bitEUR now suffer great suppression in supply and liquidity by force settlement.

To apply BAIP2(https://github.com/bitshares/baips/blob/master/baip-0002.md) on bitEUR will lessen the suppression in supply and liquidity and will activate the ecology of bitEUR.

Two poll workers have been created:

1.14.257   Poll-BAIP2-Reform on bitEUR feed price mechanism

1.14.258   Poll-BAIP2-Do Not Reform on bitEUR feed price mechanism

BAIP2 is approved to apply on bitEUR if worker 1.14.257 get higher voting power than 1.14.258 and also 1.14.236 BAIP-Threshold.

Please vote according to your opinion.

2019年1月15日， Bitshares项目发现安全问题，并于次日定位问题来源于开源项目https://github.com/bituniverse/bitshares_wallet的签名随机数问题。

Bitshares官方安卓项目https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares_android_wallet分叉自该项目源码。

GDEX Andriod App 基于上述Bitshares官方安卓项目钱包开发，因此GDEX Andriod App也可能存在该签名随机数问题带来的安全风险。

随后GDEX修复了此问题并发布了强制更新版本。

为杜绝安全隐患，强烈建议在使用强制更新版本之前下载GDEX Android App并注册及交易的用户，注册新的账户或者对旧账户更换新的秘钥使用。

巨蟹

bitCNY是一种去中心化的金融衍生品。

它是从BTS链上的原生资产衍生出来的一种资产，根据一定的合约与BTS之间进行各种交割，交割的执行过程是去中心化的，直接在链上执行的，而合约本身是由BTS理事会来进行管理的。

在设计之初，bitCNY的设计目的是一种任何用户通过抵押BTS都可以生成，而其价格与人民币锚定的资产。有两个合约规则是为了达到这个目的而设计的，一个是爆仓规则，当一个债仓的抵押率低于最低维护抵押率时，就会触发爆仓，债仓中抵押的BTS被系统强制卖出，获得的bitCNY用与还债，爆仓规则的目的是保持债仓一直有足额抵押。另一个是强清规则，任何持有bitCNY的用户都可以发起强清，按照各个债仓抵押率从低到高的按照喂价强行买入抵押的BTS。强清规则的目的在于通过保障bitCNY持有者的流动性索取权来维持bitCNY价格与人民币基本锚定。

bitCNY发布运行一来，曾经产生了很大影响，但也不断发现各种问题。

首先是如果对强清不作限制，那么强清就很容易在市场极度低迷的时候成为bitCNY持有者向债仓持有人强行收购BTS的工具。为此，系统开始不断对强清加上了各种限制，限定系统每小时强清额度为bitCNY总供应量的0.5%，又加上了2%的价格补偿。

接着社区不断感觉到，爆仓规则对于抵押者来说过于残酷，因为爆仓后抵押的BTS是按喂价/MSSR在市场强制卖出的，最初MSSR=1.1，也就是说爆仓后抵押的BTS是按喂价打九折在市场卖出的，这规则不但对抵押者非常不利，也常常让bitCNY处于溢价10%左右的状态，后来经过一系列的调整，目前MSSR=1.01，较好地解决了问题。

但是这些参数改动都没有解决一个根本问题，那就是bitCNY的生产和交割规则是一个很有利于对BTS发动做空攻击的规则，当空头看准市场走弱的趋势，就会通过砸盘压低BTS的价格，同时囤积bitCNY，当喂价下跌，慢慢地就会有债仓爆仓，爆仓单继续砸盘，压低喂价，又导致更多的债仓爆仓，这样的连环爆仓效应之下，BTS常常经历惨烈的跌价。2019年10月，社区终于无法忍受在连环爆仓效应之下BTS价格眼看走向归零，通过投票通过了锁定喂价的决议，约定BTS的喂价不得低于0.22CNY，应该说，这一类似熔断的举措对于终止BTS价格下跌起到了明显作用，保护了抵押者的利益，但是也导致了bitCNY大幅贬值，损害了bitCNY持有者的利益，也难逃违反契约的嫌疑。从某种意义上，此举宣告了bitCNY纯粹的锚定资产目标的破产，bitCNY走向何方需要进一步探索。

再接下去，社区通过投票通过了BAIP2，中国社区俗称喂价改，它约定，有效喂价为当前市场价和MA48（二日均线）的高者，其主要的目的是防御做空攻击。

不难理解，BAIP2在明显弱化了bitCNY的锚定的同时，也创造出了大量的交易机会，当市场急跌，MA48高出现价很多的时候，bitCNY将会贬值，这种贬值是防御做空攻击，保护抵押者付出的代价。但因为MA48线与现价迟早是要会和的，bitCNY的价值也迟早会回归，这一过程中有巨大的交易bitCNY谋利的机会。

到此，bitCNY与当初的设计相比已经有了非常大的不同。对于bitCNY如何定位，社区需要做一个系统性的反思。

我认为，bitCNY定位不再是一个寻求与bitCNY高度锚定的稳定币，它的价值主要是在BTS交易所中发挥交易价值。而抵押BTS借出bitCNY这种行为，不应与传统意义上的抵押贷款等量齐观。它其实是一种参与衍生品交易的行为，用户抵押构建的债仓可以被视为某种BTS交割仓库，用户在抵押无息借出bitCNY的同时，必须承担相应义务，除了如果爆仓抵押物将被卖出外，还要承担”如有bitCNY强清单执行，则抵押率最低的债仓中抵押的BTS将被交割“这一义务。

那么，这套体系金融意义在哪里呢？

首先，bitCNY依然是一种有保值价值的资产，通过不断优化喂价规则有希望将贬值控制在10%以内，那么在BTS内盘，bitCNY依然有稳定币的价值。依然有交易价值，依然可以为系统创造收入。

其次，这一系统是一个提供BTS流动性的系统，不应该把强清视为简单的薅羊毛的行为，事实上，在BAIP2实施后，在抵押-强清-市场交易之间也出现了很多的交易机会，没有必要把强清视为洪水猛兽，衍生品交易者应该在充分理解规则的基础上去发现市场中的交易机会来获利。充分利用交易大赛对USDT/bitCNY, BTS/USDT等交易对的激励，用BTS/USDT交易对来连接内外盘，用USDT/bitCNY交易对来对bitCNY进行市场定价，可望充分做大市场。

以下图为例，这是当前时间（北京时间2月21日0点）火币的BTS/USDT交易对的K线图，当前MA48高于现价6%多，相当于内盘喂价比当前市场价高出6%，那么当一个债仓在这个时刻被强清，相当于卖掉BTS然后打了6%的折扣还债，如果被强清的时候按照市场价用USDT等资产买入BTS，等到MA48线与现价线会和时，不就相当于这部分交易有几个点的收益吗？有这样的交易机会为什么不去利用，为什么整天哭着喊着被薅羊毛了呢？



总之，不要再以抵押借款的视角看待bitCNY，要以一个衍生品交易者的视角去理解bitCNY。

从系统的视角看，只要强清没有带来恶性的bitCNY供应量下跌，那么系统就是健康的。

系统当然应该通过强清收费来增加收入，但是，强清收费的目的不应立足为阻止强清，而应该是对有量的行为收取合理的费用来为系统产生收入。

in the last 3 days BTS experienced the first rapid downtrend after the implementation of BAIP2, and the case provide a chance to review what BAIP2 bring to us.

below is the BTS price hourly chart in the last 20 days, the red, blue, and green line represent MA48, MA24 and MA12.



as BAIP2 request witness to feed price with max(MA48, current market price), so always when BTS price is in uptrend, the real time market price is fed, when BTS price is in down trend, the MA48 price is fed.

many people complained that their debt positions are force settled at 1st, Feb to 2nd and they have no chance to buy back at the same price, in my view, this is relevant to the fact that BTS price went up to cross 0.22CNY.

now let's check more exactly on the time that BTS price is in rapid downtrend, as BAIP2 mainly change the feed price result at these moments.



in below the thick red line represent the feed price change at last 2 days. at 15th, 23:00 Beijing time the MA48 went above price line and met the price line again at 18th 00:00.

positive effect:
it make the feed price went down very slowly and smoothly, it give debt position owners big time and price buffer to take care their debt position, it avoid the feed price to arrive the lowest market price in this interval. all this make shorting attack almost impossible.

negative effect:
in the interval that MA48 is above the BTS price, there is always a big gap between MA48 and price line. at 17th 00:00 we can see MA48 = 0.0367, the lowest price = 0.0301, the former is 1.219 times the latter.

this brought a big devaluation to the smartcoin which have implemented BAIP2, in the interval we saw the highest GDEX.UST/bitCNY trading price has been reached 8.15 which means a close to 15% devaluation to bitCNY.

we have to continuously optimize the rule and do necessary balance to get the positive effect and avoid the negative effect.

in below chart, the thick blue line stands for the feed price if we adopt MA24 instead of MA48. the thick green line stands for the feed price if we adopt MA12 instead of MA48.

in the discussion in China community, most users agree that MA24 will be a better choice than MA48 in this scenario. for MA12, it is doubtful that it can provide enough buffer to resist shorting attack.

A worker proposal is created as the poll of BSIP77.

1.14.246   Poll - BSIP77 - Add ICR for Debt Positions

the worker adopt a different name just because the BSIP name is too long to be included in the worker name.

the detail of BSIP77 can be found here: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0077.md

please check and vote according to your opinion.

Two worker proposals are created as the poll of Maker - Taker Fee relevant BSIPs

1.14.240   Poll - BSIP81 - Simple Maker-Taker Market Fees
1.14.241   Poll - BSIP85 - Maker order creation fee discount

the detail of BSIP81 can be found here: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0081.md
more discussion can be found here: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/229

the detail of BSIP85 can be found here: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0085.md
more discussion can be found here: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/240

please check and vote according to your opinion.

Currently BTS suffer big problems in several sides.

bitCNY and bitUSD devalued greatly, bring big loss to holders and hurt reputation a lot.
Most of the workers are voted down, core team do not have a clear future, some members are considering to leave.
China community and Western community conflict in some key problems.

Bitshares is in a dilemma, Bithares need to find a way to reborn.

Bitshaes has flaws from initial design, simply speaking:
1.smartcoins operation request BTS be robust in price, otherwise shorting attack will have chance to make smartcoin crash, as well as BTS.
2.worker proposal also request BTS be robust in price, otherwise the inflation also have chance to make BTS crash in bear market.

China community press "STOP" in a simple and crude way, it really "stop" the problems but what we need is to solve the problems.

In my view, we need some shift on paradigm, at this moment we need to focus on how to make BTS generate enough income to sustain BTS price.

Based on this idea, I have a simple review on the candidate BSIPs and classify them into 3 categories:

Class A: BSIPs that will help to generate system income directly, and are in controlled development cost and risk.

BSIP74：Margin Call Fee Ratio
BSIP86: Share market fees to the network
BSIP81: Simple Maker-Taker Market Fees
BSIP85：Maker Order Creation Fee Discount

Class B: BSIP - irrelevant to generating income directly, however is important and in low development cost and risk

BSIP62：  Close Short Position     
BSIP71：  Add "Prevent Global Settlement" Flag for Smartcoin
BSIP73：  Match Force-Settlement Orders with Margin Calls and Limit Orders
BSIP61：  Operation to Update Limit Orders
BSIP39:   Automatically approve proposals by the proposer
BSIP64:   Optional HTLC preimage length, HASH160 addition, and memo field

Class C: BSIP - too complicated, uncontrollable development cost and risk, or the feature is not important and in early stage.

BSIP70:  Peer-to-Peer Leveraged Trading
BSIP69:  Additional Assert Predicates
BSIP57：Managed Vesting Balances
BSIP22:  Vote Decay for Witnesses, Committee Members & Proxies
BSIP47: Vote Proxies for Different Referendum Categories and explicit voting operation
BSIP45: Add bitAsset Backing Collateral flag/permission

In my view, we can put BSIPs in Class A and also some in Class B into a package and request core team to work on it, maybe a independent worker is necessary for that.

Committee, core team, witnesses, cn-vote, BEOS and also other big proxies, please review this post and share your ideas, sufficient discussion and strong consensus and needed for optimize and apply this plan.

我觉得BTS的费用体系一直做得不太好，作为一个DAC，费用体系没有对业务形成有力支撑。

我一直反对对于gas fee的“按法币计价”的调整方式，这种方式每每在熊市提高收费，给用户带来很差的感受。我也不认为gas fee应该成为系统收入的主要组成部分，原因很简单，一个DeFi平台，针对业务的按比例收费应该成为收入的主要组成部分，一个用户交易100万BTS，你收千一的费用，收1000个BTS，他没有太大感觉，但是你对一个转账100BTS的用户收2个BTS，他感受就不太爽。

系统并不需要支付什么法币性的费用，这使得按法币计价收费更加显得不合理，类似经济下滑，但政府死活不肯减税。

BTS2.0上线很久后bitCNY才开始收费，不够及时，而现在由于搞了80%的返佣，相当于0.1%的交易费里面只有20%成为系统收入，太低了，我认为把返佣比例调低到60%是很必要的。

其它种类的收入，有些在计划中，有些还没开始讨论，比如：

爆仓费用：https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/blob/master/bsip-0074.md BSIP已经写好，可惜还未排入投票。

taker fee：https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/229 也很值得考虑。

借款利息：可以考虑向借bitCNY等智能货币者收取利息，DAI的巨额收入很大部分就是依赖利息，利息还可以用来调节供应量。

https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/194， abit在这里建议系统向一切有交易费设置的资产收取交易费的一小部分，比如5%，我现在认为是合理的。

还有，IIRC，强清现在是不收费的，应该改为收费。

以Alex为代表的一些人总认为BTS不是公司，不能靠收费强大，而要靠被更广泛的应用强大，但我觉得，BTS就是个DAC，BTS需要费用来发展经济，需要收入来对BTS的价格产生支撑，需要收入来支付基础设施建设费用。