35 am »
As MSSR values, 1% and 2% are different at:

1. 1% will lead to better pegging at time while margin call price impact the expectation on BTS price.

2. 1% reduce the benefits of shorting BTS in half.

3. lower MSSR will make the margin call orders a little more difficult to be eaten. and may lead to some risk accumulation.

We have seen that bitCNY behaved well after the MSSR was reduced to 1.01.

Now bitUSD has a MSSR of 1.02, what we can see is that bitUSD has a 2%+ premium.

I feel it's time to bring a better pegging to bitUSD.

GS protection is already implemented in bitUSD, so no need to worry too much on black swan.

Please find BSIP59 Doc: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0059.md for detailed info of BSIP59.

Two worker proposals have been created for this poll:

1.14.207   Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MSSR of bitUSD to 1.01

1.14.208   Poll - BSIP59 - Keep MSSR of bitUSD as 1.02

please consider the 2 choices carefully before you vote.

13
This proposal is to replace 1.14.200 https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28508.0

I agree with what the China BTSer Union suggested, https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28549.0, BTS is now obviously under estimated in the market, we need to introduce more money to increase BTS holdings.

I think currently it's a good idea to use the accumulated bitCNY market fee to buy BTS, and this measure can be combined together with the left OMO issue.

1. now account committee-cnytrader owns a debt position of 451K CNY debt and 3.9M BTS collateral,  reorganize account committee-cnytrader, let the representative from CNY BTSer Union to replace witness-still,  committee-cnytrader will handle the task of buying BTS using the bitCNY market fee.

2.each time the accumulated bitCNY market fee is above 100K CNY, claim it and transfer to the cnytrader account, when BTS price is under 1CNY, the multisig members will decide the process to buy in BTS.

3. when the BTS price is above 1CNY, multisig members need to sell some BTS to pay the debt, and also accumulate bitCNY for the next down trend.

A poll worker proposal is created for this:

1.14.205   Poll - increase BTS holdings with accumulated market fee

please vote this proposal according to your opinion.

14
中文(Chinese) / 把BTS从ZB提出来?
« on: June 21, 2019, 04:16:58 am »
如题,现在ZB也参与BTS社区,nevermore1在积极投票,zbbts也在运行节点,但我觉得我们依然需要对ZB的情况做一次严肃的审视。

ZB钱包现在有大约2.6亿BTS,是CEX里面最多的,ZB平台的BTS/QC杠杆交易也很活跃,可以说ZB交易平台对BTS的价格走势有很大的影响。

但鉴于虚拟货币交易的各种不规范现状,CEX里面可能存在各种不规范的操作,比如裸卖空,比如挪用用户资金进行放贷,市场操纵等等。

在过去的时间里,已有多次用户爆料ZB的不规范行为,涉及裸卖空,市场操纵等。



在BTS方面,由于ZB的BTS积累比较充足,暂未发现裸卖空的迹象,但是,是否有挪用用户资金进行放贷或者市场操纵却是很值得追问的事情。

而且,ZB也的确有这么做的动机。

ZB之所以能吸引到如此多的BTS,一个关键点就是用户可以拿BTS在这里放贷收息。而借贷者借了BTS是用来做空的,如果ZB希望保持这种吸引力,就有必要保持乃至增加借贷需求,换句话说,需要保持BTS的“做空可操作性”。

一个聚集了BTS流通量10%的交易所如何保持BTS的“做空可操作性”呢?挪用用户资金操纵市场,在合适的时机主导做空,制造BTS的弱势形象,我想都是不难想到的方法。

而且看看其他社区用户的控诉,这样的怀疑也并非空穴来风吧?

在过去,BTS自带杠杆的特性也给这种做空收割的操作提供了便利,现在,虽然这种便利大大减少了,但依然存在。

所以,我们需要反对的不是做空机制本身,而是种种不规范操作可能给BTS本身带来的伤害,杠杆做空机制本身没有问题,可以更有效地进行价格发现。目前社区正在讨论的“lending margin call”新功能,如果能成功实施,那么用户可以再内盘抵押bitCNY借BTS来做空,但这里不存在裸卖空或者资金挪用的可能,这种机制就是我们所需要的。

而对于有较大嫌疑进行资金挪用,价格操纵,主导做空的CEX,我想,BTSer们还是最好把BTS从这些CEX里提出来吧,因为你放在里面的每一个BTS,都可能转化为做空攻击的子弹,虽然你可能通过放贷获得小小的收益,但比起BTS本身健康成长能给你带来的收益,这点小小收益真的很微不足道。后面还隐藏着巨大的风险。

更何况,做空BTS已经变得比过去更难。

15
Three committee proposals are created to update bitCNY, bitUSD and bitEUR.

1.10.34553 set bitCNY reward percent to 80%, market fee to 0.1%.

1.10.34555 set bitUSD reward percent to 80%, market fee to 0.1%.

1.10.34565 set bitEUR reward percent to 80%, market fee to 0.1%.

All the three proposals will expire at 2019-7-1 00:00:00 UTC.

The 80% reward percent and 0.1% market fee can help to

1.generate enough incentive for referral.
2.add more value to LTM, as LTM will actually need only to pay 0.02% fee and have chance to get good referral reward.

and at the same time, 0.1% is not too high a fee rate, it is still a normal exchange fee rate.

Committee members, please check and vote according to your opinion.

forum discussion:
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28517.0

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