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Messages - bitcrab

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1
Simply adding a smartcoin isn't that impressive a feat for a centralized exchange, I'd fully support these bounties for CEX which allow borrowing bitCNY using BTS from the CEX interface resulting in BTS returning from CEX to the BTS DEX whilst providing BTS buy pressure and bitCNY liquidity within the CEX. Alternatively, if these large exchanges are convinced to create a BTS DEX gateway or bridge, that'd be far more valuable than a single token being added to a CEX.

https://www.bitshares.foundation/workers/2017-10-compliance Already covers this topic, no? "$50,000 worth of BTS in each case we convince an exchange (i.e. Kraken, bitstamp, coinbase, bitcoin.de) to list any asset (pair) that is primarily hosted on BitShares."

I don't think 'Bitfinex' should count, aren't they behind Tether & thus a direct competitor? If Tether collapses then won't Bitfinex too?

Binance doesn't charge for addition anymore, couldn't a community based application suffice?

it add much complex for CEXs to build a BTS DEX gateway or enable borrowing from BTS DEX, if some CEX are interested in this it can be handled in a single event.

bounty means "if you make something done, you will get the reward", so it doesn't matter if it is impossible for Bitfinex to adopt smartcoin, what happend recently to USDT hurt the reputation of Tether greatly, but I believe Bitfinex will continue be one of the most important CEX in this area.

the bounty is not for paying to CEX for listing, it is pay for the lobbyists that can make things happen, I believe CEXs like binance or huobi have some other concerns which are more important than charge: supply, pegging accuracy, remittence service..etc, the bounty is to hire salesperson actually.

2
I like the idea.

I believe the worker should include bitEUR as well. (yes it's very small now but I believe has great potential)

I also believe bitEUR has great potential, but now there's only less than 80K supply, I think for bitEUR firstly we need to implement BSIP42 or the updated MCR based proposal to guarantee an accurate pegging, and then get sufficient supply and market depth by some market making activities,
otherwise CEXs will not be interested in it.
 

3
Excuse the noob question but can ppl in China still buy bitCNY with CNY?

If not wouldn't it be better if ppl in CHina could swap their CNY cash by giving it to merchants using PalmPay? Like paying extra with their groceries and the merchants would top their balance so to speak? That would be really decentralized...

yes they can.

4
“Stable coin” become hot in recent past and attracted much attention,  the event that USDT is discounted more than 5% bring great worry on this token that occupy more than 95% stable coin market shares, now there is a great market chance for smartcoins, we should not miss it and need to do some big promotion to extend the market share.

Now one of the biggest market for stable coin is exchange, exchange has the demand to adopt stable coin as base trading currency, to encourage every potential people in this world to help to lobby the exchanges to adopt bitCNY and bitUSD, I suggest to open a worker proposal to use public fund for a marketing campaign.

1. Bounty quantity

the 4 most famous exchange: binance, OKEX, Huobi, Bitfinex.      1M/0.5M BTS

Top 20 in coinmarketcap  Adj.Vol(24h) ranking                           400K/200K BTS

Top 50 in coinmarketcap  Adj.Vol(24h) ranking                           200K/100K BTS

if one succeed to lobby one of the 4 most famous exchange -  Binance, OKEX, Huobi, Bitfinex to open smartcoin market, he/she will get 1M BTS as reward for the first adopted smartcoin(either bitCNY or bitUSD), 0.5M BTS as reward for the second adopted smartcoin(either bitCNY or bitUSD).

for other exchanges, the reward is as listed above based on the Adj.Vol(24 hours) ranking in coinmarketcap.com.

2. Work verification and reward distribution
Bitshares Committee will take the responsibility to verify the work of lobbyist and decide the distribution of reward.

People who want to work as lobbyists need to comment on the work proposal thread, give the information of bts account, email and which exchanges he/she want to lobby, if finally the exchange open smartcoin market(open at least 3 relevant trading pairs), the lobbyist need to provide evidence that it’s his/her work that make things happen.

There is a 30 days observation period, if the smartcoin markets are kept open in these period, then the highest  Adj.Vol(24h) rank of this exchange in coinmarketcap in these 30 days will be used to determine the reward.

This campaign will last 180 days, only when exchange open smart coin market in these 180 days then the reward will be distributed accordingly.

A worker proposal  of 100K BTS daily pay will be created for this campaign, if too many exchanges open smart coin markets and the totally 18M BTS is not enough to pay the reward, open market operation fund will release the fund to fill up the gap.

I hope this suggestion can be supported by community and we can implement it rapidly to capture the market chance.


5
General Discussion / Re: New mechanism to handle bad debt (black swan)
« on: October 18, 2018, 09:10:07 am »
BSIP-18 doesn't guarantee recovery either. If BTS continues to go down, neither solution will help.

@abit 's suggestion is better than BSIP-18 because it limits the damage to only the undercollateralized positions, while leaving the rest of the market intact.

Exactly, that's why I like it.

Quote from: abit
IMHO, in % sense, collateral requirements should be increased while market is bullish; then when market turns to bearish, there will be more spaces to release risks.
Interesting, I understand that logic, but am surprised to see you say it, since doing so would dis-incentivize trading and shorting in particular. Wasn't it you that said 175% collateral was too much in bullish conditions?

I know I've seen bitcrab and others talk favorably about allowing CR to go < 100% and "not to penalize debt holders", but I believe we should use the carrot and the stick to keep them trading by the rules, which help to keep the ecosystem safe and fair for all.

I believe abit means that in bull market 175% may be low and need to increase

exactly speaking, now I just do not want the independent <100% ratio debt position trigger global settlement, abit's suggestion here seems good.

6
actually BSIP42 is already active on bitUSD, otherwise bitUSD would have a big premium as before.

BSIP42 is irrelevant to MCR adjusting, the new MCR-based solution should have its own BSIP.

yes we need metrics to evaluate the feed price, as a base I think we need a chart that involve feed price from all witnesses, median price, latest price and some other reference price, seems someone began working on this?


7
up to now I don't think it's a good idea to make Bitshares a smart contract platform.

one big concern is security, yes smart contract can bring great flexibility, but it also bring risk, we have seen many security events that had happened in Ethereum&EOS, Bitshares is a system focus on Finance, we should be more careful while handling this topic.

yes smart contract is a trend for public blockchain, but that does not means each public chain should become a smart contract platform, smart contract is a big new feature and is not so tightly linked to Bitshares' current competitiveness.   

8
The most difficult part is how to guarantee the lenders can always get back their assets before a black swan event, with good enough performance. All external markets have external tools E.G. insurance to try to achieve this. BM has proposed a similar idea long before (read: bond market) but abandoned IMHO due to performance issues and other limitations.

why need to guarantee this?

9
great idea.

my concern:

what kind of assets can be used as collateral? only BTS or some UIA such as OPEN.BTC, GDEX.EOS also available? anyway in the  cryptocurrency market BTC,ETH, EOS, etc occupy the most share.

margin trading need good liquidity of the collateral, now even BTS/bitUSD is not in satisfactory depth. so I am also considering other forms of bond market:

A borrow 100$ of bitUSD from B, with X interests and Y terms and put 110$ worth of GDEX.EOS to collateral, A can get the collateral back by paying the debt and interests, when the expire time arrive and A does not pay back the debt and interest, the collateral will be sent to B.

this kind of borrowing is widely used in China OTC market, it do not rely on the collateral liquidity in an exchange.

 




10
General Discussion / Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« on: October 12, 2018, 05:25:24 am »

1) Do you support an experimental MSSR of 0 as an incentive to keep shorts in the game and not penalize future bts collateral holders?


now I feel to reduce MSSR make sense even after the implementation of BSIP42, and I don't think setting MSSR=100% means the penalization is cancelled, forcing one user to sell it's collateral in market price is still one kind of penalization.

there is another BSIP for setting MSSR to 105% for bitCNY, https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/97, however it is not moved forward when BSIP42 is on the way.


11
大跌行情,外盘领跌,外盘价低于内盘价。

因为bitUSD溢价基本是靠比较内外盘价格来计算,所以这种情况下,算法认为bitUSD有折价,开始向下调喂价。

于是,要么引起不断爆仓,要么内盘把价格砸下去让算法觉得bitUSD有溢价,保持喂价。

不是说不能接受爆仓或者内盘价格下跌,但问题是,这种情况下通过简单比较内外盘价格来判断溢价是有问题的。

需要发展更好的算法来判断溢价/折价。
没感觉有问题呀。
当出现差价,如果搬砖不能搬平,那么就是存在折价了。
流动性差,搬砖渠道不通畅,价差会存在较长时间。

但价差和bitUSD溢价未必是等价的,虽然内外盘价差较大,但没看到bitCNY/bitUSD汇率有较大波动。

要努力让bitUSD/BTS交易对与外盘联动才行。。。

12
大跌行情,外盘领跌,外盘价低于内盘价。

因为bitUSD溢价基本是靠比较内外盘价格来计算,所以这种情况下,算法认为bitUSD有折价,开始向下调喂价。

于是,要么引起不断爆仓,要么内盘把价格砸下去让算法觉得bitUSD有溢价,保持喂价。

不是说不能接受爆仓或者内盘价格下跌,但问题是,这种情况下通过简单比较内外盘价格来判断溢价是有问题的。

需要发展更好的算法来判断溢价/折价。

13
General Discussion / Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« on: October 09, 2018, 01:16:14 pm »
So, let me summarize my understanding. We basically have three parameters available that we can use
towards fulfilling our optimization criteria:

* settlement price (price feed) - This is the price that is used for margin calls as well as force settlements.
* MSSR - the max premium a shorter needs to pay (from market) in case of margin call
* MCR - The minimum collateral necessary for call positions, if lower -> margin call

Essentially, we can apply a "feedback loop" on all of them, either by "derailing the price feed", tuning MSSR or MCR.
The main motivation for "detailing the price feed" is because the MSSR as well as the MCR are lower bounded by 100.1%
and thus cannot go lower. A "tuning" of the price feed could lead to reduction of the premium beyond what could be
possible by tuning MSSR or MCR.

Now, the question (at least to me) is, where is the "premium" and how can we lower it, best?

I would like to see how well this approach would work:

* Feed: price feed with a fixed 1% offset from the "fair price" (fixed tuning) - this way, we allow bitasset buyers to outcompete margin calls and have margin calls provide liquidity at 1% 'discount'
* MSSR: at 100% if premium >=0%, else (100-premium*penalty)% if premium <0 (feedback) - this way, we cause margin calls to raise the price in case there is a discount - "penalty" would cause the margin call to pay a premium
* MCR: dynamic MCR at     max(130, 170 - 40 * (premium/5%))% (feedback) - this way, we have a MCR of 170% in case of 0% premium which groes if the premium is <0% and shrinks towards 130% (linearily) in case of premium >0%

The only thing that I am not sure about is if this approach may not lead to more and more margin calls piling up at the settlement
price with not incentive provided to sell into them - unless the external "premium" is negative ...

Thoughts?

in my view, although there are 3 parameters, we do not to make each one dynamic. adjusting all 3 will make things very complex.

feed price: let it return to just reflect the "real market price". it also do good for information.

MSSR: I feel it's OK to set it to a fixed value, either 10% or 5%.

MCR: is 130% low enough as a limit? is say 110% better as a limit? is it possible to set 100% as the limit? as we all agree that we should allow independent margin call orders with ratio<100%

14
General Discussion / Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« on: October 08, 2018, 09:03:06 am »
Define "sufficient collateral"? Almost all the time all debt positions have more collateral than debt, from this perspective, they should never be "hurt" in terms of margin calls or forced settlements? Apparently this is not our rule.

If you mean 175% is sufficient, I disagree. 175% perhaps is sufficient sometimes, however, when a smartcoin is oversupplied, IMHO that means 175% is NOT sufficient; when under-supplied, I'd say 175% is too high.

So, if we adjust MCR dynamically and keep feed price unchanged, for debt position holders, it's not always "safe" to keep their positions if they have only 175% collateral ratio or even 200%.

if sufficient collateral become insufficient because of feed price or MCR adjusting, and then the debt position become margin called, it's a well defined and acceptable process. no problem.

but according to the current force settlement rule, smartcoin holders can always settle the debt position with the lowest collateral ratio, regardless whether the ratio is sufficient or insufficient,  regardless whether the smartcoin is in shortage or oversupplied, I don't think that's a well designed rule, and in practice, the force settlement just provide an arbitration tool, it is not a must for smartcoin pegging.

15
General Discussion / Re: Announcement on BSIP42 relevant actions
« on: October 07, 2018, 01:45:22 pm »
Define "hurt"? Debt positions are attached with responsibilities, we can't deny it.

When smartcoin is oversupplied (which is reflected as trading below par value), actually borrowing more will hurt the peg thus we can say it hurts the ecosystem. In this case, in order to encourage people to borrower less, there need to be methods to reduce debt or keep debt at a certain level.
* the original approach is to encourage people to force-settle, in this case, a positive offset does the opposite;
* the BSIP42 approach (as well as a MCR adjustment approach) is to force the least collateralized positions to be margin called

Either way the cost is paid by the debt position owners.

When smartcoin is under-supplied, to maintain the peg, we encourage people to borrow more. In this case, force-settlement doesn't help and thus should be discouraged. People are still possible to buy from market at fair price even if force-settlement is disabled. The offset doesn't really matter here.

when the debt position is in sufficient collateral, a smartcoin holder can forcibly buy the collateral, this is definitely hurting.

maybe this is what is called "responsibility" of debt position owners according to the initial design of BTS, but what had happened is that we have to adjust parameters now and then to avoid hurting debt position owners, and finally we found force settlement do not provide better buying condition to smartcoin holders than just buying in DEX.

in traditional financial systems, I haven't seen that the borrower's collateral can be forcibly "bought" when the collateral is sufficient.


Peter's idea is actually manually setting a MSSR, then dynamically adjusting price feed, so there is a feedback.
Xeroc's MCR-based idea is also dynamically adjusting MCR, so it's also based on feedback.

I am aware of this while replying, I just want to tell this will make things complex, we may need to set MSSR=100% at bear market while increasing it at bull market, the effect is just "make feed price closer to market price".

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