Quote from: Sapiens on October 20, 2019, 12:11:01 pm

The proposed protocol recovers peg, eliminates GS, avoids hurting all debtors because it can be implemented to liquidate only the very lowest CR position once its CR falls below 1. What else do you want?

* It does NOT keep/recover peg when BTS price is low enough.
* It's essentially automatic-GS, but not eliminates GS.

Please think carefully, if you're talking about the idea proposed by Sahkan.
One scenario: assuming there are 1 million accounts holding 1 million bitUSD, when there is one debt position with 1K USD to be forcefully liquidated, whose bitUSD will be forcefully converted to BTS? Unless you mean all of them, technically it doesn't scale well (performance-wise) if considered fairness.

 I am not saying it is not complex on a larger scale but you have to make choices. You can close positions based on age, size or percentage of holdings. Age is hard to determine and percentage does not scale well. So you can pick size as an example. Based on size you can liquidate from the largest stake or the smallest. If we decided to go with the smallest, we could:
1. potentially avoid force settling CEX because they would arguable hold the largest amounts
2. liquidate small bit asset holdings which might promote larger investments
3. and the most important we would be able to hold the bit asset peg as it was designed to do in the first place, no fake feeds!

How about if we change the rules? And instead of GS where the blockchain takes over the debt, it simply gets settled to Ana. So Ana gets 1000 BTS and all debts are wiped out.

removed support for every witness except blckchnd.

If you're a witness and you run with default settings (non-fucked up smartcoins) post here and highlight me on telegram. will vote for you.

Hey, just wanted to say thanks for your support in the past. I appreciate your vote. At this point I don't believe I will be voted in because I am strongly against price setting. It is unfortunate that in the cross fire all other smartcoins lose price feeders because certain actors feed only what they need. Anyway just wanted to say thanks!

I would to request votes back for my witness: sahkan-bitshares

I have been a witness for over 2 years and often voice my opinions on things that matter and even though sometimes I don't agree with others; I ultimately always follow the majority consensus as a witness. I maintain several servers and services on Bitshares (to include APIs, access points, seeds etc.) thank you for your consideration!

I understand you. It's easier to blame others than to find the real reason or solution.

I'm not sure if you do, at least on this issue. I was just stating a fact.

bitSILVER, bitGOLD and bitBTC always had 10% MSSR and never applied BSIP42 but GSed long ago. This fact doesn't support the assumption that a higher MSSR will prevent undercollateralization from happening.

It takes more than MSSR. At least a combo of MSSR and MCR. But The weaker the bitAsset the higher they need to be; as en example bitCNY can have lower settings and still function properly. If you don't have liquid market on butAssets GS will happen no matter the MSSR and MCR if the right conditions are met.

If we can find a proper way to incentivize the involved parties, we'll solve the problem.

No matter the incentive, there will be always someone (maybe someone that no longer pays attention to his debt) that will let it ride. If we don't come up with a way to automatically close the debt the GS will always be there.

Quote

I will give everyone another option to think about on the GS issue:
When collateral reaches 1:1 simply force settle that debt based on percentages. If there are 1000 smart coins issued, 10 is being force settled; each holder would see 1% of their smart coin force settled by the blockchain. This avoids GS alltogether and good debt stays in the system.

This is also an option if our only goal is to avoid undercollateralization (btw technically 1% is not guaranteed that all undercollateralized positions will be settled, also technically we can increase the percentage when it's the case).

IMHO this option does more harm than good, because we have other goals which IMHO are more important, one of them is to give debt asset holders as much freedom as possible to decide by themselves, because we assume they're risk haters. On the other hand, debt position holders are risk lovers, so it's fine to have more aggressive rules on them, e.g. margin calls and force settlements. Please see discussions in https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179.

Also it would be a crisis for businesses built on top of BitAssets because they have no easy way to convert the collateral back to BitAsset when collateral price bounced back up. Imagine that if someone deposit bitUSD to an exchange but later can only withdraw some BTS and some BitUSD. In short, don't remove coins from users' balance, otherwise users will leave.

Alternatively, perhaps we should give asset holders an option on whether *automatically* settle a part of their holdings when feed price is closed to GS price, which may slightly improve the situation, but is not that hard.

bitAsset is not a currency or not even a coin, it's a contract between 2 parties that agree that particular asset will have a value equivalent to that asset in real life and will be backed by BTS. If anyone (exchanges) are running their business on that asset they should be able to adjust their holding (and users) to bitAsset+BTS. They already do it for some forks, air drops etc. This would not be any different and would always avoid GS. And I think that's the goal to have liquid market where the bitAsset is equal to it's RL counterpart ie: 1 bitUSD = 1 USD
Auto settling bad debt on a bit asset holder would be somewhat like force settlement on the debt holder. A risk on both sides.

Running your own chain would be like running Bitshares private testnet. You can start here:
https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/wiki/private-testnet

Quote from: sahkan on July 19, 2019, 01:41:37 pm

Quote from: abit on July 19, 2019, 01:33:37 pm

Quote from: sahkan on July 19, 2019, 01:30:15 pm

Quote from: abit on July 19, 2019, 01:21:02 pm

The word "settle" is used in too many places but means different things.

I was referring to "Force Settlement" and the idea that the first person that settles bad debt gets less BTS.

Current rule aka GS means everyone who settles bad debt gets less BTS.

Yes, and that's bad business. And how about if we introduce a 24hr debt settlement where the debt holder gets a chance to close his debt before GS?

Before discussing your idea, how about you think about the 4 options I described?
It's better if you can explain what are the pros and cons first then ask others.

In your words you mentioned "debt holders", I guess you mean "debt position holders"?
When the debt positions turned into margin calls, the debt position holders are already willing to close their positions. It's that nobody buys into the margin calls caused the final undercollateralization. It's the debt asset holders' fault.

When it's already undercollateralized, what's the use of the 24 hours? Assume some debt asset holders will settle, what's the fair price? where to get the collateral to pay them? You still need to face the fact: whether first settler will get less.

I am not here to argue your points. I simply state my thoughts. If we were to increase MCR and MSSR (tools we already have) we might be able to avoid GS or "GS protection". That's my point. You think otherwise and that's ok, we are all entitled to our opinions.

@abit I am not arguing, just stating my thoughts.