for alt.

We all know alt is an amazing guy who helps BitShares move forward with his best efforts. But seldom know he is also kind-hearted and caring.

Chinese community calls him Monkey, , the nick name of a protagonist in the classic fiction Journey to the West http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journey_to_the_West . Monkey is a fearless warrior with redoubtable KongFu.



Why do we call him Monkey? Check his Weibo http://weibo.com/u/1570505863 and you know.

 

now.dacwin
future.dacwin
upgraded to 0.4.4   

熊真辛苦。赞。
社会共识其实很简单。随便举个例子: 红灯停，绿灯行。你过马路或者开车时得遵守，大家都按这个共识来就相安无事，有时你过马路碰到红灯但觉得没车或车很远就偷跑下，成功了你个人的通行效率就变高了，你获益了，不过搞不好判断失误就会被装死装伤，收到了违反共识带来的惩罚。当然你会说那个撞人的司机遵守了共识咋还是倒霉了，这其实就是个可能性（概率）问题，总的来说遵守共识毕竟还是风险低多了，而相比肆无忌惮的闯红灯，你起步偷跑抢黄灯的风险就小多了，当然相对节约的时间也少多了。
就像总有人闯红灯抢黄灯，锚定也总会有波动。如果系统设计的不好，或者参与者不够理性，那么红绿灯机制会运行的很差，而锚定会波动过大，最终两者都可能失效。当然如果设计的好，锚定成功也是正常的，就好比红绿灯规则在大部分地方运行的不错。

I do not think it's a good way to drive shareholers to vote by just giving Delegates incentives to push it because it's low efficient. If we want people to vote, it's better to give them incentives directly instead of let Delegates to do it. So I believe we should do this with hard-coded:

1. For every new wallet, people must vote all their shares in like one week(set proper blocks number), if you do not vote, after that(one week), you will lose 5% of the shares in this wallet. We could call this as "iniital vote".

2. After the initial vote or penalty complete, you need to update you vote quaterly(I think yearly is too long), or you will lose 5% shares in this wallet every time.

EDIT for voting incentive: after further discussion with others, I realized that give penalty to these inactive acounts is not a good idea since it's too unfriendly and it may bother users all the time even we think voting is an important duty for everyone. Actually, like Gulu mentioned below, I start to believe financial penalty/award is not a correct way for voting incentive. I suggest we do like this:

Make a status remark for every account to show if it has voted or not, when is its last time to update its votes, and maybe the persentage of voted shares in this account. Make this information listed beside every acount name shows in everyone's wallet clearly and publicly. This may be just a small incentive, but it could be helpful, it's not unfriendly, it's easy to implement. By just doing this, we could not increase the voting rate to like 60% or more, but high voting rate like 60%+ should not be really necessary to the system at all.

EDIT END.


For encouraging the Delegates to compete each other and try to clime up on the Delegates list, I think current mechanism already works in an  effective way. To make it even better, we could make the delegates maxiam pay rate limitation linked to their position in the list directly. Like set the maxiam pay rate limitation of No.1 Delegate as 100%, No. 2 as 99.5%, and reduce it by 0.5% of each postion down. For the Delegates in backup list, we could make it w/ discount fixed payrate, like set No.102 delegets to have 49.5%*10%=4.95% fixed payrate every round, and so there will be 99 paid backups in the row(from 4.95% to 0.05%), and these money could be covered by which we reduced from top 101 pay rate. 

As for penalty for bad performance, I think the most important thing is have some automatic machanism to stop the bad performance immediately and make the Delegates have fianance loss meanwhile. For example, if one delegates missed x(may set it lower than 5) blocks continously, stop its right of block production immediately, make all the votes on it invalid until those votes get updated by shareholders. We could also set a maximum cumulative block miss for each Delegate and implement similar penalty. And meanwhile, we could set the cumulative record clear(to 0) like every month or quaterly. We could define more rules w/ similar or different penalty(from stop block production right by 24 hours to ban the delegate forever). The key is too have automatic way to stop the bad performance and/or attack immediately instead of waiting for shareholders to vote them out, which will not happen in minutes or hours for sure. And of couse, the behaviors restriced by these automatic mechanism should be simple/clear enough as "bad performance" or "attack" and get the community in agreement before it implemented into system.

In my view, the proposals above are more effective/simple, so want to share with you for discussion. Thanks.

The Duty of Delegates – DACWIN Joined Competition

As the latest great innovation in crypto-assets industry, the most important fact for DPoS is “D - Delegated”. Now, with BTSX launched and running stably and high efficiently as well as the launch schedule of BitAssets function, BTS DNS, BTS Voting and other DACs become more and more clear, the whole great plan comes true, BTS DACs(with DPoS) family members coming into existence gradually. Meanwhile, DPoS voting mechanism, shares release model, delegates incentive problem becomes hot topics in the community. And the real essential question here is what is the duty of Delegates.

Just as the name implies, Delegates get the delegation from shareholders, they are on behalf of the interests of shareholders, so the duty of Delegates should be summarized as below:

I. Keep DAC running stably and high efficiently. Ensure to no block miss, produce the blocks in time, contain the information into blocks fairly, accurately and sufficiently. Whether or not in the first 101 position, target to 100% uptime, always ready to produce blocks.

II. Focus on building up infrastructure of DACs ecosystem. Leverage the resource of Delegate role, dedicate to development, maintenance, spreading of DACs, which includes in, but not limited by new DAC proposal discussion, DAC development test, DAC operation maintenance, DAC new features development, spread DAC in various way, for instance, translation, website building, on line / off line lecture, daily consultant, etc.

In the belief to above duty of Delegates, as the members who participate, build up, spread BTS community, especially for Chinese community, from the beginning till now, we establish DACWIN team to join the competition of Delegates, running the BTSX delegates nodes, start to take the duty of Delegates from August 10th, 2014.

Our Delegates Nodes:
now.dacwin
future.dacwin

We will ensure the performance of our delegates, and contribute more to the development infrastructure of DACs ecosystem.

We are confident to ourselves, to DACs and to the trust you will deliver to us.

DAC WIN NOW and FUTURE!


With best wishes to our great cause,

DACWIN – coolspeed, logxing, yidaidaxia *


* In alphabetical order

coolspeed——Server-side programmer, DAC fans, who is one of the earliest disseminators to spread DAC theory, information in China, very interested to see and work out the potentials of DAC industry, participated BTSX dry run test, running personal active delegate, delegate.coolspeed now.

logxing—— Programmer, entrepreneur. Dedicated to spread DAC concept and study related technology, who is in belief that DAC is a fundamental revolution to the world, it will benefit everyone and let people start to think about what is liberty and right again.

yidaidaxia_郝晓曦——Crypto-assets fans, pursuer, disseminators, who translated BTSX white paper and DPoS white paper into Chinese, member of Bitfarm club, senior program manager.

Quote from: yidaidaxia on August 14, 2014, 01:57:56 am

Quote from: 天籁 on August 13, 2014, 11:52:23 pm

BM发起了一个新帖子：

FDIC for BitUSD—— BitUSD之FDIC（联邦存款保险公司）
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=6867.0

主要讨论空头头寸背后的抵押品不足时的三种应对方法：

1)冻结所有市场，直到持有BitUSD的某个人愿意亏本出售。
2)贬值BitUSD，通过允许无背书的BitUSD流通。
3)贬值XTS，通过发行新XTS来弥补损失。

请相关金融领域从业者参与讨论。

       3. 导致无背书BitUSD出现的爆仓，肇因是BitUSD相对BTSX大幅贬值，即BTSX升值，而增发BTSX是削弱BTSX价值，两者一定程度上是对冲

3. 导致无背书BitUSD出现的爆仓，肇因是BitUSD相对BTSX大幅升值，即BTSX贬值。增发BTSX是削弱BTSX价值，会进一步使BTSX贬值，从而出现恶性循环。

谢谢指正。那么这条不能作为支持方案3的理由了。但是我仍然不觉得会是一个大问题，因为增发量相对总量会很有限。具体要测算下。等我晚上有空算下。。

BM发起了一个新帖子：

FDIC for BitUSD—— BitUSD之FDIC（联邦存款保险公司）
https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=6867.0

主要讨论空头头寸背后的抵押品不足时的三种应对方法：

1)冻结所有市场，直到持有BitUSD的某个人愿意亏本出售。
2)贬值BitUSD，通过允许无背书的BitUSD流通。
3)贬值XTS，通过发行新XTS来弥补损失。

请相关金融领域从业者参与讨论。

说下我的理解:
方案1，不是正常市场机制，在无背书BitUSD出现后会导致市场交易暂停，且解除暂停的条件依靠某个人的自愿“牺牲”，不靠谱。
方案2，允许无背书BitUSD流通，会从根本上动摇锚定机制，使得BitUSD : USD越来越小，亦即单位BitUSD相对于USD越来越贬值，不可取。
方案3，通过增发BTSX来替这些BitUSD背书，虽然等同于全体持股人付出代价为某个或某些在市场中操作失败的人收拾残局，但是：
       1. 这种损失是机制化的，参与者都应知道可能发生，对持股人而言是可预见风险；
       2. 由于主贴里提到的种种机制(感谢楼主)，目前已经无法利用该机制套取大量BTSX牟利，原本担心的这方面风险和对系统影响已经很低；
      3. 导致无背书BitUSD出现的爆仓，肇因是BitUSD相对BTSX大幅贬值，即BTSX升值，而增发BTSX是削弱BTSX价值，两者一定程度上是对冲
所以我觉得方案3合理，实际也是社区主流支持的方案和第14轮测试使用的方案。

Edit: 支持方案3的第三条理由我理解反了(感谢@天籁 指正)，实际爆仓说明BTSX贬值，而增发会加剧，但考虑到增发量很有限，应该不是一个方案3强有力的反对理由。