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Topics - bitcrab

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1
General Discussion / market fee sharing setting for smartcoins
« on: June 15, 2019, 01:29:33 pm »
now the market fee sharing feature is ready in core code, although it is not completely ready in GUI, I think it's time to consider the relevant setting for smartcoins.

at the first step, one idea is to set parameters of bitCNY, bitUSD and bitEUR as below:

set the reward percent to 80%

reset the market fee to 0.1%

which means, users pay 0.1% market fee for the smartcoins, however the life time members will get 80% back.

80% of the market fee paid by basic members will be paid to the referer.

I believe this setting will greatly encourage users to become life time members and invite new users.

any thoughts?


2
中文(Chinese) / BTS投资指南
« on: June 10, 2019, 01:23:39 am »
人能不能拽着自己的头发离开地面?

肯定是不能的,但这只是一个比喻,真正要讨论的问题是:

靠抵押借来的bitCNY能不能撑起BTS的价格?

先来个假设,假设BTS完全在内盘流通,没有上外盘的中心化交易所,而且90%的流通量(当前总流通量2,722,138,126 BTS)都被某大户控制了,该大户将这些BTS全部抵押,按3倍抵押率,如果价格是0.5CNY的话,那么可以借出4.1亿bitCNY。

剩余的BTS流通量2.7亿。按0.5CNY价格计算总价值1.35亿。该大户用手里的4.1亿bitCNY托起0.5CNY的BTS价格应该不是个事儿吧?

当然,这是一个最简化的模型,但它至少说明了,能不能靠bitCNY支撑BTS价格这个问题并不能简单地类比为人能不能拽着自己的头发离开地面的问题。

当然,实际的情况比这复杂得多。

首先筹码是高度分散的,即便是alt这样的大户,控制的BTS也不及总流通量的10%。

目前处于抵押状态的BTS大约不超过总流通量的20%。

还有除了内盘流通以外,BTS还在许多交易所流通,有些交易所还是可以借BTS来做空的。

筹码的分散同时也意味着人心的分散,意味着复杂的多空博弈,并非每个人都关心BTS是否可以成长壮大,多数人更关心的都是自己是否能够获利。挖空心思寻找各种做空机会做空获利的不在少数。

如果拿现在系统中总的bitCNY债务(供应量)和bitUSD债务(供应量)除以总的BTS流通量的市值,可以得出现在系统的债务比率大约是8%,这是一个相当低的数字。

如果再算一下系统中BTS的总抵押量和平均抵押率的话,可以得出结论,那就是BTS总体的抵押量比较少,抵押操作比较集中,发行智能货币的潜力还远没有释放出来。

(未完待续)

3
General Discussion / why not borrowing?
« on: June 09, 2019, 06:39:34 am »
as shown below, some top whales has big amount of BTS and 0 debt.

I just wonder what kind of thoughts lead to this? do they all hold the policy that "buy while cheap and sell while expensive, do not borrow"?

bitUSD is still in big shortage and has a 2%+ premium, it will be good for more stake holder to borrow bitUSD and release(via buying BTS or others) to the market, right?

in the past, it seems the  "buy while cheap and sell while expensive, do not borrow" policy behaved well, "shorts and buy back" policy behaved even better, right?

we have done a lot change to make the rules more friendly to longs, help the system to resist shorting attack.

Target CR, MSSR reduction.

I hope these changes will make "borrow and buy" policy better than the "0 debt" policy.

if when bitUSD is in such a big shortage and high premium but only few users want to borrow bitUSD and release to the market, it's hard to say the changes succeed.






4
General Discussion / [Announcement]Change of bitEUR parameters
« on: May 31, 2019, 07:40:19 am »
As the poll worker proposals 1.14.192, 1.14.194, and 1.14.196 have been voted active and got more support than the "do not change" worker proposals, some parameter changes will be made:

Global Settlement Protection will be applied to bitEUR.
MCR of bitEUR will be reduced to 1.6.
MSSR of bitEUR will be reduced to 1.02.

These changes will happen after  UTC 00:00 4th, June, 2019.

Every witness is requested to update the feeding script to apply the 3 change items as mentioned above, please do the job after UTC 00:00 4th, June, 2019 and finish before UTC 00:00 6th, June, 2019.

For more information about the poll for this change, please check https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28465.0

5
Stakeholder Proposals / [Poll] Modify bitEUR parameters
« on: May 26, 2019, 08:22:58 am »
Up to now bitEUR has poor liquidity.

I don't know whether bitEUR can grow up, but I believe we need to give bitEUR a chance, while both bitCNY and bitUSD have experienced changes on parameters, bitEUR also need similar change, otherwise bitEUR will have no chance to compete with bitCNY and bitUSD.

The first poll is on Global Settlement Protection implementation on bitEUR, reference Doc: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0058.md

1.14.192   Poll-BSIP58-Apply GS Protection on bitEUR
   
1.14.193   Poll-BSIP58-Do Not Apply GS Protection on bitEUR

The second poll is on reducing MCR of bitEUR to 1.6, reference Doc:https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0059.md

1.14.194   Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MCR of bitEUR to 1.6

1.14.195   Poll - BSIP59 - Do Not Reduce MCR of bitEUR

The third poll is on reducing MSSR of bitEUR to 1.02:

1.14.196   Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MSSR of bitEUR to 1.02

1.14.197   Poll - BSIP59 - Do Not Reduce MSSR of bitEUR


Approvement on  "1.14.192 Poll-BSIP58-Apply GS Protection on bitEUR" is the precondition for the other 2 changes to be allowed.

Please vote according to your opinion.


6
As the poll worker proposal 1.14.181 has been voted active and got more support than the "do not change" worker proposal 1.14.169, MSSR of bitCNY will change from 1.02 to 1.01.

The change will happen after  UTC 00:00 22th, May, 2019.

Every witness is requested to update the feeding script to publish 1.01 as MSSR of bitCNY, please do the job after UTC 00:00 22th, May, 2019 and finish before UTC 00:00 24th, May, 2019.

For more information about the poll for this change, please check https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28294.0

7
General Discussion / Does it make sense to cultivate bitEUR?
« on: May 15, 2019, 03:10:56 pm »
actually I am always confused that we have a lot of members come from Europe, Europe community is an important community for BTS, but why bitEUR hasn't grown up?

do we really need bitEUR?

as bitCNY and bitUSD has been updated settings, if we need bitEUR to grow up and provide enough supply to users, we need also to set bitEUR parameters as bitUSD:

MSSR:1.02
MCR: 1.6
market fee: 0.04%

but before doing that, we need to answer the above questions.

any thoughts from Europe community? 

8
General Discussion / Price Feed Review
« on: May 09, 2019, 04:59:06 am »
This thread is to replace https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28265.0

Feed Price is so important that we need some mechanism to review/audit it.

If anyone in BTS community find that some witnesses do bad in price feeding, please provide proof here to show to all, voters should also get information from thread and decide to support or not support which witnesses.

In bitCNY price feed, I'd like to emphasize one principle,which get strong consensus from China community: the price feed should not conflict with the DEX price plus an bitCNY premium/discount offset.

 

9
As the poll worker proposal 1.14.187 has been voted active and got more support than the "do not change" worker proposal 1.14.188, MCR of bitUSD will change from 1.75 to 1.6.

The change will happen after  UTC 00:00 13th, May, 2019.

Every witness is requested to update the feeding script to publish 1.6 as MCR of bitUSD, please do the job after UTC 00:00 13th, May, 2019 and finish before UTC 00:00 15th, May, 2019.

For more information about the poll for this change, please check https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28352.0

10
中文(Chinese) / bitCNY/bitUSD的进化
« on: May 06, 2019, 09:19:57 am »
在去年大熊市中经历了BTS公市基金和源水基金的惨败之后,我一直在想症结在哪里,总有人苦口婆心地告诉我,只有更多的真金白银入场,才能把一个币的价格拉上去。这是一句正确的废话,提供不了太多的指导意义。在对系统设计的不断反思中,我逐步意识到的是,对于BTS这样一个去中心化的自带杠杆的交易系统+稳定币发行系统,规则才是第一重要的。规则好比管道,而资金好比水,只有设计合理的管道,才会把水导向正确的方向,只有足够合理的规则,才能把逐利的,永不眠的金钱吸引到正确的地方,让其发挥出正确的作用。

对BTS来说,优化规则的出发点,首先是如何防御做空攻击,其次是如何激励多方,为bitCNY和bitUSD提供足够的流动性。而且,由于BTS已经是一个成型的产品,不太可能在架构层面作大的改动,所以这些问题必须在对系统改动尽量小的前提下解决。

曾经的BTS面对做空攻击非常不堪一击,那时还没有引入目标抵押率的设置,一个债仓爆仓所有的抵押物都被挂单拍卖,那时爆仓惩罚参数MSSR高达1.1,于是那时的BTS成了空头的乐园,空头屯足bitCNY/bitUSD,然后看准时机砸盘,因为爆仓的抵押物是按喂价/MSSR的价格被强制拍卖的,大的债仓爆仓之后,几乎可以瞬间把价格砸下10%,引发新的爆仓,等到这种被称为“死亡螺旋”的连环爆仓戏码一轮接一轮上演完毕,BTS价格跌无可跌的时候,屯足bitCNY/bitUSD的空头就会像闻到尸体味道的秃鹫一样出来享受他们的大餐,在一轮轮剧烈的牛熊转换中,bitCNY/bitUSD的流动性和稳定性得不到足够的保证。

BTS的智能货币体系本质上是一个稳定币发行系统,抵押借贷,杠杆交易只是其表现形式,这样一个稳定币发行系统与传统的抵押借贷和杠杆交易的本质区别是,体系中交易用到的基础货币正是通过借贷创造的,如果无视如何保障基础货币供应这样一个根本性问题,而只是按传统抵押借贷和杠杆交易的风控思路来制定规则的话,就会因为基础货币供应量的不断紧缩而加重危机,从而不断陷入“处理危机的操作催生了更多的危机”这样一个死局。

对降低MSSR的争论反应了社区在这一问题上的认知差异,一派人士认为,MSSR就应该足够高,让被爆的债仓的拥有者受到足够惩罚,同时也让吃爆仓单(黄单)的用户有足够的利润空间,从而保证黄单能尽快被吃掉,降低系统风险。

如果对市场中的人的行为逻辑有足够认识的话,不难理解高MSSR会带来什么结果,因为吃黄单会有高利润空间,空头不会满足于持币等待,他们会主动出击,通过看准时机砸盘来制造黄单出来然后收割。打个比方,这就好比政府为了防止火灾的危害对灭火这一行为实施高奖励,于是引发了一些人主动放火然后灭火领取高奖励。当规则不合理,资金有可能会带来灾难。

即便不考虑做空攻击,高MSSR也等于放大了市场下跌对BTS系统造成的危害,从而使BTS系统成为一个非常脆弱的系统,而在市场暴跌之后,BTS内盘现场常常是大额黄单压盘,直接导致bitCNY和bitUSD高溢价,脱锚。

过去两个月之内,通过投票,bitCNY和bitUSD的MSSR都被降到了1.02,过去的几天BTS又经历了一次剧烈的下跌,给我们观察降低后的MSSR对BTS市场的影响提供了一个好的机会。

下面是北京时间5月1日下午1:49左右BTS内盘BTS/bitCNY交易对的K线和盘口的情况,之前BTS的价格在攀升到0.52CNY之后,经历了几次大跌在29日回到了0.32CNY左右,又在30日和5月1日经历了一波小幅上涨到了0.34左右,bitCNY的溢价超过了5%,与以往不同的是,由于MSSR调低到了1.02,所以当前的黄单卖价是0.3549,比盘口价格高出3%以上,过去三天,这些黄单都静静地挂在那里,没有发生黄单被吃的现象。





这样的“黄单高悬”现象对市场有几个方面的影响,与以往比较,首先,做空攻击获利变得更困难了,MSSR的降低削弱了连环爆仓效应,也使得黄单有较大机会在市场低迷时挂在比盘口价格高很多的位置,从而挤压了空头的获利空间;其次,在BTS处于相对低价的时候贴线借入bitCNY的风险降低了,因为BTS相对低价对应着bitCNY的短缺和高溢价,也就意味着黄单会挂在比盘口价格高很多的价格处,有较高的概率不被吃掉而等到价格恢复之后全身而退;还有,黄单高悬也避免了bitCNY供应量的收缩。

上面谈到的都是“黄单高悬”对市场的正面影响,当然也有负面影响,那就是黄单不被吃掉容易引起风险累积,增加了系统进入黑天鹅防护状态的概率。

但我认为这里正面影响可以抵消乃至超过负面影响,黄单高悬避免了bitCNY供应量的收缩,本身就有利于抵御BTS价格的进一步下跌,而因为进入黑天鹅防护状态会导致bitCNY的贬值,当系统处于黑天鹅状态边缘时,bitCNY持有者有动力通过吃黄单或者强清的方式降低全局清算价,避免黑天鹅防护状态的发生,而且即便进入黑天鹅防护状态,之前的经验表明回复到正常状态的难度并不大。

如果我们把脑洞开得再大一点的话,“黄单高悬”本身是否就可以当成一种对多方的激励来使用?让这种现象造成的多方相对空方的优势激励多头为市场提供更多的流动性?

1.02这样的MSSR值对于当前的bitUSD是合适的,但对于bitCNY来说还嫌高,观察表明当BTS的价格达到0.4-0.5CNY的时候,bitCNY的溢价就会降低到1%以内,黄单就会从高悬变成随爆随吃的状态,对多方的激励也会降低很多。

MSSR的设置原则应该是在不小于1的前提下尽量小,对于bitCNY来说,下一步降到1.01是非常必要的。

一年以来,BTS系统通过引入目标抵押率,降低MSSR,降低MCR来不断激励系统提供智能货币流动性的能力,接下去还需要增加“平多”功能,更好地降低风险和维护流动性。

这些措施的效果最终会如何,让我们拭目以待。

11
General Discussion / smartcoin evolution
« on: May 05, 2019, 01:39:45 pm »
plan to publish an article in some media to introduce the evolution of smartcoin, post here in advance for review, if any thoughts please share.

Background

In 2013 BitShares introduced the concept of smartcoin, which is designed to track the value of fiat with BTS as collaterals to back the value, actually smartcoin like bitUSD or bitCNY is a service provided by the shorts to the longs. bitUSD/bitCNY is operated by creating an order book between those who wanted leverage on BTS and those who wanted price stability. To provide liquidity for those who purchased bitUSD/bitCNY, bitUSD/bitCNY holders were allowed to force settle the least collateralized short positions at the price feed plus an offset after 24 hours delay with limited amount. This created an effective margin call and assured buyers of bitUSD/bitCNY that their token was always worth about 1USD/CNY worth of BTS. The system also designed ways to handle bad debt, which has been global settlement but now it is global settlement protection.

Some key parameters can be adjusted to adapt to the market, they are:

MCR: Maintenance collateral ratio, it defines the least collateral ratio a debt position should have, if CR fall under MCR, margin call will be triggered, this parameter is maintained by witnesses.

MSSR: Maximum short squeeze ratio, the margin call orders will be forced placed at feed price/MSSR, it can be seen as penalty to margin called positions and reward to those who eat the margin call orders, this parameter is maintained by witnesses.

Force settlement offset: if define the fee that the smartcoin holders need to pay while issue force settlement. this parameter is maintained by committee.

In the past these parameters have been changed for several times, taking bitCNY as an example, MCR is changed from 1.75 to 1.6, MSSR is changed from 1.1 to 1.05 and then 1.02, force settlement offset is changed from 0 to 2%.

Another big change is the introduction of TCR(Target Collateral Ratio), with setting a TCR, while a debt position is margin called, not all the collateral will be placed in margin call order,   the order amount will be calculated out based on the logic that paying debt with the got smartcoin via the sold amount will increase the CR to TCR.

Core consideration on rule update

If we compare bitCNY with Maker DAI, we can find that DAI business has little impact on ETH price, and ETH has a big enough market cap to support DAI supply, on the other hand, bitCNY business has big impact on BTS price, and as BTS market cap is so low bitCNY can succeed only when BTS price have a big rise up.

In the past years Bitshares community experienced a lot short attacks, at the early time of BTS2.0, all the smartcoins were set MCR=1.75 and MSSR=1.1, TCR (Target Collateral Ratio) is not introduced yet, while the market is in down trend and provide good chance to shorts, shorts will sell BTS in large volume to speed up the down trend of BTS price to make margin call, if some big debt positions is margin called, all the collateral of the position will be sold at feed price/1.1, which will lead to further price fall and more margin calls, while the “death spiral”make disaster and BTS price has no space to fall further, the shorts that has accumulated big amount of smartcoins will come out to eat the big margin call orders, shorts benefit most while the whole BTS ecosystem is in huge disaster.

Even we suppose there is no shorting attack in bear market, the high MSSR will always speed up the down trend of BTS price, and prohibited the system to provide enough smartcoin supply.

what the system responded to crisis finally aggravated the crisis, the same story repeated in each market cycle,BTS become a game field that speculators enjoy but the ecosystem cannot grow up, BTS community has to answer the following questions:

How to resist shorting attack?
How to provide incentive for creating smartcoin supply?
How to respond to crisis?

In long time Bitshares follow the traditional risk control logic of traditional mortgage loan and leverage trading to ensure security, but essentially Bitshares is a stable coin issuing system, the key difference is that traditional mortgage loan and leverage trading system do not have the problem of base currency supply, which is the key issue of Bitshares smartcoin system, any rules that ignoring the base currency supply will not lead to success, any measure that pursue security via punishing margin call will not make sense.

Below shows the candle chart of BTS/bitCNY pair at UTC 1st May, 5:49, several days before BTS price has risen up to 0.52CNY and then returned to 0.32CNY after several big falls, at 30th April and 1st May it went up a little to 0.34CNY, at the time bitCNY has a premium of more than 5%, different than before, as MSSR has been reduced to 1.02, so the margin call orders(yellow orders) is at 0.3549CNY, 3% more higher than the top sell orders, in the past 3 days, these yellow orders just stayed there without any partly being eaten.
 
This “yellow orders highly placed” phenomenon have some effect: first, it make shorting attack more difficult, low MSSR lessen both the “death spiral”effect and the profit space of shorting attack; second, it lower the risk of borrowing bitCNY at low CR, because at this scenario even when a position is margin called there is also a high possibility that the margin call orders stay for long time without being eaten and disappear after the BTS price recover; third, this “yellow orders highly placed” phenomenon avoid the deflation of bitCNY.





In long time smartcoins lack a mechanism of encouraging creating supply in high premium scenario, but now I see possibility to build such a mechanism via MSSR, if we adjust MSSR to a suitable value, it can encourage smartcoin supply in high premium scenario and at the same time keep the possibility of bad debt low enough.

We can see currently bitCNY is in such a status, an about 4.8% premium encourage speculators to borrow with CR=MCR and buy more BTS, we can also see that bitCNY supply keep almost unchanged while BTS price fall from 0.4CNY to 0.32 CNY, the mechanism works. However according to observation, when BTS price rise up to about 0.5CNY, bitCNY premium will fall under 2%, and the encouraging mechanism will not work, if we need it to work at that price, we need an even lower MSSR.

So in my view, MSSR value selection depend highly on the market depth of the smartcoin, it is time for bitCNY to try a lower MSSR such as 1.01 and 1.02 is a low enough MSSR for bitUSD.

Bad debt handling

In the past months bitUSD has experienced global settlement and revived, bitCNY has also been at the edge of global settlemet but is protected by witnesses.

Global settlement(GS) is a bad way to handle bad debt, it is just like suicide, it collect all the collaterals into one global settlement pool and sell in fixed price, while none can borrow more smartcoins. When bitUSD is global settled, bitUSD holders are hurt as bitUSD is devaluated, debt positions with high CR are also involved unfairly, stop bitUSD borrowing makes it difficult for bitUSD to revive.

Comparatively, the core idea of GS protection is not allowing feed price to fall under GS price, this cannot be understood as simple “faked price”, actually it is “we try best to avoid bad debt, but if it really happen for some positions, we will keep the book value  of all positions not bad and wait for the market to solve it, while keep the borrowing feature continue and gs price can also go down while margin call orders are eaten or force settlement happen. Which minimize the devaluation of smartcoin”.

BSIP58 is implemented on bitCNY and bitUSD, the problem is it still depend on witnesses' operation, a better solution is to include the logic in the core code -  remove GS by not allowing feed price under GS price.

There is no way to completely avoid bad debt, what we can do is to minimize the possibility and the possible harm to all the parties in the market.

Conclusion

To cultivate smartcoin ecosystem, we need to include reasonable incentive in the rules, which will make BTS longs get advantage in the long-short game when smartcoin is in obvious premium.

MSSR will be reduced toward 1 step by step, to ensure the incentive to BTS longs and good pegging. this will limit the premium of smartcoin. this will also provide solid support to BTS price in bear market when smartcoin is in high premium.

Force settlement will limit the discount of smartcoin.






to be continued...

12
Stakeholder Proposals / [Poll] BSIP59:Reduce MCR of bitUSD to 1.6
« on: May 01, 2019, 02:26:21 am »
Based on BSIP59, https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0059.md, now 2 poll worker proposals have been created:

1.14.187   Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MCR of bitUSD to 1.6
1.14.188   Poll - BSIP59 - Do Not Reduce MCR of bitUSD

The purpose of this change is to improve the liquidity and also the peg, at the time while bitUSD is in great shortage and premium.

The MCR of bitCNY has already been reduced from 1.75 to 1.6 and worked well up to now, it's also necessary to set MCR of bitUSD as same as bitCNY, otherwise more users would like to select to borrow bitCNY to lessen the liquidity of bitUSD。

Please vote according to your opinion.

13
As the poll worker proposal 1.14.174 has been voted active and got more support than the "do not change" worker proposal 1.14.175, and the protocol upgrade to 3.0.1 has been done successfully, MCR of bitCNY will change from 1.75 to 1.6.

The change will happen after  UTC 00:00 28th, April, 2019.

Every witness is requested to update the feeding script to publish 1.6 as MCR of bitCNY, please do the job after UTC 00:00 28th, April, 2019 and finish before UTC 00:00 30th, April, 2019.

For more information about the poll for this change, please check https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28208.0

14
Stakeholder Proposals / [Poll] BSIP59:Reduce MSSR of bitCNY to 1.01
« on: April 16, 2019, 06:04:35 pm »
As MSSR values, 1% and 2% are different at:

1. 1% will lead to better pegging at time while margin call price impact the expectation on BTS price.

2. 1% reduce the benefits of shorting BTS in half.

3. lower MSSR will make the margin call orders a little more difficult to be eaten. and may lead to some risk accumulation.


Please find BSIP59 Doc: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0059.md for detailed info of BSIP59.

Two worker proposals have been created for this poll:

1.14.181   Poll - BSIP59 - Reduce MSSR of bitCNY to 1.01

1.14.169   Poll - BSIP59 - Do Not Reduce MSSR of bitCNY

please consider the 2 choices carefully before you vote.

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update:

As 1.14.169 expired, a new WP is created to replace it:

1.14.191   Poll - BSIP59 - Do Not Reduce MSSR of bitCNY to 1.01

If you are against to reduce MSSR of bitCNY to 1.01, please vote 1.14.191

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I open this thread and poll to provide a place for community to express their opinion on bitCNY price feeding.

good price feeding is so important, without it we cannot make bitCNY pegged well enough, and cannot convince users that BTS is a dependent financial system.

I hope that anyone vote here can at the same time provide proof and explanation on your selection.

 

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