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Borrow bitAsset from network fee
sell asset in dex fee
The only real change I see in the OP is that a short-sell now has to potentially pay two (different) fees in contrast to one fee atm .. though this only makes the DAC more proditable (depending on the ACTUAL fees)
In traditional, centralized, exchanges users and bots only pay a fee for fills. Who pays that on CCEDK?
i see this as a potential "problem",
32:22: fuzzy : How will wallet host be compensated?
32:59: bytemaster : Wallet host will end up registered the most users and will be compensated by the referral program.
I worry about the referral program being used as the only funding method for wallet hosts. I presume a user can always take their identity with them and go to another wallet host. A user will likely to keep their account and associated metadata (web-of-trust, reputation) for life. But it is silly to think they will use the wallet provided by the same wallet provider for life, or perhaps even for more than a year. However, the wallet host that first signs up that user will be the one to get 80% of all the fees that account pays for life (or 80% of the lifetime member upgrade fee). What happens if a user signs up with one wallet provider, uses it for a few months and then switches to another wallet provider that the user uses for years? All of the transactions during those years will have 80% of their fees still go to the original wallet provider even though they are no longer the ones provide the service the user uses or investing in the development of the wallet to keep the user using their wallet. The incentives are broken.
This is why I suspect that wallet providers will still need to create (and only accept) transactions that also pay an additional small fee to the provider with each transaction (like the LightWallet did) as a better aligned revenue source. This is a little troubling because the fees are already pretty high for the sake of funding the referral program (although I guess the stakeholders can always reduce it). But if my suspicions are true, the high fees of the referral program will only be used to compensate marketers bringing in the new users (which is fine and what the purpose of the referral program should be) but not as a long-term solution for funding wallet providers.
Same issue with faucets.. a 3rd-party faucet could collect 80% and leave wallet providers with nothing.
I too suspect that wallet providers will need to charge an extra fee per transaction to be sustainable long-term.
Unless wallets have alternate monetization strategies. But as arhag said, the incentives appear to be broken.
By making the referal fees liquid you undo the attack defense.
which attack vector do the vesting balance prefent? I don't get it yet.
Someone can create a wallet and sign people up for free (auto refund registration fee). I'm not convinced this would be a problem in practice. I say go with no vesting and if it ends up being more than a purely theoretical problem, implement vesting.
It would definitely be a problem in practice because you wouldnt necessarily have to refund the full $80. Any amount refunded would give an edge over other registrars. It might start out with "get $10 back" or "get $20 back" but eventually competition would push it higher and higher until we have a situation like I describe above (two posts back.)
Yeah I can see that happening but why a year of vesting? One or two months should be enough to prevent this. It's more a psychological scare tactic to prevent this practice from manifesting. One year seems extremely arbitrary.
I think 60 days would be sufficient. Long enough that there is no potential draw for attracting customers. Nobody wants $20 or $50 or $80 back in two months. If its not instant, its not going to attract. There still will exist the potential for a registrar to front their own funds and offer some amount of instant cashback, but that could happen regardless of the vesting period.
Fortunately this is a blockchain parameter that can be tweaked by delegates / stakeholders without hardfork. 2 months, 1 year... what ever works.
That is great news but it still doesnt solve the attack vector problem. It appears the vesting will only deter, but not completely prevent registrars from offering a certain % cashback. They can always issue a bond/UIA or more likely acquire off blockchain capital funds to finance their ability to offer at least some % cashback. What this means is that registrars who cannot afford to do this will have to look for other ways to provide an attractive value proposition and attract users and referrers.
Options market is designed but we didn't want to delay 2.0 for more features...
3. The referral system is killing the product [while probably being very good tool to sell it], or very actively working on it.
In order to provide decent referral bonuses ($80 per account seems to be the target) the transaction fees are $0.20 for free account (and $100 + $0.04 per transaction for lift time one). Do you really thing the customers will come flying to the system at those levels. [Leaving aside how astronomically high that is for each placed/canceled order on the DEX…not filled just placed]. Do you think customers will jump on the system with $0.20 per transaction when the competition is 10x less? I know a lot of marketer will try to sell it to them to get their $80 bucks, but how many will really use it 10x higher transaction cost (or be happy to pay $100 for the privilege to try it and enjoy normal fees)
Go BTS!
We were pretty bullish on pushing the referral system ourselves, but now we have no choice to back out from integrating it.
I don't see any reason why a kid using paypal would pay 80 USD and use this instead.
