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Messages - sahkan

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1
General Discussion / Re: ANN: HONEST Market Pegged Assets
« on: February 02, 2020, 05:19:27 am »
Been following your work for some time. I can support this. We definitely need to break away from price setting.

2
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [Witness Proposal] sahkan-bitshares
« on: December 12, 2019, 01:26:58 am »
Hey,

Can you please update your HERTZ price feed to use a real USD price feed reference? bitUSD hasn't been accurate for months now, so your feeds whilst regularly published are about 40% off.

Cheers

I am using real USD pricing. I will take a look at the script. I keep getting voted in and out so hard to keep a steady pace atm.

3
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [Poll] BSIP76:Set bitUSD feed threshold
« on: November 20, 2019, 03:09:17 am »
A full month later, we're in the same position.

BTS worth $0.024193 looking at CMC, last feed price is 28.98571 BTS/bitUSD aka $0.03449, so (1-(0.024193/0.03449))*100 = 29.85% below the correct feed price.
Both BitCNY and BitUSD are no longer witness fed SmartCoins, but I can think of at least one S letter word that we could use for the name of this new type of ....Coin.

4
The proposed protocol recovers peg, eliminates GS, avoids hurting all debtors because it can be implemented to liquidate only the very lowest CR position once its CR falls below 1. What else do you want?
* It does NOT keep/recover peg when BTS price is low enough.
* It's essentially automatic-GS, but not eliminates GS.

Please think carefully, if you're talking about the idea proposed by Sahkan.
One scenario: assuming there are 1 million accounts holding 1 million bitUSD, when there is one debt position with 1K USD to be forcefully liquidated, whose bitUSD will be forcefully converted to BTS? Unless you mean all of them, technically it doesn't scale well (performance-wise) if considered fairness.

 I am not saying it is not complex on a larger scale but you have to make choices. You can close positions based on age, size or percentage of holdings. Age is hard to determine and percentage does not scale well. So you can pick size as an example. Based on size you can liquidate from the largest stake or the smallest. If we decided to go with the smallest, we could:
1. potentially avoid force settling CEX because they would arguable hold the largest amounts
2. liquidate small bit asset holdings which might promote larger investments
3. and the most important we would be able to hold the bit asset peg as it was designed to do in the first place, no fake feeds!

5
How about if we change the rules? And instead of GS where the blockchain takes over the debt, it simply gets settled to Ana. So Ana gets 1000 BTS and all debts are wiped out.
CEX would then have to replace their held bitassets with BTS in user portfolios, no? Doesn't sound right.

The debt would be replaced by Joe's collateral. So Joe's debt gets settled to Ana, his debt is 0, and Ana has 1000BTS instead of BitUSD. Joe gets to keep 500BTS that he was trading with + the profits he made on trading. That's in that scenario, if CEX is holding bitAssets and they get settled then yes they would have to swap funds for users, but that would be their problem to solve; DEX is build for DEX not for CEX.

6
How about if we change the rules? And instead of GS where the blockchain takes over the debt, it simply gets settled to Ana. So Ana gets 1000 BTS and all debts are wiped out.

7
And there you have it. Witnesses are willing to do the price feed (because, wow - they are the most qualified?) and there is no need to de-couple the price feeding from witnesses. But there is a need to to stop the fake price feeding and fix the smart coins to fulfill the DEX promise of a smart coin being the same value as the RL asset it represents.

8
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: Proxy: fav - Journal
« on: October 17, 2019, 12:59:57 am »
removed support for every witness except blckchnd.

If you're a witness and you run with default settings (non-fucked up smartcoins) post here and highlight me on telegram. will vote for you.
Hey, just wanted to say thanks for your support in the past. I appreciate your vote. At this point I don't believe I will be voted in because I am strongly against price setting. It is unfortunate that in the cross fire all other smartcoins lose price feeders because certain actors feed only what they need. Anyway just wanted to say thanks!

9
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: [Poll] BSIP76:Set bitUSD feed threshold
« on: October 15, 2019, 01:53:47 pm »
In reality, everyone that voted for price fixing conducted a 0 cost attack against all bitCNY and BitUSD holders. Essentially nothing that much different that ZB did.

10
中文(Chinese) / Re: cn-vote投票公示
« on: August 24, 2019, 01:12:53 pm »
I would to request votes back for my witness: sahkan-bitshares

I have been a witness for over 2 years and often voice my opinions on things that matter and even though sometimes I don't agree with others; I ultimately always follow the majority consensus as a witness. I maintain several servers and services on Bitshares (to include APIs, access points, seeds etc.) thank you for your consideration!

11
Stakeholder Proposals / Re: Proxy: xeroc
« on: August 09, 2019, 06:19:01 pm »
hi, Fabian,

I hope you can support to reduce bitUSD MCR to 1.5 based on careful consideration.

bitUSD is ill, we need to find ways to help it to recover.

Dr. Brown has already published his first paper about smartcoin mechanism, although the research is based on a simple model, it give some conclusion that it make sense to set MCR<1.53 to incentivize smartcoin supply.

https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=28823.0

the risk of undercollateralization is very limited, especially when bitUSD is already under GS protection.

set USD MCR=1.5 and keep CNY MCR=1.6 will also attract capital from CNY market to USD market to help bitUSD to recover.

please support for a more prosperous ecosystem. thanks!


This what he said about his particular paper numbers:
  • The specific numbers used in the paper (MSSR= 1.005, 1.01, 1.02 and MCR= 1.4, 1.5, 1.6) are to be taken with a grain of salt. I used them to illustrate the general shape of the problem, not to draw any specific conclusions about those particular parameter choices.

12
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 21, 2019, 01:42:52 am »
I understand you. It's easier to blame others than to find the real reason or solution.
I'm not sure if you do, at least on this issue. I was just stating a fact.

bitSILVER, bitGOLD and bitBTC always had 10% MSSR and never applied BSIP42 but GSed long ago. This fact doesn't support the assumption that a higher MSSR will prevent undercollateralization from happening.
It takes more than MSSR. At least a combo of MSSR and MCR. But The weaker the bitAsset the higher they need to be; as en example bitCNY can have lower settings and still function properly. If you don't have liquid market on butAssets GS will happen no matter the MSSR and MCR if the right conditions are met.

If we can find a proper way to incentivize the involved parties, we'll solve the problem.
No matter the incentive, there will be always someone (maybe someone that no longer pays attention to his debt) that will let it ride. If we don't come up with a way to automatically close the debt the GS will always be there.
Quote
I will give everyone another option to think about on the GS issue:
When collateral reaches 1:1 simply force settle that debt based on percentages. If there are 1000 smart coins issued, 10 is being force settled; each holder would see 1% of their smart coin force settled by the blockchain. This avoids GS alltogether and good debt stays in the system.
This is also an option if our only goal is to avoid undercollateralization (btw technically 1% is not guaranteed that all undercollateralized positions will be settled, also technically we can increase the percentage when it's the case).

IMHO this option does more harm than good, because we have other goals which IMHO are more important, one of them is to give debt asset holders as much freedom as possible to decide by themselves, because we assume they're risk haters. On the other hand, debt position holders are risk lovers, so it's fine to have more aggressive rules on them, e.g. margin calls and force settlements. Please see discussions in https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/179.

Also it would be a crisis for businesses built on top of BitAssets because they have no easy way to convert the collateral back to BitAsset when collateral price bounced back up. Imagine that if someone deposit bitUSD to an exchange but later can only withdraw some BTS and some BitUSD. In short, don't remove coins from users' balance, otherwise users will leave.

Alternatively, perhaps we should give asset holders an option on whether *automatically* settle a part of their holdings when feed price is closed to GS price, which may slightly improve the situation, but is not that hard.

bitAsset is not a currency or not even a coin, it's a contract between 2 parties that agree that particular asset will have a value equivalent to that asset in real life and will be backed by BTS. If anyone (exchanges) are running their business on that asset they should be able to adjust their holding (and users) to bitAsset+BTS. They already do it for some forks, air drops etc. This would not be any different and would always avoid GS. And I think that's the goal to have liquid market where the bitAsset is equal to it's RL counterpart ie: 1 bitUSD = 1 USD
Auto settling bad debt on a bit asset holder would be somewhat like force settlement on the debt holder. A risk on both sides.


13
General Discussion / Re: New BSIP:GS protection via core code
« on: July 20, 2019, 12:37:26 pm »

Choosing MCR and MSSR is a surprisingly complex issue. Like abit said, 10% MSSR didn't protect BitUSD from GS last December.
   
The MSSR did not work because BSIP 42 introduced price manipulation and the MSSR was offset by fake price feeds.

I will give everyone another option to think about on the GS issue:
When collateral reaches 1:1 simply force settle that debt based on percentages. If there are 1000 smart coins issued, 10 is being force settled; each holder would see 1% of their smart coin force settled by the blockchain. This avoids GS alltogether and good debt stays in the system.

14
Technical Support / Re: Setting Up a New Witness Node
« on: July 20, 2019, 12:22:10 pm »
Running your own chain would be like running Bitshares private testnet. You can start here:
https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/wiki/private-testnet

15
Technical Support / Re: Setting Up a New Witness Node
« on: July 20, 2019, 02:26:20 am »
Hello, so if i follow your installation guide i will be able to run my own exchange,with my own coin?

No. To do that you have to just install bitshares with new parameters. A bit more work.

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