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1
中文(Chinese) / 流动性挖矿
« on: July 11, 2020, 03:39:53 pm »
流动性挖矿是前面的交易大赛(https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=29665.0)的升级版本,新的名字更加准确地定义了这个活动,因为这并不是让交易者来比拼谁能通过交易获得更多盈利,而是通过代币来激励做市者为市场提供更多的流动性/深度,从而促进市场的活跃。

这个活动的相关投票情况参见这里:https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32382.0

活动的设计文档见这里https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0087.md,中文版本见这里:https://dpos.club/t/topic/874 下面做一个简单的介绍:

##市场和网关##

流动性挖矿相关的市场分为3个交易对群:

交易对群A:
BTS / [gateways].BTC
BTS / [gateways].USDT
BTS / [gateways].ETH
BTS / [gateways].EOS

交易对群B:
BTS/bitAssets

交易对群C:
[gateways].BTC / bitAssets
[gateways].ETH / bitAssets
[gateways].EOS / bitAssets
[gateways].USDT / bitAssets

这里bitAssets包括 bitCNY, bitUSD, bitEUR 和 bitRUBLE.

有兴趣参与此流动性挖矿的网关可以去英文主贴https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32509.0回帖,提供资产证明后加入。

因RuDEX和XBTSX之前宣布在开始时不参加此次流动性挖矿,所以活动开始时网关只包括GDEX。

## 审核过的网关资产和相应资产证明页面:##
GDEX.BTC https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets
GDEX.USDT https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets
GDEX.ETH https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets 
GDEX.EOS https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets 

##奖励和规则##
每个交易对每日分配的奖励将和当日该交易对贡献给系统的交易费挂钩。
同交易对组的交易对将互相竞争,每日最多瓜分2万BTS。
做市者通过挂单来挖矿。
挂单量越大,持续时间越长,离盘口越近,获得的奖励越多。
另外,3 个交易对组买卖单奖励比不同,A组为7:3,B组为10:0,C组为5:5.
详细规则请见:https://dpos.club/t/topic/874

## 开始时间##
2020-07-12 00:00:00 UTC

本流动性挖矿活动由比特股理事会组织并负责日常运营。

2
General Discussion / Liquidity Mining(main thread)
« on: July 09, 2020, 08:55:23 am »

The Liquidity Mining is the updated version of the previous Market Making Contest(https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=31515.0), the contest is not for traders to compete who can get the most profit by trading, but to compete who provide the most liquidity/market depth for the markets. The contest is to incentivize market makers, and consequently encourage the liquidity and trading volume of the DEX, in some previous discussion and documents it has been called "Ordering Mining", "Ordering Mining" and "Liquidity Mining" refer to the same thing here, finally "Liquidity Mining" is adopted as it has been widely used and accepted in this industry.

Details of the poll voting on this activity can be found here:https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32382.0

The detailed design of the activity can be found here: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0087.md,  here is a simple introduction:

##Markets and Gateways##
The Liquidity Mining relevant Markets are divided into 3 pair groups:

Pair GroupA:
BTS / [gateways].BTC
BTS / [gateways].USDT
BTS / [gateways].ETH
BTS / [gateways].EOS

Pair GroupB:
BTS/bitAssets

Pair GroupC:
[gateways].BTC / bitAssets
[gateways].ETH / bitAssets
[gateways].EOS / bitAssets
[gateways].USDT / bitAssets

Here the bitAssets include bitCNY, bitUSD, bitEUR and bitRUBLE.

Gateways who have interests in participating in the contest please reply to this thread.
Every gateway needs to prove that its gateway assets are fully backed by real assets.

As RuDEX and XBTSX announced that they will not participate the Liquidity Mining at beginning, at this moment the qualified Gateways include only GDEX.

## qualified gateway asset(s) and corresponding audit page(s):##
GDEX.BTC https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets
GDEX.USDT https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets
GDEX.ETH https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets (Added on 2019-12-17)
GDEX.EOS https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets (Added on 2020-01-04)

##Rewards and Rules##
Each pair will get reward based on the contributed market fees to system.
Pairs in the same group will compete each other to share up to 20K BTS every day.
Market makers place orders onto the order book.
The bigger the orders and
the closer the orders to the opposite side of the order book and
the longer the orders lasting on the order book,
the more rewards the owner of the orders will earn.
detailed rules please check here: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0087.md

## Start Date
2020-07-12 00:00:00 UTC
End date not yet decided.

The Committee will manage the operation of this activity.

3
According to the voting rule, BAIP6 is now approved. https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=32382.msg342564;topicseen#msg342564

BAIP6 will be implemented based on what is described in the document: https://github.com/bitshares/baips/blob/master/baip-0006.md

As the first step, the four BitAssets bitCNY, bitUSD, bitEUR, and bitRUBLE will be set unified market parameters as market fee = 0.1% and reward percent = 20%.

Subsequently, Committee will find developers to develop the necessary scripts used in BAIP6. when the scripts is finished and tested well, the Ordering Mining will begin.

4
Stakeholder Proposals / [Poll] BAIP6: BTS-DEX economic model
« on: May 25, 2020, 01:59:06 pm »
BAIP6(https://github.com/bitshares/baips/blob/master/baip-0006.md) is a new drafted proposal that consist of the updated Market Making contest(Ordering Mining) rule and some other parts, the purpose is to cultivate the market depth and the trading activeness in BTS-DEX through a task distribution mechanism, and to increase the system income to buy back BTS to create value for BTS stake holders.

Now 2 poll workers have been created:

1.14.260 Poll-BAIP6-Implement BTS-DEX economic model
1.14.261 Poll-BAIP6-Do Not Implement BTS-DEX economic model

According to BAIP procedure definition, the BAIP6 will be considered approved while below 3 criteria are met:

1.worker 1.14.260 get more voting power than 1.14.261 worker.
2.worker 1.14.260 get more voting power than BAIP-Threshold Worker 1.14.236.
3.Both No.1 & 2 above last for three consecutive days.

Kindly Reminder:

BTS-DEX try to make sure,but do not guarantee that the listed gateways always provide liable service and is not legally responsible for that, users need to judge the service liability of the gateways by him/herself.

As RuDEX and XBTSX claimed not to participate the subsequent Ordering Mining, at the beginning only GDEX is included in the gateway list,  however any qualified gateway is welcomed to join after the Ordering Mining begin if the gateway accept the mentioned conditions in the BAIP.

Please vote according to your opinion.


BAIP6(https://github.com/bitshares/baips/blob/master/baip-0006.md)
是新起草的包含交易大赛(挂单挖矿)和销毁的部分的提案,目的在于用去中心化分发任务的方式来培育市场深度,刺激交易活跃度,提升系统收入,为BTS持有者创造价值。

现在有两个投票提案被创建:
1.14.260 Poll-BAIP6-Implement BTS-DEX economic model   ##赞同实施BAIP6
1.14.261 Poll-BAIP6-Do Not Implement BTS-DEX economic model  ## 反对实施BAIP6

根据BAIP流程,当以下三个条件满足时,BAIP6将被视为被社区批准实施:
1.提案 1.14.260 获得投票高于提案 1.14.261.
2.提案 1.14.260 获得投票高于提案 BAIP门槛提案 1.14.236.
3.以上两种状态持续三天以上。

友情提醒:

BTS-DEX尽力确认,但无法保证挂单挖矿涉及到的网关可持续提供可靠服务,也不对此负法律责任,请用户自行判断所涉网关的服务可靠性。

因为RuDEX and XBTSX宣布不参加接下来的挂单挖矿,开始的时候挂单挖矿将只包括GDEX一家网关,但欢迎任何服务达标且接受BAIP6中描述的参加条件的网关在后续时间选择加入。

请投出您神圣的一票!

5
This is a proposal which mainly focus on the update of the MM contest rules, however it is not only relevant to this, it try to build an economic model for BTS-DEX, to encourage users to contribute valuable transactions to the ecosystem, activate trading and promote the ecosystem value.

At the time that the MM contest paused, we observed that the BTS-DEX become more cold/desolate than the contest is active, it easy to understand, in any exchange in the world Market Making is a service that cannot be ignored, That’s why we try to optimize the MM contest rules and hope it can get enough support from the community.

The proposal will be discussed sufficiently and then be put into BSIP/BAIP poll voting, it will be executed if it is authorized by the voting.

On one hand, this proposal continuously enhance the platform token feature of BTS, enhance the contribution to system income from various assets, and the subsequent BTS buyback and burning.  On the other hand, this proposal will update the MM contest rules and rename it as “ordering mining” as one important part of the BTS-DEX economic model, BTS/bitAssets pairs group will be added in, reward on one pair will depend on the market fee income that was contributed from this pair to the system, the infrastructure will include several parameters which can be adjusted  to fit the business status, the gateway assets which are included in the ordering mining will be forced to pay part of the market fee to system before BTS 4.0 launching as a must for being listed in. All these update is to build a market-oriented selection and cultivation  mechanism, to make the competent pairs to stand out in a fair environment, and feed back to the system after growing up. The 3 trading pair groups just form a trading triangle, much trading chance will come out there if the market making really help.

Daily system income include all the BTS fees and the market fee share of the ordering mining listed gateway assets that were collected to committee-account, counted in BTS. All the funds that were used as rewards of for burning comes from committee-account, as current balance or future income.

#Ordering Mining
Ordering Mining involve 3 categories of assets which are BTS, bitAssets and Gateway assets.
bitAssets include bitCNY, bitUSD,bitEUR,bitRUBLE.
Gateway assets involve the according gateway assets of main crypto currencies include BTC, USDT, ETH and EOS, the organizer demand the gateway to guarantee the in time deposit and withdraw service with quick support while necessary, and provide the proof of real asset. Now the listed gateway asset include:

RUDEX.BTC https://audit.rudex.org/
GDEX.BTC https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets
XBTSX.BTC https://xbts.io/audit

GDEX.USDT https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets
RUDEX.USDT https://audit.rudex.org/
XBTSX.USDT https://xbts.io/audit

RUDEX.ETH https://audit.rudex.org/
GDEX.ETH https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets
XBTSX.ETH https://xbts.io/audit

RUDEX.EOS https://audit.rudex.org/
GDEX.EOS https://www.gdex.io/noticeAssets

Ordering Mining is to encourage market making via reasonable reward, to form sufficient market depth to attract traders, so the principles for the rules are:
1.give incentive to ordering, to narrowing the gap between top buy/sell orders, to big fund participation, and try to form a long-term mechanism.
2.attendees need to operate with self owned funds and bear profits or loss,no matter how much funds are included.
2.1 the bigger the order volume, the higher the reward.
2.2the closer the order price to the top counter party order price, the higher the reward.
2.3 the longer the order stay there, the higher the reward.
3.each day the reward to each pair depend on the fees that were paid to committee-account from this pair, the fee include the marginal fee and force settlement fee of bitAssets.

Rules
*Each pair group have 3 parameters include Base Reward, Top Reward, and Buy-Sell Reward Ratio, each pair have parameters include Pair Top Reward, Fee Return Ratio, Gear Goal Depth, Minimum Effective Order Volume.

*Calculation of pair reward and adjustment
First, calculate out the reward for each pair based on the contributed fee and the Fee Return Ratio of that pair, compare it with Pair Top Reward and select the lower one as the reward of that day for that pair. in formula Reward to one pair in one day = min(Fee paid from this pair to committee-account*Pair Fee Return Ratio, Pair Top Reward)

*Calculation of pair group reward and adjustment
Sum up the pair reward in the pair group to get the pair group reward, if Top Reward>pair group reward>Base Reward, adopt the pair group reward directly, if pair group reward<Base Reward, adopt Base Reward as pair group reward, if pair group reward>Top Reward, adopt Top Reward as pair group reward.

*Distribution of pair reward
*only the order with volume >  Minimum Effective Order Volume will be put into the market depth and reward calculation

*calculate the depth based on the distance from current order to the closer effective order in counter order listing.
Distance = ABS(this order price-closer counter order price)/MAX(this order price, closer counter order price)
Ordering Gears and according Reward Ratio
*orders inside 1% distance will share maximum 53% reward
*orders inside 2% distance will share maximum 25% reward
*orders inside 3% distance will share maximum 12% reward
*orders inside 5% distance will share maximum 6% reward
*orders inside 7% distance will share maximum 3% reward
*orders inside 10% distance will share maximum 1% reward
 
*In each gear:
If the summed up depth does not reach the goal depth, reward = maximum reward share* real depth/goal depth.
If the summed up depth overcome the goal depth, reward =  maximum reward share


*Distribution inside gears:
calculate the weight based on the distance of the order price to the gear border price:
Weight Coefficient = 1 + (gear top border price -  order price)/(gear top border price - gear bottom border price)
The pair reward share to each gear will be distributed to orders based on Order Volume*Weight Coefficient inside each gear.

*Calculation and rewarding will be done each day with period from UTC0:00 to 24:00, proposals will be created to distribute the rewards.
*If BTS 4.0 is not launched yet when this Ordering Mining begin, gateway need to pay 20% of the market fee of the listed gateway assets to committee assigned account, the reward to pairs with the gateway asset will stop if more than 1K BTS fee are not paid.

Parameters and Initial Values

Minimum Pair Daily Volume: 5KBTS, pairs with volumes less than this value at the day will not be included in reward distribution.

1.BTS/gateway assets group, Base Reward 3KBTS, Top Reward 20KBTS, and Buy-Sell Reward Ratio 7:3, each pair inside have Pair Top Reward 2K BTS, Fee Return Ratio 40, Gear Goal Depth 200K BTS, Minimum Effective Order Volume 100BTS.

2.BTS/bitAssets group, Base Reward 3KBTS, Top Reward 20KBTS, and Buy-Sell Reward Ratio 10:0, each pair inside have Pair Top Reward 10K BTS, Fee Return Ratio 20, Gear Goal Depth 1M BTS, Minimum Effective Order Volume 100BTS.

Suggest committee to set market fee to 0.1%, market fee sharing ratio to 20% for bitCNY, bitUSD, bitEUR and bitRUBLE.

3.  Gateway assets/bitAssets group, Base Reward 3KBTS, Top Reward 20KBTS, and Buy-Sell Reward Ratio 5:5, each pair inside have Pair Top Reward 2K BTS, Fee Return Ratio 20, Gear Goal Depth 200K BTS, at calculation the depth will be converted to according gateway asset depth based on the MA24 price, and
bitAssets/BTC: Minimum Effective Order Volume 0.0002 BTC
bitAssets/USDT: Minimum Effective Order Volume 2 USDT
bitAssets/ETH: Minimum Effective Order Volume 0.01 ETH
bitAssets/EOS: Minimum Effective Order Volume 1 EOS

#BTS Buy back and Burning
Committee will be responsible for the BTS buy back with the non-BTS assets in system income.
A parameter Burn-Income Ratio is set, each day BTS with amount=(system income*Burn-Income Ratio)will be transferred to the specific burning account, and will be burned when the accumulated amount reach a certain value.

#Payment for Development and Daily Operation
Generally BTS with amount = reward*1% will be paid to daily operators, each day proposal will be created to transfer such amount of BTS to operator account. On the other hand, as the update need development, salary will be paid to the developers if the proposal be approved by voting, currently the estimated salary is about 150K BTS.

Chinese version can be found here: https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=29665.msg342265;topicseen#msg342265

6
BTS community had suffered the dead spiral for long time, BSIP76 is created to fight against this, I believe everyone have seen that BSIP76 made sense in resisting shorting attack. however it now brought another big question: bitCNY and bitUSD peg off for long time, this bring great trouble in the ecosystem.

I would like to ask such a question -  now is it possible for us to slowly lower the bitUSD and bitCNY feed price threshold to solve this question?

A simple idea is that, firstly lower the bitUSD threshold to close to bitCNY threshold, in other words, lower from 0.0345USD to about 0.0311USD, in 1 or 2 steps.

and then lower  bitUSD and bitCNY feed price threshold synchronously with care and slowly, if the community can reach great consensus on each step.

thoughts?




7
中文(Chinese) / 交易员日记
« on: May 06, 2020, 09:19:24 am »
DEX有啥好玩的吗?

如果一个用户目的只是买卖BTC/ETH/EOS等主流币,那么确实没多少理由选择BTS-DEX,因为无论从市场深度还是平台用户体验,这里比起top CEX都差很多,杠杠交易,OTC交易就差更多了。

当然DEX也有点CEX没有的东西,前段在俄罗斯发生的骗子骗人充BTC到GDEX然后买自己骗子币的故事也说明,DEX比CEX开放得多。

当然,这点目前的意义也很有限。

不过呢,挂单挖矿(交易大赛)还是让事情变得很不一样了。

(待续)

8
General Discussion / Info about scamcoins?
« on: April 29, 2020, 02:35:24 am »
recently it is frequently reported that some cheaters ask the fooled to deposit BTC in GDEX and then buy the scam token with GDEX.BTC.

seems mainly happened in Russia?

GDEX are considering to take measures like whitelist for this to protect the interest of BTS users.

however we have little info about the scamcoins, hope the community can provide relevant info.

9
bitEUR now suffer great suppression in supply and liquidity by force settlement.

To apply BAIP2(https://github.com/bitshares/baips/blob/master/baip-0002.md) on bitEUR will lessen the suppression in supply and liquidity and will activate the ecology of bitEUR.

Two poll workers have been created:

1.14.257   Poll-BAIP2-Reform on bitEUR feed price mechanism

1.14.258   Poll-BAIP2-Do Not Reform on bitEUR feed price mechanism

BAIP2 is approved to apply on bitEUR if worker 1.14.257 get higher voting power than 1.14.258 and also 1.14.236 BAIP-Threshold.

Please vote according to your opinion.


10
Stakeholder Proposals / [Poll]BSIP87:Force Settlement Fee
« on: March 11, 2020, 04:44:43 pm »
A worker proposal is created as the poll of BSIP87.

1.14.254   Poll - BSIP87 - Force Settlement Fee

The detail of BSIP87 can be found here: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0087.md

More discussion can be found here: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/260

This BSIP will be seen as approved if worker proposal 1.14.254 gets more votes than below worker proposal:

1.14.158   threshold-bsip

Actually a new BSIP is being prepared for introducing the BSIP threshold:https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/267, it will be put into voting to update the rule of BSIP approval.

please check and vote according to your opinion.



11
中文(Chinese) / 对GDEX安卓版App安全问题的说明
« on: February 27, 2020, 11:12:10 am »
2019年1月15日, Bitshares项目发现安全问题,并于次日定位问题来源于开源项目https://github.com/bituniverse/bitshares_wallet的签名随机数问题。

Bitshares官方安卓项目https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares_android_wallet分叉自该项目源码。

GDEX Andriod App 基于上述Bitshares官方安卓项目钱包开发,因此GDEX Andriod App也可能存在该签名随机数问题带来的安全风险。

随后GDEX修复了此问题并发布了强制更新版本。

为杜绝安全隐患,强烈建议在使用强制更新版本之前下载GDEX Android App并注册及交易的用户,注册新的账户或者对旧账户更换新的秘钥使用。

巨蟹

12
中文(Chinese) / 强清的意义
« on: February 22, 2020, 08:34:12 am »
强清的意义很清楚,就是通过保证bitCNY持有者(适用于所有smartcoin,为叙述方便以bitCNY为例)的流动性索取权来稳定bitCNY的价格。

正是因为强清套利的存在,使得内盘的BTS/bitCNY不可能高出强清价太远。

BAIP2的实施,进一步保护了抵押者的利益,使得强清发起者需要承担更多的风险和义务。

下图中,黄色粗线是BAIP2实施后喂价的大致走势。



BAIP2将喂价设为”MA48(48小时均价)与市场现价取高“,因为MA48对市场价走势做了较大幅度的平滑,所以实际上新的喂价实际上是”当市场现价处于近期高位时取现价,当市场现价处于近期低位时取更高的MA48价格“。

图中几个箭头所指,都是当市场价格处于近期低位时喂价比市场现价高出许多的位置,高出的幅度高达5%-15%。

正如我在另一篇文章中所述,这些点位发生强清,其实相当于给被强清者加了5%-15%的补偿,如果在这个时刻被强清,被强清者大可以选择从市场上用USDT按被强清的量买入BTS,等到MA48线与现价线再度会和,bitCNY回归基本锚定,再用bitCNY换回上次花掉的USDT,是可以有几个点的收益的。

当然,5%-15%的补偿是否显得过大也是一个问题,因为这么大的补偿比较容易造成bitCNY的短期快速折价。所以到底选择怎样的均线来平滑掉近期低价是一个需要平衡的问题,当前正在进行的BAIP3投票,意在用MA24来替换MA48,适当降低平滑的程度。

所以,被强清并不是多么可怕的一件事情,这里面是有许多可以盈利的交易机会的,当然,前提是你不能简单地把持有bitCNY债仓当成简单的抵押借贷来处理,不能指望只要抵押率高过MCR就可以放任债仓不管睡觉就好。持有bitCNY债仓的你相当于一个衍生品交易员,需要时时关注你的仓位才好。


13
中文(Chinese) / 重新认识bitCNY
« on: February 20, 2020, 04:25:59 pm »
bitCNY是一种去中心化的金融衍生品。

它是从BTS链上的原生资产衍生出来的一种资产,根据一定的合约与BTS之间进行各种交割,交割的执行过程是去中心化的,直接在链上执行的,而合约本身是由BTS理事会来进行管理的。

在设计之初,bitCNY的设计目的是一种任何用户通过抵押BTS都可以生成,而其价格与人民币锚定的资产。有两个合约规则是为了达到这个目的而设计的,一个是爆仓规则,当一个债仓的抵押率低于最低维护抵押率时,就会触发爆仓,债仓中抵押的BTS被系统强制卖出,获得的bitCNY用与还债,爆仓规则的目的是保持债仓一直有足额抵押。另一个是强清规则,任何持有bitCNY的用户都可以发起强清,按照各个债仓抵押率从低到高的按照喂价强行买入抵押的BTS。强清规则的目的在于通过保障bitCNY持有者的流动性索取权来维持bitCNY价格与人民币基本锚定。

bitCNY发布运行一来,曾经产生了很大影响,但也不断发现各种问题。

首先是如果对强清不作限制,那么强清就很容易在市场极度低迷的时候成为bitCNY持有者向债仓持有人强行收购BTS的工具。为此,系统开始不断对强清加上了各种限制,限定系统每小时强清额度为bitCNY总供应量的0.5%,又加上了2%的价格补偿。

接着社区不断感觉到,爆仓规则对于抵押者来说过于残酷,因为爆仓后抵押的BTS是按喂价/MSSR在市场强制卖出的,最初MSSR=1.1,也就是说爆仓后抵押的BTS是按喂价打九折在市场卖出的,这规则不但对抵押者非常不利,也常常让bitCNY处于溢价10%左右的状态,后来经过一系列的调整,目前MSSR=1.01,较好地解决了问题。

但是这些参数改动都没有解决一个根本问题,那就是bitCNY的生产和交割规则是一个很有利于对BTS发动做空攻击的规则,当空头看准市场走弱的趋势,就会通过砸盘压低BTS的价格,同时囤积bitCNY,当喂价下跌,慢慢地就会有债仓爆仓,爆仓单继续砸盘,压低喂价,又导致更多的债仓爆仓,这样的连环爆仓效应之下,BTS常常经历惨烈的跌价。2019年10月,社区终于无法忍受在连环爆仓效应之下BTS价格眼看走向归零,通过投票通过了锁定喂价的决议,约定BTS的喂价不得低于0.22CNY,应该说,这一类似熔断的举措对于终止BTS价格下跌起到了明显作用,保护了抵押者的利益,但是也导致了bitCNY大幅贬值,损害了bitCNY持有者的利益,也难逃违反契约的嫌疑。从某种意义上,此举宣告了bitCNY纯粹的锚定资产目标的破产,bitCNY走向何方需要进一步探索。

再接下去,社区通过投票通过了BAIP2,中国社区俗称喂价改,它约定,有效喂价为当前市场价和MA48(二日均线)的高者,其主要的目的是防御做空攻击。

不难理解,BAIP2在明显弱化了bitCNY的锚定的同时,也创造出了大量的交易机会,当市场急跌,MA48高出现价很多的时候,bitCNY将会贬值,这种贬值是防御做空攻击,保护抵押者付出的代价。但因为MA48线与现价迟早是要会和的,bitCNY的价值也迟早会回归,这一过程中有巨大的交易bitCNY谋利的机会。

到此,bitCNY与当初的设计相比已经有了非常大的不同。对于bitCNY如何定位,社区需要做一个系统性的反思。

我认为,bitCNY定位不再是一个寻求与bitCNY高度锚定的稳定币,它的价值主要是在BTS交易所中发挥交易价值。而抵押BTS借出bitCNY这种行为,不应与传统意义上的抵押贷款等量齐观。它其实是一种参与衍生品交易的行为,用户抵押构建的债仓可以被视为某种BTS交割仓库,用户在抵押无息借出bitCNY的同时,必须承担相应义务,除了如果爆仓抵押物将被卖出外,还要承担”如有bitCNY强清单执行,则抵押率最低的债仓中抵押的BTS将被交割“这一义务。

那么,这套体系金融意义在哪里呢?

首先,bitCNY依然是一种有保值价值的资产,通过不断优化喂价规则有希望将贬值控制在10%以内,那么在BTS内盘,bitCNY依然有稳定币的价值。依然有交易价值,依然可以为系统创造收入。

其次,这一系统是一个提供BTS流动性的系统,不应该把强清视为简单的薅羊毛的行为,事实上,在BAIP2实施后,在抵押-强清-市场交易之间也出现了很多的交易机会,没有必要把强清视为洪水猛兽,衍生品交易者应该在充分理解规则的基础上去发现市场中的交易机会来获利。充分利用交易大赛对USDT/bitCNY, BTS/USDT等交易对的激励,用BTS/USDT交易对来连接内外盘,用USDT/bitCNY交易对来对bitCNY进行市场定价,可望充分做大市场。

以下图为例,这是当前时间(北京时间2月21日0点)火币的BTS/USDT交易对的K线图,当前MA48高于现价6%多,相当于内盘喂价比当前市场价高出6%,那么当一个债仓在这个时刻被强清,相当于卖掉BTS然后打了6%的折扣还债,如果被强清的时候按照市场价用USDT等资产买入BTS,等到MA48线与现价线会和时,不就相当于这部分交易有几个点的收益吗?有这样的交易机会为什么不去利用,为什么整天哭着喊着被薅羊毛了呢?



总之,不要再以抵押借款的视角看待bitCNY,要以一个衍生品交易者的视角去理解bitCNY。

从系统的视角看,只要强清没有带来恶性的bitCNY供应量下跌,那么系统就是健康的。

系统当然应该通过强清收费来增加收入,但是,强清收费的目的不应立足为阻止强清,而应该是对有量的行为收取合理的费用来为系统产生收入。

14
Based on BAIP3, https://github.com/bitshares/baips/blob/master/baip-0003.md, now 4 poll worker proposals have been created:

1.14.249   Poll-BAIP3-Refer to MA24 in bitCNY price feeding

1.14.250   Poll-BAIP3-Still Refer to MA48 in bitCNY price feeding

1.14.251   Poll-BAIP3-Refer to MA24 in bitUSD price feeding

1.14.252   Poll-BAIP3-Still Refer to MA48 in bitUSD price feeding

Please vote according to your opinion.




15
General Discussion / Review of BAIP2
« on: February 18, 2020, 08:04:48 am »
in the last 3 days BTS experienced the first rapid downtrend after the implementation of BAIP2, and the case provide a chance to review what BAIP2 bring to us.

below is the BTS price hourly chart in the last 20 days, the red, blue, and green line represent MA48, MA24 and MA12.



as BAIP2 request witness to feed price with max(MA48, current market price), so always when BTS price is in uptrend, the real time market price is fed, when BTS price is in down trend, the MA48 price is fed.

many people complained that their debt positions are force settled at 1st, Feb to 2nd and they have no chance to buy back at the same price, in my view, this is relevant to the fact that BTS price went up to cross 0.22CNY.

now let's check more exactly on the time that BTS price is in rapid downtrend, as BAIP2 mainly change the feed price result at these moments.



in below the thick red line represent the feed price change at last 2 days. at 15th, 23:00 Beijing time the MA48 went above price line and met the price line again at 18th 00:00.

positive effect:
it make the feed price went down very slowly and smoothly, it give debt position owners big time and price buffer to take care their debt position, it avoid the feed price to arrive the lowest market price in this interval. all this make shorting attack almost impossible.

negative effect:
in the interval that MA48 is above the BTS price, there is always a big gap between MA48 and price line. at 17th 00:00 we can see MA48 = 0.0367, the lowest price = 0.0301, the former is 1.219 times the latter.

this brought a big devaluation to the smartcoin which have implemented BAIP2, in the interval we saw the highest GDEX.UST/bitCNY trading price has been reached 8.15 which means a close to 15% devaluation to bitCNY.

we have to continuously optimize the rule and do necessary balance to get the positive effect and avoid the negative effect.

in below chart, the thick blue line stands for the feed price if we adopt MA24 instead of MA48. the thick green line stands for the feed price if we adopt MA12 instead of MA48.

in the discussion in China community, most users agree that MA24 will be a better choice than MA48 in this scenario. for MA12, it is doubtful that it can provide enough buffer to resist shorting attack.


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